
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OPINIONS

OF

THE EUROPEAN PRESS

ON THE

EASTERN QUESTION.

TRANSLATED AND EXTRACTED

FROM

TURKISH, GERMAN, FRENCH, AND ENGLISH PAPERS AND REVIEWS.

27549 aa

EDITED BY

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PREFACE.

THE compilation here offered to the Public was commenced in the early part of last year; it was originally the Editor's intention to have restricted it solely to extracts from the Turkish press, as at that period the papers and periodicals of Europe had contained no views of any value on the state of those Eastern countries with which the public relations of Europe are actually so deeply involved; indeed, I was induced to undertake these translations from the Moniteur Ottoman, in order to expose the erroneousness of the opinions generally prevalent in Europe on the state of Turkey, which errors, instead of being combatted by the leading organs of public opinion, were chiefly maintained and confirmed through the instrumentality of the European press.

Ill health and absence led to unavoidable delay in the publication, and in the interval so extraordinary a re-action of opinion took place, that instead of making this volume a protest in the name of Turkey against the fatal conclusions into which English reviewers and European journalists had

fallen, I found I could not serve the interests of that great question more effectually than by collecting into one volume, and thus placing within the reach of those who were desirous of studying it, the opinions of those very journals and reviews in 1835, in refutation of whose opinions in 1834 I had undertaken the translation of the most important articles in the Moniteur Ottoman.

At the time when no danger existed of the occupation of Constantinople by Russia, no one ever thought of questioning the point, that if she did succeed in seating herself at Constantinople the result would prove most fatal to the interests of civilized Europe; but gradually as the combinations of Russia for arriving at that end developed themselves, we became reconciled to the very state of things which in prospect we apprehended. No one ever thought of doubting the nature of the designs on the part of Russia, or the effect of those designs upon Europe, until we found ourselves imperatively called upon to take measures to avert their realisation. Then began the distraction and division in public opinion, and in our anxiety to avert a catastrophe so replete with danger, we accelerated that very danger by the injudiciousness of the means taken to avert it. The Greek insurrection was the commencement of this momentous epoch, and we were led, partly by our fears, partly by our religious fanaticism and classical predilections, to conceive and hope, that Greece might one

day be led up to Constantinople, there to found a new Byzantine empire, and stay the inroads of the northern hordes, whose progress we thus assisted and hastened—by the danger that impelled us to act—before we had reasoned.

The successes of Mohammed Ali then directed our eyes to him, and it was supposed that he might erect a strong government, capable of resisting the encroachments of Russia.* Under this impression the public mind remained vacillating and distracted, but this delusion has gradually been dispelled.†

* At the opening of the session of 1834 of the British Parliament, I was in Turkey, and in the midst of all the distraction caused by the position of Mohammed Ali, and the, at that moment, apparently imminent dissolution of the Ottoman empire through the use Russia made of him, I was also engaged in reading that admirable work, "The Designs of Russia, by Col. Evans," at that time the only thing in print capable of encouraging the belief that England *could* not abandon Turkey. The post brought the anxiously looked for debates. The names of Turkey, of Russia, had been pronounced! and by the author of "The Designs of Russia." Colonel Evans had expressed a hope that the English government would form an alliance with *Mehemet Ali to oppose Russia.* The opinions of the Ministers were equally intelligent, and if Lord Ponsonby had not been the representative of England, the contemptible exhibition of the House of Commons on that night, might have sufficed to seal the doom of Turkey.

† I refer the reader to a pamphlet entitled, "Sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali," which is the only publication in which the feelings of the Turkish population have been represented and explained.

It has long been a popular scheme* to erect a confederation of states out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire, to bar the progress of a power so artful in sowing dissensions! In fact, so anxious did the public appear to prevent Constantinople from falling into the hands of Russia, that nothing was left unsuggested, excepting that which one would think would most readily present itself to any dispassionate inquirer, viz. to uphold the power which was in actual possession. It was concluded that the empire of the Sultans had reached its term. And the policy and moral influence of England were exerted to hasten the accomplishment of a prediction, which the simple and the sage had combined to announce, which the misguided philanthropist applauded, and which the greatest statesmen of this country have lent their talents and their influence to bring about.

Having determined the fate of Turkey—having made up our minds that it was impossible to prevent Russia from falling into what we conceived a vacuum, we reconciled ourselves, as we best could, to what appeared inevitable; the greater part of the

* See a sonorous article in the Edinburgh Review at the commencement of 1833. It made a great noise at the time in England, and seriously alarmed reflecting persons in the East; in the same strain was one in the Foreign Quarterly, entitled, "Crisis in the East." The effect of both these articles was the more dispiriting, as they were supposed to be prompted by the Government, and as taking up a line in *opposition* to Russia.

community found shelter in indifference and apathy, thinking to disarm the crisis of its dangers, by concealing from themselves their fears and suspicions; whilst there were not a few, as in every age of doubt and distraction, who sought to lull the public disquietude by the most dispiriting encouragements and desolating consolations. These political quietists told us that the stream after overflowing its banks would soon of itself return to its regular channel—universal dominion was a chimera—what mattered it to us whether Russia possessed itself of a few provinces less or more?—that the Russian empire by acquiring Constantinople would only reach its natural limits—that the Turks were not Christians—here was a motive to rejoice—that war itself was a desperate alternative, and had been frequently abused—Russia was armed to the teeth—we could only rescue Turkey by expenditure of blood and treasure, and this would only be putting off the evil for a moment,—Turkey was but a "*cadavre,*" with no inherent principle of life. Russia had always assured us that she was moderate and magnanimous—we had best rely on this magnanimity and moderation—accession of strength would in all probability prove a source of weakness—she would fall to pieces as every grasping and ambitious power had done before her—witness the Romans, the Macedonians, the Persians, the Popes, Philip of Spain, &c. &c.

If this calculation failed, we might retire to our

ocean fastnesses—we were an island—and need only arm when the enemy appeared at the Isle of Wight—as for India, &c. the question of Colonies was a difficult question—Russia had as good a right to India as ourselves. As for our commerce, we would find Turkey a much better customer after being put under the Russian Tariff.

Such is the analysis of the articles that appeared in the greater Reviews during the three or four years that preceded 1835, which in fact amount to attempts to account for the *fact*, of which they were all thoroughly convinced, *that Turkey was dead*. After a careful examination of the public prints, I have but one exception to make, and that is in favour of that singularly gifted man Cobbett, whose sagacious mind perceived the nonsense of considering defunct a power against which Russia found it necessary to employ such enormous means, moral, military, fanatical, and insurrectionary.

The work of Colonel Evans, which so ably and so conclusively exposed the "Designs of Russia" contributed to the propagation of *those errors respecting Turkey* through which alone the designs of Russia could ever become dangerous, either to our Indian possessions, or to the peace of Europe.

During the course of 1833, subsequently to our refusal to support Turkey, and during the occupation of the straits of the Bosphorus by Russian troops, and when every lingering hope had vanished

in the west for the prolongation of the existence of Turkey—"Turkey and its Resources" appeared.

At the commencement of 1835, the pamphlet so often quoted in these pages was published.

The facts, views, and opinions put forward in these two works, so novel and so startling, soon found zealous partisans and powerful confirmation in those who were best acquainted with the East. A revulsion of opinion not in England only, but throughout Europe, has been the consequence, unparalleled in the bearing of that opinion on circumstances and events, unparalleled in its rapidity and its unanimity.

This change is proved and confirmed by the masterly essays on the East and on our Foreign policy, which appeared in rapid succession during the last year, now collected in this volume. They are all written by men who have long resided in the East. A consideration not less extraordinary than it is encouraging—is the perfect identity of their views.

Although the indifference of this country (produced by a consciousness of strength and a feeling of security) has made it neglectful of the small commencements of events which now in their growth have become so alarming, and is therefore the ultimate cause of our actual difficulties; still have the errors of England not always been of a passive character; England, unfortunately, at times has been most active—in the harbour of Navarino

for instance, in supporting Capodistria and Mehemet Ali, in expelling the Royal Regency of Greece, in heaving the guns out of his Majesty's ships destined for the Black Sea. A superficial review of late events will suffice to convince any impartial inquirer that in our energy as in our inertness we have invariably acted in accordance with the views of Russia, and it is not too much to suppose, under her influence. Hers is not the mere influence of the strong mind over the weak—but of knowledge over ignorance—the root of the whole evil has been, therefore, ignorance of the state of the East, an ignorance common to the Government and to the nation.—How indeed could they understand what Russia was about, when they had no idea of what Turkey was? Supposing Turkey powerless, if not absolutely defunct—they saw no way of keeping Russia back from an acquisition so valueless, and not seeing the barrier before her, supposed her restrained by her spirit of moderation, or unable to advance from inherent weakness; in fact, Russia like a man fighting with an invisible antagonist, presented to the perplexed spectator attitudes and movements of which he could neither comprehend the cause nor calculate the effects.

But by what one may almost call an interposition of Providence, even when Russia was on the point of bringing her schemes to a propitious termination, a light was thrown upon them from an unexpected

quarter, which has not only shown to us that our case is not so desperate as we apprehended, but also that the consequences are far more serious than we apprehended—that is, that Turkey is not defunct, that she actually opposes a barrier which Russia never can pass if we choose to maintain things as *they actually are*, but that her acquisition of Turkey, setting free the force actually counteracted by Turkey, will render the aggregate means of both disposable for the ulterior views of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

Nor is this conviction the sole or perhaps the most important result of the recent exposition of the state of Turkey. Another consequence has flowed from it and from the altered tone of the press of Europe, namely, the revival of a spirit of nationality among the Turks, and a passage from animosity and dread, the result of our past policy, to confidence in our intentions and in our power. Having had numerous opportunities of observing the depression and hopelessness, and consequently resignation to Russia, produced by the language of England, whether emanating from ministers or reviewers during the years 1832, 1833, 1834, and the reaction produced against Russia by the tone of the English press in 1835, and which seems to have greatly increased in 1836, although no *acts* of the English government come to confirm, or even to warrant such impression,—I can with confidence attribute to this change of the opinion of Eng-

land, the resuscitation among the Turks of a spirit of nationality, and, perhaps, even the prevention up to the present hour, of the planting of the standards of Russia on the shores of the Mediterranean.

But while, in common with every one I know, whatever his station or capacity, who has had personal means of judging of our Eastern relations, I express my most unqualified contempt in this respect for the conduct of the present and the past administrations of Great Britain, I am glad to have an opportunity of bearing testimony to the power still possessed by England in Turkey through the personal character and influence of her distinguished representative. No one can be at Constantinople, at least among the native population, without *feeling* that influence, and although nothing has taken place to justify by deeds this favourable impression, still it is kept alive by the conviction commonly established, that Lord Ponsonby would cease to be the representative of England if he himself despaired of saving Turkey.

A new and fearful responsibility impends now over his Majesty's Ministers, arising out of the complete exposure of the danger of Turkey, the consequences of its fall, and the facility of its preservation. If any thing could aggravate this responsibility, it would be the explosion of the idea that England cannot avert the catastrophe otherwise than by arms.

TURKISH PRESS.

THE most interesting portions of this volume are doubtless the extracts from the *Moniteur Ottoman*, with which it commences. The first article, entitled "On the Freedom of Commerce in the Ottoman Dominions," appeared in the early part of 1832, and was the first exposition of those views on the internal state and principles of Turkey, which have latterly occupied so large a space of the attention of statesmen and philosophers in this and other countries. It provoked violent remonstrances from Russia, and this, together with the absence of all sympathy on the part of European opinion, and the feeling of hopelessness, inspired by the difficulties of the question and the universal prejudices prevailing on this subject, arrested the further disquisition of these topics, until Mr. Urquhart's work on Turkey called forth the able criticism which occupies the five following articles. When we look upon the confirmation of doctrines then so novel, as having the authentication of Turkish opinion, being published on the spot, in the midst of the circumstances to which reference is made, in the face of the prejudices of the Frank population, and of the haughty and once garrulous contempt of European diplomacy, we must confess, that it attaches to itself no ordinary importance. The review that follows of the progress of Reform in Turkey, I have selected from several luminous articles that have

subsequently appeared. But as the press itself has been, perhaps, the most powerful instrument in bringing about these reforms, I may be permitted to say a few words on this subject.

The establishment of an Official Gazette was not only intended to be a connecting link between Europe and the East, but to be also a medium of communication between the Porte and the people. It is singular to see the government styled despotic availing itself of the press as the most powerful means of acting on its subjects. It also found the necessity of this direct communication for the purpose of transmitting political news, to prevent false reports respecting revolts and rebellions, which being carefully disseminated by Russian agents, kept men's minds in a state of perpetual alarm, diffused a spirit of insecurity, interrupted and embarrassed commercial relations, and prevented the resources of the country from being duly developed. Most of the disasters of the last few years would not have occurred had this easy and rapid means of communication been established before.

The Moniteur Ottoman appeared as if with the presentiment of its future importance; the types were of the most beautiful workmanship, cast at Constantinople, the press one of the best from England, the *locale* set apart for its publication, a handsome palace, in the centre of Constantinople, where Mr. Blacque the editor of the French department of the paper resides.

Considering the ignorance existing throughout Europe as to that country, and the character of its government, and to combat this ignorance, the necessity of logical powers of the very highest order, in the individual to be selected by the Turkish Government as its organ, it was a piece of singularly good fortune to obtain the services of Mr. Blacque, as editor of the French paper, while the selection reflected the highest credit on the Turkish Government.

Mr. Blacque had for several years, in the Courier de Smyrne, alone advocated the cause of Turkey, and the cause of Europe, in defiance of the universal prejudices of the day, of the contempt of diplomacy, and of the persecution of Cabinets—and yet that paper was considered, during the period of its direction by Mr. Blacque, as one of the ablest organs of publicity. Transferred to Constantinople, invested with the character which the publication now confided to him possesses—his "rôle," if I can use the word, while losing for the moment its apparent importance, while excluded from the disquisition of all-absorbing European politics, assumed in reality one of far higher importance, one of political investigation, which was not to struggle against the errors of diplomacy, but to enlighten the opinion by which future events were to be moulded. Genius often digs the tomb of its own reputation by the facility with which it overcomes

difficulties which slighter minds would have rendered apparent by the efforts necessary to overcome them. Mr. Blacque's success might have obscured his merits without diminishing them. It is now doubly gratifying to appreciate the difficulties which have been overcome, and to observe the unequivocal testimony of respect and admiration which the whole press of Europe has borne to the advocacy of opinions in the Moniteur Ottoman; which, however, the European public are still very far from being able to appreciate at their full value.

The Turkish editor is one of the Ulema, the historiographer of the empire, and now raised, since the assumption of his editorial functions, to one of the highest judicial dignities.

The Gazette simultaneously appeared in three languages, Turkish, Greek and French, to these were to have been added Persian, Arabic, Armenian, and Bulgarian, but a watchful power, alarmed at this revelation of the importance of Constantinople, arrested the further prosecution of the design; though she was unable to put an entire stop to a publication, which had awakened the full sympathies of the Turkish empire.*

The publication in Greek was suppressed, but

* The answer of the Reis Effendi to the Russian Minister respecting the publication of the Gazette, is illustrative of that strong practical good sense which has alone hitherto presented a barrier to Russian encroachments. "If a newspaper is so dangerous a thing, why have you a Gazette at St. Petersburgh?"

the Turkish and French continues, with a circulation of between 4 and 5000, a circulation immense, considering that posts are not yet established.

The French paper is not a translation of the Turkish, excepting in its official part. The Turkish paper contains generally more matter, more extended administrative and personal details. The French paper, from want of a regularity yet to be introduced into the system, has not always the command of the whole of the materials published in Turkish, but it more than supplies this deficiency by disquisitions and illustrations calculated to enlighten Europe on the state of Turkey.

The two abuses that weighed principally upon the Empire, were the organization of its military, and the defective system of its provincial, governors. No change could be effected, good or bad, so long as the Janissaries were in existence, their destruction was rather a struggle of self-preservation than a political measure; with the exception of this one act, which was necessarily one of violence, every reform in Turkey has been of the most peaceful character. The next important object, but one apparently of greater difficulty, was to curb the power of the provincial governors. On the institution of the Press, the Firmans, which are really models of justice and benevolence, were no longer respectfully received by them, read and consigned to oblivion, they were proclaimed to the whole empire at once, and public opinion thereby gra-

dually gained strength, and other habits became established. On the displacement of every governor the people are informed of the causes of his removal:—thus, on the application of the inhabitants of Nissa, the whole empire is informed that the governor of that province was displaced on account of his vexatious conduct, and the inhabitants of other provinces are invited, if they have grounds of complaint against their governors, to make their grievances known to the Porte.

A few lines of praise or blame published in this paper have effects on men in Turkey, which we can with difficulty conceive, living as we do, in a country where the fountains of right and wrong are almost broken up by party dissensions. The unity of opinion in the East accounts for their extreme susceptibility; I have seen veterans trembling with emotion on learning that they had been honourably mentioned in the Gazette; I have been refused admittance to governors who shunned the public gaze, while smarting under animadversions published in the same paper. The governor of Adrianople on finding that the zeal with which he pushed on the erection of a bridge over the river Maritza was noticed in the Moniteur, pitched his tent on the river side, and remained on the spot all the day transacting his business, in order that he might have the workmen continually under his own eye.

Travellers look down with supercilious con-

tempt on the reforms of the Sultan; they are not sufficiently elaborate to please their tastes, they expect a cumbrous and complicated machinery, and yet facts make it appear that so far from it being impossible to reform the abuses of the Turkish empire, that the simplest and apparently the most inadequate means, have produced effects that baffle all calculation. Are the feelings of habitual respect with which these people encircle their monarch to be trifled with and neglected? Is not this very feeling itself a sufficient cause of regeneration in the Turkish empire? The will of the Sultan was disobeyed because it was not known to the *governed* as well as to the *governors*. The more and more this will becomes known by the dissemination of this paper, the more will disobedience be impossible, provided the Sultan is not pushed on by Russia to overstep the narrow limits that circumscribe the legitimate authority of the Turkish Sultans.

It is by an appeal to public opinion that habits of insubordination are disappearing, which had been generated by long years of anarchy, and as a consequence of the consistency opinion is assuming, a new race of functionaries have already sprung up, and the change in the spirit of the times is displayed in a change in manner, epithets, and address.*

* "I will have your head taken off!" was formerly a common phrase in the mouth of a provincial governor: the expression if used now would call forth a laugh.

The Firmans of the Sultan do not obtain on their first promulgation, the prompt and minute observance that laws obtain in European governments, with ponderous, complicated and oppressive machinery, the very constitution of the Turkish government prevents it, and this simple fact proves, how absurd it is to apply the sweeping and vague term of despotism to the Turkish government; the manner that these Firmans obtain for themselves observance, proves that the Sultan has it not in his power to coerce his subjects; thus we find that some enactments which Europeans said were out of the nature of possibilities have become facts, while the Sultan misled or miscounselled into measures in imitation of European fiscality, which those same Europeans judged excellent and feasible, have been found perfectly impracticable.

When therefore we take into account the submissiveness of these populations to their chief, so long as he does not put himself in collision with practical interests, their sufferance of arbitrary acts when these are accidental; when we remember that there is no organization by which the Sultan can enact his own individual will—when we perceive the effects that this appeal to public opinion, by means of the press, has already produced,—can we persist in applying to this people terms of reprobation and contempt—can we go on asserting that its political life is extinct or even languishing?

When the Sovereigns of the 15th century wished to curb the excesses of the feudal Barons, they instituted large standing armies, not as a means of defence against external enemies, but to keep in awe the turbulent Barons and their armed retainers; the expedient that Sultan Mahmoud took to deprive the Pashas of their usurped authority, was one more worthy of an age that claims for itself the peculiar character of mildness and benevolence. The organized armies that he has instituted, are designed merely to defend his frontiers from the enemies with which he is surrounded, they are merely a nucleus of discipline in case of a war, 40,000 men to a population of 30 millions.

A single glance at the Russian serf and the Turkish peasant can leave no doubt as to who is best entitled to the possession of this empire, on the abstract grounds of humanity, the Sultan or the Czar. But humanity is a luxury, national interest a necessity. If Mahmoud were the despot, and Nicolas the humane reformer, our interests would remain the same, our policy imperative. It is a precept even more binding on states than on individuals, to hold accursed "whoever removes his neighbour's landmark."

GERMAN PRESS.

From the depth, accuracy, and persevering research of the German mind, it might be expected that that literature would have made considerable progress in all those various and profound questions connected with the East. It is true that the ablest orientalists are Germans. In literature, statistics, science, the Germans have laboriously collected from ancient treasures and from modern research, all the details which have been placed within the reach of Western literati. But that information has not led them to higher and more extended fields, and that research has led to no great results as connected with the social state of man, to no correct view as regards the connexion of the destinies of Germany with those of the Ottoman Empire. Besides this, Russia has such a complete ascendancy over the German literary world, that she has rendered it usefully active in promoting her views. The degree of care given by Russia to the formation of opinion in Germany, and the degree of success to which she has attained, is marked by her having, not under her influence, but in her pay, such men as Kotzebue, Klaproth, &c. men of the first genius, and the highest acquirements, and whose labours were directed to ends, in the one case the fomentation of literary strife, and in the other an under estimate of Central Asia,

which at that period no one could have dreamt of as having any connection with the policy of Russia! It remained for the 19th century to exhibit a scheme of ambition which acts by the contamination and perversion of those means which have hitherto conferred on man, light and science, well-being and peace.

Under such circumstances it was not to be expected that we should be indebted to the German periodical press for any views favourable to Turkey, and it was with extreme surprise that shortly after the dissemination over the Levant of the celebrated speech of M. Delamartine, we saw a refutation appear in the Augsburg Gazette of that voice from the Chamber of France, which had been repeated with so much exultation by the many-tongued agency of Russia all over the East.

This article in the Augsburg Gazette rendered the speech of M. Delamartine a benefit to those countries, for the refutation it provoked was the first indication of a difference of opinion between Austria and Russia, because from the period of the treaty of Adrianople up to the circumstance in question, Austria had exhibited herself in the East the subservient tool of Russia.

However, although this is the only article that appeared to me worth extracting since that period, Germany has felt the shock from England; a perception in Germany of the real state of the East, and a knowledge of the falsehoods promulgated

by Russia on that subject, will solve many an enigma, raise many a doubt, and cast in her path innumerable difficulties.

FRENCH PRESS.

Formerly the French were intensely alive to the importance of the Eastern question, this interest reaches back to the reign of Francis I., who was the first Christian Prince who emancipated himself from the trammels of religious fanaticism, and allied himself with the Sultans to present a counterpoise to the preponderating power and ambition of the German Emperors.—"Then," as remarks the able French translator of 'England, France, Russia, and Turkey,' "was created that political system which for three centuries has regulated the destinies of Europe, and during that period no alliance is recorded by history more advantageous, more necessary, or even more constant, than that which has bound France to Turkey."—The writer goes on to describe that epoch in a manner that throws much light on the present time, when Russia is represented by a foreign servile press, as placed at the head of a movement of civilization.

"When at the commencement of the 10th century the people of Christendom became alarmed at the

conquests of Selim and Solyman—when the Popes endeavoured to reanimate the spirit of the crusades, the kings of France required as it were a diplomatic inspiration to resist the religious sympathies of their people and to avert the dangers with which their country was menaced by the ambition of the House of Hapsburgh, which sought to appear the instrument of an universal religious movement, and thus to subvert a dangerous rival, the subversion of which must have rendered that House the mistress of Europe.—It was a phenomenon new in Europe; it was, to use the expression of the times, scandalous to see the very Christian King leagued with the chief of Islamism against an apostolic Emperor. However, from the very principle of that alliance, French diplomacy received an impulse and a direction so natural, so profitable, and so necessary, that during three centuries, France never deviated from this political dogma."

During the reign of Louis XV. France appears still the attached friend of Turkey, although the state of her finances during that reign prevented her from taking up arms to resist the alliance formed between the Emperor Charles VI. and the Czarina Anne. Yet the Journal des Débats takes too much upon itself in asserting that the stipulations obtained by the peace of Belgrade so favourable to Turkey were owing to the consistent policy of Cardinal Fleury. Although the Porte at that time placed the most implicit confidence in the integrity and attach-

ment of the French, which made her persist in refusing every other mediation except that of France, still she knew that she was only to expect favourable conditions by relying upon her own firmness and sagacity. The Marquis de Villeneuve would have led her to cede all her conquests from the Imperialists, and at the same time to abandon Azof and Ocszakow to the Russians, although they had insidiously taken possession of the former previous to the declaration of war.

During the Revolution, France had no longer any interest in the preservation of peace, nor consequently in the maintenance of the balance of power on which international repose depends.

She herself became the universal aggressor, but Napoleon soon found, although his early dreams had been directed to the conquest of the East, that the preservation of the Ottoman Empire from the only power that was in a position to conquer it, was the first of the duties of a Sovereign of France, however great her power or his authority.

On the restoration, France dwindled into a state of timid subserviency to Russia, and ceasing to entertain open and comparatively speaking, honourable projects of aggrandisement, she was led into views on Greece, the Levant and Africa, similar to those of Prussia on Germany, which projects not only favoured the designs of Russia by their direct tendency, but seconded her no less powerfully, though indirectly, by weakening if not destroying in Europe

the feelings of inter-national justice and public right.

The revolution in Poland created a strong enthusiasm in France in its favour, and consequently that generous and susceptible people, were animated by strong feelings of indignation and hatred against the oppressor of Poland. Still this enthusiasm led to no practical result, it awakened no sympathy for the fate of those other countries, which Russia intended to make her future victims, for their minds were distracted by the conflicting views of liberal and anti-liberal policy, and not prepared to meet upon the common ground of national interest. The anti-liberals looked upon Russia as a type and model of legislative policy, the liberals whilst weeping for Poland, cared little about Turkey, which they had been taught to regard as a capricious despotism, and conceived, that Russia although she might oppose liberalism in the West, had a "*mission*," to extend "civilization" in the East, and they flattered themselves that by Russia's extension in that quarter the interests of England were alone endangered, and the Indian empire of England alone menaced.

In the midst of this apathy of the French public with regard to the Eastern question, which as in our own case proceeded from an ignorance of facts, in the midst of a confusion of words and phrases, of lingering dreams of conquest and aggrandizement, whilst the Cabinet of Louis Philippe was

sinking down into a state of political prostration before Russia, similar to that under Charles X. —the translation of the pamphlet, "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," sounded a note of alarm which was loudly re-echoed by the press of that country. The official organ of the French government took the lead in advocating the views of that publication, and appealed to the warrior spirit of France, to hold itself in preparation. One paper, the Courier Francais, reviewing the fatal apathy of the French Cabinet, breaks out in the energetic language of humiliation and self-reproach, and declares that while "the Oriental question is one of the most important and urgent that the Press has ever yet been called upon to handle, our Cabinet alone, feigns not to comprehend its weight, that it may escape from the consequences of such a conviction."

TURKISH PRESS.

MONITEUR OTTOMAN.

ON FREEDOM OF COMMERCE

IN THE

OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

THE Ottoman Empire has numerous claims on the interest and friendship of the nations of the West; and it is not our fault if we are frequently under the necessity of reviving the recollection of these claims. The position in which we stand is not of our creation; it is the result of numberless errors propagated respecting these countries by levity or bad faith, the effect of which, principally within the last ten years, has been to make opinions not only the most erroneous but the most hostile to Turkey pass current in Europe. It is not, perhaps, in our power to meet or to stem this current of false opinion, but we shall endeavour to adduce facts which, to inquiring minds, may prove that Turkey has been completely misunderstood and misrepresented.

All theories of social organization, individual welfare, and civilization are now based on practical interests. Commerce, as the most powerful instrument of labour, the most direct in its application, and the most extended in its results, has acquired an influence of the first rank among the elements of social life. The facility of commercial

intercourse and the freedom of exchange have been considered by political economists as the source of more or less general prosperity in proportion as more or less extended; and consequently their efforts have been exerted to oppose this system of commercial prohibitions. If this system does still exist in most of the states of Europe, and especially in those farthest advanced in civilization, it is not because the principle of free trade is disputed, but because it is necessary, in order to prevent disorders which would result from too sudden a change, to preserve, by means of protecting tarifs, numerous branches of industry which have grown up under the faith of the protecting system. It is admitted that it would be advantageous to the large majority to substitute the system recommended by theoretical men; but it is desirable to find means of separating ourselves from the past without a violent rupture. Hence the difficulties encountered by Governments whilst endeavouring to satisfy the demands of agriculture, industry, and commerce; they are compelled to move within a circle, in which every measure in favour of one class operates in an inverse sense on the others; it is a sort of see-saw movement, which will never succeed in establishing, amidst so many crossing interests, the equilibrium which absolute freedom of exchange can alone secure to them.

Thus, one of the most important questions which

engages the serious attention of European statesmen, is to discover how to remove the barriers which pen up within narrow spaces the various departments of the trade of each nation, without shocks which might endanger public order.

Good sense, toleration, and hospitality, have long ago done for the Ottoman Empire what the other European States are at this moment endeavouring to effect by the application of the science of political economy, and by combinations more or less happy. Since the period when the throne of the Sultans was established at Constantinople, commercial prohibitions have been unknown. They have opened all the ports of their empire to the trade, the manufactures, and the agricultural produce of the nations of the West, or to speak more correctly, of the whole world. In the Ottoman Empire unlimited freedom of trade has prevailed without limits, and it has been as extensive as it is possible to be. Never has the Divan dreamed, under any pretext of national interest or even of reciprocity, of restraining this freedom which has been and still is enjoyed in the most unlimited sense by all nations, who wish to furnish a portion of the consumption of this vast Empire, and to have a share in the produce of its soil.

Here every object of exchange is freely admitted and circulates. It meets no obstacle excepting the payment of an infinitely small proportion of its value to the Custom-house. It then immediately enters the market. The chimera of a

balance of trade has never entered the heads of a people too sensible to waste their time in calculating seriously whether it be more advantageous to sell or to buy, and too wise and sufficiently just to think of preventing either the Government or the subject from profiting by the industry of all nations, and from choosing from that immense bazaar, the commercial world, the particular articles most suited to the wants and the means of each. The markets of Turkey, supplied from all parts of the world, refusing no object which the spirit of enterprise puts into circulation, and imposing no charge on the vessels which transport them, seldom or never are exposed to those disordered movements, occasioned by the sudden deficiency of any particular article of merchandize, which exorbitantly raising the price, scourge the poorer classes, and thereby subject them to many painful privations, whilst the reaction, on the other hand, occasions the ruin of many fortunes. The system of prohibitions and restrictions gives rise to those destructive commercial ebbs and flows, which, like the hurricanes of the Antilles, sweep off in the space of a day the labour of years, and render commerce a career of perpetual alarm and danger. In Turkey where this system is unknown, these disastrous effects do not appear.

The extreme moderation of custom-house duties is the complement of this system of commercial freedom. In no part of the world does foreign merchandise pay so low an import duty as in

Turkey; nowhere else do we find the persons appointed to collect the customs animated by an accommodating spirit in fixing valuations, and relying almost entirely on the sense of honour of the commercial interests themselves.

But let it not be supposed that these facilities granted to strangers, are concessions extorted from weakness. The contracts called *Capitulations*, guaranteeing the rights of the foreign merchants, establishing themselves in different ports of the Ottoman Empire, bear the dates of those periods when the Mussulman power was predominant in Europe. The first capitulations obtained by France in favour of trade (and these are the oldest) are dated 1535; they were signed by Francis I. and Soliman the Canonist.* In 1604, Henry IV. obtained from Sultan Achmet I. the renewal of the capitulation, with some additions. Those capitulations were enlarged in 1673, under the reign of Mehemet IV., and on the application

* The Greek authors style this Prince, Soliman II., and the Turks call him Soliman, without any numerical designation. The sovereign whom the Greeks call Soliman I., and who is distinguished in Turkish histories only by the name of Soliman Bey, is one of the sons of Bajazet, who, for some time, disputed with his brothers, Issa and Moussa Beys, the throne, which was enjoyed neither by the one nor the other. It fell to the lot of their fourth brother, Sultan Mehemet I. who put a period to the anarchy that prevailed. The Soliman alluded to above, was the author of the Canons of the Ottoman Empire. He was surnamed *the Canonist* by Demetrius Cantemir.

of Louis XIV., and finally, in 1740, they were renewed, and received some considerable additions, which now constitute half the articles of that treaty.

The provisions of these contracts have become antiquated—the changes which time works in various international relations, and the constitutions of states doubtlessly occasion modifications in what we may call contrats d'Aubaine (but without the feudal signification attached to the word), still the liberality and generosity of these are unprecedented in the annals of any nation. But the fundamental principle remains. Commerce freed from restrictions and prohibitions is the invitation held out to every man of commercial enterprize without distinction of religion or of nation.

Thus, for the space of three hundred years the Sultans have realized an object which civilized Europe is now earnestly labouring to accomplish.

If we look for a moment on every thing involved in this wise concession, we may comprehend it in its full extent, and find there an unanswerable argument to the charges of intolerance and fanaticism which have so often been re-echoed in the public prints of Europe, and in the journals of superficial Frank travellers.

It has been repeatedly asserted that the Turks are encamped in Europe. It is not their treatment of the foreigner which could have given rise to this idea of precarious occupancy; for the hospi-

tality they have offered has not been that of the tent; neither is it the hospitality of the laws, for the Mussulman code being at once religious and political,—having a double character indivisible in its action on government and society, is inapplicable to those not professing the religion of the masters of the soil. But the Turks have done more; they have granted to the foreigner the safeguard of his own laws, and exercised by a functionary of his own nation. In this privilege, so vast in its consequences and in its benefits, shines forth the admirable spirit of generosity and real hospitality. Where else do we find this spirit so magnanimously developed? Is it in the history of antiquity? Athens opened her gates to the foreigner,—she did not open to them her halls of justice; she allowed them a dwelling place, but nothing more. Rome treated them more harshly, and Cicero complains that they were stigmatised by a term of contempt (*peregrinæ*), whilst at a former period they had received a name more congenial with the spirit of hospitality (*hospites*). The remonstrances however of the philosophers of that enlightened age did not secure to foreigners the enjoyment of any civil rights; and no where were they more harshly used. We know how foreigners were treated in the feudal ages of Europe; we know what they suffered by the introduction of the *droit d'aubaine*, and the fiscal inhumanity which was established as a principle

in an age when there was no interval between kinsman and foeman. There was then no difference between the persons of foreigners and the merchandize which was allowed to pass on payment of the transit toll.

Even in our own times, and among the most enlightened nations, hospitality is stained by numerous vestiges of the system which prevailed in feudal ages; and as to other states of Europe, hospitality towards foreigners continues nearly as it was in past ages; with this difference, that it is less charged with positive burthens, and more restrained by political precautions.

In Turkey and there alone does hospitality present itself great, noble, and worthy of its name. It is not the mere shelter of a stormy day, but that which rising from the simple impulse of humanity, to the dignity of political reception, offers at once security for the present and the future. The foreigner when first he sets his foot on the territory of the Sultan, is greeted by the title of guest (*Mussafir*). "You are welcome, remain with us. Your religion, your customs, differ from ours, consequently you will not be obliged to live as we do. In the country which you have left, you obeyed certain laws. Preserve them, for it is impossible that they can teach you to behave ill to those who invite you to share with them the fellowship of their treasure and their soil. Continue then to follow those laws; the only thing

we demand of you is that you respect our laws, our customs, and our faith. In return we offer the same respect to your's. On these conditions you may live amongst us, and live in peace."

Compare this language with that which for three thousand years has been inscribed in harshest terms on the barrier which each territorial denomination has placed against the foreigner; and then decide whether the Mussulmans do not deserve the gratitude of those children of the West who visit them. From the first day of a stranger's arrival, they grant, as the accompaniment of their hospitality, civil liberty, according to the laws of each nation, and commercial liberty, according to the laws of nature and of reason.

An old maxim informs us that truth with difficulty reaches the ears of sovereigns; does it experience equal difficulty in finding its way to the ears of their subjects? The injustice of public opinion in Europe towards the Mussulmans would seem to prove the last as difficult as the first.

Voltaire was of opinion that all that had been written upon the Mussulmans ought to be consigned to the flames. Are the erroneous ideas respecting them, less glaring now than they were in his time? Or, if he lived now, would he alter his opinion?

REVIEW OF "TURKEY AND ITS RESOURCES."

BY D. URQUHART.

(First Article.)

We have long felt the necessity of treating of the administrative system of Turkey in the hope of drawing the attention (if not of fixing the opinions) of the European public and Governments to some points of immediate importance as regards this Empire, and, perhaps, of no less consequence to the whole of Europe.

A work has at length appeared calculated to lessen the difficulty of this task, which we have been prevented from undertaking hitherto, arrested on the one hand by internal disorders, aggravated by the menacing aspect of our foreign relations; and on the other by the discouraging ignorance with regard to Turkey which has prevailed throughout the West of Europe. The contempt with which Europeans have been uniformly accustomed to look on this Empire, is now, however, giving place to deep reflection—to examination of its actual condition and its future prospects. Let us then take advantage of this disposition in favour of an investigation, freed from frivolousness and prejudice, to penetrate into the recesses of the great social sys-

tem of Turkey—a system hitherto so little studied and so imperfectly understood. Turkey now beholds her horizon brightening, and notwithstanding the predictions of narrow minds is progressing towards a better state—towards a successive resumption of strength and power. Peace, on all hands admitted to be indispensable to the advance of European interests, requires as its first condition, the integrity of the Ottoman territory. The intestine convulsions of the country have subsided, and been succeeded by a feeling of greater confidence in the Government, and by an universal desire for union among all the parts of which this political body is composed. And if tranquillity and order have not yet opened up the freest field to labour, industry, and enterprize, this last triumph of Mussulman regeneration is reserved, not for arms, which have no permanent influence, but for administrative wisdom, which can alone free the ground of the ruins with which it is encumbered at present.

At length, Europe begins to pierce the veil which has long been interposed between Christendom and Islamism. In France, in Germany, in England, people begin at length to speak of the system and institutions of Turkey, and whilst now, for the first time, "freedom of commerce," "direct imposts," and "municipal administration," have become the symbols of the furthest progress of political science, and the object of the wishes of the

most enlightened people of Europe,—these same words, or rather these same principles, are found associated with the earliest days of the Ottoman Empire, engraved on its ancient buttresses, and connected with all the phases of its history. One may well inquire with astonishment—Is this the fact? We shall endeavour to satisfy the doubts of the inquirer.

It is necessary that we should first contrast the principles of government acted on in the East and in the West. We will do this in few words. It will easily be understood that on thus confronting these principles we do not mean to advert to their aggregate results, which would require for their explanation a series of developments out of the range of our present subject.

The Mussulman rule, in appearance despotic, has not, in the constitution of its power, any of that despotic arbitrariness of execution which makes its own rule and plummet the standard of national habits, feelings, and interests. The Governments of Europe (whatever their peculiar form) reserve to themselves exclusively the execution of all laws, political and administrative. These laws, like rude and inflexible bars, rather than elastic and pliant bonds, overly every relation of man and man, of interest and interest. The common-place existence of the humblest individual cannot escape from their control, nor the opinions, interests, customs, or even necessities of

any race or any locality be respected by their uniformity. This is what is called centralisation; and which, more or less, is to be found all over Europe. This system once introduced is sure to take root; it has the air of science—it has discipline in its own body, and it brings to bear against every opposition the full concentration of its forces. Therefore, too, is opposition permanent; and when successful, its fury knows no bounds. Such causes, such recollections, such possibilities, have produced that state of hostility between the governors and the governed, the events of which form the public news of Europe. And as if it were not already beyond all human ingenuity to keep going decently a machine, so complicated in itself, so aggressive against every thing within its reach—the cares of Government are still further distracted by having to abrogate, to change or modify, these innumerable laws and regulations, and to go on enacting new ones.

In Turkey there is nothing of the kind. Government leaves to custom, to habits, to opinion, and to local necessities the direction of the greater part of the interests of the people. Its sovereignty is only exercised in a higher sphere, and presses not upon individual existence. It is content to exist under the sanction of laws which in principle are unchangeable. It may be objected that this immutability of laws must arrest the progress of improve-

ment, and we would admit it, if the laws of Turkey bore any resemblance to the codes of Europe; but the simplicity and excellence of the fundamental system, far from rendering this immutability an obstacle to improvement, have now rallied round that principle of immutability the decided support and the warmest wishes—not of those who have, but—of those who have not profited by abuse.

Should it be asked why this system has not produced results which would establish excellence, if not superiority? we reply, in the first place, that there has always existed in Turkey a mass of prosperity, wealth, commerce, and, indeed, a population far more considerable than what has generally been conceived in Europe; and, secondly, that if the progress of industry, science, and education, has been impeded, if superior minds and the most enlightened intellects have fallen victims to persecution and punishments—if the interchange and combination of knowledge and opinion, the ties of patriotism, and military and political power, have, till now, been wanting in the Government and the nation—these are attributable to a military oligarchy, which has drained for its own advantage the resources of the state. The excellence of its fundamental principles has alone preserved it against the prolonged attacks of that regime of destruction. From this thraldom it has been at length delivered by the fortunate unison of the sovereign

will with the popular interests—a memorable effort, containing at once an interpretation of the past and hope for the future.

Mr. Urquhart lays down this reflection as a prolegomenon to his remarkable work. He has pointed out in few but significant terms how the destruction of the Janissaries at once freed the empire from a factious force, the long existence of which had established it as a sort of equilibrium in the Government, while it had become a burden which had reduced the nation to despair. The abrupt transition thus effected has occasioned, no doubt, a void which time alone can supply, but, as our author remarks, this vast body being laid bare, displayed a vitality in every articulation. In fact, the question of the tyranny of a minority arrayed in hostility against the nation, and menacing its existence, may be solved by one vigorous and effective blow, but the re-adjustment of social elements, violently shaken, is a slow and difficult operation, and one which requires the aid and sanction of years. Happy the state in which simplicity of manners, the little complication of interests, fundamental institutions consistent with reason, the presence upon the throne of a prince benevolent and favourable to the progress of improvement—in which all these circumstances concur to diminish obstacles, and lend their aid to the solemn task of social reform!

An indiscriminating imitation by the Ottomans

of civilised Europe, would, in our opinion, be an irreparable error. Upon certain points, the art of war for instance, we have every thing to adopt; but with regard to the bases of social order and administrative science nothing. If we have often had reason to deplore that Europeans constantly set out in passing their judgment on this country, with the prejudices and ideas engendered by European education and institutions, it gives us a lively satisfaction to find the author of the present work adopting a contrary course, examining the institutions of the Ottoman empire, and studying their spirit with the view of contrasting them with the institutions of Europe. He draws from this comparison conclusions which prove any thing but the necessity of a servile imitation. The impartiality of his opinion cannot be doubted, for, in his investigation, he does not disguise the abuses of the Ottoman administrative system, which have grown up and taken root during the many years passed under the rod of pretorian bands; he sees clearly that the reparation of former disasters, demand experience, cautious handling, even faults, but especially time; and he renders just homage to the intellectual advancement and the superior combinations which have taken place in Europe, weak when Turkey was powerful, ignorant when Turkey, compared with what she is now, was enlightened.

In the absence of all information on the elementary administration of Turkey, and more or less impregnated with prejudices almost universally adopted, even a conscientious observer is incapable of admitting principles and fundamental institutions such as exist in this country, without astonishment, without incredulity. Such was Mr. Urquhart's first impression, and it is with some degree of embarrassment that he proceeds to prepare his readers for the unexpected discoveries he has made, while he ingenuously avows the hesitation and scepticism he had to conquer himself before he could admit as realities the facts, which he proclaims only when he was satisfied himself that they did not partake of the least particle of generous illusion.

" When I first observed," he says, " the effects " of this local organization, and the financial system " depending on it, I thought I had discovered the " secret of the permanency of the Turkish empire, " in effects which had accidentally grown out of its " own anarchy and oppression, as necessary, " though accidental compensations, which ever " accompany permanent wrong, to prevent it from " exhausting and destroying the substance on " which it feeds: but it was with no less gratifica- " tion than surprise, that I subsequently found " these institutions, and that financial system, not " only known and appreciated by enlightened " Mussulmans, but even venerated as the funda-

" mental principles of Arabic legislation, and " handed down as the constitutional and tradi- " tional doctrines of Islamism; but above all " was I struck with their importance, when " I saw Turks, who had visited Europe, return " to their own country, detesting more than ever " the practical abuses of their own govern- " ment, but attached more than ever to these its " fundamental principles."

From these preliminary considerations, Mr. Urquhart passes to the description of the Greek and Bulgarian municipalities, as he had observed them in Roumelia. It were to be wished that his investigations had extended to Asia Minor and Syria, and other parts of the Ottoman empire. We reserve entering on the particular details of this organization for another moment, but we cannot pass over without citing them the remarks of the author respecting its influence on the moral character of the population—the resources it furnishes to Government—the elements of life and prosperity it holds out for the future:—

" The extreme simplicity of this system affords " no detail to which attention can be called, or on " which it can be fixed. Little would the passing " stranger, seeing this unpretending ceremony " hurried over in the church after the service, or " under the village tree, think it possible to " ascribe to the occult, but all-pervading influence " of these elections, and the social condition and

" moral character which depend upon them, con-
" sequences so vast and important. The elders,
" thus elected, hold their offices for a year; but
" the same want of formality observable in the
" election, is also to be found in their functions,
" and in their term of office. The same indivi-
" duals may remain in office for years, or even for
" life, without re-election; but if they lose public
" confidence, no returning day of election is waited
" for—they are immediately ejected, and succes-
" sors appointed to them, and this very facility of
" resuming the trust has the effect of prolonging
" the term of office."

This permanent exercise of popular justice, which though in constant action never produces violent shock, but which keeps constantly alive the zeal and probity of the elected functionaries—is not this a phenomenon well worthy of investigation?

After reviewing the nature of the functions of the primates, who combine in themselves a very great number of important attributes, Mr. Urquhart continues in the following terms:—

" The union of all these powers, in the hands
" of the elders, leads to no abuse, while public
" opinion acts immediately and directly on the
" functionaries, and while these owe their election
" solely to character, and their tenure of office to
" public confidence. The acceptance, as well as
" the conferring of the trust, elevates the charac-

" ter of both parties. The ambition of obtaining " so honourable a distinction extends its effects to " the whole community, while the equal right of " conferring it leaves no individual the irritation " of exclusion, no motive for exception to the ge- " neral feelings, or for opposition to the common " interests. The equal distribution of taxation, " and the immutability* of the common burthens, " make them look on private prosperity as com- " mon gain, and on individual poverty and negli- " gence as common misfortunes.

" Thus were these communities linked together " by the strongest ties of interest, opinion, and " mutual responsibility: each man was a gua- " rantee for his neighbour's obligations, a security " for his person, and consequently a censor on his " condition and morals. Man did not lose his " individuality, for the character of the individual " extended to the mass, while the prosperity of " the whole, under the direct system of taxation, " benefited each individual. They rejoiced in " each other's prosperity, bewailed each other's " misfortunes; they reproved the idle, lest he " should be a charge to the rest; they watched " the fugitive, lest his debts should be thrown on " the community; they repressed the robber, not

* " It is also a maxim of the Arabs, that the expenditure of the " state be adjusted to the legal and fixed revenue, not that the " revenue should be accommodated to the expenditure; but at inter- " vals new assessments were made.

" to suffer in his stead; and were happy when the " submissive were not punished for the rebelli- " ous, and when the living had not to pay for " the dead.

" This forced guaranteeship resembles the vo- " luntary associations of the Anglo-Saxons, termed " gild scipes, in which the members were bound " to protect each other, and were rendered by law " responsible for each other. In the distribution " of the *were*, or price of blood, in the territorial " arrangements of tythings, when the members of " each community were bound by the law of frank- " pledge for each other's obedience to justice, we " may trace the principle of responsibility, and " consequently of control exercised by every body, " whether a family, or an association, or a com- " munity, over its members. Where the gild paid " a portion of the penalty incurred by a member, " it would carefully scrutinize character before " admission, and watch it afterwards.* If men " paid also a portion of the penalties that might " be incurred by their relatives under a code by " which every crime had its fixed price, they had

* " In Russia there are companies of free labourers termed artels, " The artel elects a chief, and takes his name. The numbers run from " 20 to 60. When a candidate offers himself for admission, his " character is inquired into, and he is only admitted on its proving " good, and on his furnishing caution to some specified amount; the " artel then becomes responsible for losses occasioned and theft " committed by him. Their character is deservedly high."

"a right to exercise consorship over those rela-
"tives, and if the community was bound for
"its members, every man had an interest to
"watch over his neighbour's conduct. What
"coincidence can be more striking than this
"guaranteeship of man for man, and how ir-
"resistible must have been its effect on national
"character!"

But all admirable as was this elementary organization, it served but to mitigate the effects, not to prevent the oppression of the military and administrative oligarchy, which, contrary to the will of the latter Sultans, has so long preyed upon the industrious inhabitants and these rich countries. The principles of the superior and inferior administrations were in a state of constant opposition; what the one created the other destroyed. It would therefore be necessary to appreciate the capabilities of the system to find some instance in which it has not suffered from similar disturbing causes. Mr. Urquhart supplies us with many interesting fields, such as Ambelakia, &c. upon which, however, the limits of this article prevent our entering. But the examples he cites, and others as striking might be added, are sufficient to establish the fact, the author has so successfully maintained, that the Municipal principle, notwithstanding absence of systematic development, has up to this moment sustained the Ottoman Empire; that the industry, which is the result of this prin-

ciple has supplied and continues to supply resources to the State, that it is necessarily connected with the power and interests of the Sovereign; and that, in fact, on the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire, its admission and infusion into the higher organizations is as necessary as the admission of the blood of the heart to circulation in the head.

We are aware that there are many persons in Europe, and even in Turkey, who express fears that from the development of this principle will result the subdivision of the Empire. We answer, with the firmest conviction of the truth, that it is the development of this principle which has annihilated the Janissaries, and therefore saved the empire; and that this very principle has alone sustained the supremacy of the Sultan, when no material force was yet organized to replace that which had been destroyed. And if Greece be objected to us, we reply, that the circumstances of that country precisely tend to justify this long cherished opinion. It was because the Municipal principle was crushed beneath the military preponderance that Greece took up arms to effect similar reforms to those which then occupied the mind of the Sultan Mahmoud; she has contributed immensely to the happy change he effected. And if Greece be now separated from Turkey, it is only because the Ottoman people and Government, during the first five years of the insurrection, were suffering beneath the withering and stationary domination of the Janissaries.

In closing this article, and before we follow Mr. Urquhart in his review of the fundamental institutions of the Ottoman Empire, let us declare our satisfaction in having to express an opinion on his work. Unlike so many writers who have preceded him, he does not present us with a picture preconceived in his own brain,—an amusing spectacle compounded of tragedy and burlesque. He sets out with courage and intelligence in the pursuit of truth, of truth unknown, misunderstood, perverted by disingenuous chroniclers, and by the deplorable contempt of haughty civilization. By dint of patient research and persevering investigation, he has lighted on what he never expected to discover. He hails his discovery with joy, and this sentiment so worthy of the man and of the conscientious inquirer, breaks out at least twenty times in the course of his work. But in his work, containing scientific disquisitions, profound observations, and opinions of great importance, he makes science and opinions second and subordinate considerations to the spontaneous exposition of novel and remarkable facts; and this is the highest eulogy we can pass upon it.

REVIEW OF "TURKEY AND ITS RESOURCES."

BY D. URQUHART.

(Second Article.)

A reaction of that hostile feeling entertained towards the Mussulmans, which once before occurred in the history of Europe, is now again taking place. Europeans appear all at once reverting to sentiments of an opposite nature, and with the sincerity of real regret, endeavouring to catch at every thing that may aid them in recognizing and expiating their errors.

The period of the first crusades—that long infatuation of Christendom, was one of bitter animosity, of furious passion, rejecting all investigation, and exercising a despotic sway over the masses of men which the influence of fanaticism poured upon Asia.—To hate and to fight was the impulse of the crusaders during the eleventh century. But in the following century a different direction was given to the human mind—the contest between the two antagonist religions, and social systems, then lost its character of blind fury. The contest, it is true, was still continued from the mere fact of hostilities being engaged, but the spirit of inquiry took the place of passion, fanatical prejudices gradually wore away. The Crusaders began to study their enemies, to examine their man-

ners, their character, and from that moment commenced that movement towards civilization, which was the final result of the vast irruptions of the West on the East.

This revolution in sentiment is made apparent by a comparison of the chroniclers of the first crusades, with those who flourished towards the end of the 12th and 13th centuries. The former, reflecting only the feelings prevalent during the first period, discern nothing in the Mahometans but objects of hatred; they did not give themselves the trouble of examining into their character as individuals, or as a society. Religious hostility was the only point of view from which they surveyed them, and they consequently looked on all Asiatics as a race to be detested and exterminated. Not so, however, with the later historians of these wars. Throughout their writings are to be traced evidences of the existence of social relations with the Mussulmans. They surveyed them from a closer point of view, examined, criticised, and evinced a kind of sympathy with them. Reason and charity resumed their empire. These writers, indeed, not unfrequently contrast the manners and conduct of the Mussulmans with those of Christians, and commend the former while they censure the latter; as Tacitus laments over the morals of Rome while he describes the manners of the Germans. The latter period is characterised by a tone of impartiality with regard

to the people against whom the crusades were directed, by an earnestness and candour which the century before would have been regarded with wonder and indignation.

The nineteenth century commenced its crusade of civilization against the Ottoman empire, like the eleventh, with blind hatred, prejudice, and condemnation without reason; but it terminates, like the thirteenth, in unbiassed inquiry, sympathy, and justice. This revulsion of feeling, which, in another age, required for its completion a period of two centuries, has, in this, been effected in the short space of ten years. The progress of knowledge, and the improved communication between different countries, the immense influence of the press, are causes which sufficiently explain this difference between the two ages. Thanks to the men whose elevated intellect have dissipated the prejudices of their time; whose investigations have smoothed the path for this return towards impartial judgment, fraternal intercourse, and the genuine spirit of civilization.

Mr. Urquhart is one of these:—he has caused his contemporaries to make an important stride in the path of honour, social science and humanity. His laborious researches have shed an entirely new light on the subject, before so obscure, of the institutions of the Ottoman empire, of the causes of its decline and of the means of its regeneration.

The principle on which he insists throughout his work, is, that every political question resolves itself into one of finance, and that the grand point towards which disquisitions, in appearance the most abstract, converge, is the amount and above all the mode of taxation.

The doctrine of "*Laissez faire*," and "*Laissez aller*," of free unburdened circulation of men's labour and their wealth, has been advocated by some as the sole correction for the numerous evils that every European society presents. By others this doctrine, or rather practice, has been taxed with producing, by means of excessive and unregulated competition, poverty, distress, and sudden and dreadful fluctuations of credit. No solution of this problem has yet been given sufficiently simple, sufficiently practical, to unite opinion. It would be no difficult task for us to point out the modifications which, introduced into laws and experiments by European timidity, have falsified the principle and distorted the results.

No where has the principle of freedom of exchange been allowed to develope itself, without counteracting clogs, but in Turkey, where, during the long period it has existed, it has produced miraculous results, the happy influence of which have counterbalanced every element of destruction.

But what will not be disputed is, that, if in a social state, where a multitude of complicated and

divergent interests exist, it appears necessary for the Government to interpose, to protect, to prohibit, to confine within certain limits commercial freedom (in our opinion, one of the greatest errors of which such a government can be guilty), —no such necessity exists in a country which enjoys a simple, and, in some respects, virgin organization; where the whole interests repose on a uniform basis, viz. the produce of Agriculture. There, we may boldly proclaim the economic maxim of—"leave things alone," as the fundamental principle of general prosperity. The force of circumstances will speedily place Europe in a similar position.

These reflections naturally conduct us to the question of direct taxation, through which the widest field is opened to commercial speculation—that vast ocean with neither shallows nor quicksands, in which the vessel of the state moves along in safety, without the science that dangers and difficulties alone create. Our author has treated this subject with the most interesting illustration, and the most striking truth. But, before we follow him over this ground, we will take a parting glance at the Municipalities, and each glance leads to the dicovery of facts, which opens up new views, which again lead us to direct taxation.

In examining the Municipalities of the large towns, he experienced great regret at finding that these bodies bore an opposite character from the

Municipalities of the villages. His first impression on this discovery, was, that the municipal form of administration was inapplicable to large masses of the people. But he soon rectified this opinion, formed, no doubt, in one of those moments of impatience which irritate the calmest, when the idea they have long cherished as complete and perfect, is suddenly overset. The cause of this distinction could not long be hidden from the observation of so judicious an inquirer. He ascertained, that in the towns, the imposts were not direct. He found the karatch (poll-tax) farmed, as also the internal customs, on certain articles of consumption, under the management of a board, the iktisab (*droits reunes*), and the custom duties on foreign imports, collected by the agents of Government. These, borrowed from the fiscal science of civilized Europe, replace the direct imposts, the repartition and collection of which form the objects and bond of the rural municipalities. From the moment of this discovery, the corruption of the municipal bodies, thus deprived of the exercise of their most important function, and of the responsibility attached to it, became a new argument in favour of his first opinion, and of his present faith in the excellence of the application of the municipal system to the finances of the state.

This observation is undoubtedly of great weight, and the author's simple and forcible comparison between the rural municipalities where the imposts

are direct, that is to say, established according to the ancient Arabian institutions, and the urban municipalities, where the imposts are indirect, in imitation of the fiscal combinations of European science, is no less interesting as an analysis of Mussulman society, than as a means of fixing opinion upon the principles which should guide future reforms in the financial administration.

Our author concludes his examination of the Turkish municipalities by a hasty recapitulation of the beneficial results which have emanated from this principle, and opposed a firm barrier to all the destructive elements that have combined to endanger the existence of the empire. This remarkable passage must be given at length :—

" We have now traced these institutions in the " character of the people; we have shown how " they have preserved the raya population among " whom they prevailed, and perpetuated uniformity " of creed, doctrines, and opinions, of language, " disposition and character; while they have kept " them distinct from all other races that live under " the same general government, and while other " races, less oppressed, but less strongly knit to- " gether have been swallowed up by Islamism: " we have seen how the activity they called forth, " furnished resources to the Turkish empire, and " how the submission they inculcated and pro- " duced, allowed that supremacy so long to exist: " we have then followed them in the powerful im-

" pulse they have given to communities under dif-
" ferent circumstances; engaged in commerce,
" manufactures, and agriculture, relieved from all
" other jurisdiction than their own: we have seen
" an unknown village of Pelion conducting vast
" commercial speculations on the Elbe, the Danube,
" the Rhine—the barren rocks of Magnesia furnish-
" ing the fertile plains of Thessaly with fruit and
" vegetables in their season: we have seen remote
" and unfrequented rocks, sprinkled over the
" Egean and Ionian Seas, rising to the possession
" of a marine and a commercial prosperity, next
" to miraculous; and all, independent of any poli-
" tical institution whatever, and under no other
" influence save that of the municipal system, which
" is common to the rest of the fertile land and
" heavenly climate, whose neglected spots have
" displayed examples of such unparalleled pros-
" perity. What would that country then become
" if left to itself? If the disregarded seeds, fallen
" among stones and briars, have produced sixty
" and a hundred fold, what harvest might be ex-
" pected from the deep soil, if allowed to bring
" forth the seed slumbering in its breast?

But our author observes that the Ottoman Government has, in regard to this vital principle which has furnished it with so many resources, gradually departed from the primitive Arabian type. He shows that the municipal system, though still powerful, has preserved but a feeble portion of the

authority and uniformity that are indispensable for the production of all the benefits of which it is susceptible. The existence of these municipalities is not guaranteed by special laws, their attributions are not determined with precision, and as administrative bodies, their powers are too vaguely recognized by the Government to admit of their acting without impediment, and with confidence. Beneficial as they are in their silent and unostentatious operation, and spread over the face of the whole empire, they are, nevertheless, destitute of combined action, of the support of the ties of common interest, and of the free communication of opinion. The municipalities of Arabia had a character much more decided. The Ayans in these formed a Municipal Council, the legal and recognized object of which was the collection of the revenue and its direct transmission to the Government treasury. The unfortunate introduction of the farming system under Mahomet II., blighted the vigour of the Turkish municipal bodies, while the farmers made use of the municipalities of Rayas as convenient and supple instruments.

The shadow, indeed, of these ancient municipalities still exists in the divan of every governor.

This Council, according to d'Ohsson, "is chosen "by the province, and approved of by the Porte. "Its members are called Ayans, municipal officers "so denominated. In many localities these muni- "cipal posts have become hereditary, but when the

" individuals who fill them are of consideration in " the district, they can control the pashas and coun- " teract their unjust proceedings."

We have already remarked, and it may be as well to repeat here, that the gradual weakening of the ancient Ottoman institutions has been principally occasioned by the constantly increasing influence, during a long series of years, of the military oligarchy of the Janissaries. This *imperium in imperio* absorbed all the powers of the state, pressing equally on the authority of the prince, and on the rights of the people. This powerful body, however, owed its destruction to the excess of its arbitrary power, and now that the head of the state has become a free agent, he will find in the judicious authentication and development of the municipal principle, the surest and speediest, and the only practicable means of exhibiting a regeneration, prompt, effectual, and free from the shocks and complications which render so problematical the future prospects, political and commercial, of Europe.

REVIEW OF "TURKEY AND ITS RESOURCES."

BY D. URQUHART.

(Third Article.)

It will be apparent, from the first portion of our disquisition, that the municipal system formed the ancient basis, now in part maintained, of the administrative institutions of the Ottoman empire; that this principle diffused over the whole face of the territory subject to the Sultan, is still full of vitality, though modified by the various vicissitudes the Turkish empire has undergone; and finally, that certain fiscal practices imported from Europe have established essential differences between the town and country municipalities, all to the advantages of the localities where these fatal visitations have not found admission.

We now come, following the order of the work we are reviewing, to a consideration of the mode of assessing taxes in Turkey. But we should be unable to proceed a step with proper advantage in this question, without keeping Europe, as well as Turkey, in view; without drawing a parallel which was never even attempted to be instituted before the appearance of the excellent work of Mr. Urquhart, simply because the pretensions of civilization till now repudiated the idea of the slightest comparison between a region fertile in experiments, and one content to be regulated by the good sense of

ancient principles. But we cannot help offending the pride and dignity of whole nations, or attacking deep convictions, which, however, merit no other name than prejudices. What are we to do, if not to say to impartial men; "behold the facts, and judge for yourselves?"

"It has too long been a habit in Europe to regard "Mahometanism purely as a religion, without con- "sidering that a political was involved with the "religious question, and that the religious sanc- "tion was often not unprofitably applied to public "ends. It is not even by the code of Islamism "that the political structure and powers of that "system are to be estimated, because the Koran "was accompanied by traditions which were the "political institutions of Arabia, preserved from "time immemorial, admirable, simple, and power- "fully efficient; 'and so well adapted, so natural, "and so simple, that every nation not reduced to "slavery, if thrown at large on the wide desert, "might be expected to adopt the same.'* But "fortunately juster notions are beginning to pre- "vail; the religious is now separated from the "political question, Arabic literature is gradually "unrolling itself to our eyes, and from many points, "new and steady and increasing lights are thrown "on the character, history, and institutions of "eastern nations.

* "Burckhardt. Notes on the Bedouins, p. 214."

"The beauty and energy of the Arabic insti-
"tutions lie in their simplicity, and looking at
"them in their original purity, the extent of the
"Mussulman dominion ceases to surprise; for
"while in arms and in religion a free field was
"open to the daring or the devotion of each indi-
"vidual, the government, if venal, had no tempta-
"tion—if ignorant, was under no necessity of com-
"mitting errors.

"In every branch of science in which Europe
"desired to be instructed, Arabia became her
"mistress; but there were other questions in
"which interests, not arguments, prevailed; in
"these, no instructions were sought; and we
"remain up to this day ignorantly sceptical of the
"existence of such a science among the Arabs, as
"that of government. Yet in this, as in the other
"sciences, Arabia brought her principles to the
"test of experiment*, and reared and consolidated
"the most stupendous fabric of government that
"the world has ever beheld."

Mr. Urquhart thus approaches the question of taxation. He clearly demonstrates that the Mussulman religion, so frequently declared an invin-

* "The Arab philosophers were men who combined with an acute-
"ness and activity of mind that has never been surpassed, all the
"knowledge that industry could attain. They were superior to the
"Greeks by combining logic and metaphysics with experimental phi-
"losophy.—*Turner's History of England during the Middle*
"*Ages.*"

cible obstacle to all progress, has, on the contrary, carefully stored up and consecrated all those political principles which formed the most flourishing society that ever existed in the world—that of Arabia—and that it has repudiated from its code those complications in the art of Government which separate so widely the interests of a nation from those of its rulers, which form an instrument lever in perpetual action for the creation of mischief to the people, and of enmities to the prince, and an inextricable labyrinth in which most governments have been entangled without the possibility of extrication. The Ottoman dynasty is still preserved intact; its existence never having been even seriously menaced, though in the midst of distinct and unamalgamated populations, and encompassed by difficulties which would have destroyed twenty other dynasties; and this not by the maxims of the religious code of the empire, but by the political part, the influence and grandeur of which maxims have up to the present moment remained unknown.

If it be true that the alienation from the government of the tenths, or taxes in kind, which, before the establishment of the feudal system in Europe, supplied the revenues of the states,—if it be true that this alienation drove these governments to seek resources in indirect imposts, it must be admitted that the maintenance of the primitive principle has saved Turkey from the consequences

the indirect mode of taxation has inflicted, and continues daily to inflict on the Western states, in every other respect so enlightened. These disastrous consequences form a very long list, but we shall content ourselves with citing a few which are now admitted and familiar. Demoralization of the mass of the people—opposition and hostility between the different classes, and between all the classes and the Government—a struggle between labour and capital—impediments on all internal commerce, and on all foreign relations—the high price of all commodities—difficulties created at a vast expense, and requiring a still vaster to remove them—a commercial war with foreigners; a financial struggle among the citizens—revolutions and bloodshed within the state, destruction and bloodshed without.

Such are the miseries from which Turkey has as yet been exempted. But in order that we may not lie under the suspicion of overcharging the picture, let us form our judgment on the representations of the Europeans themselves; let us borrow the colours furnished us by the most enlightened minds and the most distinguished talents of civilized Europe.

Lord Brougham, the Lord High Chancellor of England, the lustre of whose name imparts an imposing authority to his opinions, expresses himself in these terms:—"The jealous and monopolizing spirit of mercantile policy has introduced into diplomatic relations a new kind of treaty, called the

treaty of commerce. These treaties are, in every respect, absurd. Their object is to hamper what ought to be free, and to regulate what the profits of every individual can alone regulate. They have relation to *subjects with which no Government ought to interfere*, and are only supportable when they are intended to abolish regulations, imposed by the folly of former Governments."*

A commission which was sent to France by England to arrange a new commercial treaty between the two countries, has published the bases of the plan it recommends. The Report contains the following passages :—

" It is proposed wholly to repeal the existing tariffs, because the defects in them are so numerous that it would be impossible to remedy them in any other way; and further, because by taking this course, the best opportunity will be afforded of introducing reason and sound principle in the place of those erroneous theories about trade and manufacture, on which the present tariffs were founded."

" High prices, the result of protective duties, are evidently a great national calamity. It would seem that the principle on which the advocates of these duties reason, is *that public misery is the source of private happiness.*

" To prohibitions and restrictions on commerce

* Colonial Policy, vol. 2, p. 273.

are directly or indirectly to *be traced the origin of all the wars which have devastated Europe since* 1667. It is impossible, therefore, to come to any other conclusion than this, that the statesmen who invented the protective system, who maintained it, and who still maintain it, *must be classed among the cruellest enemies of civilization and the human race.*"*

These quotations, which in some measure make amends for the unwarranted contempt which has been, up to the present time, displayed by Europe towards the East, free, however, from the serious aberrations of the West, lead us on still further. We shall conclude them with a sentiment expressed by the distinguished preceptor of the Emperor of all the Russias.

"The mania for instituting regulations, the offspring of the mercantile system, has deranged and injured the relations of industry in a thousand ways. It has made each nation look upon the system acted on by its neighbour as incompatible with its own. Hence the reciprocal desire it engenders of destroying and impoverishing; hence that spirit of commercial rivalry which has proved the proximate or remote cause of by far the greater number of wars in modern times. The effect of this system has been to impel nations to extort, by force or stratagem, from the weakness or ignorance

* Sir H. Parnell's Financial Reform, p. 87.

of their neighbours, treaties of commerce, which however confer no real advantage on them. It had led to the establishment of colonies for the purpose of compelling them to purchase the commodities of the Mother Country, or to oppress them with monopolies. In a word, whenever this system has produced but little mischief, it has arrested the progress of improvement. In most cases it has deluged the earth with rivers of blood, and depopulated and ruined the countries who anticipated power and riches from its adoption."*

Turgot, Necker, Fiévée, arrived at conclusions in favour of the Municipal collection of land taxes by abstract reasoning. Guizot, Allan, Turner, Palgrave, Grimm, consider municipal institutions merely as organic relics of a former world, fit only to be exhibited in a museum of legal antiquities. Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Bentham, Ghanilh, Macculloch, and Say penetrated deeper into the inextricable labyrinth of evils which commercial regulations have created for mankind. But the truths they revealed have never been classified, still less applied;—they have been regarded as axioms admitted, but ineffective;—as principles which no one ventures to deny or thinks of following;—as precious, but unprofitable relics.

For some years past, the glaring defects of the fiscal system of Europe have forcibly directed logical discussion to the assessment of imposts ac-

* Storch *Cours d'Economie Politique.*

cording to Arabian principles. But beyond lucubrations in the closet nothing is ever attempted on the subject, and even the most enlightened Governments of Europe turn a deaf ear to the speculations of science. To persevere in inventing the most ingenious expedients is the principal occupation of European ministers, and the spirit which animates representative bodies in the allocation of imposts is one of partiality, injustice, and hostility. All reform in the assessment of imposts is constantly opposed by the dread of not finding immediate resources. The repeal of the prohibitions which hamper the commerce of each individual nation, is opposed by the tariff of other nations. Turkey, unconscious of the first series of these errors and misfortunes, offers to Europe the solution of the second. She admits of no imposts, but such as are direct, and opposes no prohibitions nor protections of her own to those disposed to place her on a footing of mutually beneficial reciprocity.

How has it happened that the Oriental Governments have been able so long to resist the temptation of interposing like the European Governments in all the relations of commerce, and of regulating all the details of circulation? Because they have reserved the tenths for the service of the state. Besides, Eastern Governments never have resorted to the expedient of disguising imposts. They had no fiscal officers to overlook the relations between individual interests, and by the extreme simplicity of the ad-

ministrative organization, expenses are not created which induce the necessity of discovering, and at the same time of disguising fresh sources of revenue. Mr. Urquhart successfully analyses this condition of things, and his reflections form at once excellent economistical arguments, while they furnish a history of the Turkish Administration during the long period of its happy simplicity.

" A Government raising its revenue by a direct " property tax, has no motive or pretext, for the " favouring of any class of producers, to introduce privileges or monopolies.

" It has no motive or pretext, for the favouring " of any class of consumers, to distribute unequally the burdens of the state.

" It has no motive or pretext, for the protection " of its revenue, or for facilitating the collection, " to introduce restrictions or prohibitions, or generally to legislate in financial matters, so as to " interfere with commerce.

" No interests have grown up under such restrictions and protections, to perplex Government with new demands, to overawe it by powerful combinations, or to corrupt it by occult " influences.

" Taxation falling on the amount of property, " the Government has a direct and sensible interest " in the general prosperity; and there is no organized body of collectors to whisper in its ear new " modes of taxation, or measures of increased " severity.

"The general effects of the system on the na-
"tion are, that taxation takes from the people
"only the sum that Government receives, conse-
"quently that it does not indirectly augment
"prices. That it falls on wealth realized, not on
"the means of production. That, consequently,
"it falls equally on all, and gives a constant in-
"terest to the rich and powerful to control expen-
"diture."

The connection between the municipalities and direct imposts is so immediate and necessary, that it is hardly possible to view them but as one question. This being the case, all the moral and political advantages which flow from municipal organization, proceed originally from the system of direct taxation, which creates this organization. This reasoning, so true and so important in its results, but so contrary to the European system of administration, produces immediate conviction on the minds of all who have interested themselves in the subject of the Ottoman administration, and observed it narrowly. Mr. Urquhart in establishing the connection between the two principles, tells us that in them will be discovered the secret of the easy conquests the Mussulmans made in the East. The astonishing rapidity of their conquests is certainly attributable to their administrative system, the effect of which on the people of Turkey is described by our author with a fidelity which must carry conviction to every one the least acquainted

with that empire. His elucidations of this topic are so interesting that we cannot resist the impulse of transcribing them :—

" The rayas owe these institutions to the Turkish " dominion. Under the weak and despicable " eastern empire, the mass of the people was re- " duced to the lowest state of moral and political " depravity. A corrupt aristocracy, a tyrannical " and innumerable clergy, the oppression of pervert- " ed law, the exactions of a despicable Government, " and still more, its monopolies, its fiscal system, " its armies of tax and custom collectors, left the " degraded people neither rights nor institutions, " neither chance of amelioration nor hope of re- " dress. It is therefore not to be wondered at if " they fled from the tax-gatherer to the barbarians, " or if, at a later period, they were glad to ex- " change both the precarious sway of these con- " flicting tribes, and even the more fell dominion " of their own weak empire, for the powerful pro- " tection of the Ottoman dominion.

" The establishment of the Turkish dominion " swept away all privileges, all monopolies; " but it swept away, too, all disabilities ; if it de- " stroyed pre-eminence of caste, it destroyed invi- " dious exclusions. It reformed the corrupt and " overgrown hierarchy, abolished oppressive in- " fluences, and reduced the nation to a state of " perfect equality, by depriving it of all rights and " distinctions, so that in industry alone this hitherto

" effeminate people were reduced to seek merit and
" distinction, as well as the means of existence; and
" industry, though recently oppressed by anarchy
" in Turkey, has never been repressed by law.

" Each district was required to furnish a fixed
" sum, and to the subjects themselves was left the
" care of distributing the burthens and collecting
" the amount. This sum was not fixed arbitrarily,
" however arbitrarily it may have been subse-
" quently exacted; and though contempt for their
" tributaries, and national indolence, may alone
" have been sufficient motives for leaving the
" Greeks and others to their own government,
" yet the strict justice that seems to have dictated
" the first assessments of all species of taxes and
" property, may lead us to infer that the legislative
" doctrines of the Arabs, and the nomade habits of
" the Turks, essentially contributed to the esta-
" blishment of that simple form of administration—
" direct taxation under the management of muni-
" cipal institutions—which would seem, judging by
" the experience of Turkey, to have the property
" of rendering a people indestructible.

" The various denominations submit their dis-
" putes and differences to their elders and priests,
" whose decisions are not the less final because
" destitute of legal validity. In the communities
" the reciprocity of responsibility gives public
" opinion the right of censorship—a right which is
" most despotically exercised. Crimes are unheard

" of, save amongst those whose office is the preser-
" vation of order; and the most remarkable in-
" dustry and frugality, I will not say characterise
" the body of the nation, but form the essential
" features of each individual disposition."

From the consideration of these effects on the moral character of the people we pass to the purely financial question. We do not propose to enter into the details of this subject, or to enumerate the exceptions and innovations which have been made in the system, because these have been but transitory, and have at no time destroyed, nor even seriously affected, its principles. We shall confine ourselves to the mere enumeration of these principles, and we believe we shall be able to render them intelligible in very few words.

The primitive imposts of Islam simply consisted of a tax, which varied according to the fertility of the soil from a fortieth part to a moiety of the produce; that portion of the produce which, if it had not been applied to the exigencies of the state, would have gone to enrich individuals who, more or less detached from the soil, would thus have been maintained in idleness by the labour of others. Had the Government been deprived of these its natural resources, it would have been forced to levy a tax on commerce, and on the exchange of commodities, as at present in Europe, where the feudal system, which in its origin, like the spahilik in Turkey, was but a military service compensated by

the tenths paid to the Government, is now converted into an absolute property of the soil, and the military aristocracy having become a territorial aristocracy, has imposed taxes on every thing except the land. From this change has arisen the necessity under which the European Governments labour of extracting revenues from the exchange of commodities, WHICH EXCHANGE, HOWEVER, IS THE ONLY THING THAT GIVES LANDED POSSESSIONS THEIR VALUE. Such is the origin of the struggle between the various interests which conceive themselves opposed to each other, now effectively constituted by a demoralizing system into a bitter warfare—a struggle which has never existed in Turkey and which never can exist under a system of direct imposts.

REVIEW OF "TURKEY AND ITS RESOURCES."

BY D. URQUHART.

(Fourth Article.)

THE system of direct taxation is not confined to Turkey alone, it exists throughout the whole of the East.

The English Government found this same system established in its Indian possessions; but it laboured to overthrow it, though with the best intentions, because that Government was influenced by European ideas, and referred every thing to these ideas. The English Government, which must certainly be allowed to have followed up a most able plan of colonization, and which owes the success of that plan chiefly to the respect it has shewn for the manners and institutions of the countries in which it has planted its standard, has been induced in India to sap that which it might have found most useful to itself; so strong is the prejudice in favour of a system which has existed for a long series of years, and which, throughout the greater portion of the world, has struck the deep roots of custom. By endeavouring to establish a landed aristocracy, the English Government has sacrificed to a routine theory, the rights and prosperity of India; and, after thirty years of dis-

astrous efforts, it now seeks to purchase back, by money, the power it so inconsiderately granted.*

Setting aside, then, the exceptions, the fiscal innovations recently borrowed from Europe, and the abuses of all times, we find in Turkey, at this moment, as well as in India, under the Ottoman and Hindoo administrations, and, as at all periods, and under all forms of her ancient Arabic government—*the revenue of the government derived from that portion of the produce of the soil (calculated according to its fertility)*, which exceeds the expenditure of labour and the capital employed in its amelioration; that is to say,—from the surplus. But not, it must be observed, from the whole of the

* It is curious to observe, how completely puzzled our early administrators in India appear to have been with the system they found prevailing there. Commissioners for settling the land revenue in 1785, thus express themselves:—"In forming conclusions on this subject, and, indeed, in all our reasonings concerning the revenue of Bengal, we cannot too carefully avoid the comparison between the customs and institutions that prevail in this country, and those which are established amongst a people more free and refined," because amongst us, "the invention is exhausted in discovering other objects, (than land,) and modes of taxation, (other than the direct,) which shall raise a revenue in a manner imperceptible to those who actually pay and where it is rather the policy to conceal than to lighten the burthen." Afterwards they admit that, "To the neglect of these ancient institutions, *may*, *perhaps*, *partly*, be ascribed most of the evils and abuses that have crept into the revenue." (Note of the work.)

In the Fifth Report of the Committee of the British Parliament, it is admitted by several well-informed statesmen, and by a distin-

surplus; for, after deducting the tax, lands of the first and second quality, in Turkey, yield a profit, which exceeds several times the amount of that tax, and which, according to the division of the lands, reverts to the cultivator, or becomes rent in the simple sense of the term.

Mahomet fixed the tenth portion of the produce for the government; but Omar, taking into consideration the inequality of the lands, and the difference between irrigable lands and those watered only by the rain, that is to say, subject to less certain chances of fertility, introduced the system of valuation, quoted by Mr. Urquhart, in page 88 of his work, and the basis of which is contribution to the public expenses in proportion to the profits supplied by labour. Subsequently, the multiplication of the objects of taxation, has rendered the levying of the imposts less accurate and less clear; but, still it comes back to a portion of the profit realized; which, through the medium of the municipal authorities, is proportioned to the facilities of production, and consequently to the surplus.*

guished Member of the Board of Control, that the old Municipal Institutions were preferable to those which have succeeded them.—How important is this experience to Turkey?—What a valuable experimental monument is Turkey for England? (Note of the Editor.)

* "The particularity of India, in deriving a large proportion of its revenue from the land, is a very great advantage. Nine-tenths, probably, of the revenue of the Government of India is derived from

If imposts are levied in such a way that they are derived from the land, or from the fortune realized by industry, or commerce, it is evident that industry and commerce will be free from taxation within the sphere of their activity; that circulation, the primary source of social wealth, and individual comfort, will not be impeded by any fiscal regulation, and that this principle of eternal justice and political reason, of making public burthens fall on the profits of those who have, and not on the consumption of those who have not, will cement the nation and its government. If, on the contrary, imposts fall on trade, circulation, and consumption, the moment will arrive when it becomes impossible for the people, whose exchanges, and, consequently, means of wealth, are thus impeded, to contribute to the wants of the state, or, at least, with the same facility and good will as they did before.

the rent of land, never appropriated to individuals, and always considered to be the property of Government; and, to me, that appears to be one of the most fortunate circumstances that can occur in any country; because, in consequence of this, the wants of the state are supplied really and truly without taxation. As far as this source goes, the people of the country remain untaxed. The wants of Government are supplied without any drain upon the produce of any man's labour, or the produce of any man's capital."—(Third Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of India, 3134th reply.)—This answer is by Mr. James Mill, an authority equally important as a Political Economist, and an Indian Administrator, and the author of the only Classic History of India.

Such are the principles which form the basis of the fiscal system in Turkey, and which have hitherto formally contradicted the many predictions of its approaching downfall. Exceptions, we repeat, ought not to check us in demonstrating the positive existence of this system. The exceptions are new and ephemeral, and the institutions are old and fundamental. The former will pass away rapidly, and the latter will recover their primitive vigour: a little light thrown upon these exceptions will make them disappear in less time than has been requisite to instal them in the usurped place which they occupy. Mr. Urquhart has elucidated in the clearest way the real advantages of these beneficent institutions. He has discerned them through the rind which partly hid without entirely concealing them.

These political maxims in active though obscure operation in those countries, have at all times sought to work their way into European society; they have at various times struggled against the fiscal systems which have triumphed for a while, but which are now attacked by public interest and reason; instinctive common sense has constantly repelled the complications created by the science of government. On this subject the author quotes a petition from the City of London, under Edward I., of England, in which the citizens represented to the King, that if they were not relieved from those taxes on trade, from which they were

before exempt, *they could not pay either their contributions to the State, or their private debts.*

The same opinions have been expressed at various times, under other forms, and on different points. Mr. Sullivan, in his testimony on Indian affairs, employs these remarkable words: "to take freedom of markets and of production as the condition of imposts, and afterwards to restrain the freedom of exchange, is at once a violation of private rights and of public faith."

We find that those men who have had the opportunity of forming, by comparison, ideas of political economy in the east, condemn most severely every tax which becomes an obstacle to free circulation. We have shewn the intimate connection existing between direct imposts and municipalities, those two great points of social order. Indeed, it is the system of taxation which determines the mode by which the taxes are levied. Indirect taxes have rendered necessary those hosts of collectors which may be numbered among the most afflicting scourges of modern society. The direct tax, on the contrary, requires only the municipal element, so fertile in justice, in equality, and in comfort to all: they are two parts of the same edifice, which mutually support each other. On this subject we may quote a striking passage from Mr. Urquhart's work:—

"The collectors, even under the despotic go-
"vernments of France, Spain, &c., while they re-

" tained the Roman municipal law, were men indi-
" vidually known and respected,* as their yearly
" election proves, and supported in their functions
" by common interests and public opinion, required
" not to be backed by the severity of legal penalties.
" And as I have already stated, when and where
" the municipal organization existed, we find the
" laws of the most confiding mildness with respect
" to taxation and to debt; while the person was
" free from arrest, neither lands, nor tenements,
" tools, implements, or necessary clothing, could
" be distrained. Yet these were the laws of abso-
" lute, arbitrary, and despotic governments. In
" England, on the contrary, our laws, whether good
" or bad, have emanated neither from arbitrary will,
" nor from despotic authority. Whence then their
" singular and revolting severity? Whence this
" strange contrast of a mild code emanating from a
" despotism, and a cruel and unmerciful code ema-
" nating from a free and representative govern-
" ment? The compact and self-adjusting me-
" chanism of the municipal organization was put in
" motion by the slightest impulse—the extensive,
" cumbersome, and ill-adjusted machinery of cen-

* " A particular distinction is drawn between the collector of cus-
" toms and excise, who farmed his office, and the collector of personal
" and real taxes, or property-tax, who was elective; respecting the
" first the Pandects say, 'quantæ audaciæ, quantæ temeritatis sint
" publicanorum functiones, nemo est qui nesciat'—L. 12, ff. *de Publ.*
" *Vectig. et Comm.*; respecting the second, 'exigendi tributi munus,
" inter sordida munera non habetur.' 17 sect. 7 ff ad municip."

" tralized collection, could only be moved by violent " and dangerous efforts."

A striking fact comes to our aid, at the present moment to plead this cause of social improvement, as being that of Turkey. The Sultan has, by an ordonnance, dismissed the collectors of the capitation of the Rayas, and has consigned the levying of that impost to the Municipal Chiefs, who being responsible to the treasurer for a sum corresponding with the number of the individuals forming the three classes proportionally taxed, will divide the tax according to the known fortune, the realized means, and will thus require each Raya within their jurisdiction to contribute to the public burthens as far as he is able. From this moment, the municipal organization resumes new life: it is not merely tolerated; it has its existence in the land, and from the first step which it makes in the administrative career, the Sultan raises it to the levying of one of the most important taxes from which the public revenue is derived. Where shall we find such examples in Europe? But the necessity of uniting by the easiest and most natural links the interests of subjects with those of their government, must every where be present to the minds of men; and wherever it has been an object to establish facility, economy and equity in the distribution of the public burthens, the collection of taxes has been consigned to the municipal power. We have cited the examples of the English in India, and we may close this

article by adducing the example of the French in Egypt.

"Kléber, the General in Chief, was firmly convinced that the prosperity of the Colonies, and the maintenance of the discipline of the army would in future depend on the proper administration of the finances and internal resources of the Country. Bonaparte employed Generals and Commanders of Corps in the different districts to collect the money or territorial impost, payable in money or in kind. They were directed to transmit the amount either into the treasury or the magazines. Kléber adhered to this plan when hs first assumed the chief command, but having observed that it was likely to engender arbitrary and vexatious exactions on the part of the collectors, he informed the Divans of the Provinces that in future they would be charged with the assessment; thus the contingent for each province would be fixed in advance, and the heads of the Corporations would have, under their responsibility, the sole task of levying it.

"An arrangement so favourable to the Egyptians could not fail to be received by them with joy and gratitude. The fact is, that the former mode of collecting the taxes had generated great abuses; the least of which was the inducing the inhabitants to practise frauds, which exposed them to rigorous punishment. The tax-payers having no longer to deal but with individuals chosen or appointed from

among themselves, had little cause to dread the enactments of the fiscal measures, always vexatious, of the French revenue officers. On the other hand, the heads of the Corporations being responsible for the amount of tax imposed, levied it with punctuality, so that the treasury agents could confidently speculate on the estimated revenue. A Copt, appointed by the Intendant-General, came unattended to a village, intimated the order for the contribution, and was obeyed with greater promptitude than a superior officer of the French army at the head of his detachment."*

* Victoires et Conquêtes des Françaises, tome xii. p. 237.

REVIEW OF "TURKEY AND ITS RESOURCES."

BY D. URQUHART.

(Fifth Article.)

As we advance in our examination of this profound work, we are more and more impressed with a circumstance which, indeed, forms its peculiar character, viz. the author's entire devotion to the cause of truth. He has rendered homage to no prejudice, to no popular opinion;—he has made no concession to the taste of the age, which requires from every writer on Turkey descriptions teeming with glowing colours and picturesque beauty, and the enchanted scenes of fairy land; for nothing less provides pasture for their credulity. A writer, must, in short, excite the wonder of the mass, by the recital of marvels, or he need not aspire to the character of a man of talent. That reputation Mr. Urquhart has not been desirous of acquiring at such a price; he broke at once through the tyranny of received ideas, and turned a deaf ear to the outcries of a false though general opinion. His predecessors on the same ground, for the most part men of leisure, who travelled through Turkey for mere amusement, and guided by the phantoms of their imagination, have almost

unanimously adopted the conclusion—that the Ottoman Empire cannot endure. Are we to infer from their unanimity, that such is really the fact, or that the great majority of the human race being like sheep, ungifted with the happy quality of spontaneous impulse, blindly pursue the path traced out for them. Numerous facts, which are constantly developed under our eyes, give the authority of an axiom to this opinion, and the book now before us tends materially to corroborate it.

This work is not the result of the care and time which matters of such high importance as those it treats of might be supposed to demand. It was written and published in haste; and, perhaps, under the excitement of events which announced the almost total dissolution of the Turkish empire, and at a time when the decision to which his own Government had come, must have impressed the author with deep regret. It seems as if Mr. Urquhart had seized the pen as an orator ascends the tribune, roused by a proposition which clashes with all his convictions. "The Ottoman empire," we may fancy him saying, "can and must endure. Policy has ruined it, and by policy alone can it be saved. Its constitution is still sound and robust. If you doubt this, behold my proofs." He has produced them, they are irrefragable; but being forced to hurry on rapidly like passing events, he has scattered over his pages only the superabundance of his information. We can easily imagine,

that he regards his work as a child whose premature birth has been accelerated by a shock. He considers himself judged on incomplete testimony; he perceives voids which require filling up, and feels convinced that new ideas, like his, at variance with all that has been previously advanced, require, on being presented to the world, the support and sanction which they would have acquired by a few years study of the Arabic writers, and their principles,—of the past history, and present circumstances of the Ottoman empire.

We respect, though we do not participate in these laudable scruples. Is the age in which we live distinguished for methodical lucubration and long-meditated works? Europe, at the present day, is the public place of Athens:—it is the arena of active and vigorous minds, always armed and ready for combat. For our own part, amidst the hurricane which rapidly sweeps away men and things, we sincerely rejoice in the sudden appearance of this rich improvisation; it is all that we could wish, and we look upon it as a brilliant light, and powerful and unexpected aid. The English journals and the English public have shared our sentiments, and the work has received from them the most unqualified approbation. We may consequently hope for a complete re-action in European opinion; the dreams of a Greek empire have received a decided check from this hasty but powerful disquisition; and if, after the thousands

of works which have anathematized Turkey, the author has only succeeded in obtaining a suspension of final judgment, in awakening the idea that principles of fertile utility lie dormant in this mysterious body;—if he should induce other well-informed and independent men to enter the field of fair investigation, free from hostile intentions, he has rendered to mankind a service of the highest order.

We have already observed, that those who wish to become acquainted with Turkey, must rid themselves of an enormous burthen of prejudices; and when the investigator has thus stripped off the old man, the man of Europe, he will still have to surmount the numerous obstacles arising out of our manners, our language, our ideas, our epithets, which characterize but imperfectly each point of the social question, and inaccurately define each detached part of the political structure. Then, again, what a void is created by the absence of all the facilities which the publicity of facts and statistics affords in Europe! There is no analyzing spirit among the Turks. He who would observe them as a nation, must obtain all his information by dint of his own efforts. To the European Turkey is an historical accident. It is an assemblage of facts totally different from the facts of Europe, unclassified by the science of political economy, which they are so well calculated to enrich, and the limits of which they might so greatly extend.

We see the municipal system and direct taxation existing as fundamental bases on the Turkish soil, where they are firmly rooted, in spite of numerous attempts to violate the integrity of their principle. The commercial circulation of the Ottoman empire presents to the observer a harvest as rich as the civil and financial administration, perhaps more so, since the relations of man with his food and raiment are of more immediate importance than his relations with his government, especially where the government does not extend its sphere to the details of private life. Unlimited freedom of trade is in Turkey a recognized and undisputed principle, which may be modified for a transient necessity (though that necessity would always be considered fatal), but clearly established in all minds as indispensable to public prosperity, and presenting to all the authority of a dogma of faith.

When we speak of Turkish principles, we mean the true and ancient principles of Islamism, not even those which were repressed though not destroyed under the despotism of the Janissaries, and have subsequently been more or less deteriorated by ideas imported from Europe;—we mean the principles which secured the prosperity of the Caliphate, of the Soldans of Egypt, of the Western Sarrazins, and the Seljoutes of Anatolia;—we mean the *circulation without any burthen or restriction whatsoever of the products of human labour.* The beauty of these primitive principles has been tar-

nished at several periods; first, by the prohibition of the exportation of grain, an enormous burthen, which repressed or annihilated so many resources, and recently by indirect taxes, and by attempts at monopoly, all of these measures, on the essence of which public opinion is unanimous, have been looked upon in the East as calamitous phenomena, but without any chance of duration.* These measures, borrowed from the fiscal errors of civilized Europe, conceal the foundation of the true Turkish principle, even from the eyes of those who examine it most closely.

In Turkey the greatest astonishment is expressed at the continual opposition manifested in the states of Europe to the principle of unlimited freedom of trade. It is asked, with surprise, how there can still exist in the focus of information such differ-

* It certainly is the fact that commercial restrictions have found favour throughout the East during the last few years; these restrictions were even considered as part of the imitation of Europe towards which almost all Eastern people and Governments incline. It has been more than once said, these questions have not been reasoned upon, and probably but for the work here reviewed, and the disquisitions arising out of it, the two systems would have become confused without being understood, and the convulsions produced by the effects of the false imitation of Europe would have gone to establishing a general conviction of the rottenness of the Turkish system, and of the impossibility of its endurance. This indeed has already partially taken place. The absolute manner in which in the text the public reprobation of such principles is stated is perhaps to be attributed to a desire of affixing on those dangerous innovations the stamp of the most decided reprobation.—Ed.

ences of opinion, on a question on which public good sense has at all times pronounced irrevocable judgment here. Which is right or wrong?—Science proudly displaying herself in the commercial councils of Paris and London, or Turkish simplicity? We cannot believe that there is here any ground for dispute, and we set aside all theoretic discussion.

The price of a commodity indicates the facility of production—facility of production is the first element of national prosperity. If in one country a thing is to be bought at a lower rate than in another, the first country possesses, in proportion to the difference, a superiority over the second; it is perfectly immaterial whether that difference is effected by a simpler financial system, or by a more perfect adaptation of machinery.

Now, in comparing the price of various articles in Turkey where taxation falls on profits realized, and in European states where taxation falls on the means of production, we will find in the first, compared with the second, greater facilities of satisfying the desires of men, and greater facilities of production, *mutatis mutandis*, by cheapness of labour resulting from cheapness of commodities, and cheapness of the primary articles required for further combinations of industry; a few instances will explain our meaning.

Lead shot, an article of English produce, is sold in the shops of London at 12 French sols

per pound, and is sold at 4 sols in Constantinople. —French refined sugar is sold in Paris at 15 sols, and at 9 in Constantinople.—Tobacco for smoking, the produce of Turkey, is sold here in retail at 16 sols per pound; and the same tobacco is sold in London at 12 francs. The carpets of Anatolia, whose manufacturing price is here increased to the purchaser only by the low profits which suffice for trade in this land of abundance, are sold retail in London for three times the amount of the retail price in Constantinople; and they cannot be legally purchased in Paris at any price.

These are facts (and it would be easy to augment their numbers), which are by no means invalidated by explanations. The assertion that it is necessary for France and England to pay every year the interest of their national debts, and for that purpose to avail themselves of every expedient, is only an additional argument in favour of Turkish simplicity, which has enabled the government, amidst the most perilous political emergencies, to live without debts, and in abundance, and for this reason, because it has abstained from commercial prohibitions.

But if it is supposed that the largeness of the revenue required in England and France has led to the introduction of indirect taxes, we assert that the objector is wholly ignorant of the principles of taxation—there can be no question that the amount of taxation, legally or illegally raised in Turkey

during the last few years of war and distress, has immensely exceeded, in proportion to the public fortune, the taxation of England or France. Indeed, it is only by the system of Turkey that so large a proportion of revenue could be raised—England has used every means to increase the revenue of India, and in the interest of that very revenue has she abandoned the attempts at indirect taxation she had previously introduced. But England herself, in the period of her necessities, found all her indirect complications insufficient, and had recourse to a Property-tax—she supported the war by that tax, although laid on without principle, and without intelligence, *not as a substitute for indirect taxes, but as a super-imposition.*

The abstract discussion of the question would give us, so at least we think, the same advantages over the erroneous opinion which we have combated. But we prefer entering at once upon a subject of practical and immediate importance.

The commercial treaty agreed upon for a certain number of years, between the Porte and England has just expired; and the time has arrived for renewing it. It is a principle of the international law of Europe, that every country is at liberty to tax foreign merchandize as it pleases. The relations between nations, as between individuals, consist of reciprocal injuries or benefits. If the former, then their evil effects may re-act upon their authors; but it belongs to human nature to retaliate,

even at its own expense. We see a striking example of this in the union of so many small states with Prussia, a measure favourable to internal industry, except from the high rate of duties provoked by the fiscality of England.

Our homage is justly due to the present administration of England, for the wisdom of its views, for its efforts to apply them to reforming measures, and we applaud the general system which has led the English government to make a reduction of taxation on certain articles of Turkish produce. But at what a distance England still remains behind in the unlimited liberality which Turkey displays towards her! How far is she from that spirit of equity which ought long since to have overthrown her custom-house barriers to the products of a country which opposes to her no obstacles or prohibitions, no protection of national commerce, and scarcely even duties, in comparison with those countries in which the sale of her manufactures is charged with heavy taxes, accompanied with formalities almost equally oppressive!

It must however be admitted that England is pursuing the right course. Her efforts are not confined to correcting the views of her own system; they also tend to bring other nations to the wise principles of which she now appreciates the value. She extends, across the channel, her hand to France, and urges her not to withhold her efforts to disperse in fertile community the resources of the two first

nations of the globe, each of which would double her comfort by the fusion of those means of production, which political union has not yet been able to conciliate. England says to her neighbour: "We do not propose to you the revision of our tarifs as a diplomatic negotiation, the fruits of which are the reward of the most able,—we propose it as an amicable distribution of reciprocal advantages."

Availing herself of this language, may not Turkey say in her turn to England:—"We do not threaten your trade with the imposts and difficulties with which you burthen ours; but weigh at least the advantages which would accrue to yourself from the reciprocity which justice enjoins you to adopt towards us. Apply a little in our favour those arguments which you yourself employ to convince others. If you be sincere in your professions of new doctrines of political economy,—if you yourselves be convinced of the truth of your principles, we offer you the opportunity which you in vain seek elsewhere, to make the experiment of their application, and to try the question."

This appeal, we are convinced, would not be without an echo in England. Are we not authorized to make this appeal, after perusing the investigation of the interests of Turkey in pages sent forth by the English press? Let us hear what Mr. Urquhart says:—

"Europeans very generally believe that the "trifling per centage exacted on commerce in

" Turkey, and the absence of such restrictions as " European nations have placed on the exchange " of commodities, are concessions extorted by the " strength of Europe from the weakness of Turkey, " or advantages gained by the skill of European " diplomatists from the ignorance of Turkish ad- " ministrators. Now, even those who are partisans " of the European indirect system, and who conse- " quently think that the Turks are injuring them- " selves by their freedom of commerce, must, on " a moment's reflection, perceive, that if the Turks " have adopted this system against their interests, " it has not been by the overreaching of diploma- " tists, or by the threat of violence; for the sti- " pulations regulating the present custom-house " system, to which alone a consul or minister " appeals, when they are violated, were established " in the days of Turkey's vigour and power, and " equally favourable conditions were granted to " the weakest state, and to the most powerful mo- " narchy. In fact, she regarded not who came to " buy or sell, but her own interests in buying and " selling; and while powerful and haughty enough " to treat with contumely the representative of the " first prince of Christendom, she granted hospita- " lity, with his national laws, with the exercise of " his creed, and a free market, to the humblest " merchant of the most insignificant state."

These considerations were not at the time of their publication duly appreciated; but now men

of sound judgment are adopting the sentiments of the author. The Edinburgh Review, whose opinion claims serious attention, adopts and reproduces with the sanction of its authority the ideas of Mr. Urquhart. In a criticism on his work, the Reviewer makes the following remarks, after having enumerated the different importations from Turkey:—

"As we can supply these articles cheaper and "better than the natives can manufacture them, "or than they can buy them from other markets, "there appears one reason only why these exports "should not gradually approximate to the total "consumption of Turkey; namely, her present in- "ability to purchase, and this inability is created "by our refusing to receive and import her produce "in exchange for our goods. We thus lose a vent "of, perhaps, several millions for our cottons "alone. From Turkey, too, the demand and "supply would spread far and wide into the "Southern and Asiatic provinces of Russia. In "common equity, we are called upon to adopt this "liberal policy towards Turkey; for, since she im- "poses slight or no duties upon our goods, the "sticklers for reciprocity can have no plea for con- "tinuing our heavy restrictions upon the importa- "tion of her raw material."*

* "Yet, with a strange perversity, we appear to be least liberal towards those countries which are the most so towards us in their commercial relations."

If other organs of publicity in England, holding as high a place in public opinion as the Edinburgh Review, were to adopt and proclaim these wise doctrines, we might expect soon to see the removal of those heavy burthens which the fiscal laws of England still continue to impose on the trade of that country, and which we find strikingly developed in the work now under our consideration. The author makes an estimate of English merchandize and Turkish produce, each to the amount of 5000*l.*, and he shews that the former, when imported into Turkey, pays a duty equal to 150*l.** whilst the latter, when imported into England, pays 30,000*l.*

To conclude our observations on the commercial question treated of in this book, we may quote the words with which Mr. Urquhart terminates his disquisition.

"In conclusion, Turkey is a country having "three thousand miles of coast still remaining, "and a territory of five hundred thousand square "miles, under the happiest climate, possessed of "the richest soil, raising every variety of produce, "having unrivalled facilities of transport, abound- "ing in forests and mines, opening innumerable "communications with countries further to the "East, with all which our traffic is carried on in

* If three per cent. were actually paid, the sum would be 150*l.*; but as in fact the tax scarcely exceeds 1½ per cent., the amount of the tax may be reduced to 80*l.*

" English bottoms, where labour is cheap, where " industry is unshackled, and commerce is free, " where our goods command every market, where " government and consumers alike desire their in- " troduction. But all the advantages that may " accrue to us from so favourable a state of things, " is contingent on her internal tranquillity and " political re-organization. Here is a field for di- " plomatic action of the noblest and most philan- " thropic character, where our interests are so " much at stake as to call forth our most strenuous " exertions, and where that interest is so reciprocal " as to involve no selfish motives, and to introduce " no invidious distinctions."

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE.

(First Article.)

THE seasons when Governments embark in the work of social reform, are periods of extreme difficulty, and it is necessary for them from time to time to pause and review the work that has been done, and to weigh maturely what is to be attempted next. Violent and rapid changes in a work, where caution is so necessary, seeing that therein is involved the fate of nations, afford but little hope for the future, wherein fertile and unknown regions, however, disclose themselves to those who are wise enough to proceed onward with a measured pace, letting deliberation wait upon every step, causing repose to succeed to activity, and economizing the resources of society with the same care as the prudent man economizes his strength.

The dilatoriness of the Turkish Government in its work of reform, is a consequence of the reforms required, being points of practice and detail and not theory, and no one well acquainted with the country will be disposed to reproach the Government for its tardiness in this respect. Much more labour and consideration are required to restore an entire system to its primitive simplicity, than to build up the complicated systems, which exist

in some countries;—it is more difficult to clear the ground, than to encumber it. It is not our business to raise the veil, which conceals the plans which are meditated on in silence by the Government, but by taking a review of the principal acts done by it within these few years, we may be enabled to appreciate, by anticipation, the spirit in which all that remains to be done, will be conceived.

Police.—In almost every state the Police is considered as a means of government: as an indispensable element attached to power, to protect it from the attempts which might be made on its existence. In Turkey the Police is simply an instrument of public peace: its functions are limited to the easy business of suppressing turbulence or misconduct on the part of individuals, calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the rest. Consequently its character is as simple as the manners of the people; being little suspicious, because the Government itself is little supicious: and but little expensive, because a very inconsiderable number of men is found to be sufficient to repress excesses of rare occurrence, and to which the good sense of the public frequently puts an end, even without the intervention of authority. A political police—that mysterious machine, furnished with innumerable eyes, and whose arms extend invisibly in all directions—whose object is public security, but the means by which these objects are sought to be arrived at are immorality and degradation—that

system is unknown at Constantinople, as well as in the other parts of the Empire. The preservation of general tranquillity, the prompt repression of all public disorders,—such is the circle within which are confined the duties of the subaltern agents, to whom this department of the government service is committed. The Turkish police is merely a street-police; its original intention remainsun perverted, and its utility is incontestable.

To the Seraskier-Pacha, as Governor General of Constantinople, belongs the care of the Police of the capital and its environs. For that purpose a corps of Kavashes is specially attached to his department. The new organization which this corps has lately undergone, has revealed a very curious fact, viz., that a monthly sum of 3075 piastres, equal to 820 francs, or from 33*l.* to 34*l.* is sufficient to defray the whole expense of the central bureau of police, called Tomrouk. If the triple of that sum be taken as the monthly pay of 150 Khavas, directly acting under the orders of the Seraskier, it will appear that an annual amount of 30,000 francs, or 1200*l.* is sufficient for all the charges of the general police of a city, which, with its dependencies, contains 600,000 inhabitants. This almost incredible cheapness of a police establishment, exercising a surveillance over so large a population, and so vast an extent of territory, is a striking fact, and full of instruction with regard to the manners of the nation, and the peculiar character of the govern-

ment. Are we not, for instance, irresistibly led to the conclusion, that the people must be slow to indulge in violent commotions,—that they are not agitated by feelings of unbridled ambition, and that they are especially free from those vices, which, in all other countries, where large bodies of men are collected together, create a demand for almost as many policemen as families. Again, is it possible to avoid the inference, that in the Government there must exist a feeling of confidence, based on the force of its principle, and not on the principle of force; and moreover, the intention of leaving the most perfect freedom to the individual relations of subjects, without impeding or fatiguing them with the incessant action of authority.

The new organization, which the corps performing the functions of the police has undergone, has subjected that body itself to a very severe control, with the view of preventing all exactions and ill-treatment. The ordonnance published on this head has remedied many abuses, which time had successively introduced into the system, which opened the door to extortion, under the pretext of obtaining money for defraying their expenses. There has happily existed no cause for repressing acts of violence committed previous to trial against individuals, standing solely in the capacity of accused parties, and not being yet convicted of any offence; for the police here has never been regarded in any other light than as a mere mechanical

instrument, and not as an executive authority commissioned to act as a judge in its own cause. The silver-headed cane of the kavashes of police is the constable's staff of these countries, where individual liberty is most respected.

Such being the real facts of the case, what becomes of the tales, constantly circulated—of disturbances and conspiracies at Constantinople.—If conspiracy had fixed its permanent abode here,—if secret agitation unceasingly prevailed,—if there existed all those combustible elements, which are so often indicated by honest gazetteers, as ready to burst into flames—would 150 Khavas be sufficient to repress sedition, and 30,000 francs a-year, be enough to hire informers?

An idea of the spirit in which the police is conducted, may be collected from the proclamations, though they are not, be it observed, numerous, which emanate from that department. These documents do not consist of haughty injunctions expressed in stern and menacing terms:—the punishment, which attends delinquencies, is not alluded to,—disobedience is not presumed. It is under the form of friendly advice that the decree of the police appears, and the good sense of the public is mooted, as the best guarantee for the general execution of what is prescribed. All idea of coercion is banished, entire reliance being placed upon a natural feeling impelling every one to the fulfilment of his public duties. This

is, in our humble judgment, a most judicious mode.

On the occasion of the solemnity of the Ramayan, the Seraskier Pacha addressed to the Patriarchs of the different communions an instruction,* directing their attention to the duties imposed on the subjects of the Porte (not being Mussulmans) during this month of sanctification for believers. Every word used by the chief of the police, is mild and affectionate, and is expressive of the Sultan's own sentiments:—"At the several periods, when his Highness visits the mosques," says the firman, "passes from one to another, or stops in any place, to gladden by his presence his faithful subjects, the Rayahs who may meet him, need not be troubled by fear; but, on the contrary, they may proceed on their road, after manifesting that respect which they owe to the Chief of the Empire. The propriety of their demeanour in the presence of the Prince, will be the expression of these sentiments; and he will consider that a surer proof of the devotion of his subjects, than any symptoms of dread or awe, which ought not to be felt by the subjects of a monarch, whose greatest pleasure is to know that they are happy." This language, be it remembered, is addressed to the mob; and it is not, it must be confessed, very consistent with the ideas which prevail in Europe, respecting the exercise of power in Turkey. The

* Moniteur Ottoman, Jan. 17, 1833. No. 77.

moderate tone, and benevolent recommendations of the proclamation are, however, at least as effective, as a practice existing in a constitutional country we could name, where guards furiously precede the carriage of the Prince, and the weapons, associated with the idea of destruction, are employed to open the path for his peaceful progress.

In the above-mentioned proclamation, a few words respecting mendicity are introduced without any affectation of importance, which, nevertheless, convey a great social lesson. After separating the paupers into three classes, viz.:—the maimed and infirm, who have no other resource but public charity, and ought to be received into the hospitals, or other asylums:—the able-bodied, out of work, for whom employment ought to be provided:—and those, who though strong and able, are addicted to indolence, and who should be made the objects of special surveillance, and be compelled to use their faculties for the advantage of society;—it proceeds:—"We are bound to provide succour and protection to the weak and infirm;—work to the labourer out of employment;—but to the sluggard, who only seeks to live at the cost of others, nothing but unrelaxing severity. This is what God commands us to do, and what I desire you to execute."

On a recent and memorable occasion,—the period of the *fêtes*, given for thirteen consecutive

days, in celebration of the marriage of the Sultan's eldest daughter—the true character of the relations between the police and the people was manifested. The following passages of the police ordonnances, published at that time, are too remarkable not to be cited here, as a model of patriarchal benevolence:*—

"During the period of these rejoicings, it is more than ever incumbent on every inhabitant to preserve the respect which he owes to public order. Tumult would convert into moments of pain the time consecrated to pleasure and joy. This truth will not fail to be felt by every individual. The spot designated as the place of meeting for witnessing the passage of the cortege is vast:—there an immense number of spectators may with ease move about. No motive, then, not even that of a pardonable curiosity, can exist for encumbering with crowds the narrow streets, obstructing the thoroughfares, or for creating the risk of accidents by impeding the progress of the troops and carriages.

"Know, then, inhabitants of Constantinople, how to enjoy, abundantly, but without disorder, these days devoted to amusement. It would be grievous to me to think of inflicting punishment at a time when the Sultan, our master, desires to see all the people of his capital happy. Remember this advice; and deport yourselves in all places

* Moniteur Ottoman, 12th July, 1834. No. 83.

with that propriety and tranquillity which characterize faithful and loyal subjects."

Immense crowds assembled every day to witness these *fêtes*, and every European present was struck with the unexampled tranquillity which prevailed among the multitude, and which was the result solely of the good disposition of the public, and of habits of order and quiet. There was not a single excess to repress—not a single offence to punish. The police was unseen, and inactive. To the truth of this statement, the strongest testimony can be borne by Namik Pacha, at present Ambassador at London.* On one of the thirteen days, we met him on the plateau of Dolma-Baktchè, where the people were collected in a dense and innumerable mass. He was at the head of a few companies, and was charged with the chief superintendence of the place. "I am here," said he, "to maintain order;—but I have nothing to do but to admire it."

This remarkable expression describes, better than volumes could do, the character of the police at Constantinople, and of the Mussulman people.

Imposts.—Throughout all the provinces of the Empire, the collection of the annual imposts takes place at half yearly periods. It is effected according to accounts or budgets, prepared by the Cadi of each district, subject to revision at Con-

* Since this article was written, Namik Pacha has been succeeded by Nourri Effendi.

stantinople. The preparation of these budgets had gradually become encumbered by various abuses, and the charges imposed on the people had in consequence increased. Private, but powerful, interests were involved in these malversations. Nevertheless, the Sultan, as soon as he learned the existence of the abuses, did not hesitate to eradicate them, and reform visited that important branch of the public service.

An imperial firman* was published in the month of the Ramayan, preceded by an *exposé* of the necessity on which it was founded, having for its object the re-establishment of the imposts as the amount fixed by the ancient laws. The firman sets out by enumerating the various modes, in which this arbitrary augmentation, made in the legal taxation, had been introduced:—Among these are included such items as the expenses of Commissioners, and of Tartars, household expenses, charges for superintendence for the suite of the Musselleins or Voïvodes, gratuitous distributions to travellers; all which expenditure ought to be defrayed at the personal charge of the Government authorities. The firman then proceeds to notice the increase which had taken place in the legal expenses for the preparation of the Budget, under the head of charges for *procès-verbaux*, and fees, while no higher payment ought to be allowed than a *para* for every *piastre*, or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

* Moniteur Ottoman, Feb. 22, 1834. No. 78.

The practice of causing the expenses of public functionaries traversing the provinces by the orders of Government to be defrayed by the inhabitants, is stigmatised in the firman as most vexatious, and unjust towards the people. "The inhabitants," it declares, "are not bound to give anything beyond *fresh water*, to those functionaries, who must purchase, with ready money, and at the market price, all articles which they may require in their journies."

Finally, all collections of money made in the interval between the two half-yearly periods,—that is to say,—at a time when the people need all their resources, in order to carry on the business of agriculture, and trade, are denounced as abuses which must immediately cease.

"No one is ignorant," says the Sultan, "that I am bound to afford support to all my subjects against vexatious proceedings:—to endeavour, unceasingly, to lighten, instead of increasing their burdens, and to ensure their peace and tranquillity. Therefore, those acts of oppression are at once contrary to the will of God, and to my imperial orders."

The measures adopted to prevent the repetition of abuses, and which are prescribed by the firman, are based on the wisest principles. They are:—1st. The separation, in the budgets, of the imposts appropriated to the service of the general government from those appropriated to local purposes. 2nd. The

strictest supervision at Constantinople. 3rd. The assembly of all the distinguished inhabitants before the judge of the place, for the purpose of collecting the tax. 4th. The responsibility, in cases of arbitrary taxation, of the functionary guilty of the offence, as well as of the judge and other authorities, who shall have tolerated it, and refrained from sending the proper information to the Government. 5th. The obligation of distributing the impost, whilst maintaining its legal amount, among the people, according to each person's fortune and condition: —the rich and the poor being required to pay in proportion to their means.

KHARATCH.—Of all the imposts, that of the Kharatch or Capitation tax, although moderate in its amount, was the most burdensome to the Rayahs on account of the mode of its collection. As this tax is attached to the individual, the slightest abuse in the mode of collection immediately assumes the form of a serious attack on individual liberty, which, as we have already stated, is here the object of much more real respect, than is commonly imagined.

The Government had, for some time past, formed the idea of making a reform in this portion of the public imposts. In order to effect this purpose in such a manner as to render any future change unnecessary, it was felt desirable to wait until the general census, directed to be made in all the provinces, was completed. Nevertheless, the knowledge of the vexatious acts, committed by the col-

lectors, having come home to the Sultan, induced his Highness to lose no time in proceeding to the requisite reformation. The desire to stay oppression proved more powerful than the pecuniary consideration, and an immediate reform has been decided on, in spite of the loss that thereby may accrue to the Treasury. This benevolent idea is thus expressed in the *exposé* which precedes the firman, published for this purpose.*

"Those guilty agents (the collecting officers) have carried fiscal rapacity to such a length, as to demand the capitation tax from Rayahs, either crippled, suffering from illness, or very far advanced in years; unfortunate beings, whom the sacred laws of Islamism exempt from every tax, out of compassion for the ills with which God has visited them. They have even made the tax fall on children, who have not yet reached the age, which enables individuals to furnish outof the profits of their industry, their portion to the public charges. It is the duty of the Rayahs to pay the lawful tax of the Kharatch, and to comply with the conditions attached to their station. When they have fulfilled this duty, their existence, their honour, their property are entitled to as much respect as those of the Mussulmans—such is the law of Islam. And it is a sacred duty to see that it be put in execution; and whatever public functionary transgress, violates it by vexatious or oppressive acts towards the

* Moniteur Ottoman, April 26, 1834. No. 81.

Rayahs, insults religion, and rebels against his Sultan."

The firman has abolished the collectors of the Kharatch, and ordains that in future there should be instituted in each province and district, a commission composed of the Cadi, the Mussulman, or Waïwode, and the members constituting the commonalties of the Rayahs, to which commission the collection of the personal tax is specially assigned. It is prescribed by the firman that without the concurrence of the principal Rayahs, no Kharatch ticket can be given to any person, nor any sum received in exchange. Every ticket given in acquittance of the tax must have, in addition to the seal of the Cadi and the administrative authority, the signature of one of the principal Rayahs.

The returns furnished by the Municipal Chiefs of the different Rayah nations, is to be held sufficient evidence of the number of persons comprising them, as well as of the changes which take place in the course of the year. Provision is made by the firman with respect to the two following cases:— First, Where the local authorities, members of the commission of the Kharatch, adopt vexatious proceedings towards the Rayahs, in consequence of pretended doubts as to the accuracy of the returns. Second, Where the Municipal Chiefs betray their duty by furnishing false returns, either with regard to the number of inhabitants, or the condition of certain Rayahs, necessary for the arrangement of

the classes, and for determining the gradation of the tax. In either of these cases a strict investigation is ordered to take place; and the offence being proved, either on the part of the authorities towards the Rayahs, or on the part of the Municipal Chiefs towards the Government, it will be punished in an exemplary manner.

All the payments previously made for the collection of the tax—such as office charge, collection dues, &c., are abolished. The commission discharges its functions gratuitously. The slight expenses occasioned by its meetings will be defrayed out of the whole sum collected, and a deduction to that amount will be allowed by the Treasury of the Kharatchs.

The Rayahs are divided into three classes. The first class is to pay for the annual capitation tax the sum of sixty piastres for every able male person; the second class is to pay thirty piastres on the same account; and the third, fifteen piastres. These sums are respectively equal to about sixteen, eight, and four francs. The smallness of this charge is certainly very remarkable, when it is considered that no other tax besides is imposed on the Rayah, with the exception of those imposts which Mussulmans are also obliged to pay, and which are placed either upon landed property, or upon the exercise of trade (of recent adoption); imposts light and easy of acquittance, when legally exacted.

Besides, the municipalities, members of the com-

mission of the Kharatch, being only responsible for a fixed sum, determined according to the number of Rayahs in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd classes, have the privilege of arranging its distribution. This distribution is effected in proportion to each person's fortune, so that the poor man is relieved by the increase of the charge on the rich; and the concurrence of all the inhabitants in the election of the body, by whom the distribution is arranged, is a guarantee for its fairness.

This firman, which has been received with unanimous approbation by the Rayah population, is characterized by the introduction of two very important measures. The levying of the tax without the aid of collectors; and the elevation of the municipal element to the rank of administrative power. Once that a Government adopts the plan of levying imposts without collectors, it cannot fail to perceive the great advantages it must derive from such a system; in respect to the economy, the facility, and the fairness of the collection. It is equally beneficial to the tax-payers, to public tranquillity, and to the Treasury. The beneficent action of the municipal element is promptly felt, wherever it is introduced, and these two great principles of social organization, now put in practice, will, by their fruits, prove that there cannot be found a more simple, or a more solid foundation for the general work of reform.

As we are under the necessity of bringing this

article to a close, we must postpone the review of what has been done for the central administration, and the armed force.

It must be remarked, that the Capitation tax or Kharatch, was paid by the Rayah in lieu of military service. The Turk is liable to be called on to defend his country by arms. The Christian and Jew pay instead a yearly sum. As proof of this, the Greek Armatoli, and other Rayahs that are liable to be called on to serve, do not pay Kharatch. In some places, the Turks pay Kharatch, as in the province of Volo in Europe, and in Baba near the ruins of Troy, and therefore are released from serving.

It is evident thence to foresee, that in time Turks will be called on to pay the capitation tax, and Christians to serve, and thus religious distinctions abolished. The payment of the regular troops will lead to this.

But it is evident, equally to any one who understands this Government, which forces nothing, but leaves causes to work out their natural effects, that this change will not proceed from it. It will be the people that will demand the change. The conscription presses unequally on the Turks, and although the disciplined troops compared with those of European Governments, is but a drop in the ocean, still the Turks consider they bear a

heavier burden than their Christian fellow-subjects who pay only a trifle. On the other hand, the Christians, when the system of National Guards comes into operation, will find themselves placed on a footing of inequality, if not allowed to serve. So that I foresee, at no distant time, an equalization of rights and duties between the Turks and Rayahs. It cannot well be otherwise.

I would next remark, that the applotment of the capitation tax on each individual, is to be settled by the Municipal Chief alone. The sum to be collected in the district over which he has jurisdiction, being agreed on by the Commission of which he is only a member. This, as the Moniteur observes, will lead to its converting itself into a *bonâ fide* property tax. It has always done so. The poll tax was left in Magnesia Roumely, to be levied by the Municipal Chiefs, and it became a property tax, the applotment being decided on by the assembled village. I might name many more instances, but shall content myself with a curious practice observed by the Jews. We know that the Jews every where, however they may distrust the letter of their law to support them in the frauds they practise on those whom they call Goïm or Gentiles, are always guided by principles of the greatest uprightness and integrity in their transactions with their brethren. Not only this, but their disinterested kindness and humanity towards the poorer part of their fraternity, ought to call up a blush on

the cheek of Christians. In the East, a custom which, with them, is stronger than all law, makes it incumbent on every wealthy Jew, to purchase from the collector a number of certificates, or Kharatch papers, in proportion to his wealth, to be distributed among the poorer Jews—and thus by a simple moral process, this has been converted into a property tax. But while I approve of the principle of the reform, with regard to the assessment and collection of this tax, and which I hope will be, ere long, extended to all departments of the revenue, I must notice an error, and a grave one too, into which the Porte has been betrayed by a want of a clear perception of this principle in all its bearings. It is a great matter that the Porte saw the necessity of bringing the municipalities into closer contact with its functionaries, than it was before on the important matter of taxation. It is not to be overlooked that it has dispensed with the useless and pernicious office of Kharatch collectors, and established a direct intercourse between the Municipal Chiefs and the executive officers. But it is still charged with needless complication, and therefore has failed in working well, by placing as intermediaries between itself and the representatives of creeds and districts, the Governor of the Province and the Cadi. It has failed in raising in respectability the former, and brought them into collision with the latter. Several disputes have arisen respecting the enumeration of heads. I shall instance one that

took place at Smyrna when I was there. Words ran so high between the Turkish functionaries and the municipalities of the Rayahs, that the latter broke up the conference, and rushed into the street in a high state of excitement, and spoke in no measured terms of the Government authorities—both sent up statements of their case to the Porte. The answer the Porte sent down, was in favour of the Rayahs. This established the fact, that if the Central Government had communicated directly with the municipalities, this collision would have been saved. As the official organ of the Turkish Government allows there must be errors committed in a work of reform, it was the good fortune of this Government that its error was so soon detected, and which let to run on, the rectification would be difficult, perhaps dangerous. Doubtless the municipalities will be, ere long, placed in direct communication with the Porte. This, any one will see that has read the history of municipalities in this and other countries, will lead to their being brought into contact with it—that they will be called up to check or grant the supplies. This will lead to the re-establishment of the old Tartar Kuriltai or Representative Assembly. Such are the hopes of political regeneration held out by this one reform of the Sultan—if Russia's influence be curbed, and prevented from continuing anarchy and dissension.

Ed.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE.

Second Article.

THE ameliorations introduced into many important branches of the taxes or imposts, terminated the first portion of our rapid review. We cannot, however, dismiss that part of our subject without calling attention to what was done by the Sultan in favour of the Rayahs of Varna at the period which we are now examining. A large number of the Christian inhabitants of that town and its environs had emigrated in consequence of the political events of 1828 and 1829. Those who remained, and from whom, on account of the smallness of their number, the Government had not exacted, for the space of five years, the annual impost on vines, the principal culture of the country, presented a memorial in which they stated that they were neither in a condition to pay up the hundred thousand piastres of arrears, nor even the impost for the current year, amounting to twenty thousand piastres, because a great number of the vineyards has since the emigration been left uncultivated.

The Sultan forthwith ordained :*—

The complete remission of the amount of the

* Moniteur Ottoman of 12th April, 1834.—No. 80.

five years' imposts due from the Rayahs of Varna to the treasury.

The remission of the imposts for the current year.

The exemption of these Rayahs from all impost during an indefinite term of years; until it can be legally proved that their vineyards are in such a state as to enable them to resume the payment of the tax, without inconvenience or loss.

The Sultan having ascertained that many of the emigrants, desirous of returning, were prevented by want of means, or by apprehension of consequences, directed the Governor of Varna to make known the exemption from taxes, the amnesty granted in their favour, and to defray the expenses out of the treasury, of such of the emigrants who might return but not having means of paying them themselves. On this the emigrants flocked back to Varna, and the Sultan directed money to be distributed amongst them, out of the privy purse, to purchase implements of agriculture.

In other countries we find, that to obviate loss to the treasury is the predominant consideration in every fiscal arrangement; but here the Sultan is guided by benevolence and justice, principles of paramount necessity in all Governments; for the duty of every Government is to consider the distresses of the suffering class before the interests of those who are better circumstanced.

The Rayahs of Varna sent an address to the

Sultan, in which the following touching expressions occur.

"We bow ourselves before the Sovereign whose generous soul is opened towards us, and our grateful hearts implore heaven to shower blessings on the days of his life. We suspended all work for one day, and on that day, all, both old and young, assembled in the Church to fulfil the solemn debt of gratitude and love."

Central Administration.

The Administrative Reforms introduced by the Sultan have two principal objects in view, viz:— Order in the public service, by the proper distribution of authority, and economy in expenditure, by the suppression of useless and sinecure offices. Every Administrative Establishment of long standing is subject by lapse of time to the insensible and reciprocal encroachments of the powers connected with it, and by the creation of officers for the gratification of privileged ambition. Hence arise the confusion and conflict of authorities, and the extravagant increase of Government expenses. These abuses are the inevitable result of time and human passions. The regulations of one period not being found suitable to another, are altered and superseded, and become at length ineffectual and inapplicable. Now, as none of the component parts which form human societies are stationary, they require to be, by constant attention and

improvement, kept on a level with the general progress. The functions of a chief magistrate are similar to those of a provident cultivator of the earth, who incessantly applies the pruning knife, uproots the parasitical weeds, ploughs at the proper season the ground he wishes to keep in a state of fertility, and which is to produce continual new crops. This is not destruction, it is life and improvement.

The Government of Constantinople, like that of every other country which has not undergone reform for a long series of reigns, had insensibly been incroached upon by what we denominate sinecures. Hence the machinery of the system became considerably complicated, while the treasury was overburdened with expenses, which impeded its operations. Much courage was necessary to institute examination into this labyrinth, and more still to remove all the superfetations which obstructed the free action of the machine. Some legislative measures, expressed in an ordinance of a few lines, have required for their enforcement long efforts of patience and firmness, which the simplicity of their form might render almost incredible. Of this number was the reform of the Turkish Central Administration. To effect this reform the Sultan found it necessary to exercise all the authority of his arbitrary power to overcome the resistance of private interests, which opposed the innovation to the last, and called to

their succour the aid of every influence within their reach, but which never dreamed of shielding themselves under the common excuse of acquired rights. That abuses could confer rights is an idea that could never enter the head of any one in Turkey.

All offices of ancient date, under the name of *functions of the divan*, had increased in number enormously, and engaged a train of officials, far more extensive than the performance of the duties required. By means of complicated subdivisions, various independent posts had been created, which had no connection one with another, and which were dearly paid. Powerful men had been appointed to these posts, under various titles. Such a state of things was at once detrimental to the homogeneity of the government, and to the interests of the treasury. It was requisite that the reform should bear this double object in view. "It was indispensable," says the preamble of the ordinance,* "that some of these offices should be entirely suppressed, and others considerably modified, so that to each appointment in the different ministerial departments there should in future be attached an *effective* labour, and consequently a remuneration appropriate to the rank and the support of the person filling it." This strikes directly at the very spirit of sinecure; effective labour

* Ottoman Moniteur, January 17th, 1834. No. 77.

being the indispensable condition of the appointment.

The same ordinance which suppressed at a single stroke fifteen posts, important by their prerogatives and their emoluments, but completely null as regarded utility, united them to the principal branches of the administration, from which they ought never to have been separated. With these posts have disappeared their dependencies, the numerous train of subaltern places, which were grouped around them, for the purpose of conferring importance on the functionary who was the patron of an imposing retinue of clerks, appointed only to conceal the utter want of employment. The ordinance likewise rooted out from the administration three appointments which had been engrafted upon it, and which were purely court appointments :—the ordinance expresses that the functions of the titularies attaching them exclusively to the seraglio, they will cease to be included in the posts of the divan. Finally, after having effected the administrative concentration, together with an enormous economy of expense, the ordinance regulates the duties, by dividing the superior powers into four distinct classes. Under the appearance of a simple designation of rank in public ceremonies, to obviate all conflict for precedence, it has restored the administrative hierarchy, which had been totally annihilated in the confusion of useless titles, and functions without labour.

This important purification of the central administration was preceded by another, which prepared the way for it. The Sultan, persuaded that it is not sufficient for a sovereign to command, in order to ensure the ready fulfilment of his orders, and that good example has a power superior to that of supreme authority, commenced by correcting the abuses existing round his own person. He decreed a new organization of the imperial household.*

All the useless appointments, created to uphold what is termed the dignity of the throne, were mercilessly abolished. All titles without duties, all offices without functions, were suppressed. A superior officer, under the title of Director of the Imperial Palace, was invested with the general superintendance of the seraglio. Order and economy were introduced, where profusion and irregularity had prevailed for so many years; and the scaffolding of ranks and honours erected round Ottoman sovereigns, as a necessity of Imperial Majesty, suddenly disappeared under the energetic hand, which at the same time was attempting reform of similar nature, but more important and difficult, in the central administration.

Armed Force.—The good sense of the nations of the East, has at all times repelled the system of permanent armies. The Arabs of Spain never

* Ottoman Moniteur, January 4th, 1834.. No. 76.

27549

rallied round their standards until the moment when war commenced, and when the campaign was ended, they returned to their agricultural and manufacturing labours. Agriculture and trade were so important in the eyes of the Caliphs, that they would have thought themselves wanting in their first duties, had they deprived either the one or the other, except in cases of absolute and immediate necessity, of the hands employed in those pursuits. The only corps kept permanently under arms, were the cavalry of the Caliph's guard, and the troops which corresponded with the old French Marechaussée; but they were employed only for the internal police. The military service seems to have been imposed on the Arabs, only in voluntary obedience to the orders of the Caliphs, as a duty, in some sort entirely religious, and not by any political obligation. In the military usages of the Caliphate of Spain, and by reason of its special position a fatal fault, and one that has been severely reprehended,—the dispersion of the Mussulman army, after each campaign, rendered the preservation of conquests impossible; whilst its enemies, commanding armies, bound by the chains of the feudal hierarchy and political obligations, were always ready for the attacks, and even with equal forces were sure to conquer in the incessant war which they waged against the Caliphs.

But this defect in the Arab organization was merely relative; in itself it was, on the contrary, a

principle of wise administration. Standing armies exhaust the population and the wealth of a nation, which they consume without in their turn producing any fruit. In our time, the creation of national militias have resolved the problem of the preservation of men for the internal culture and defence of the territory. This purely defensive system must rapidly prevail throughout all Europe. The love of military glory is on the decline, like every thing which is not founded on a rational basis, and which is at variance with the interests of mankind.

Turkey will not have been the last nation to enter upon this course of real civilization. It is remarkable that a few years after the creation of regular and permanent troops in the Ottoman Empire, the Arab principle, so watchful of the interests of agriculture and commerce, predominated over the new institution. Far from yielding to the seductions of a great task successfully accomplished, to the dazzling array of numerous battalions, the Sultan thought of the depopulation, and the void occasioned in the ranks of the cultivators. Yet it was necessary to provide for the defence of the country by the means which science indicates:—fifty years of reverses proved the necessity of so doing. The Sultan accordingly ordered the formation of national militias, and published his motives in a manifesto, which is worthy of consideration.*

* Ottoman Moniteur, January 10th, 1834. No. 82.

After explaining what is requisite, on the one hand, for the defence of the Empire, by reason of its extent, and on the other for the preservation of hands for the culture of the land, the object of the plan is summed up as follows:—

1st. To augment throughout the Empire the means of public security and comfort, which rest on the inviolability of the territory.

2nd. To attain this result without in any degree diminishing the agricultural wealth of the country.

3rd. To obviate, in the event of war, levies of troops made hastily and without discrimination; and to avoid all the inconveniences of precipitation.

4th. To put a period to the fruitless expenses which burthened the inhabitants.

"To relieve the people," says the manifesto, "from those heavy burthens, to prevent disastrous depopulation, and at the same time to insure the integrity of the Ottoman territory by an imposing number of able and well disciplined troops, his Highness wishes that henceforward every Mussulman in the vigour of life should be instructed in the use of arms and military exercise: devoting to those exercises only his intervals of leisure, without quitting his native town, and without renouncing the labours of his profession."

It was requisite to determine the principal basis of the institution. This was done shortly after the marriage of the Sultana. The Sultan availed

himself of the presence in Constantinople of several Viziers and Governors of provinces, and he summoned all those men who were familiar with the details of the administration, to deliberate on the plan which he submitted to their attention. For the first time was held in Constantinople, independently of the Council which forms the Government, an assembly instructed to examine a state question.* Several sittings were occupied with the discussion of the various opinions. It was decided that each member of the Assembly should draw up his observations in writing, and a committee was appointed to arrange, from the mass of documents furnished, a plan, which being presented to the Assembly, was again discussed, article by article, and finally adopted. Then a General Council was convoked at the residence of the Grand Mufti. It was attended by the Ministers, members of the Divan, the members of the first assembly, the effendis, professors of the public schools, and the scheiks and ulemas who had come from the interior of the country to be present at the festivities of the Princess's marriage.

By this means administrative information was combined with the information of men versed in matters regulated by religious law. The plan of the new organization, after being first investigated by a deliberative assembly, thus received the sanc-

* Ottoman Moniteur, August 30, 1834. No. 86.

tion of an assembly which may in some sort be called a representation of all the classes of the State. Nothing similar had ever taken place under the predecessors of Sultan Mahmoud.

The creation of the militias, which conciliates the old Mussulman principles so rigorously observed by the Caliphate, with the political necessities of our time, promises to the country a series of ameliorations which it renders indispensable. No Government would commit the error of placing arms in the hands of a population whom it would not wish to render happy by institutions congenial to their feelings and habits, and favourable to their interests.

AUGSBURG GAZETTE.

ANSWER OF THE AUGSBURG GAZETTE

TO M. DE LAMARTINE.

First Article.

THE voice of the Author of the "Poetical Meditations," even when it is raised on a subject of so stern and imaginative a nature as political theorization, is certain to awaken an interest in the minds of the greater portion of those who constitute the intelligence of Europe. After a ramble along the coasts of the Ottoman Empire, Lamartine unveils to his country and to Europe the new destiny he has conceived, in the midst of his rambles, for this Empire; and the new wishes he has formed. The more we esteem the Poet—the more we appreciate the influence his opinions are likely to command—the more do we feel the necessity of refuting his opinions when they appear to us erroneous, and the objects of his wishes when they seem unjust.

The point of view, in which Lamartine regards the East and her relations with Europe, is that of civilization, such as he understands it as a Frenchman and a Christian. This, we think, is placing our level too low. To further the progress

of civilization is certainly a most praiseworthy object.—But what civilization does Lamartine mean? His own no doubt—the civilization of France; of Christianity—of Catholicism. Is such a scheme practicable? if practicable, would it be advantageous? For to suppose that civilization, admitting the term in his own unphilosophical sense, is one and equally applicable and beneficial to all,—is to be ignorant of the history of the human race, of the character of the people which is the subject of his meditations; it is to allow national and personal vanity to usurp the place of enquiry and of reason.

That civilization which raised the gigantic temples of Thebes, and that which exhibits itself in the works of a Phidias and a Praxiteles, of a Xenophon and of a Plato,—are they one and the same? Does the civilization of the times of Horace and Virgil resemble ours, in its nature—in its effects? If we are to understand by civilization, the developement and extension of scientific enquiry, the increase of the luxuries of the higher classes,—then must we admit the superiority of European over Mohammedan civilization.

But if this definition comprehends the preservation of our moral purity, and the quiet contentment and happiness, which is its result,—then, there is, perhaps, not one individual among those really acquainted with the East and the West, who will not give the preference to the civilization of

the East.* Lamartine himself honours this fact. A feature, indeed, so prominent, we will even say, of so decisive an importance, could not have escaped the observation of one, whose world is the simple and spontaneous movements of the human heart. When he regrets in these countries the absence of civil institutions resembling our own, might we not ask if this absence—if this dissimilitude between the constitutions of the two societies does not prove on their side a moral superiority.

If supposing that the system of European administration should appear as the result of Oriental civilization, or as originally coming from thence, its inhabitants would not gradually fall, from step to step, to that degree of moral depravity which, amongst us, necessitated the adoption of measures, sometimes not altogether in harmony with natural principles, sometimes in direct opposition to them;

* We may here remark, that on the advantages already obtained by eastern civilization, the good part of western civilization may without injury be engrafted,—its instruction, its scientific enquiries and scientific results, its military discipline, its agricultural and mechanical improvements, whatever, in fact, is CIVILIZATION. Not, certainly, its tribunals, penal codes, custom houses, gens d'armes police, standing armies, church government, public debt, laws of succession, whether English primogeniture or French subdivision, its close corporations, or general centralization; nothing, in fact, in political science, save representation, which is no less Eastern than European. The West, on the contrary, can borrow nothing from the East, save the instructive, but humiliating conviction, that in politics, there is more science in simplicity than in complicated, even when honest and able, calculations.—ED.

almost always encroaching upon individual liberty, and at all times incompatible with our peace and happiness.

It is true, and it is one cause of the erroneous opinions we hear and read of daily concerning the Eastern nations, that we seldom meet with among them anything analogous to those potatypes which we designate *Nation, Empire, Government.* These men are not what we are. Such a difference exists, because their mode of life, their way of speaking, thinking, acting—their existence appears not to be the same as ours. To require that a cherry-tree should produce apples, to reproach the plantains with the want of the formal and lofty branches of the poplar, would be quite as rational as to condemn that which is different, or to us unintelligible, in the innumerable diversity of the human race. Those who disregard possibilities, may require the inhabitants of the East to renounce the institutions existing on their soil, and the habits formed by their social condition; a conqueror might argue so, but not the man who places himself on a far higher level—that of a philanthropist. Lamartine thought, but did not reason, on this subject.

To say that patriotism, security of property, the feeling of independence, the love of glory, are sentiments to which the people of the East are strangers, is to advance that for which he has no authority. For 100,000 Europeans, who wander to the East, scarcely a single Asiatic comes to

Europe. And yet this man does not love his country! that country, to which, if he dies in a foreign land, he requests his last remains to be transported, devoting his fortune in the execution of this sacred duty. He has no feeling of security of property? Would he not say the same of Europeans, if Lamartine had explained to him by what tenure property is held in Europe, and the conditions on which that property is acquired, maintained and transferred—he, who knows, that not even the Sultan dare, without his express permission, enter his house, would have some difficulty in understanding, how in Europe we can call a house our own which may daily be ransacked, shut up, and sequestered. The proprietor in the East holds on other conditions than we do in Europe, nevertheless he does possess. From India, even to the centre of France, the Mussulman has proved that the prosperity and glory of his country are dear to him. By country, we do not here mean those having one origin and one colour, or still less those inhabiting the same territory, surrounded by two rivers, bounded by two hills, but those whom *one conviction* unites,

We will here point out a deeper and less observed source of our erroneous judgment, not only as regards the East, but other subjects also. We mean the false light in which the difference of language places the matter to be examined, and the ideas which we consequently form. We say in

Europe, Emperor, King, House, Court, Administration, Governor, Subject, &c. &c.; and we apply these terms to things, which, in the East, appear to us more or less to resemble our own. A closer enquiry however soon exposes the difference, and then taking the rule established with us as applicable to all, we reject that to which we have applied similar names, as faulty and corrupted. Could they not, were they equally unjust, condemn us, with equal facility and self-satisfaction.

Lamartine attempts to prove that the actual inhabitants of Turkey do not constitute a people, because the Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, Bulgarians, Jews, Maronites, Turcomans, Druses, &c., who compose the population, although born upon the same soil, do not consider themselves of the same nation. The natural reason is that they really do not *form* the *same people*, but that the tie of religion, stronger and more binding than the limits of geography, unites them in heart. In some states of Europe, we see the same peculiarity. The distinction of race, in these countries, is as marked as in Turkey. The Arab and the Osmanli, both subjects of the Sultan, do not differ from one another, more than the Pole and the Russian, who serve the same Emperor, nor more than the Hungarian and Bohemian, who both are Austrians.

The Eastern governments in general, and more especially the Turkish, the subject of Lamartine's remarks, far from imitating the example given by

those of Europe, have never attempted (for considering such an act as a crime both towards God and man, they would never have undertaken) to compel the mass of the people, who are subject to them, to adopt the same mode of life—to class them, arbitrarily, according to a system considered as good, and no doubt intended as such, but which makes bodies of men resemble a machine, where all parts are subjected to a common impetus, of which some are moters, others are moved, and all are set in motion by causes, which are not spontaneous, to produce results, the benefits of which are not common to all.

This system may have its history — may produce good or evil—it may be true or false; and in opposition to the worst consequences, we may be compelled to admit, we set down an Asiatic sovereign as an effeminate being, reclining upon cushions of velvet, amusing himself by beheading his subjects; considering himself as brother of the sun and of the moon; looking upon his kingdom as the universe, and the universe as a toy bestowed upon him by God at his birth. Upon this representation, which is so much the more true, as it was instilled into us in the nursery, and confirmed to us a few years later on the stage, and convinced that we coincide with the whole intelligence of Europe —are our minds made up on the social state of the East.

Every independent throne in Asia, must neces-

sarily depend on heaven, since he who reigns is the chief of the religion :*—as such, he is the head of the state, and the state itself is only a re-union of people partly independent one of another, and partly united by certain general interests under one chief, who, by virtue of certain rights of supremacy, holds the reins of government :—he is entrusted with the administration of religion and justice ;—he also is the first sentry to watch over his people, and to guard it from foreign danger. As regards the rest, he leaves to each family, or to each collection of families, the absolute liberty of what relates to morals, customs, to employment and religion :—he cannot venture to break through this circle circumscribed around him ; for non-interference is for him the first of obligations, and the first of rights to the people ; a bond so lax can offer but feeble means of resistance against foreign aggression ; but, assuredly, it cannot be prejudicial to individual happiness ;—viewed as the standard of the merits of a people, it cannot appear characteristic of a barbarous nation.

We conclude, therefore, that the introduction of European civilization, of a system of European

* Not, be it observed, chief of a political church body. The priests of Islamism, are the elders of each congregation, without salary, combination, prerogative, tythe, costume, or pretension. The Sultan, as Imaun of Islamism, *ought to be* the most respected of the whole congregation, as the Imaun of the village *is* of his congregation.—Ed.

government, would be disastrous for the East, and never could be desired save by those wholly ignorant of the question. As regards our improvements in the conveniences and luxuries of life, they are opposed by the taste of the East:—that the embellishments of our habitations, and our peculiar enjoyments, are agreeable to *us*, no one will contradict: but he who finds himself well does not feel the necessity of being better. There are many things which we find comfortable, which would not be considered so by an Asiatic:—many of our comforts are singularly at variance with his customs, and others would but ill accord with the climate or soil. The Bedouin, who, for thousands of years, has led a wandering life, and who is still insensible of the prodigies of civilization spread around him, he does not *wish* to renounce his primitive habits, and sets but little value on that state which makes the peasant envy the lot of the inhabitant of the capital. The Turk and the Arab understand by *enjoyment*, *honour*, *distinction*, ideas different from our's:—compared to his magnificence, our's would be vanity;—his pleasures are as expensive in his way, as our's are to us, and a stranger to the pressing necessity that prompts us to scatter our existence around us, and which gives their chief value to most of the institutions of our civilization, he would estimate them at only an infinitely small portion of the price we set on them.

Lamartine's observations on the tributaries of

the Porte, as compared with their masters—such as the Greeks, the Druses, &c. is strictly true:—but how could this position be different? What would these people gain, in point of independence, by imitating an European state of civilization?—Christian conquerors have destroyed, wherever it has been in their power, the native Mohammedan:—they have, even in our own days, declared the impossibility of allowing them to intermarry amongst them, and have banished thousands of families far from their paternal homes:—the victorious Mohammedans received the Christians with open arms——they respected their religion, their property, almost always too, their laws and their institutions.

ANSWER OF THE AUGSBURG GAZETTE TO M. DE LAMARTINE.

Second Article.

LAMARTINE calls the reforms of the Sultan before his Tribunal, and condemns them without reprieve. We are inclined to consider this sentence as just, whenever these reforms seek for foreign materials of construction, instead of employing those that exist in the nation itself; whenever they violate religion or morals, but not in as much as they are calculated to suppress the disorders of the administration, not when they oppose a barrier to the presumptuous caprices of subalterns. Enlightened by adversity, perhaps also by prudent counsels, above all favoured by the unexpected turn affairs have taken, the Sultan appears to have understood exactly the exigencies of his empire, and to have taken the nearest road to satisfy them. We cite as proofs the measures which he has latterly adopted to protect his people from the abuse of power, the cupidity of governors, the capricious tyranny of the military, as well as to keep within the bounds of their duties the ministers of religion and justice.

Lamartine looks on the fall of the empire as imminent. This opinion we do not partake in. If it were a European structure, Turkey, without

doubt, would be near its dissolution. But it constitutes an Asiatic edifice, of which only some columns repose on the soil of Europe. Attacked from without perhaps it would succumb to-morrow. Tortured by foreign interventions, such as that of Navarin, its chief would have to fly from the throne of Constantinople. But left to itself, to its own genius, and what cause will bring on its ruin? Its interior may be sometimes the theatre of partial insurrections—of disputes sometimes bloody, but the vital principle of the empire is not thereby compromised. *The revolutionary spirit does not exist in the East.* The Sultan is there the God and prophet of the Mussulmans. No element that even menaces the existence of the state is discoverable in its bosom. That which strikes us as symptoms of dissolution and of ruin, is but the natural order of its constitution, of which the ties, for being less tightly drawn, are not the less enduring than those of a European Government. As to the heterogeneous parts that compose its population, we mean those that do not profess the Mohammedan religion, they do not possess (neither can) the force of a central generalization, and one cannot discover in the different fragments of the population any desire of arming themselves against the masters of the country. In a certain number of them, the Armenians for example, which forms the strongest mass when united, there exists not one single European element. Ages may pass over this people without

its seeking to operate the slightest change in its position towards the Sultan. Greece may separate itself from the Ottoman empire as a part foreign to it, and as it were superadded to the extremities of this vast body. Egypt may, up to a certain point, detach itself from the centre, and cause, as immediate result, the Arab and Osmanli to live apart. But even in this case the Turkish empire will not fall, the religious tie will continue always to bind into one body these two portions, even under different authorities.

Lamartine proposes, when European Turkey shall sink from decrepitude or any other malady, the empire should be divided, under the protection of the European Powers, with an engagement to respect the customs, manners, religion, rights of sovereignty, &c. which exist there, and also to consider these countries as placed under common protection, and as neutral ground in case of a war amongst themselves. How operate this division? And even supposing that they could come to an understanding with an open rupture, by what means maintain this eternal peace? If one could find a solution of these difficulties in a treaty, how repress the passions of parties, prevent the difference of views in Governments? How prevent the destruction of the primitive equilibrium by an unequal developement? How remedy all real or imaginary dangers which would result from it? How avoid the re-action which every political

change in Europe would inevitably cause in these countries under protection? If even the history of America—that of the Colonies on the coasts and Isles of Africa, that of the two Indies; if the history of all those countries, wherever Europeans have founded establishments, have ruled or been endured, did not force us to consider the proposition of Lamartine as a dream, a glance at human nature would suffice to oblige us to pronounce it such. Whoever has read one single page of the general history of the world and persists in nourishing such illusions, we will not argue with.

But it is in a grand system of colonization that Lamartine is to remedy the evils: he discovers, "without such a system," says he, "Rome would never have raised herself up to the rank of mistress of the world." It may be so. But such a scheme is not well calculated to seduce Orientals, and it is highly probable, that they would reject as suspicious which has for means and end, dominion. It was easy besides for Rome to establish Colonies. Every where she found her own religion, or at least she amalgamated her own with that which she found. Can the Christian do as much? Overwhelm and drive out the Mussulman as in the Morea; that he can do. Or treat him formally as a subject, as in Southern Russia; but more than this he cannot do. Servia presents us with a striking example of this in the present day. "If Rome had not Provincial Governments to give her Demagogues, and lands

to divide amongst her veterans, twenty times she would have fallen in ruins." One must allow that the Easterns would not find this picture very attractive for them, and that the Turkish Government in combating such a resolution of Europe to the last gasp, would not pursue a policy so destructive to its own existence, as the philanthropical poet wishes to shew it would be.

But we come now to the key of all these propositions of Lamartine: "In the midst of the brilliant civilization which we enjoy," says he, "the people suffer, and are discontented." This then is the result of the civilization he would confer on the East. That discontentment which extinguishes the generous feelings of the soul, which strikes the traveller so forcibly the moment when returning from the East, he sets his foot on European soil, —that robe of Dejanira—is this the present he would confer on the East? To engraft the diseases of a worn-out system on the healthy constitutions of the children of nature. He points out Asia as a means of assuaging the evil. He wishes that the sphere of the malady, which he depicts so forcibly, should be extended in order that the natural force of the disease should be enfeebled, by spreading over a larger surface. Such philanthropy passes our comprehension, it never could have originated in the heart of the man to whom we are indebted for the *Poetical Meditations.* It is but a vagary of his benevolence.

Observations of the Moniteur Ottoman on the answer of the Augsburg Gazette to M. de Lamartine.

De Lamartine on his return from his "Pilgrimage to the Holy Land," seized the moment, when the affairs of the Ottoman Empire excited to the highest degree the public attention of Europe, to express in the French Chamber of Deputies, his opinion of the condition and destinies of this Empire.

The Utopia which he developed as the fruit of his investigations created no difference of opinion, it was neither combated nor contradicted, nor even criticised. Scarcely indeed was it considered as a serious proposition; it carried with it its own refutation, and merely displayed the enthusiastic visionariness of a generous nature, absorbed in mystic contemplations, belonging rather to the heaven than the earth.

If, however, the sentiments of the illustrious Poet on the future prospect of the Ottoman Empire can be abandoned without danger, to the feebleness of their own ideality, it is not so with his opinions upon the actual state of Turkey, as regards her institutions, the condition of her subjects, the temperament of her inhabitants, and her forms of government.

These may be considered as the positive result of recent examination,—as the conscientious,

learned, and profound study of an enlarged mind, embracing all the mysteries of the social state of a great nation. He has seen, one may say, much, and that with the glance of a man of genius. What he relates is true; and if he mistakes the remedy, at least he has well and thoroughly verified the disease.

The remarks of M. de Lamartine deserve, under this last point of view only, serious examination and a *reply*.

The Augsburg Gazette has undertaken this task, and acquitted itself of it with ability, justness, and impartial moderation. We adopt it. It emanates from *that* civilized Europe, whence came the accusation. We add however a few observations in defence of a people and of a system, which can only be known after a few years more of such discussions as this.

This reply is sufficient to overturn the inconceivable Utopia of Lamartine. It opposes calm and cool reason to speculative ideas, the most impartial and profound observation to superficial and unmeaning facts,—contrasts Mussulman hospitality and toleration, acted up to for so many centuries, with Christian prejudices, which have so perplexed a superior mind as to inspire him with the unhappy courage of resolving, into a question of fanaticism, a question of civilization.

But the Correspondent of the Gazette d'Augsbourg seems overwhelmed with the difficulty, which

he also expresses of judging of Eastern Institutions after the ideas of Europe, and of defining them in their conventional terms. Instead of overcoming this difficulty and penetrating deeper, he yields to it and contents himself with being vague, from not having sought elsewhere positive and satisfactory explanations. European prejudice stands before him, a new Cerberus, to oppose which he is not armed with the cake by which to lull the monster, and gain access into those happy regions, where repose unknown secrets. Thence the word *religion* appears in the "Reply" as a solution of those parts of his subject which he fears to analyse. The absence of all revolutionary spirit is attributed to the union in the person of the Sultan of spiritual and temporal power. And yet, if we judge from the history of these words in Europe, this union would but have had a tendency to add fuel to the revolutionary flame, for it would have produced no other result than this—long hatred produced by long injustice. However, the author asserts it as his conviction, that it has not been as in Europe. The same tree has not produced the same fruits. The solution of this phenomenon must be found in something which also differs from Europe, and where discover it but in the modest and unpretending financial system, proceeding without impediment and always attended by submission, because it respects the most valued and the most operative interests of society. Where find a solution so

important, if not in a very great domestic liberty compensating for the absence of political liberty; placing tangible interest in the place of theory, leaving passion no handle, because it satisfies the most essential wants of man, not placing his daily and hourly existence under a restless and ever vexatious control.

These institutions took their rise under the Caliphate, and surely it is brilliant enough, and sufficiently ancient to make whatever it has produced wear a venerable air. We have, here, the source whence spring the most durable and splendid results, conferring on numberless populations prosperity and power!

Is it force that has banished the revolutionary spirit from Turkey? Force is but a momentary auxiliary. It can never be an element producing permanent and durable results. "It is to form of governments in general," says a modern political writer, "a very contracted and mean idea, to suppose that it resides in force, especially in the force it exercise of making itself obeyed, in the element of coercion. Doubtless, force is mixed up originally with every institution. Doubtless, it has much to do with its progress, but whenever you perceive a great event developing and reproducing itself during a long series of ages, and in the midst of different situations, do never attribute it to force. Force acts a considerable part—a daily part in the affairs of man. It is not the principle, the main-spring—

concealed under force, and the part it plays, a moral cause is always in operation, which decides events. Force, in the history of societies, is as body in the history of man. The body, surely, has much to do with the life of man; but it is not the vital principle. Life circulates in it, and does not emanate from it. So it is with human societies. Whatever part force plays, it is not force which governs—which presides supremely over their destinies.—There are ideas—moral influences, which conceal themselves beneath the accidents of force, and regulate the course of society."

The coercion of Government in no state is less active and sensible than in the Ottoman Empire. Every where else, the police of the capital is the object of care and enormous expense. At Constantinople, the Chamber of the Tourrouk, placed under the direction of the Governor-General, and the functions of which one may define by the word, Direction of the Police, is sufficient for this task. The expense is 3075 piastres per month (about 800 francs). Thus, with 150 persons, and a sum not exceeding 10,000 francs per annum, the general police of Constantinople is conducted, wherein reside 600,000 inhabitants. Where are the state prisons in Turkey—those long tortures which elsewhere take man at the flower of his youth, and pursue him to the limits of old age? Here, eight days imprisonment is looked on as a long punishment, and personal liberty is so deeply

rooted in the manners of the people, that no sooner is any one deprived of it, but all influences are at work to liberate him. It may be that some that are guilty may escape punishment that they deserve. But what a happy characteristic is that of a society where each feel so sensibly the necessity of the liberty of others. Is this, then, the result of force, employed as a lever in constant action, and does it produce similar results wherever it is the principle of government? Lamartine perceived none of the elements we have just noticed, which may easily escape superficial observers, but which should not have escaped him. How has he stept down from the eminence of genius which is raised above mankind and institutions, whence it dives into their bosom, analyses and judges, to take a station unworthy of him in the midst of the *servum pecus*.

Is it a great honour to repeat, after so many obscure declaimers, "All Europe should be Christian. Let us get rid of the Turks?" A phrase trite and *passé*, when M. de Lamartine took it up on his own account. But, certainly, it is a great pity for the reputation of a distinguished man, when he comes in this age, to increase the complications of politics, by adding a question of Christianity and Mohammedanism; doing such cruel injustice to the sentiments of his age, and to the spirit of civilization. Before attempting, from the tribune, to decide on the fate of a great people—of a people which has given to all the others lessons of hos-

pitality and disinterestedness, Monsieur de Lamartine should have inquired, as Montesquieu would have done, into the particular laws of particular institutions—examined into the causes and reasons which sustain certain forms of government. He should have observed facts with patience and good faith. In the course of this study, which to him was a duty, as he was going to make it the object of a solemn declaration, he would have learned to esteem, and even love, the nation which he does not scruple to place in the alternative of persecution or triumph.

Turkey participates in the renovating movement which toils everywhere. She does not plunge herself blindly into an adventurous course, but she studies herself, tries her forces, and will apply them with energy as soon as she has discovered, on mature consideration, the end she should have in view, and the means by which she is to arrive at it. Let her abstain from the honied poisons of Europe. Let her place once more confidence in her ancient institutions, and in the moral character of her children. Let her give to the former, vigour and efficiency for the direction of society, and to the latter, the free possession of all those riches on which their feet tread; and soon, in spite of the predictions of genius itself, she will see grandeur and power return to her hands, and then there will be no question of a partition of her empire, but of imitating her example, and conciliating her friendship.

FRENCH PRESS.

FRENCH PRESS.

JOURNAL DES BEBATS,

Paris, 17th July, 1835.

"ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY."

UNDER this title a most interesting work has just appeared, translated from the English, to which, the claims put forward by Russia to the navigation of the Black Sea, gives, at this moment, a particular interest. This work pleads vehemently against Russia ; but it is of little importance that the pleading is energetic if it is true, if it is just. Truth loses nothing of its strength from being enforced with ardour.

This pamphlet discloses with perfect acquaintance of the subject, all the details of the Eastern question. The author possesses an intimate knowledge of Turkey ; and he has seen developed under his eyes the train of combinations, by means of which Russia has arrived at the protectorate which she exercises this day over Turkey, a protectorate which threatens Europe. These are the combinations which he denounces to the world, sparing no one in his plain candour, neither England, whom he frequently accuses of indolence and inaction, nor France, whom he reproaches with having often served the interests of Russia. These

combinations have now obtained the success they aimed at, Turkey is no longer independent. This old Turkish Empire which preserved the equilibrium of Europe, is no more than an instrument of Russian policy. It exists only to obey it; and this subordination is, perhaps, still more dangerous than reunion.

Turkey, in fact, is more useful to Russia as a feudatory than as a subject, since the shadow of independence which she preserves, is employed against Europe. What then is to be done in this state of things? We must re-establish the independence of the Turkish Empire. We must restore to Turkey liberty and power: and to effect this, we must make war upon Russia—War! not to-morrow, but to-day—War, for the deliverance of all Europe—for the Dardanelles are the keys of Europe. Thence this bold and strong conclusion of the author. To defend Turkey, they must be occupied (pour defendre La Turquie il faut l'occuper).* Turkey, in the opinion of the author, is the Dardanelles. France and England must occupy the Dardanelles.

We do not disguise from ourselves that this clear and precise conclusion may be somewhat disagreeable to those who dream of perpetual peace with the

* It is perhaps superfluous to observe that no such expression is to be found in the original. The translator's mistake was advantageous, by giving rise to a combat between the Journal de Frankfort and the press of England and France.—Ed.

Abbé of St. Pierre—beautiful dream without doubt, this perpetual peace, which, to be realized, requires only one or other of these two things—the immobility and the *statu-quo* of all nations, that some do not increase, nor others decrease; the progress of the world will be arrested, or, if that cannot be, it will happen that the nations that become strong, will scrupulously respect those that become weak. Perpetual peace is only possible on one or other of these two conditions—universal immobility, or universal justice; and, unfortunately, the one is scarcely less impossible, and in human nature, than the other.

The present work discusses many important questions; the progress of Russia in the subjection of Turkey, from the insurrection in Greece to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi—the actual state of Turkey—the prospect of its re-establishment—the system of those who would create many small States out of the ruins of the Turkish Empire; and present thereby new obstacles to the encroachments of Russia. We shall, in availing ourselves of the light thrown on these questions by the English author, examine them in our next. To-day we shall only explain the conclusion drawn by the author, namely, the occupation of the Dardanelles.

Montesquieu has defined the Turks as a nation occupying to no purpose the strongest position in Europe. The saying is just and profound. For a

long time the Christian Princes have seen without uneasiness, the Bosphorus in the hands of the Turks who made no use of it, nor permitted others to do so; it was like a trust confided to them by common accord. So long as the Dardanelles were Turkish, they were neutral, and of little consequence. They added to the power of none. They were, so to speak, (amorties) by their possessor. Every thing then assisted in preserving this singular state of things. Behind the Dardanelles, in the Black Sea, there was no empire or powerful nation. There were some States subjected to Turkey, equally destitute of ambition, and of power.

Germany delivered over to internal struggles, and held itself in check by the Turks, saw the Danube traversing her territory, and issuing into the Black Sea, without being taught to descend the stream to the east; and to extend its power upon the borders of the Euxine Sea. To-day, she begins to bethink herself of it, and to perceive the new political and commercial destiny which the course of the Danube points out to her. The inutility of the Dardanelles in the hands of the Turks, the absence of any powerful and ambitious State on the borders of the Black Sea, rendered all this portion of Eastern Europe, a blank, which never engaged the attention of politicians. But the erection of the Russian Empire has changed all this—an empire immense, powerful and ambitious, placed itself at the extremity of this Black Sea, until

then buried in weakness and barbarism. Will this empire content itself with the possession of the Black Sea, and the coasting trade of its rivers, always poor, and barbarous—while beyond the Bosphorus is the Mediterranean; that is to say, commerce, riches, industry, and civilization? The Black Sea is but a *cul-de-sac* to Russia, so long as Turkey can at will, open and shut the Dardanelles. "The Dardanelles," M. Nesselrode has said, is a vital question for Russia."—"It is the Key of my House," said the Emperor Alexander. Russia breathes through the Dardanelles; and, while she does not possess them, she has so to speak the cord round her neck, with the power of tightening it in the hands of her oldest enemy.

Behold the importance of the Dardanelles to Russia. What is the importance of these straits to Europe, when it will be in the power of a restless and active people, and no longer in that of a people who deaden what they touch, and who have for so long been unacquainted with the political and social movements of Europe. To understand what from that moment will be the danger to Europe we need only cast our eyes on the map. Constantinople threatens Germany, Italy, France, whilst she is herself inattackable owing to the Dardanelles. Constantinople is vulnerable only from the Black Sea; it is impossible to preserve Constantinople long without possession of the Black Sea. In the feebleness of that sea has existed for a long

time the power of the Turks, and the decline of their empire dates from the first Russian port in the Black Sea. From that moment the throne of the Sultan has tottered. Mistress at once of the Black Sea and Constantinople, Russia is inattackable. She bears then upon Europe with the whole weight of her mass. Present everywhere, by the Dardanelles she passes into the Mediterranean, while by the Baltic she enters the Northern Sea. Her two arms, in the North and the South, bind Europe, destined to perish, suffocated in her gigantic embrace. Think of the power of an empire, which can attack every where without being herself attackable any where—which by Persia threatens India and the commerce of England—by the Dardanelles, Egypt, French Africa, Greece, Italy, Southern France—by the Baltic, the West of France, all the North of Germany, as by the boubouchure of the Danube all the South, and by Poland, the centre of Germany (I omit Prussia, intimately connected with Russia, which serves to her as a garrison in the very heart of Germany, and an *avant garde* on the borders of the Rhine). And from what side shall we attack the Colossus? By the Dardanelles? On the North? Here a defile to overcome, and behind that defile a capital to conquer. There the climate to surmount, and we know what disasters it entails. The Dardanelles, yet open at this moment, are the only hold which Russia offers. When Turkey delivers them

to her, the thing is then complete. The armour of the giant is all of apiece, nor is there any defect through which to penetrate his mail. More fortunate than Achilles, he has succeeded in rendering himself every where invulnerable.

Of what consequence is it that the Sultan fill the duty of porter, if the gates of the Dardanelles be opened or closed at the will of Russia. Her empire commences at the Bosphorus, but Russia upon the Bosphorus becomes all powerful in Europe. Is it wise or prudent in Europe thus to permit her to become all-powerful? Where will be the independence of the Christian States when this preponderance is attained? What sort of liberty is that which is dependant on the will and moderation of a foreign monarch? Russia, in her proclamations and manifestos, always boasts of her magnanimity and her moderation. This tone of protection should make Europe reflect, when her political measures add at the same time to the effect of her words. We can look for moderation when power is limited; but the day that a State becomes all-powerful it easily permits itself to follow its own inclinations.

The preponderance of Russia menaces more particularly France and England. England knows what a covetous eye Russia throws upon her commerce; for it is this immense commerce which preserves her marine, and it is this marine which has hitherto been the envy and despair of Russia. France knows the boundless ill-will which Russia

nourishes against her liberal institutions, thinking truly that these institutions are her most formidable enemies, and that wherever liberty has taken root, Russian dominion is impossible. See Poland and the fermentation she created in the heart of her conquerors, and all because she had imbibed the liberal spirit of the West, and because she had not been engulfed before she had been impregnated with this breath which vivifies the independent and stirs up the conquered under their yoke. Russia cannot obtain the European protectorate but by the annihilation of English commerce and French liberty. The day when the Dardanelles are hers, she will have gained in pursuit of this achievement the immense advantage of choosing according to her pleasure the time and place of combat.

Paris, July 21, 1835.

We continue our remarks on the pamphlet upon Turkey and Russia.

Combination and perseverance make states powerful. And we but render justice to Russia in saying she never abandons projects once conceived. From the day when she first threw an eye of desire and usurpation upon Poland, until she accomplished her work of invasion upon that unfortunate nation, she neglected nothing, omitted nothing. Always watchful, always diligent, always ready, and from time to time foregoing her prey only to seize it the more easily.

From the day, too, when she cast her eyes on Turkey, she has never ceased watching her with that patient vigilance and inflexible steadiness of purpose which fascinates and benumbs its victim before devouring it. This tenacity and perseverance of Russia in her resolutions, presents a history well worthy of attention. Nothing can turn her from her object, neither wars, revolutions, nor assassination of her Emperors. In vanquishing Turkey, in seizing the Dardanelles—the whole line of Czars and Czarines, appear but as one and the same, having during their whole lives, but one and the same opinion.

In Russia every thing dates from Peter the Great. In 1686, at the commencement of his reign, Peter the Great seized upon Azof, at the extremity of the Black Sea, behind the Crimea. It is there that Russia commenced the invasion of the Euxine. In 1711, beaten on the Pruth, Peter the Great was obliged to abandon his new conquest—and he died, having shown, rather than opened to the Russians, the road to the Euxine. In 1711, Anne seeks to revenge the defeat of Peter the Great. Azof is retaken—the Crimea invaded—Moldavia conquered by Murinich. And yet by the peace of Belgrade, which put an end to the war—Azof is demolished rather than be left in the hands of Russia—Moldavia is restored to the Ottoman Porte, and Russia is interdicted from having and constructing fleets on the Black Sea. And how comes

it, that a peace so disadvantageous was agreed to after so many conquests and victories? Because the peace of 1739, the peace of Belgrade, was concluded through the mediation of France, who saw that it was the interest of Europe to exclude Russia from the Black Sea. This sea continued then to belong to Turkey. France, when she thus wisely and resolutely settled the affairs of the East, was, however, no longer under Louis XIV. and Louvois, but under the ministry of Cardinal Fleury.

In 1768, war again breaks out between Russia and the Porte. It was declared by the Ottoman Porte in order to save Poland, then menaced by Russia—Russia then concluded with Poland a treaty of mutual guaranty (*garantie mutuelle*, 1768). Catherine II. guaranteed the liberty, constitution, and integrity of the Polish Republic. These treaties of guaranty are her means of conquest and reunion.—The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi is a treaty of guaranty.

Guided by the advice of M. Debergenne, the French Ambassador, Turkey saw that by leaving Poland to fall before Russia, she was herself losing a support and an ally; she therefore declared war to succour Poland, but she commenced too late, and was unfortunate. Moldavia and Wallachia were again conquered. The Crimea fell before the powers of Catherine. A Russian fleet, skirting Europe, entered the Mediterranean, ascended the Archipelago, and burned the Ottoman fleet in the

bay of Tchesmé. The defeat of Schumla, in 1774, compelled the Porte to submit to her enemy, and peace was signed at Kaynardji. Unhappy peace, whence may be dated Russian ascendancy over Turkey.

France forgot her ancient policy—Catherine II. was the favourite of the French philosophers—the correspondent of Voltaire and D'Alembert, the benefactress of Diderot. The weakness of Turkey remained unaided—the victorious audacity of Russia remained uncurbed. Fresh treaties of peace terminated the *procès*. Russian treaties of peace with the Porte, are only skilful steps towards new quarrels and new conquests. Such is, in particular, this peace of Kaynardji, which Europe permitted. Wallachia and Moldavia were again restored to the Porte; but the Crimea and the Koubau were declared independent of Turkey. The independence of the Crimea was but a transition leading to its junction with Russia—that lasted only nine years. In 1783, Catherine announced by a decree, that the Crimea was reunited to the Muscovite Empire. At present Moldavia and Wallachia are independent of Turkey.

Russia obtained also, by the peace of Kaynardji, besides Azof and the coasts, as far as the Dniester and the Bog, free navigation for her merchant vessels in all the seas belonging to the Porte.

It was the division of the Black Sea previous to its exclusive dominion. Nothing evinces more

forcibly the weakness of French policy in 1774, than this treaty, the commencement of the subjugation of Turkey. It was in vain that in 1783, upon the annexation of the Crimea, England, seeing the dangers to Europe and herself, induced Turkey to retake it by force of arms. Turkey liked better to negotiate—but negotiations were of no more avail than armies, and the peace of Constantinople in 1784, gave up to Russia the Crimea and the Koubau. It was then no longer only from the extremity of Azof, that Russia menaced Constantinople, but from the Crinea, a kind of bank thrown out into the Black Sea to command it.

As customary with the weak, Turkey yielded, and repented after having yielded. Roused by England Turkey again took up arms. Potemkin and Suwarroff entered Wallachia and Moldavia, and after successive defeats, Turkey, in 1792, signed the peace of Jassy. This time Russia advanced as far as the Dniester, and prepared the future independence of Moldavia and Wallachia. Catherine II. had consecrated the peace of 1774, by the foundation of Cherson, the peace of Jassy she consecrated by the foundation of Odessa, near the mouth of the Dniester—doubtless wishing thereby to show, that wherever Russia once planted her foot there she always remained.

The fall of Poland followed hard on the peace of Jassy. The weakness of Turkey brought on the destruction of Poland, the destruction of Poland

accelerated the fall of Turkey. One of the principal causes of the fall of Turkey at this time, was the pusillanimity of France, who permitted her ancient ally to be crushed, without saying or doing aught to save her. In 1774 and 1784 she negotiated in place of arming on behalf of the Porte, and her negotiators without an army at their back, could not arrest the progress of Russian victories. Austria then ill-advised for the first and only time, Austria conspired for the fall of the Ottoman Empire. England roused Turkey to arms, but did not support her. Strange policy, of which we pray heaven we may be spared the imitation in our day, which sees the danger, points it out, but does nothing to avert it; from this moment England comprehended the full importance of the Eastern question. The great Lord Chatham said, "I will not argue with those who do not see that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire is to England a question of life and death." It is a great deal to know, but yet better to do—England did nothing. To weaken Russia, whose aggrandizement alarmed her, she set up Turkey against her. But not sending forth her fleets, the contest between Russia and Turkey but profited the former, who by every war gained something; and the calculation of England, unsupported by deeds, turned to the advantage of the Russian empire. England, France, and Austria have to reproach themselves with the treaties of 1774 and 1784. As to the peace of

Jassy in 92, France was innocent of that—herself involved in a great revolution, she had not time to think of the European equilibrium.

Since the French Revolution, all the events of History, all the vicissitudes of European policy appear to have conspired with more unanimity than ever to the aggrandizement of Russia against the Ottoman Porte. It is this course, this unanimity, that we must now retrace. But, first, let us remark, that all the principles, by means of which the ruin and subjection of the Turkish empire has been accomplished, are already established by the peace of Jassy. Feudatory States erected into independent States, afterwards to pass from independence to subjection, Empires to be conquered, enveloped first in treaties of mutual guaranty. Behold Poland—Behold the Crimea—Behold the Black Sea, which, if not the friend and subject of Constantinople becomes its mistress. In the European Powers, a pusillanimity, or a foresight, which perceives danger, but does nothing to avert it. These are the principles and resources with which Russia in 1700, under Peter the Great, commenced the subjection of Turkey, paved the way for the peace of Kaynardji and Jassy, owing to the pre-occupation or indifference of Europe, and must accomplish its end at last, if Europe, always weak, always distracted, leaves her quietly to follow up this successful plan, the principal part of which we have just pointed out.

Extract from Le Constitutionnel.

July 19, 1835.

THANKS to the clearness with which the question is now understood, we have arrived at the period when it will be necessary by energetic measures to put a curb on Muscovite ambition. Europe can no longer be made a dupe of this diplomatic hypocrisy, which otherwise has no actual power. If Russia in the affairs of the East has hitherto pursued a course so tortuous, it is because she knows the insufficiency of her means to seize upon the Bosphorus, the moment that France and England may have determined to oppose it by force of arms. The political discords which she foments and maintains among the other Cabinets, are the means she employs to withdraw their attention from the constant aim of her ambition.

In the North, inaccessible by her frost, she turns her restless eyes on southern possessions; she knows her vulnerability on the side of the Black Sea, and the insecurity of her dominion over the Mussulman populations. Behold, however, the warning given. The Turkish empire must be preserved from the fate of Poland, and Europe from the dominion that this new conquest will secure to the Autocrat. Among the Great Powers two above all are interested in driving back the Russian power

far from the Bosphorus;—England, whose interests are menaced both in the navigation of the Black Sea and in her Indian possessions;—France, whose commerce will fall to pieces the moment Russia extends her frontier to the Mediterranean, and whose independence will be endangered when a Muscovite army has only to cross the Adriatic to land in Italy. Once the struggle has commenced with England and France on the one side, and Russia on the other, Austria, whom political sympathies still unites to the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, will be inevitably compelled to take an active part, and the simple instinct of preservation will suffice to range her on our side. This triple alliance is only perhaps realisable in a war where questions of a political order would remain strictly internal, and where distance would remove every apprehension for internal tranquillity.

Our object is not to examine the resources offered to the Anglo-French occupation by the actual state of the Mussulman populations, nor the proper means by which to raise up the Turkish Empire from her state of abasement, which is now making her a certain prey to Russian ambition. We refer our readers for a profound exposition of these questions to a publication recently translated from the English, where they are set forth with a remarkable knowledge of European diplomacy, and of the state of affairs in the East. "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," is the title of this work;

where, perhaps, for the first time, a subject so important to the future prospects of Europe is treated in its fullest extent.

Extract from Le Courier Français.

July 25, 1835.

From this inability, which cannot be denied, the English author concludes, that the re-establishment of the independence of the Turkish Empire is the only barrier capable of arresting Russian aggressions. The Ottoman Empire owes its durability to the unity of its power. The maintenance of this unity, is, he says, the wish of all the populations. To them the Chief of the State has never ceased to be an object of fear and veneration, and the means of replacing them under his sceptre, is to deliver them from Russian influence (obsession).

The whole question then, in our English author's opinion, reduces itself to a question of opportunity. Well, according to him, all the chances of war are against Russia; she is poor and famished. In her struggles at the Caucasus she has received serious checks; her defences at Sevastopol, and other places on the coast, are weak. Her army is in bad condition, and her navy insufficient. The Russians are generally discredited in Europe, and all skilful as it is, their Government has lost much of its influence—by speaking of conscience, jus-

tice, humanity, philanthropy and religion, while prostituting the most sacred objects of the veneration of a people, and while committing against Poland acts of revolting barbarity and signal disloyalty, she has laid bare her hypocrisy, and disclosed to Europe that she counts too much on her divisions, her ignorance, and her credulity. France and England in attacking Russia on the instant, would raise up against her an irritated mass of Ottomans, would rouse to the assertion of their independence all the discontented people whom she has subjected to her dominion since 1774, and would neutralise her allies. Just now England could obtain the co-operation of France, which could not be if the battle is to be fought on the Indus. Perhaps to annul the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi it may suffice if the two Allied Powers merely show themselves ready and determined to act with vigour; for Russia, being unprepared to defend herself, would prefer the conditions presented to her, to the dangerous chances of a collision. But once established at Constantinople, she is no longer vulnerable there; she has only the Dardanelles to defend, and her whole line is covered from the mouth of the Dwina to that of the Volga.

Journal des Debats.

Nov. 15, 1835.

In his strange speech to the Poles, the Emperor Nicolas forgot that Europe was listening; but he was evidently in a forgetful humour, and forgot many other things.

For instance, he forgot the treaty of Vienna, which is yet the law of Europe. He forgot the gratitude he owes to the memory of his brother Alexander, who called him to the throne and made him Emperor. He forgot the respect due to his most intimate allies, to his brother-in-law, the King of Prussia; to the Emperor of Austria, when he proclaimed that Russia was the only power firm and intact amid the confusions of Europe.

If the Emperor Nicolas wilfully forgot treaties which are the public law of Europe, *this hardihood foretells great designs.* If he has not seen what he has done, this blindness denotes a singular absence of mind.

The Emperor Nicolas treats the idea of Poland distinct from the Russian Empire as a chimerical dream. Such a speech is not becoming when we think that this chimerical dream is the wish, nay, the very expression of the treaty of Vienna. The treaty of Vienna was not drawn up by chimerical men. M. de Talleyrand, M. de Metternich, Lord Castlereagh, Le Prince de Hardemberg, have scarcely in Europe the reputation of men who deal

in chimeras. Yet these are the men who wished that Poland should not be completely absorbed by the Russian Empire; and these are the men who wished that she should preserve a distinct existence. In this respect the intentions of the treaty of Vienna admit of no doubt. It is said in the first article, that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw is united to the Russian Empire; but is this reunion pure and simple, as the reunion of the Duchy of Posen to Prussia, or Gallicia to Austria? Certainly not! It is said in the very first article, that Poland *will have an administration distinct* from that of Russia; and they foresee the case even where the Emperor Alexander would wish to reunite to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw the Polish provinces detached from Poland in 1795, in order to re-establish the kingdom of Poland. It was not intended then to incorporate Poland with Russia, since, on the contrary, they thought of incorporating with Poland, provinces that had been Russian for twenty years.

The idea of Poland as distinct was not then a chimera nor a dream; and to consecrate this separation, the treaty of Vienna directs that the Emperor of Russia will add to his other titles, that of King of Poland. If Poland was to be annexed purely and simply to Russia, why this express title? Every thing, in the treaty of Vienna, evinces the intention of preserving to Poland her name and national existence.

At the Congress of Vienna, there were a thou-

sand different interests that protected the nationality of Poland. England, Austria and France, dreading the ascendancy which Russia was taking in Europe, wished to weaken as much as possible, the effect of an annexation of territory, which they could not prevent; they abandoned to Russia the body of Poland, but they wished to preserve the name: they did not wish the name to be erased from the map. Timid wishes! useless calculations, will it be said? No!—Events have shewn that this remnant of life preserved by the Congress of Vienna, to Poland, has yet been an obstacle and embarrassment to Russia. To these political calculations, I add, that the conscience of Europe was not yet resigned to the bloody immolation of Poland; and, that the Congress of Vienna, although formed of Kings and Princes, after a national war as that of 1813, in Germany, was held to account by the conscience of the people.

Moreover, do the intentions of the Treaty of Vienna with regard to Poland require an interpreter, and a commentator? Read the proclamation of Alexander to the Poles, 22nd June, 1815, upon taking possession of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It is not our fault, if, in reading some of these passages, the public will be struck with the contrast between the noble language of Alexander, and the speech of Nicolas:—

"The object of the war," says the Emperor Alexander, "has been to regain *the independence of*

the nations; and to put it upon the footing of justice, moderation, and *liberal ideas,* so long effaced by military despotism from the book of the civil and political rights of the people." "It is upon these principles that the lot of Poland has been regulated—it was essential that she should re-enter the circle of nations." Behold, truly these words scarcely convey the idea that Poland should disappear from the map, and become a Russian Province.

"Poles," continues the Emperor Alexander, "we love to appreciate the grandeur of soul, the sensitiveness and firmness which distinguish your national character, and, which have shone out in your efforts to recover the political existence of your country which you love above all other." The Emperor Alexander does not treat Polish patriotism with reproachful disdain—he does not say to them that they dream of a country, and a nationality; and that these are vain chimeras. On the contrary, he praises the Poles for their supreme love of country. To-day, they can only gain the good-will of a Nicolas, by ceasing to merit the esteem of Alexander. It would appear their choice is made.

"The treaties we have concluded at Vienna will inform you of the *circonscription politique of Poland,* and the advantages the countries that pass under our rule, will enjoy."

"Poles, new ties are about to unite you to a generous people, who, by ancient relations, by a

valour worthy of yours; and by the common name of Sclavonic nations, are disposed to admit you to *a fraternity*, (a fraternity, and not fusion,) which will be clear and useful *to both people*. A wise Constitution, and an unalterable union, will attach you to the lot of a great monarchy, too extensive to be under the necessity of aggrandising itself, and whose government will never have other political rules than impartial justice, and generous ideas.

"Henceforth your *Patriotism* instructed by experience, directed by gratitude, will find in *the national institutions*, a motive and an end capable of occupying all its faculties.

"A Constitution adapted to your local wants and character, *the use of your language preserved in the public acts, the functions and employments accorded to Poles alone*, the freedom of commerce and navigation, the facility of communication with the parts of ancient Poland *that remain under another Power*, YOUR NATIONAL ARMY; all the means guaranteed to perfect your laws, the free circulation of intelligence in your country: such are the advantages you will enjoy under our dominion.

"*This new State will become the Kingdom of Poland*, so anxiously desired—so long called for by the nation; and acquired at the price of so much blood, and so many sacrifices.

"Poles, it was impossible otherwise to regulate your destinies, and all that appertains to your *national happiness*. IT WAS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE

TO YOU A COUNTRY, which would neither be a source of jealousy and inquietude to your neighbours, nor a cause of war to Europe, which are the wishes of the friends of humanity; and such ought to be the aim of an enlightened policy.

"Our *chargés de pouvoirs* will acquaint you with *all the guarantees which have been granted you in the conferences at Vienna.*"

It is difficult, we think, to find a commentary more expressive of the intentions of the Congress of Vienna, with respect to Poland. The Emperor Alexander conceals — dissimulates nothing. It was necessary to *preserve a country* to the Poles. It was the wish and opinion of all Europe. Thus Poland was not to be confounded with Russia. *Guarantees in this respect have been accorded in the conferences at Vienna.* These guarantees, that is, a distinct administration, a national army, the use of the Polish language, the distribution of public offices to Poles alone, all, in short, that permits the continuance of a *Patriotism*, because there is yet a country.

The proclamation of Alexander plainly expresses how he understood the union of Poland to Russia. He understood it in the exact meaning of the Treaty of Vienna. He understood it too in the sense of the noble and generous ideas which were familiar to him. When he was taken away from Europe, by an end so premature, his successor, the Emperor Nicolas, also made his proclamation;

and in it declares that his Government *will be only the combination of the Government of the Emperor Alexander*. In this act, Poland is clearly separated from the Russian Empire. It still forms a kingdom by itself; and the Treaty of Vienna, with the guarantees which it accorded to the Poles, is still the law and rule of the relations which unite Poland and Russia.

This solemn Treaty, the proclamation of the Emperor Alexander, his own manifesto on ascending the throne, have all been forgotten by the Emperor Nicolas, in his speech to the Poles. Strange effect of anger, or of ambitious policy! He declares in the face of Europe that Poland is no longer distinct. He invites the Poles to abjure this chimera. Treaties, however, are only a dream. This Polish country, this nation, necessary to Europe, according to Alexander, are, according to Nicolas, but an illusion which Warsaw must renounce. And, now, we understand what are the "*mauvais-ecrits*" of which the Emperor Nicolas speaks with so much animosity. They are, without doubt, the Articles of the Treaty of Vienna, the proclamation of Alexander, his own, even all the "*mauvais-ecrits*," which maintained in Poland troublesome ideas, they must speedily be effaced from the memory of the people—Poland must forget the promises of Alexander and his solemn engagements. The Emperor Nicolas, who has so quickly forgotten

the good deeds of his brother, and the will which made him Emperor—will teach it how to forget.

Is it, indeed, of a benefactor that they speak with this dry and imperious blame? *The Emperor Alexander did more for you than an Emperor of Russia ought to have done.* See here the Emperor Alexander accused before his people, by the very prince who owes him his throne, by him, of whom we could say, that the Emperor Alexander has done more for him than a brother should have done. See his memory cited before Russia, as blameable for having favoured Poland too much. It may be prejudice on our part; but it appears to us, that, in wishing to accuse the Poles of Warsaw, the Emperor Nicolas has unwittingly made a great and solemn apology; he has at the same moment passed an eulogy on the Emperor Alexander. Alexander knew how to restrain the brutal hatred of Russia against Poland. Alexander knew how to moderate and restrain the people whom he governed. He thought the act of Government lay in leading not following; in giving, not receiving the impulse. Russian, he knew how to elevate himself above the ill-will of his nation, and he befriended Poland. Was this an imprudent greatness of mind? No! it was a wise and enlightened policy; it was the policy of a man who saw in a manner at once, just and comprehensive, the mutual destiny of Poland and

Russia. Placed in advance of Russia on the side of Europe, Poland should put the Russian Empire in communication with the civilization of Europe. It was a new inlet opened for the science and intelligence of the West. It was an intermediary step of civilization between Russia and the West. See what Poland united to Russia might be, and should be. But for this, Poland must be governed mildly, and must see in Russia a sister, and not a cruel and oppressive mistress—for this, she must gain Poland, and not irritate her. The Emperor Nicolas has not understood this. A Russian, he only partakes in the hatred of his nation towards its ancient rival; and throwing aside the benevolent policy of Alexander towards Poland, he has persecuted and oppressed her. Thence the insurrection of 1830. Even now, he does not understand the noble designs and elevated conceptions of his brother; the gratitude even, which should explain them to him, or at least make him respect them, that gratitude is mute; and he cries out with rage that Alexander has done for Poland more than a Russian ought to have done. Yes! —more than a Russian, but not more than an Emperor, who understands his office—who surpasses his people, not only by the superiority of his power, but the superiority of his intelligence and his character; who moderates, and directs and who *fait son métier de Roi.*

We are not surprised that the mind which com-

prehends not the wise and generous policy of Alexander; and, which is infatuated with the extent of its power, declares, with that pride which is the ordinary attribute of lack of civilization, that Russia is the promised land of Europe—the place of refuge for society—the sanctuary of peace and order, forgetting Prussia and Austria, which have also some pretensions to be called well-regulated, and well-ordered States. Is it thus that the Emperor Nicolas regards his allies? He treats them in too brotherly a manner—he forgets how much respect, how much deference he pays them when he visits them: What! Is there no solid and stable civilization but in Russia? This reminds us that America, a people little civilized, naively thinks that her's is the cherished land of civilization. Does the Emperor Nicolas imagine that European society has chosen him for its support and defender; and, that its only hope is in him? We said, four years ago, that there was at the side of the Republican propagandism a monarchical propagandism, which appeared to us not less foolish, and no less ridiculous than its rival. The Emperor Nicolas appears to have made himself the god and pontiff of this absolute propagandism. Illimitable power appeared to him a religion that he preached to his profit, with an imperturbable faith and assurance. We know not if he has yet made many proselytes; but we fear that his prediction of Warsaw *ne lui fasse tort.*

This time the dose of monarchical exaltation is evidently too strong, his pre-occupation with himself too visible, the forgetfulness of treaties too flagrant, the ingratitude towards a brave people too glaring, not to shock every generous mind, the indiscretion and incapacity too evident, not to attract the notice of the least attentive.

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EXTRACTS FROM BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE,

No. 130, for September 1827.

INVASION OF INDIA.

MUCH has been said, and a good deal written, on the possibility of our being called upon to defend our Indian possessions against the invasion of a European power; and there is still much question of the practibility of such an expedition.

* * * *

It is almost unnecessary to say, that Russia is the only European nation at all likely to undertake this enterprise, or, indeed, whose situation puts it in her power to attempt it. She is the only nation who has a frontier in Asia, or who comes in contact with those Asiatic nations, whose remoteness leaves them at the mercy of their neighbours, and permits encroachments on their territories and interference with their governments to pass unnoticed. She is therefore the only nation who has the means of establishing any permanent influence or control over the countries lying towards India, or of extending her frontier in that direction. Other European governments may form alliances with princes of

Central Asia, and may even enjoy a certain share of consideration and influence at their courts; but Russia can make her strength be felt and dreaded, and she can threaten with effect, and dictate with the power of enforcing obedience. We shall therefore consider this subject solely with reference to the views and means of that power, and thus get rid at once of a number of unavailing discussions on impracticable schemes, which it would be waste of time to examine in detail.

There are many motives which may induce or impel Russia to improve her advantages, and extend her power in Asia.

Independent of the ambition which all nations have to extend their territories, and enlarge the sphere of their influence and authority, and the tendency which all rising nations seem to have to advance their limits, there are some more prudent and judicious considerations which might lead the cabinet of St. Petersburgh to pursue systematically the course which ambition first prompted it to adopt.

The hope, however distant, that she might one day become mistress of our Eastern possessions, which are so generally believed to be ever-flowing fountains of wealth, and the prospect of improving the commerce of her southern provinces, and indeed of her whole empire, would of themselves be serious, important, and tempting considerations to Russia: but there are others still more immediate and pointed.

The control which Great Britian can exercise

over the commerce of Russia, is so powerful a check on the proceedings of her government, that as she cannot otherwise emancipate herself from its trammels, she must be desirous to obtain the means of exerting some countercheck on the government of Britain; and it would be difficult to find any more efficacious than the acquisition of a power and influence in Central Asia, which will enable her to threaten our Indian empire. In the event of a war between England and Russia, there is in fact no other point on which she could hope to bring her power to bear upon us. Her force exclusively military, could avail her to injure us in no other quarter; and there is no portion of the British empire which is considered so vulnerable, and no acquisition so likely to yield an ample reward to the conqueror as India.

Russia has therefore abundant inducements to pursue her aggrandizing policy in Asia. We do not stop to inquire whether this may be the best policy she could adopt; but we are satisfied that it is what she has determined to persevere in; and that it would require more forbearance than could be expected from a more enlightened cabinet to do otherwise, at least so long as there is no greater obstacle opposed to the prosecution of this system than there is at present.

But this is not all. We know that Russia has been led to speculate on the possibility of attempting the invasion of India *from her present position*—an at-

tempt to carry it by a *coup-de-main*, without waiting the result of more tardy measures. We know that it has been pronounced practicable by more than one of her military leaders, and we have already noticed the opinion of Napoleon in its favour. Our own belief, however, is totally at variance with these high authorities; and we shall proceed to put our readers in possession of the grounds of our dissent.

All the plans which have been proposed for the invasion of India, seem to have been built on the belief, that because large armies have been carried over land into that country, by several Asiatic leaders, and some of them may be said to have effected its conquest, there could not, of consequence, be any insurmountable impediment to the success of the enterprise, when undertaken by an European army. But this specious reasoning, however plausible it may appear to be, is in effect extremely fallacious; for, in the first place, there is no European power that at present holds a position, in relation to India, at all resembling that which was held by every one of its successful invaders. They all possessed some of the countries which lie at the base of the Paropamisan range. They had all established a high character as military leaders and conquerors, and had over-awed or subdued all the neighbouring countries, and they all sent the fame of their achievements before them into India, to prepare the way for them. They all

set out from a position, beyond which there was only one barrier to break through before they entered India, and upon which they could have retired, had they failed in surmounting the first impediment; whereas Russia would now have to traverse more than one country, presenting numerous natural obstacles, and capable of opposing the progress of her armies, before she could bring them to the point from which any one of the Asiatic invaders commenced his march.

India was at that time governed by weak princes, whose divided cabinets and distracted dependents could never be brought to make any combined exertion for the preservation of their country. The very ministers of the government were on some occasions favourable to the enemy, and the capture of the seat of government decided the contest, and constituted what has been called the conquest of the country.

The troops of the invaders were of the description which in those times was best suited to the enterprise.—A light cavalry that scoured the country in their rapid progress—arrived every where before they were expected, and collecting provisions wherever they were to be found, were enabled, from the places in which they found abundance, to carry on their horses enough for their own subsistence for many days; at the same time, they were more than a match for any troops that India could bring to oppose them. Infantry could not have effected in

the countries over which they passed, what was done by these armies of horse. The rapidity of their movements, and the facility with which they performed long marches for several successive days, where water or provisions were scanty, gave them a decided superiority in their advance, while, on the other hand, the chief part of the armies of India, being also composed of cavalry, could not be attacked with effect by any other description of force than that which was brought against them.

The invading armies were always composed of troops of a character far superior to those whom they encountered, and they were led by men of experience far greater, and talents far higher, than any whom India could produce to oppose them,—in short, by the transcendent military geniuses of their several ages. Yet, with all these advantages, what did they accomplish? They all plundered the country. Some of them overturned the most important of its governments; but how many of them can be said to have conquered India?

The progress of these Asiatic hordes across a country, is totally different from the march of a European army. In the former, every individual has been accustomed to provide for his own wants, and he trusts chiefly to his own resources. If he finds what he is in search of within a mile of his camp, he returns, but if not, he goes on. If he

cannot obtain it otherwise, he has recourse to force or stratagem. Tribes combine for their mutual support, and their movements are so rapid, that the peasantry cannot escape them, and their strength so considerable as not to be resisted.

There are as many dexterous foragers as there are individuals in the army. The number of followers on such occasions is very inconsiderable, and even they are for the most part armed and mounted. The baggage is no encumbrance, and its total destruction would hardly impair the efficiency of the army. Provisions are collected from great distances; and though no doubt much is wasted where there is more than is immediately required, yet much is collected even where it is most sparingly scattered. The other wants of the army are few, and such as the countries it passes through can at all times supply. Its numbers are occasionally recruited from the tribes through whose territories it passes; and the new levies take their place in its ranks without any previous preparation. Such bands are encumbered on their march by no heavy trains of artillery or warlike stores; for every man carries his own ammunition behind his saddle. As they are still in their native climate, or in one differing little from it, they require little protection from the weather. They move amongst people of their own habits and their own religion, and they consequently feel at home in the countries through which they march.

But the discipline of a regular European army requires the observance of a course directly opposed to this. There, no man is allowed to provide against his own wants. The burden of doing so is taken off his shoulders, and he is required to take no part in it, however imperfectly it may be accomplished. Foraging parties bear a small proportion to the bulk of the army; and if they are unacquainted with the country, or the manners of its inhabitants, they may frequently be unsuccessful. The country will certainly suffer less, and a smaller quantity of provisions will be wantonly destroyed; but where these are very scanty, a sufficient supply will sometimes not be procurable. Regular distances must be marched at stated periods, and cannot be exceeded. The inhabitants, therefore, have abundant time to remove all they possess. If fifty miles should intervene between two productive places, or two stages where water is to be found, the army cannot pass over it without much previous preparation—a halt of some days to prepare, and a halt of some days again to recruit; and if twice that distance should divide the positions, it may be totally impracticable to cross it at all, whereas it would present no impediment to an Asiatic army. Many of the stores and supplies are of a description which the intermediate countries do not produce, and which must therefore be brought from home at an immense cost, and cause an incalculable encumbrance to the army. The

train of baggage would be enormous, and such as in some situations the whole army could hardly protect. Guns must be dragged over countries in which there are no roads. Tents, capable of defending the soldiers against the climate, must be carried through the whole march. Means must be devised for transporting an unusual number of sick over countries in which a waggon cannot move. New languages, new manners, and new diseases, will increase the embarrassment. Those only who have seen it can form any adequate idea of the nature of the field establishments required to secure the efficiency of European troops in tropical climates, or of the expense which must be incurred to maintain them; and certainly those only who have witnessed it, can form any conception of the disastrous consequences of neglecting them.

There is one difference between the movements of regular armies composed of infantry and artillery, and the irregular bands of horsemen that formerly composed the invading force, which alone would be sufficient to destroy any reasoning founded on the analogy of their situations and circumstances. Those mounted hordes have usually, when in motion, advanced at the rate of twenty-five, thirty, or thirty-five miles a-day; and where provisions or water was deficient, they never almost marched less than forty miles daily. Now this is more than double the distance that an European army could accomplish; and in the last case, is

probably three times as much as any regular army could continue to march for half a dozen days together. In those parts of the country, therefore, where provisions were scarce, the Asiatic invaders required only one-third of the quantity of provisions per man which would be necessary to subsist a European; for they remained only one-third of the time in the ill-supplied districts or provinces. No allowance can be made for forage, because in places where there was no great abundance, only the surplus barley would be given to the cattle, and moreover it is probable that a European force would have in its train as many baggage animals to feed as were required to transport the Asiatic army.

On the other hand, the nature of the government of India is changed. The resistance would now be hearty and well-combined. There is no weak head at which a blow could be aimed, whose fall would involve the fall of the government; and the capture of Delhee, even if that were possible, would no longer be the conquest of India.

There is, therefore, no analogy whatever between the former invasions of India, and that which we have now to consider. The success of Nadir Shah, for instance, is no evidence of the practicability of the Russian project against India. It might as well be argued, that the conquest of the civilized nations of Europe by the barbarians of the north, was evidence of the capability of their successors of the present day to overturn the western governments.

The practicability of the enterprise must therefore be examined and determined (without reference to these Asiatic invasions) by a careful survey of the countries through which a Russian force would have to pass, the difficulties it would have to encounter from natural obstacles, as well as from the population, and the probability of its being able to surmount or remove them.

(After a description of the interior country, and of the difficulties attending the march of a *Russian* army, and the obstacles it would encounter after, the Reviewer proceeds):—

We may, therefore, safely pronounce this enterprise to be one which Russia will never have the madness to attempt from her present position, and from which, should she make the attempt, we have nothing whatever to apprehend.

But there is another course which would be much more formidable to us, and which Russia seems to be pursuing with steady perseverance.

The difficulties which make it impossible for her even to threaten our Indian possessions, are chiefly involved in the distance of her frontier from the scene of her intended operations; and the only means by which she can overcome them, are by advancing her frontier towards India, and establishing her authority, or at least a paramount influence over the countries of Central Asia.

There are two directions in which she may advance her frontier, and only two. It may, there-

fore, be worth our while to examine the comparative facilities which these present, and their comparative advantages when accomplished. There are also two ways in which she may effect the approach to India. One by actual conquest; the other by a more insidious kind of subjugation, of which we shall speak presently, and which it is most probable will be the course adopted.

The countries lying between Russia and India, are those which we have designated by the general appellation of Central Asia. This extensive region contains four kingdoms; viz. Persia, Khiva or Kharizm, Bokhara, and Cabul, besides numerous principalities, and vast countries, occupied by communities who acknowledge no authority, and some of whom even obey no chief.

Russia might extend her dominions and advance her frontier towards India by the subjugation of Persia, or by the conquest of Kharizm and Bokhara; and the Edinburgh Reviewer of Mr. Fraser's work asserts, that the latter would be by much the more eligible course for her to pursue. We think differently, and we shall shortly state our reasons.

(After exposing the fallacy of this opinion, now obsolete, this powerful writer continues):—

We therefore assert, that the conquest of Kharizm and Bokhara, and the settlement of the country, so as to make it available for any ultimate object beyond it, could not be effected by Russia

without immense sacrifices in men and money, and that it would, in all probability, occupy a century. The religious fanaticism of the population of Bokhara is proverbial, and a moral revolution must be effected in the characters of Oozbeks and Toorkomans, before it would be possible to subject them to European laws, or to a European government. These revolutions are not the work of the sword, nor are they effected in a single generation.

Russia has within her reach a country, which, in its present circumstances, offers fewer obstacles to impede her progress, a nation that has already felt her force, and has been obliged to acknowledge it, a population that has, from time immemorial, been subjected to a rigorous despotic rule, whose subjugation has at all times been involved in the overthrow of the existing government, and whose actual condition, (great as the natural means of defence must be admitted to be,) is such as to promise, that, at a period not very distant, it will fall an easy prey to so powerful a neighbour. In short, so long as Persia is likely, on the death of the present Shah, to see twenty or thirty competitors for her throne, each of them willing rather to reign in subjection than not to reign at all, and ready to sacrifice the independence of his country, that he may enjoy the shadow of regal authority; while Russia thus holds (and is permitted to hold) the crown of Persia, as it were in the hollow of her hand, and can bestow it on whichever of the rival

brothers she may select for her vassal, and finally, while the European governments most interested in the fate of that devoted country stand aloof, and allow the storm which is gathering over her to drive her for shelter to the door of her enemy, Russia surely would be most unwise to seek to advance her frontier towards India, by undertaking the conquest of two almost inaccessible kingdoms, whose population could hardly be governed, even were the country overrun.

It is more for the interest of Russia, as it is far more easy, and has an imposing air of greater moderation, to rule through the native prince whom she may establish on the throne, than to subvert the government and undertake the subjugation of the people. It is a long time before foreign establments become domesticated, more especially where the conquerors and the conquered are separated by the prejudices of religion; and be it remarked in passing, the Russians are execrably bad managers of conquered countries. But by upholding the natural sovereign of the nation, and making him the medium of communication with the people, a more absolute authority would at once be established, than could be acquired in a series of years without the intervention of the natural ruler. That this is the course which Russia has in contemplation, we cannot doubt.

Besides the greater facility in subduing Persia, there are also greater advantages to be derived

from its subjugation. Of the countries of Central Asia, Persia is the most important. She has the largest population; the greatest internal resources; the most matured establishments; the most advantageous and commanding position; and she holds, in the estimation of the natives of Asia, the most exalted rank and dignity. The subjugation of Persia would strike with awe all the governments of Asia; but the conquest of Kharizm and Bokhara would produce a comparatively slight sensation beyond their immediate vicinity; and the facilities which it would afford for pursuing future plans and projects would be far greater than those obtained by the conquest of Bokhara.

Herat is now almost an integral part of Persia, and will probably soon be entirely so; and Herat is, of all points on the northern frontier on the Afghan country, the most favourable at which to prepare for the invasion of India. It holds a central position, at almost an equal distance from the cities of Kerman, Yezd, Tubbus, Toorsheez, Meshed, Bokhara, Bulkh, and Kandahar. It is one of the greatest emporiums of the commerce of Asia, and could draw supplies from all the places we have enumerated, and from many more of minor importance. The city itself is placed in a fertile and well-watered valley, and surrounded by extensive gardens and pastures. It enjoys a fine climate, it is amply stored with provisions at all times; it could, as we have stated, draw supplies from all

the countries around it, and it is capable of furnishing every article which these countries afford. If any place is worthy to be designated "the key to India," it certainly is Herat. There is no point within the territories of Bokhara, or its dependencies, which possesses anything at all approaching to the same advantages. Bokhara itself is, in fact, an oasis in the desert, by which it is everywhere surrounded, and the possession of its territory would leave Russia still insulated, and cut off from the countries to the south. Bulkh, if it were also conquered, is a place of mean capabilities in itself, and it is far from supplies of every kind; while the roads from Bulkh to Cabul are probably impracticable for artillery, and that from Herat to Kandahar presents no obstacle to the transport of guns of every description.

Yet the power of using Herat as a depot, and of preparing there for an expedition into India, would be a small part of the advantage which Russia would gain by the subjugation of Persia. Our own connexion with that country has prepared it to receive readily the military institutions of Europe; and our acquaintance with its capabilities to produce good soldiers, enables us to say, that, regularly disciplined, and led by a competent number of European officers of intelligence and activity, there are few armies that, in a campaign in Asia, could boast of any great superiority over that of Persia. The men are singularly tractable, orderly,

and obedient—active, contented, and intelligent—capable of extraordinary fatigue and privations—easily fed, and maintained at a moderate cost—by no means wanting in courage or enterprise, and capable of perfect attachment to their officers.—In short, admirable materials for soldiers.—On the contrary, years would not suffice to induce the bigoted and untamed, or rather the unsubdued Oozbeks and Toorkomans of Khiva and Bokhara to submit to European military discipline; and if there were no other superiority possessed by Persia, we think this alone would be a very dangerous distinction.

Suppose that Russia were to take charge of the forty or fifty thousand men whom Persia now maintains in various parts of the country, under the designation of regular infantry, and were to appoint well-selected officers to discipline and command them; suppose that to these she joined half as many Russian infantry, or even a much smaller proportion; that she re-organised the Persian artillery, and selected a well-appointed body of Persian cavalry, it would then be in her power to undertake the conquest of Bokhara, and nothing could be more easy than to conclude arrangements with its overawed government, which would effectually secure its subserviency to the views of Russia. Kharizm, lying between Russia on the one side, and her vassal of Persia and her ally of Bokhara on the other, would soon be brought to terms.

Herat, if not already incorporated with Persia, would speedily be annexed to that empire, and the pretensions of its chief would afford a favourable pretext for aiding him in the recovery of his hereditary dominions. All this might be done at the expense, as it no doubt would be to promote the interests of Persia. In short, the subjugation of Persia would give Russia the means of acquiring a paramount influence in Central Asia.

The situation of Turkey would, in such a state of things, be extremely precarious. Her weakest frontier would be completely laid open in its whole length, from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. A subject of quarrel between her and Persia would never be wanting; and between Tabreez and the Bosphorus, there is nothing capable of opposing the army which Persia could there bring into the field. Bagdad, which Persia still considers a part of her dominions, would be conquered, and annexed to them; and, in the event of a rupture between Turkey and Russia, the invasion from the side of Asia would hardly be less formidable than that from Europe. The acquisitions of Persia would, in fact, be the acquisitions of Russia; and every war with Turkey would take something from her strength, while it added something to that of both her enemies. If the jealousies of European powers still preserved Constantinople, nothing would remain of the power and resources of the Ottoman Empire.

What effect this might have on the politics of Europe, it might be difficult to determine; but it is hardly possible that it could fail to be detrimental to Britain, as the subjugation of Persia by Russia would certainly be, in another direction.

After Persia had fallen under the power of Russia, and through her the influence which we have supposed was established in Central Asia, the question of the practicability of invading India would stand on a totally different footing from what it had done before. Russia would then be in a position which could enable her to move her troops with comparative facility to a point from which she might hope to force her passage to the frontier of India, without destroying the efficiency of her army on the march. She could leisurely, and without any extraordinary exertion, collect stores and supplies at Herat and Furrah, and prepare her magazines, and mature her arrangements at no very formidable distance from the intended seat of war. She could have nothing to fear from the powers of Central Asia, and might even command their assistance. Her name, and her power and policy, would be known in India, and would unsettle men's minds by the prospect of an approaching struggle, in which the discontented might take part with the invaders; and more than all, she would be able to command the services of a large body of troops eminently qualified for the enterprise, without having to incur the expense of maintaining

them. Russia would then meet us upon something approaching to equal terms, and though we think she would be beat back even then, without having been able to make any serious impression on our power, and probably without having even reached our territories; still it must be admitted, that her holding such a position would give her the counter-check upon England which she longs to possess, and would produce a total revolution in the relative positions of England and Russia, and a change in the last degree unfavourable to Britain in their political relations.

The kingdom of Cabul, which would be the only remaining barrier between Russia and the Indus, in the case we have supposed, is now broken into many principalities. Herat is the seat of a petty government, at the head of which, is the representative of the royal family of Cabul, who has lately contracted an alliance with one of the sons of the Shah of Persia, and who pays to that sovereign an annual sum, which, though it is called a present, more resembles a tribute. The citadel of Herat is at present held by Persian troops, under the command of a grandson of the Persian monarch.

Kandahar is held by three of the brothers of Futteh Khan, Barekzie the Wazeer of Mahmood, and the subverter of the legitimate dynasty. Cabul is held by another of these brothers, who has lately taken it from his own nephew; and Pe-

shawer is held by a member of the same family, who it is said purchases exemption from the incursions of the Seiks, by the payment of a yearly sum to Runjeit Sing, the prince who rules over the countries between the Indus and the Hyphasis.

These brothers of Futteh Khan have endless feuds and quarrels, which are perhaps not the less inveterate for their being between brothers; and they are all enemies of the Prince of Herat, whom they consider dangerous, because he is a branch of the legitimate stock.

The population of the country is divided into numerous tribes and clans, who adhere to one or other of the chiefs we have mentioned, as their local circumstances or family attachments may lead them; and the weakness of the governments, their petty wars, and the bickerings of the tribes and clans, have so unsettled the minds of the people, and have made property so insecure, that agriculture is neglected, the country is waste, and the villages dilapidated, and in many places deserted.

The inhabitants are brave and warlike, and have been considered the finest cavalry in Asia. Nadir Shah certainly thought them the best troops in his army; but at present no combined effort could be expected from them under any circumstances, and the opposition they could offer to an invading army would, of necessity, be desultory and irregular. It may be doubted, however, whether this is not the most effectual kind of opposition that could

be made by any undisciplined troops to the march of a regular army, and whether the absence of an established authority, which could be overawed, or won to take a share in the enterprise, or to facilitate the progress of invaders, by causing provisions to be collected, and the inability of the country, in its present condition, to maintain a large army for any considerable time, are not obstacles more serious and difficult to be overcome, than any which could be opposed by the army of the kingdom, to the advance of a Russian force.

Events now in progress may make it necessary for us to turn our attention to the country of the Afghans, and to endeavour to raise it into a line of defence for India; and in that case we will find cause to regret that Herat is likely to fall into the hands of Persia. If Persia ceases to be to us what she has hitherto been, we may find that it would have been well to have paid more attention to the affairs of the Afghans, distracted and debased as they are; and we may discover, when it is past remedy, that in relinquishing Persia, we have abandoned a strong line of defence, to retire upon one that is untenable.

EXTRACTS FROM COBBETT'S REGISTER.

June 4, 1834.

My *writing-life* has been so long, and I have always seen so far before me, and have so constantly put upon paper predictions of what would take place, that as events now come on, I seem to have very little to do but to re-state, and, most commonly, merely to reprint that which I have stated and printed before on the subject. This is precisely the case with regard to the subject before us. That which I wrote and printed in 1829, at and after the blunder-headed battle of Navarino, was then, in considerable part, *prophesy*; it is now *history*. My readers will remember my contemptuous observations on, and ludicrous description of, that expedition, quoting the old country sarcasm:

> "Father and mother and I,
> With a stout and trusty band,
> Beat a poor little boy,
> Till he could'nt go nor stand."

The villanous newspapers: I might call them hellish; for they must be of infernal birth: these prodigious monsters, nearly one and all, town and country, cried up the "victory of Navarino," as something "which would not suffer in a comparison with the most brilliant naval achievements of England"! And, oh! their praises of the gallantry and skill of the French and their admiral! Their intolerable baseness in this respect, their praises of the French and their crowing over the poor Turk, the faithful friend of England for two hundred

years, against these very French! It was enough to drive one to distraction as one read, reflecting that such words dropped from the pens of Englishmen; and it required all the patience, all the forbearance, all the long-suffering, all the equanimity, all the cool and placid resignation, belonging to my character, to preserve to me any portion of my senses!

By-and-by, it came out, that this "brilliant" and "glorious achievement," was an "untoward event." I did not, however, stop for this discovery: I said, at once, that it would lead, and that it must lead, either to a war with Russia; a resolute and desperate war; or to a base and cowardly abandonment, not only of the rights acquired, but of the character acquired for England, by our wise and brave forefathers. To-day, I read in the *Times* newspaper, that England, in 1828 and 1829, did "commit the baseness of leaving the Turkish Empire to the tender mercies of Nicolas, the Duke of Wellington being fairly over-reached, as in 1831, she and France together, from similar mystification practised on the Whigs, barbarously deserted Poland. They now reap the fruits of the double crime. However, the design of Russia is palpable; and fixed, we have reason to believe, is her resolve to execute it, judging by her known preparations."

I believe it was to the tender mercies of the "magnanimous" gentleman who was so much praised for having ordered, or approved of, the

burning of about a thousand women in child-birth, in his own city of Moscow, and to touch the hem of whose merciful garment the "ladies" of England galloped so many miles; I believe that it was he, and not Nicolas: but it is of very little consequence which of them it was: this very *Times* newspaper joined the rest in applauding the battle of Navarino, and in being delighted with the consequences of that battle. There will be a time to talk of Poland hereafter perhaps; but what is Poland compared with Turkey? The monsters, who, chiefly through the instrumentality of the blaspheming Jews, have barbarously murdered, or doomed to the cruelest of slavery, the unhappy Polanders, are objects of my execration; but, their deeds there do not endanger the power of England but in a very indirect manner. In Turkey the Autocrat comes at us at once; and we must strike, or acknowledge that we dare not.

Much about the time I am now speaking of, or soon afterwards, the man who is now the Lord High Chancellor said, in the House of Commons, that he "thanked God, that the nation was bound to keep the peace in a bond of eight hundred millions!" There was quite enough besides this to make me shudder at the idea of that man's possessing any political power in my country; but, if he had never uttered any thing else to have displeased me, that one sentence would have been sufficient. It argued (and it argued conclusively) that he was either wholly destitute of judgment, destitute of

knowledge, or destitute of love of country, and of all feeling for its honour and safety. Beyond all doubt it was one of the two former; but, no matter which of the three, each equally disqualifying him for the possession of political power.

What! rejoice, a man rejoice, that his country is unable to go to war; and that man a statesman too; and that man now a servant of the King of England, and the keeper of his conscience with regard to high matter of state and government.

The *Times* newspaper of to-day says—"If an enemy believe that we are afraid to strike, he will do so for us." Believe! He must be hard of belief, indeed, if he reject belief on the fact that we are bound to keep the peace in a bond of eight hundred millions, and when he is told so by the man who is now Lord Chancellor.

After these things, is it not farcical in the *Times* newspaper to talk in this way, and to put an "if" respecting an enemy's belief of our being afraid to go to war? Why, we are afraid to go to war; with all our thundering navy and thundering army, we are afraid to pronounce the word war.

It is just thirty years since I went to a play. The last time I went I saw Waldron in the character of *George Downright*, giving Fawcett a "hiding" (with an ash-stick) in the character of *Bobadil*, who had a long swaggering sword by his side. "Draw! draw! draw your spit," exclaimed the former. "Tall gentleman! tall gentleman! I protest . . . ." "Oh, damn your protesting! Draw your sword!"

which the other took care not to do; but being well provided with sheepskins under his dress, quietly took a walloping that made the whole theatre resound; and, afterwards, when questioned as to the cause, lifted up his hands and turned up the whites of his eyes, exclaiming—"It was the stars; certainly, the stars." "Certainly not, captain," answered young *Wellborn*, "it was the stick; it certainly was the stick, captain, and not the stars."

Aye, and it is not the stars now that withhold our hands; neither will it be sufficient for us to plead the bond; the world is too penetrating and too just not to ascribe our want of resentment to the true cause; or rather our want of the act of showing the resentment; for all our efforts to disguise from the world that we feel resentment will fail of success. The true cause is, a change in the character of the governing powers of England, whose great principle was, for ages and ages, the maintenance of the greatness and the honour of the country, cost what it might; to think nothing worth a straw that was not calculated to endure for ages; to despise wealth and ease and show, when put in competition with the bold assertion of the rights of the country abroad, and of its genuine, solid, untinselled liberties at home. This great principle has departed from those who rule us: a huckstering, counting-house, usurious, discounting, bill-broking principle has succeeded: and here we are ready to faint at the idea of a "shock to Public Credit," while we affect not to perceive that the

whole fabric of this kingly Government is rocking backwards and forwards, and ready to come tumbling on the heads of those who ought to be its upholders.

In the meanwhile, what a figure do we exhibit in the eyes of the world! Here we are with a greater naval force; a naval force costing more money than the navy of England cost, when England was at war with France, Spain, and Holland, all at the same time, having the American rebels to fight into the bargain. Here we are with an army of a hundred thousand men, helmeted, their breasts covered with brass-plates, their horses as big as elephants, each carrying half a ton of fat: we have foot and horse grenadiers, light infantry, dragoons, lancers, horse-guards, and all the "finest troops in the world:" improvement upon improvement in the dress, in the arms, in the discipline and manœuvres; the drum and trumpet's everlasting sound half stuns us, unless we get away to the mountains of Scotland or of Wales. And what is all this for? What is it for? I have asked that question a thousand times, and never yet got a satisfactory answer. Here we are with 170 admirals, 1,684 captains of the navy, 110 of which admirals have been made since the peace. Here we are with about 200 generals, and 16,000 military officers of different descriptions. And here we are, with all these upon our hands, and not daring to pronounce the word war. What, then, is this navy and this army for? Why do they cost

us fourteen millions, eight hundred and sixty-nine thousand six hundred and eleven pounds a year? All appears to be naval and military, except that there is no fight; a commander in chief with a levee like that of a king; and a staff, like that of a sovereign prince at the head of his army; eternal paradings and musterings and reviewings and mountings of guards; marchings and countermarchings, and shiftings of quarters, a "Major Sturgeon" at every corner of the street: footmen and grooms and porters and lackeys, with bits of round leather glued up to the sides of their hats, indicating the profession of their gallant masters; but not even a footman to pronounce the word WAR: military and naval academies: young gentlemen in troops to be the nation's defenders; epaulets at right angles, and cocked-hats as fierce as the arrows of Death themselves: club-houses, and panes of glass costing five-pounds a-piece, and with waiters in silk stockings. Trafalgar Squares, Wellington Places, Waterloo Places and Waterloo Bridges; Achilles, the conquering Achilles, stuck up, stark naked, by the "ladies" of England, swinging back his shield, and holding his menacing fist up towards the bullet-proof windows. Temples and palaces decorated with standards won in the field and on the seas; galleries erected to exhibit them in; and a people creeping about, viewing the sights, listening to the rattling of the drum and the clamour of the trumpet, hearing

that the Russians have taken possession of Turkey, and not daring to utter, even to one another, the terrific word, WAR.

This is our real state; this is the figure that we are making in the eyes of the world; and this is the light in which we are viewed from one end to the other of that world. What, then, is to be the end of this? For he is mightily deceived who supposes that our humiliations are to end with the execution of the projects of Russia with regard to Turkey. When I have finished this article, I shall insert a letter which I addressed to the "*Cobbettites*" some time after the battle of Navarino, from which the reader will see, that the present events are only mere fulfilment of what I then saw and predicted. That letter should be read with care from the beginning to the end; because the ultimate consequences are there very clearly pointed out and sufficiently dwelt upon. Those consequences, shortly described, being, a close union between Russia and the United States of America, and finally joined by France; and, of course, the complete humiliation and bowing down of England.

Referring the reader to that letter, for a more full statement of my opinion as to those matters, the question that will now be put to me is this: "Would you, then, if you were prime minister, go to war?" Yes, at once, or quit my place. At once, and my fleet should negotiate the Russians out of Constantinople and all the Turkish territories; the

autocrat should hear England speak from the mouth of the cannon, and from no other mouth.

"Why, the funds would be down to forty!" will exclaim some crucifying usurer. They might be down to one, if they would, but I would go to war. But how would I get the means? I would undertake to beat the Russian bear and repeal the malt-tax at the same time; and if I did not do both, I would agree to be the next annual victim for the Jews to crucify at Easter.

Very well, now; this is what you would do; but, what do you think the Ministers will do? Ah! that's a hard question: I can tell what it is likely that any body else would do; I can tell generally, pretty nearly, what a cause, or a set of causes, will produce, when the actors are any other men than the Ministers of England; but, when it comes to them, I can never venture beyond a guess. If there be three things which they can do in a certain case, and I could ascertain which was the most absurd of the three, I should have a strong leaning towards that; but, it would be so entirely uncertain after all, that if my life depended upon it; if I were put to death if I did not choose one, and if I did not hit upon the right, I should put the three into a bag, give them a shake, say my prayers, and pull one out.

There is this much, however, of certain, in this case: one of two things they must do: they must keep peace or go to war. If they choose the former, we shall be told that Turkey is very little to us; that

it is a great way off; that the trade is something, to be sure, but that going to war for trade is purchasing trade very dearly; that besides, we can have "free trade" with Turkey still; that there is nothing like the "reciprocity system;" that we are now under the "march of intellect," and that the barbarous notions of shedding human blood for the sake of trade, or for the maintenance of power, ought to be banished from the mind; and that Messrs. Poulett Thomson and Spring Rice have "tables" to prove, that we should gain instead of lose by the exchange of masters in Turkey.*

BATTLE OF NAVARINO.

October, 1829.

It is now about five years since "the Greek cause" began to be a subject of empty speeches with the fools, and a source of swindling with the bond-knaves, of this country; and from that very day I began to warn the Government against favouring that cause; seeing, that if that cause

* Cobbett's selection of these two gentlemen's names is rather singular; the first certainly formerly was particularly connected with the Baltic,—and the first time he ever got on his legs in the House of Commons, was indignantly to repel an attack on his Majesty the Emperor of Russia. The second is supposed to be the author of that portion of the pamphlet entitled "Reform Ministry, and Reformed Parliament," which tells us that the occupation of Constantinople by Russia would, if politically injurious, still be conducive to the progress of humanity!

flourished, if that cause succeeded, the Russian power would be brought into the Mediterranean; and that, therefore, it was the duty of the English Government to uphold the unbroken power of the Turks. And what did the Government do? precisely the reverse of this. The fools and knaves supplied the Greeks with money, which they and their country have lost; and the Government, though inactive for a while, soon began to take a part most mischievous to England. This very Duke of Wellington was (by the silly Canning) sent to Russia to have a talk about Greece. Next, this same Canning made a treaty with Russia and France in July, 1826, which they call the Treaty of London; and by which treaty the three powers entered into that compact, which led to the battle of Navarino.

By this battle we assisted Russia and France to cripple the Turkish power. This was, as will presently appear, directly contrary to our interest; but we did it because we could not go to war. Russia and France were resolved (for the reasons to be stated by-and-by) to sever Greece from the rest of Turkey; and we consented to aid them in this, in the hope that they would stop there, and not proceed to make general war upon Turkey. We knew their wishes; we knew that they had a design to break up the Turkish power; in order to open a way to India, but more especially in order to bring the naval power of Russia into the Mediterranean, as a check to that of England. Our Government

knew all this very well: they hated the "Greek cause," cursed the Greek cause, and wished the Turks to crush it completely; but, not able to go to war, they dissembled, and consented (by very nearly force) to assist Russia and France in crippling our old friend and ally, the Turk; thinking, that, for some years, at least, this would pacify the Russians and the French; and that, by the end of those years, we should be able to go to war and defend the Turk.

Russia and France knew our situation; they had not been looking at our paper-money, poor-rates, distresses, and panics for nothing. Besides, my friends, the statesmen of those countries had read all that you had read; and they had not, like our pretty fellows, read it for the purpose of finding out some shuffle whereby to make the world believe it to be false and foolish. They had read the *Register* attentively; they had seen its predictions verified; they saw in it the facts and reasoning, which convinced them, as the same facts and arguments had convinced you, that this country could never go to war again as long as the debt existed; that is to say, until a species of revolution should take place; and this they well knew that the Government would not run the risk of, be the disgrace or the national loss what it might.

These two powers knew all well; and, therefore, they did not stop with the battle of Navarino: they did not stop with the liberation of the Greeks: the "Greek cause," was now clearly a mere pretence

with them; for the battle was hardly over, the shoutings in London for the "glorious achievement" were hardly succeeded by silence, when Russia, who had already prepared her armies for the purpose, declared war against Turkey, not on account of the "Greek cause;" not as a joint affair with England and France; but on her own account; on her own private account; and on pretences so false, so manifestly groundless, that those of the wolf, in the fable, in his war against the lamb, were no longer fabulous.

The part which our Government now acted was quite worthy of the rest of its conduct for years past. Its advocates of the press pretended that this war was a matter with which we had nothing to do; that Russia had a right to go to war, if she pleased; that we were not bound by any treaty to defend Turkey from invasion or even from conquest. These papers, however, let out the secret wishes of our poor puny Government; they rejoiced always when the Russians met with a defeat, or a check; they cried up the valour and obstinacy of the Turks; and, when the Russians retreated at the end of the first campaign, I was afraid that these scribes of our Government would go mad with exultation! "There!" said they, "see how wise it was in our Majesty's Ministers to let the thing alone! They know better than to plunge us into a war for nothing! They know that the Turks would do the thing themselves."

Such was their language until a few months ago.

And now what do they say? Why, that the Turks were a people destined to fall; but that the terms, granted by the Russians, are, really, not so very hard; and that, at any rate, the insult will not be injurious to England! This last is the main thing; and it shall now be my business to show you, in as plain a manner as I can, that there never was an event in the world, since this country has been called England, so injurious and so disgraceful to her; an event that so clearly marked her want of power; an event that so unequivocally proclaimed to the world her fallen and degraded state.

There are certain facts which you all know, namely, that Turkey contains about twenty-five millions of inhabitants; that its dominions are partly in Europe and partly in Asia, with a small addition in Africa; that these dominions lie for the far greater part at the eastern end of the Mediterranean sea; that the capital of this empire is Constantinople; that Europe is here divided from Asia by a very narrow channel, called the channel of Constantinople; that there is, about a hundred miles to the west of that, another narrow pass, called the Dardanelles; and that both of these (bounded by Turkish land on each side) have, for many centuries, been kept, as it were, locked by the Turks, against all ships except such as they chose to suffer to pass along them; these passes being completely guarded by forts, batteries, castles, and other means of destruction to those who might attempt to pass without leave.

Beyond Constantinople, but nearly close to it comes in a Sea, called the Black Sea, which, in extent of surface, is much about equal to that of the islands of Great Britain and Ireland, both put together; but, into this sea, from the Mediterranean, there is no passage except that of the narrow channel of Constantinople, and that of the Dardanelles. Now, mark. The territories round the Black Sea have, in great part, long been under the power of Russia. They are fertile in all the most valuable products of the earth, lying, as they do, between 45 and 40 degrees of north latitude, and, of course, on an average, in the latitude of the south of France; and they abound in the growth of all the materials for building and fitting out ships. There are the timber, the hemp, the iron, the pitch, and, indeed, every thing in super-abundance.

The Russian power has long been increasing on the land. She has, too, long had a great fleet of men-of-war, which she has always shown a strong desire to employ for the purpose of checking the power of England. But, shut up in the Baltic so many months in the year by the ice; not daring to come out, and stay out for any length of time, we have always been able to laugh at the envy and malice, visible in the several conventions and confederacies and armed neutralities, which she has, at various times, set on foot against us, and of which she has always been the animating soul. We always knew her wishes; we always knew what she was aiming at; we always knew that she wished

to destroy our maritime dominion; we knew also that the French, and other maritime powers, but particularly the French, wished to act with her in the enterprise; but, completely held in check by the frosts in the north, and by our friend, the Turk, in the south, we always laughed at the naval menaces and demonstrations of Russia. But shall we laugh now?

To answer this question we must look well at the "treaty," as it is called, but, "capitulation," as it ought to be called; for here are the Dardanelles and the Channel of Constantinople unlocked to Russia; and here is the sure and certain beginning of the demolition of the naval dominion of England, unless maintained by war, and war, too, to be begun very soon, and crowned with success at any sacrifice. In the last *Register* I inserted the whole of the "treaty." I shall insert the Seventh article again; and if you read it with attention, you will find that it puts Russia into real command of the whole of the Turkish empire by land as well as by sea; that it is conquest under the name of immunities to be enjoyed; that the real sovereignty is in the hands of Russia; and that the Sultan (as the Turkish sovereign is called) is no more than a degraded Viceroy of Russia; and not even that with regard to the most important functions of sovereignty.

"ART. 7.—Russian subjects shall enjoy throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well by land as by sea, the full and entire liberty

of commerce secured to them by the former Treaties concluded between the two High Contracting Powers. No infringement of that liberty of commerce shall be committed; neither shall it be permitted to be checked in any case, nor under any pretence, by a prohibition or any restriction whatever; nor in consequence of any regulation or measure, whether it be one of internal administration, or one of internal legislation. Russian subjects, vessels, and merchandise, shall be secure against all violence and all chicanery. The former shall live under the exclusive jurisdiction and police of the Ministers and the Consuls of Russia. The Russian vessels shall not be subjected to any visit on board whatever on the part of the Ottoman authorities, neither out at sea nor in any of the ports or roadsteads belonging to the dominions of the Sublime Porte; and all merchandise and commodities belonging to a Russian subject, after having paid the custom-house duties required by the tariffs, shall be freely conveyed, deposited on land, in the warehouses of the proprietor, or of his consignee, or else transferred to the vessels of any other nation whatever, without the Russian subjects being required to give notice to the local authorities, and still less to ask their permission. It is expressly agreed upon, that all grain proceeding from Russia shall enjoy the same privileges, and that its free transit shall never experience, under any pretence, any difficulty or impediment.

The Sublime Porte engages, besides, to watch carefully that the commerce and navigation of the Black Sea shall not experience the slightest obstruction of any nature whatever. For this purpose the Sublime Porte recognises and declares the passage of the Canal of Constantinople, and the Strait of the Dardanelles, entirely free and open to Russian ships under merchant flags, laden or in ballast, whether they come from the Black Sea to go into the Mediterranean, or whether, returning from the Mediterranean they wish to re-enter the Black Sea. These vessels, provided they be merchantmen, of whatever size or tonnage they may be, shall not be exposed to any impediment or vexation whatever, as it has been stipulated above. The two Courts shall come to an understanding with respect to the best means for preventing all delay in the delivery of the necessary clearances. In virtue of the same principle, the passage of the Canal of Constantinople, and of the Strait of the Dardanelles, is declared free and open for all the merchant vessels of the Powers at peace with the Sublime Porte, whether bound to the Russian ports of the Black Sea, or returning from them, whether laden or in ballast, upon the same conditions as those stipulated for the vessels under the Russian flag. In fine, the Sublime Porte, acknowledging the right of the Imperial Court of Russia to obtain guarantee of this full liberty of commerce and navigation in the Black Sea, solemnly declares that

she will never, under any pretence whatever, throw the least obstacle in its way. She promises, above all, never to permit herself in future to stop or detain vessels, laden or in ballast, whether Russian or belonging to nations with which the Ottoman empire shall not be in a state of declared war, passing through the Canal of Constantinople and the Strait of the Dardanelles, to repair from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from the Mediterranean to the Russian ports of the Black Sea. And if, which God forbid ! any of the stipulations contained in the present article should be infringed, and the reclamation of the Russian Minister on that subject should not obtain a full and prompt satisfaction, the Sublime Porte recognises, before-hand, the right in the Imperial Court of Russia to consider such an infraction an act of hostility, and immediately to retaliate on the Ottoman empire."

It is impossible to read this article without perceiving, that here is a complete surrender of the power of Turkey, of the rights of sovereignty in that empire; a complete subjugation, all but the mere name; and the name would have been, just at present, inconvenient to Russia. The Whigs, who appear to have a very strong desire to get from the Duke of Wellington some small part of the public money, are everywhere endeavouring to cause it to be believed that this is not so very disgraceful an affair, after all; that the Turks have not been so very harshly dealt with by Russia; and that as to

England, she has nothing to do with the matter at any rate; that the injury and disgrace, if there be any, is none of hers! This is what the Whigs are at, all over the country; and Lord Grosvenor, who, by-the-by, was one of the most desperate supporters of Pitt, until the hour of that bawling fellow's death; this Lord Grosvenor is now the leader of the Whig club in Cheshire; at a meeting of which he said the other day, that things were going on extremely well; that our prospects were very fair; and that, for his part, he saw no reason to be alarmed at the aggrandizement of Russia! In the same vineyard are labouring the miserable *Morning Chronicle*, the *Scotsman*, and every thing belonging to the Whig crew. The Irish Catholic papers sing the same tune, as far as I have perceived. In short, all those who wish to support the present Ministry, are endeavouring to maintain these two propositions:

1. That the Treaty between Russia and Turkey contains nothing very humiliating to Turkey.

2. That, at any rate, the Treaty, if acted upon, can produce no harm to England.

As to the first of these, Russia secures a concurrent jurisdiction and allegiance throughout a large part of the Turkish empire; she secures the jurisdiction over the waters, as well as over the land, in Europe and in Asia, as far as relates to all matters of commerce. By that part of the Treaty, which stipulates for the payment of sums of money by

Turkey to Russia, she secures a right to the military occupation of Turkey in Europe for at least ten years to come; she secures, in short, the real sovereignty in the Turkish empire by land and by sea, under various appellations and pretences. It is impossible, however, adequately to describe the fallen and subjugated state of Turkey, without resorting to a mode of illustration which shall bring the matter home to ourselves; which shall make the case our own; and, if we go on at this rate, God Almighty only knows how soon the case may be our own.

Let us suppose, then, a war between England and France: let us suppose the French, after landing in Scotland, and overrunning that country, marching on towards London, overrunning Northumberland, Durham and Cumberland, and penetrating as far as Derby; let us suppose the English negotiators to set off to Derby, and there to agree, if the French will not march on to London, that the King of England will bind himself to the following conditions:

1. That Scotland and the three northern counties of England shall be exempted from the fiscal power of the English Government; that they shall owe a joint allegiance to the French King and to the King of England; that the English Government shall pass no laws affecting Scotland and those counties, without the consent of the French Government; and that the King of England acknowledges

the right of France to do whatever may be necessary to protect the people of these counties against the power of the King of England.

2. That as to the waters surrounding this island, including the Straits of Dover, St. George's Channel, the passage north-about between Ireland and Scotland, and even the narrow Straits, called the Needles, between the Hampshire main and the Isle of Wight; that, as to all these, the King of England shall no longer have a right of dominion of any description: that he shall have no right of search, even in case he shall be at war; that he shall not bring any neutral vessel to; that he shall not stop her to search for enemy's goods, or even for things contraband of war; that, supposing him to be at war with Holland, for instance, he shall not have the power to prevent France, Russia, America, or any other power from going to and from Holland with their ships, carrying the goods of the Dutch, carrying powder and ball to them, and muskets, and cannons, and shall not prevent them from carrying even troops to assist the Dutch; that, finally, if the King of England make any attempt to violate this bargain, he acknowledges before hand that the King of France has a right to make war upon him for such attempt.

3. As if this were not enough; as if all this were not sufficient to convince the world of the vassal state of England, suppose the King of England to agree that Frenchmen shall bring in French

goods into any of our ports at their pleasure, paying only duties according to the present tariffs; that they shall remove them about on land or water throughout the whole kingdom at their pleasure; that they shall be subject to no excise, shall require no permits, shall be under no control of any office or authority whatsoever, that they shall sell them here if they please to foreign nations, and re-ship them in ships of other nations from our ports; that, for instance, a Frenchman shall bring in a cargo of wine, in a French or other foreign ship; that he shall land it at his pleasure; that having paid the duty according to the present tariff, he shall move it at his pleasure to any part of the kingdom without any further permission, and without any inspection or control on the part of any body; and that, if he please, he shall send it out of the country again without paying any duty at all, and in any foreign ship that he may please.

4. Still, however, this is not the worst; for the King of England agrees that Frenchmen shall come into England in any number; that they shall come here as a matter of right; that they shall carry on any commerce or business that they please in England; that they shall quit one business, and go to another when they like; that they shall have all the privileges and rights of Englishmen; and (which surpasses any thing ever heard of in the world before) they shall be exempted from the effects of

all the criminal laws in England! That no constable, no policeman, not even Mr. Peel's famous police-men; no sheriff, no justice of the peace, no judge, no jury, no jailer, no hangman, shall dare to touch a hair of the head of a Frenchman, let the Monsieur do what he may! That Frenchmen in England shall be totally exempt from the English laws and authorities; that no internal regulation or legislation shall affect them; that they shall be subject to nothing in the way of control, but the regulations and police established by the French ambassador and consuls, that if a Frenchman knock an Englishman down or rob him: if he commit a murder upon an Englishman, nay, if he conspire against or kill the King, the English law shall take no cognizance of his conduct.

Let me now put it to you, who are real Englishmen; let me ask you whether you would affect to regard England as any thing but a conquered country, if the King of England were to submit to terms like these? Besides bargaining to pay a tribute, which it is known never can be paid; and leaving all the strong holds of the country in the hands of the King of France, as a guarantee for the payment of the tribute. And yet these base Whigs, these desperate and greedy hunters after place, power, and emolument, and who hope to get them by currying favour with the Duke of Wellington; this wretched and worthless faction are trying to

persuade the country, that Russia has been moderate in her terms, and that the Turks have really not much to complain of.

With regard to the second proposition, namely, that at any rate the Treaty, if acted upon, can produce no harm to England, I have observed at the beginning of this letter, that this Treaty brings Russia into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. This is the greatest change that has taken place in the affairs of Europe for more than a hundred years. It creates a new great naval power, and opens all the seas to that power. We had a monopoly of the trade of Turkey. We are to have that no longer. France had no maritime ally in Europe: now she will have one great and powerful, and of endless resources. Russia will be the great naval power at one end of the Mediterranean, where the Greeks will be a colony of Russia instead of a colony of Turkey. It is not folly, but downright base hypocrisy to affect to believe that we shall be able to keep the Seven Islands and Malta, or either of them, for any length of time; and where is the man stupid enough to believe that we shall be able to keep Gibraltar for ten years? "Ten years!" exclaims the Scotch *feelosofer*, "why, *tan* years is a *leetel* eternity, *mon!*" Very true, for our policy for many years past, has been a sort of weekly or monthly policy.

The French and Russians have had a common interest in this war against Turkey. The French

wanted us out of the Mediterranean; she wanted Russia to be closer upon the flank of Austria; she wanted a great Russian fleet in the Mediterranean; she wanted her way open to Egypt; and now she has got it all. Not only shall we never dare show our faces in the Mediterranean again; not only shall we be totally ejected from that sea, and from the trade of Turkey and Italy; but there will be an enormous maritime power, always ready to come out into the Atlantic to join the Americans; and in a very short time, speaking of the affairs of nations, England, unless she instantly buckle on her armour, will be broken down as a maritime power; and as she has no other power, and never can have, she will be stripped bit by bit of all her foreign possessions; and will finally realize the prophecy of the Abbé Raynal, who predicted that her false and showy wealth would at last make her the scorn, instead of being the envy, of the world.

How it must amuse the laughing part of the politicians of Europe: how it must delight the surviving friends of Marshal Ney: how must it fill with ecstacy those who cursed the pillagers of the museums; how it must convulse with laughter those Frenchmen who have heard of Waterloo-bridge, of the great Achilles, and of the triumphal arches of Hyde-park Corner: though these latter have not (from pure modesty in the papers) yet received the baptismal ceremony: how it must delight all these people to look at the miserable

shifts to which we are driven in order to disguise our shame. Amongst these shifts I will cite one from the *Old Times* newspaper, which exhibits, I think, the most complete instance of folly, of childishness, of miserable, miserable weakness, that the eyes of man ever beheld, or that ever met a human ear. I beg you to read it with great attention; for that will save me the trouble of a long commentary upon it.

"In this affair of Turkey, neither England nor Europe has been fairly dealt by. A large portion of the French press, and, as its exertions proceeded, a great body of the nation under its influence, ran wild upon the Turkish question. First, the independence of Greece, which was a separate and smaller question, was put forward, as that to which alone the minds of Frenchmen ought to be directed. Had a vigorous and long-sighted part been taken by England and France together, it would perhaps have been this:—'We (the Allies) will force Turkey to acquiesce in the independence of Greece: but on the other hand, we will compel the Emperor Nicolas to respect the integrity and independence of Turkey.' This, we say, ought to have been done, if it had been practicable. But was it practicable? Perhaps not: perhaps the French press and the French public would not support the Government of King Charles in fulfilling its duty to Europe. Instead of following the direct path of French policy, and taking steps to restrain any dangerous movement

by Russia, certain papers, such as the *Constitutionnel* and the *Journal des Debats*, got up again the old Bonapartean hostility to England, and actually turned the popular feeling of the French upon a false scent, deterring them from all opposition to the views of Russia, because in resisting her, they would have to co-operate with this country! This was the extreme of folly in the public, who were duped; it was the extreme of baseness in the press and its auxiliaries, who duped them. And why was this anti-national course adopted by papers which called themselves liberal? There is a Corsican in Paris, who once received a pension from the British Government, and who, ever since the year 1815, has held the post of Russian Minister at the French Court. This gentleman is reputed to be the most dexterous intriguer in Europe. The invasion of Spain, in 1822, is said to have been chiefly his work. A large portion of the press of France is his instrument. The *Constitutionnel* is believed to be under his absolute control; and we are sorry to say, that there is nothing in the later history of another popular journal to repel the imputation of its being secretly influenced by Pozzo. The game, then, of this diplomatist, is clear: viz. to divert from Russia against Great Britain the whole power of that French feeling, which, if governed by common sense, would have united with the Duke of Wellington for a great European object; and to interpose the phantoms of English

maritime tyranny, the obsolete topics of Bonaparte's tirades against this country, between the gigantic schemes of Russia and the mystified imagination of the French people. This plan was followed up by perpetual attacks upon Prince Polignac and his administration, on the despicable pretext of his being helped into office by the Duke of Wellington; but for no real reason whatever, except that the Prince was known by Pozzo di Borgo to see, like most enlightened men, some danger in the Russian policy. Such has been, as is shrewdly hinted, the state of things behind the scenes; the stage-manager of the Parisian drama, has been Pozzo; the briber of the French press, has been Pozzo; the conscious calumniator of England, is the same Pozzo, once the pensioner of England. He is, however, an efficient servant of his present master. But we repeat most distinctly, that while the French mind was so diseased upon this great question of permanent interest to Europe, no English Minister could have discreetly ventured to break ground in the East."

This surpasses all that I ever read, even in this very stupid paper. The substance of it is this, that Pozzo di Borgo has a complete control over the French press; that the French press has a complete control over the French mind; that the French mind has a complete control over the French King; that the Duke of Wellington could not stop the

Russians without the consent of the French King; and that, as Pozzo di Borgo was the agent of the Emperor of Russia, he made the French press work upon the French mind, to prevent the French King from giving his consent to the Duke of Wellington to stop the Russians? Thus it is only by means of the few golden louis, that Pozzo di Borgo was able to give to the French press, that England was compelled to stand still and see a giant navy enter the Mediterranean to join the French and Americans in any future war, and to eject England for ever from the Mediterranean Sea, unless she put on her armour and begin to fight immediately, before this baby giant attain his manhood.

EXTRACTS FROM THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. CV.

ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY.

To preserve the independence of Turkey has long been the primary object of the foreign policy of France and England, especially of the latter—for we have an Asiatic as well as a European interest at stake; and whatever course her fear of the 'spread of liberal opinions' may have induced Austria to pursue, since the 'three glorious days' in France and the reform in England have appeared to unite these two powers in support of such changes as she most dreads, there can be no doubt that the possession of Constantinople by Russia would be regarded at Vienna as an evil second only to the propagation of revolutionary principles in Germany. But, notwithstanding these opposing interests, Russia, from the day on which Catharine II. gave to her grandson the name of Constantine, has avowed her ambition to have a third capital on the Bosphorus; and had she not avowed it, her policy has been so unequivocally, perseveringly, and successfully directed to the subjugation of Turkey, that the most careless observation of passing events, or the most cursory perusal of the history of their relations and

collisions, could leave no doubt on the subject, so it seems to us, in the mind of any sane man.

Why did Russia covet the Crimea and Bessarabia?—was her own territory too circumscribed? Why was Ismael to be purchased at any price of blood or treasure? Why was the intelligence of its fall so grateful to the soul of Catharine? Why has Russia at all times taken care to preserve to herself a right of interference in the internal affairs of Servia, Wallachia, and Moldavia; which was an ever-available cause of quarrel, and a never-ending source of discussion, with Turkey? How has it happened that she has never permitted a favourable opportunity of attacking Turkey to pass unimproved; and that her frontier has never ceased to creep gradually onward to the south and west? With what view has she preserved, at an immense cost of men and money, a position south of the Caucasus, which can avail her only for *some* aggression? What adequate motive could she have for incorporating with her own dominions, in a manner that would not have been creditable to a more barbarous power, and at a large annual pecuniary sacrifice, the little Christian principality of Georgia, which sought her protection, and confided in her good faith?—was it not that she found in it the means of planting a thorn in the side of Turkey—of paralyzing the resources of the Porte in Asia—of more effectually folding her arms round her destined victim? When Turkey, moved by

the instances of England, and taking counsel of her own prudence rather than her ambition, concluded, in 1812, the treaty of Bucharest, and put an end to a war of aggression on the part of Russia, at a moment when that power was struggling for its very existence, why did the Emperor evade the surrender of the fortresses on the Black Sea, which he had bound himself by treaty to restore? How comes it that the name of Russia has been connected with every rebellion in Greece—with every revolt in the north-eastern provinces? Why has she permitted herself, in violation of existing treaties, to make her territory a place of refuge for rebels? What could have been her inducement to tender her services to the Porte, to put down the revolt in Greece—which revolt she was believed to have excited?—Was it not a desire to obtain the same rights of protection, interference, and control in Greece, that she had already acquired in the other Christian provinces? When the Porte had declined the friendly aid thus freely offered, and declared that it would rather forego the advantages of the proffered co-operation than sanction the principle of foreign intervention between itself and its subjects, why did Russia suddenly become the avowed advocate and protectress of Greece, threatening to take up arms in her cause as she was not permitted to employ them against her? Was it not because she was determined to interfere at all hazards; and having discovered that the sympa-

thies of Europe were awakened in behalf of the revolted Greeks, she conceived the hope of detaching, on this ground, her allies from Turkey, and of being permitted to stand forth, as she actually did at a subsequent period, the champion of what she told Turkey was a European cause? Does any one who is acquainted with the discussions of 1821, and the proceedings of Baron Strogonoff,—with the terms of the ultimatum he presented—with the rude manner in which he rejected the answer of the Porte—and his subsequent departure from Constantinople, as the Porte truly said, 'without a cause'—can any one, who has any knowledge of this whole transaction, doubt for one moment, that it was the intention of the Russian ambassador to produce a rupture—or that he would have succeeded, had the ambassadors of France and England been prepared to leave Constantinople as they afterwards did in 1827? Was not the war between Persia and Turkey, which broke out at that very time, undertaken at the instigation of the Russian *chargé d'affaires* at Tabreez, and justified by him in a long note addressed to an officer of the Shah's household? Could it be that so remarkable an apparent coincidence between the views of the Russian representatives *at these distant courts* was the result of no previous concert?

But the violence of the Russian ambassador was unavailing. The firmness and address of the British government, and the temperate conduct of the

Porte, postponed the catastrophe; and it was not until the shackles we had forged for ourselves in the treaty of London, had chained us to the side of Russia, and the evil effects of so ill-omened a connexion in such a cause had already prostrated Turkey, that we not only lost the power of preventing a rupture, but found ourselves contributing to the aggrandisement of our rival, and hastening the subjugation of our ally.

Turkey, on grounds incontrovertible, denied the right of any foreign power to interfere between her and her own subjects, whether Christian or Mahomedan. International law acknowledges no religious affinities or antipathies, countenances no classical associations, no schoolboy predilections; and, however generous or disinterested might have been the sympathies of European nations with their Christian brethren in Greece—however honourable the sentiments which led men imbued with classical recollections to seek the means of repaying to a degenerate posterity the debt of gratitude they acknowledged to some of the noblest examples of human wisdom and glory—the stern questions of right and law remained untouched by these indulgences of the imagination;—and the claim of Turkey to the allegiance of her Greek subjects was as perfect as that of any other power to the obedience of a conquered people. This was acknowledged at the Congress of Verona; and that decision of assembled Europe was made known to the

Porte by the British ambassador. Could any tribunal be more competent—any pledge more solemn?

But Russia was still seeking a cause of quarrel with Turkey. True to the policy of Catharine, she longed to have her frontier advanced to the Danube. The name of Greece was continually in her mouth, and the contest in that country seemed likely to furnish the pretext for a rupture with the Porte. The sympathy of all the admirers of democracy in Europe, and of many of our scholars, with the overmatched Greeks, had been loudly pronounced. The successes of Ibrahim Pasha in the Morea threatened to replace Turkey in undisputed possession of that province, and to leave no pretext for interference. The party professing what are called 'liberal opinions' in this country, put itself prominently forward to demand the intervention of England in support of the revolt. The distinguished statesman then at the head of the British cabinet had begun to connect himself with this party, and his own early predilections for literature, his reputation as a scholar, and probably a true love for ancient Greece, prepared him to regard the association of England and France with Russia in the enterprise of liberation, as the best mode of regulating the movements of the latter, and preventing her becoming sole arbitress of the destinies of so large a part of Turkey, and so interesting a portion of the globe. At the same time

the unbridled license of the lawless Greeks had made their cruisers a terror to the trading ships of all nations, and the interests of commerce required that this system of legalised piracy should be suppressed. It was not pretended that Turkey had perpetrated or countenanced these violations of the laws and the practice of all civilized nations, but it was thought necessary that she should pay the penalty of the transgression. The Emperor Nicolas, solicited to join the alliance, graciously acquiesced, and became a party to a treaty which had for its avowed object to arrest the arms of Turkey in their rapid advance towards the suppression of the rebellion in Greece—and to punish the piracies of the Greeks, by the virtual dismemberment of Turkey;—a treaty, which not only separated his allies from the Sultan, and placed them on the side of his enemy; but which bound these allies themselves to accomplish that which, in any event, could not fail to benefit Russia. The result is well known.*

Russia, too weak to hazard a war while Turkey might find an ally in England, or in France, no sooner saw her separated from these powers than she prepared to attack her. The war in Persia was first to be concluded—for even this was a sufficient impediment to alarm Russia; and the coffers of

* We are not aware that any connected account of the negociations and proceedings of the allies, for the accomplishment of the objects of the treaty of London, have ever appeared, except that contained in a previous Number. See Quarterly Review, vol. xliii. p. 495.

the Shah made to furnish the means of putting the Muscovite troops in motion. But the Russian general at Tabreez permitted the intentions of his government to transpire, before Turkey had even put forth that letter to the pashas, which furnished the emperor with the pretext for his declaration of war; and, therefore, before the existence of the grounds on which Russia afterwards attempted to justify it. The predetermination of Russia to go to war, should an occasion be offered her, was thus put beyond a doubt. It was what every man who had attended to her previous proceedings in the East, and who knew the feelings of the Porte, must have anticipated, from the moment he became acquainted with the treaty of the 6th July—must have known to be inevitable after the battle of Navarino.*

'It is ten years of continuous disasters,' says the writer of the able and eloquent pamphlet before us, 'occasioned or exasperated by the hostility, open or disguised, of Russia, and the errors of France and England, that have reduced the existence of Turkey to a diplomatic decision between the courts of Europe.

'The independence of Turkey has been undermined by her, under the mask of common objects, common measures, and formal alliance with the two cabinets most interested, and now on the point

* For the circumstances which led to this battle, see Quarterly Review, vol. xliii.

of recurring to the last resort in its support; by an unparalleled combination of successful delusions, she not only has veiled from them her motives and her acts, but has called in the aid of their armies and fleets, and the whole weight of their moral support, for the furtherance of her designs.'—pp. 6, 7.

But before her release from the contest with Persia, and the growing hostility of feeling between the Porte and its ancient allies, had matured the occasion which the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh awaited to accomplish its purpose, it was necessary to provide for the possibility of an accession, on the part of Turkey, to the demands of the three powers, and to draw, in the meantime, such advantages as might be derived from the commanding position in which this treble alliance had placed Russia. The 'reforms' of the Sultan had already been commenced, and the destruction of the Janissaries had deprived him of the only military force which could have availed him in a contest with a European nation. His condition, therefore, was one of extreme debility, and, though he still resisted all interference in the affairs of Greece, he agreed to renew the negotiations with the court of St. Petersburgh, for the adjustment of all causes of dispute, *distinct from the Greek question*, which existed between them. The plenipotentiaries met at Akermann, and the demands of Russia were so unreasonable, that at first they were peremptorily rejected.

'After several meetings, the Russian plenipotentiaries presented, contrary to the convention, a separate document, under the name of *ultimatum*, demanding that it should be approved and accepted, without alteration.

'In vain did the plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Porte represent how much such a proposition was contrary to all diplomatic forms, and to the basis of the conference. "*Notre mission*," answered the Russians, "*a pour unique objet de faire absolument accepter cette pièce.*" The Turks finally gave way, in consequence of the official declaration of the Russian plenipotentiaries, in the name of their court, that Russia would in no way interfere with the Greek question. This declaration consigned in the protocols on both sides, appeared a pledge of peace and friendship between the two empires, for the present and the future. The close of the conference was implicitly motived on the said declaration, and the treaty was concluded, *de bonne grace*, without looking too closely at each of the articles."'—p. 15.

In April, Russia signed the protocol by which she engaged to interfere in the affairs of Greece. In September, she procured the acceptance of the Convention of Akermann, by engaging not to interfere in these affairs. In July, she signed the Treaty of London, renewing the engagements of April, with the addition of a determination to use force if necessary; and in October, her admiral,

acting on the *nautical* interpretation of that document, took part in the battle of Navarino, where the Ottoman fleet was annihilated, in the midst of profound peace, by the three powers who had so lately concluded a treaty of 'peace, mediation, and conservation.' Yet a mental reservation, of which the Porte accused itself in a letter to its own subjects, was the only intelligible cause of complaint on which Russia could found a pretext for detaching herself from her allies, and declaring war *upon separate grounds.* The letter of Count Nesselrode to the Reis Effendi, which was written in answer to a conciliatory address from that functionary, and which was transmitted to the Turkish government along with the declaration of war, clearly restricts the causes of quarrel to acts subsequent to the departure of the ambassadors from Constantinople; *for it declares the friendly intentions and feelings of Russia up to that time.* But subsequent to the departure of the ambassadors, the proceedings of the Turkish government towards Russia and her subjects had been in no one respect different from those adopted towards the other powers and their subjects. Russia had, therefore, no separate ground of complaint, except the declaration of the Porte, contained in a letter to the pashas of the empire, that it had concluded the Treaty of Akermann for the purpose of gaining time*—a declaration which

* After the battle of Navarino, and the departure of the Ambassadors from Constantinople, the Porte did not doubt that it was at

the Turkish government evinced a distinct inclination to retract; and which, if even it had been unexplained, was not more inexcusable than the conduct of Russia in contracting engagements never intended to be fulfilled, and already violated.

Had England and France been untrammelled by the treaty of the 6th July—uncompromised by the 'untoward event' of Navarino, which was the offspring, legitimate or spurious, of that treaty—and unpledged to a conditional co-operation with Russia against the Porte,—they could not, they would not have exposed Turkey, naked and alone, to the tender mercies of her enemy; they never would have consented to entrust all the interests they had at stake in her independence to the keeping of a power that had never ceased to desire and labour for her subjugation.

After an attempt to obtain the consent of the allies to 'the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia in the name of the three powers,' and even to the march of her armies into Turkey, for the purpose of 'dictating peace under the walls of the

war with the three powers; and it therefore appealed to the patriotism of the Turks, and called upon them to arm themselves in defence of their country and their religion. At the same time, it informed them, not that it had been deceived by Russia, which was the truth, but, that it had deceived Russia, and had signed the Convention of Akermann for the purpose of gaining time. As soon, however, as the Porte had reason to suppose that a war could yet be avoided, it addressed the Russian Cabinet through the Reis Effendi, and expressed a desire to renew friendly relations with the Czar.

Seraglio,'—after having failed in an endeavour to engage England and France in active hostilities against the Porte, subsequent to the departure of the ambassadors—and having declared, and been forced to retract the declaration, that 'in the manner of executing that act,' (the Treaty of London,) 'she will be able to consult only her own interests and convenience,'—Russia at length declared war.

To connect the proceedings of this period with subsequent events, to preserve unbroken the chain of Russian policy respecting Turkey, and to put beyond all doubt, if any doubt yet remains, her views of aggrandisement—the audacity with which she pursues them, and the success of her measures —we must examine the Treaty of Adrianople a little in detail; and the analysis of that remarkable document contained in the pamphlet, from which we have already quoted largely, is so able, that we must be excused for extracting it.

In reflecting on the details of these transactions, and observing their immense results, one is struck with the comparative insignificance of the means by which Russia has been able to effect, in the face of Europe, a series of aggressions and encroachments which the leading cabinets of Europe had at all times professed a desire to oppose; and we must admit that there is perceptible in our own diplomacy, and in that of France, a weakness and vacillation, as well as an ignorance of the Turks and of

Turkey, sufficient to account for our failures and our errors—while consummate vigour and audacity, and an undeviating unity of purpose, are conspicuous in the whole eastern policy of Russia. We have seen her adhering steadily during the better part of a century to one great design, which half the power of Europe has been endeavouring to counteract; and we have seen her, whether as an ally or an enemy—in the field or in the cabinet, uniformly advancing towards its consummation. We have seen her whom we regard as still barbarous, handling the more enlightened cabinets of Europe as if they were the tools with which she worked, and converting what one of our most distinguished statesmen considered a master-piece of policy—what all his adherents, and the whole liberal press of Europe, applauded as such—into an instrument for her own aggrandisement, more effectual than all the means that her unaided resources could have supplied.

The cause of all this is sufficiently obvious. Russia brought to bear on this question knowledge superior to that of all the other cabinets. She knew Turkey and the Turks—we knew them not, and sought not to know them. There was no intercourse between them and us, because we have never had any means of communication. We have been content to repose in a profound ignorance of the language, the institutions, the habits, and the feelings of the Ottoman people. We were never

able to appreciate the value of what they lost, or what Russia gained. We were incapable of profiting by their strength, or guarding against their weakness. Though we have acknowledged a community of interest, we have made no attempt to establish a concert of design. We have been walking in the dark, and we need not wonder that we have lost our way.

But great as have been the errors, and miserable as the results have been which make our unguarded interference in the affairs of Greece a subject of bitter regret—leaving us only a consciousness of the purity of our motives to compensate for the follies into which they betrayed us—even these are intelligible and venial, compared with those which we have now to deplore.

Turkey was reduced by the last war with Russia to the verge of destruction—her finances exhausted—her infant army annihilated—the executive paralyzed. The authority of the Sultan, hardly preserved in the capital, was nearly extinguished in the extremities of the empire. To the reforms which he had pushed with too much haste, were attributed the disasters which had overtaken the nation. The pride of the Turks taught them to impute to his errors rather than their own weakness the success of an enemy whom they hated. All those who felt that the innovations of the Sultan struck at the root of their own power, their importance, or their emoluments, found in them a

cause sufficient to account for the evils that had befallen their country. The whole force of ancient prejudices in the people, of personal interest in the nobles, and of religious fanaticism in the priesthood, was arrayed against the attachment of the nation to its sovereign—to sap and to destroy the loyalty of the Turks. The clamour became general, and ambitious men in the more distant provinces, or in those most loosely attached to the empire, thought the time was come when they might with impunity renounce their allegiance—revolt succeeded revolt, and the Ottoman power seemed ready to fall in pieces from the violence of the shock it had sustained, and the apparent relaxation or rupture of the internal bonds of connexion.

But beneath this feeling of discontent, unextinguished by the perception of his errors, and the evils which were imputed to them, there lay deep in every man's heart an indestructible attachment to the national chief and the head of their faith—an ineradicable feeling of mingled feudal and religious allegiance that connected the honour, the national existence of the whole Ottoman people, and the stability of their religion, with the supremacy of this representative of the family that had reigned over them for thirty generations—a feeling which, so long as he preserved in their eyes his own nationality, overcame all the causes of complaint or disaffection that prompted them to con-

demn and to abandon him. The revolts were successively put down, or the demands of the insurgents adjusted; peace was restored, and the promise of repose and renovated strength. The army was recruited, clothed, armed, and paid with regularity: the navy was re-fitted. The civil administration of the country was about to be revised, and some important ameliorations had already been effected.* Military schools were established; ex-

* We quote what follows from the journal of a recent resident in Turkey:—"During the reign of Mahmood have been abolished the state and etiquette which were formerly the occupations of the court. All the useless charges of the seraglio have been swept away. An economy and simplicity have been introduced into several departments of the state, which is really surprising. The expenditure has been reduced to one-fifth of the former charges. The power of life and death has been withdrawn from the pachas. The Christians have been relieved from those burdens and prohibitions which galled them before. The revenue, notwithstanding the deficiencies caused by the loss of the contributions of Greece, Albania, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia—for many years of Egypt, Syria, Candia, Bagdad, Akhaltzik, and lately of Kars and Erzeroom, that is, of nearly one-half of the empire—is yet in a state to meet the increased demands of the new organization. Political culprits and rebels have not only been pardoned, but trusted according to their political capacity. The prisons of Constantinople are empty. There are no heads on the seraglio gates. Numerous academies have been built and endowed by the Sultan; and there are now seven thousand young men receiving in these establishments an education which, without pretending to embrace the higher branches of science, is exceedingly well calculated to make them useful and respectable members of society, and efficient servants of the government. In some of the regiments, the whole of the men have been taught handicrafts, in

tensive means of instruction were provided; a new impulse was given to all the sources of civilization; and out of what appeared to have been but the ruins of a barbarous kingdom, there sprung up — too hastily, it is true, and with all the weakness of a too rapid growth—but still there did spring up, more especially in the capital, new sentiments, new views, new institutions, which were, and still are, rapidly obliterating the broad lines of separation that had hitherto excluded Turkey from the community of European nations, and placed her people beyond the reach of our sympathies and our attachments.

One baneful influence blighted all these prospects. The results of the war had placed the Sultan in a degrading dependence upon Russia, and she used unsparingly the means she possessed to make that obnoxious dependence everywhere apparent. The most faithful of the Mussulmans—finding that neither the dignity of their rank, nor the extent of their services, nor the fidelity of their attachment, could protect them from a like dependence on the agents of a government which every feeling of honest pride and patriotism taught them to consider as the bitter

the exercise of which they are made to occupy their spare time; the profits of their labour are applied to the improvement of their own condition. These are facts which do not cease to be so, because they are not known in Europe—because Europeans will not take the trouble to know them."—Since published under the title of Sultan Mahmood, and Mehemet Ali Pasha.

enemy of their race—began to regard the Sultan as lost to his people, as a prince whose nationality was compromised. The unreserved confidence which had hitherto subsisted between him and his trustiest officers was shaken. Favourites crept into the monarch's councils, and Russia stepping in to give the whole weight of her influence to the personal *attachés* of the Sultan, succeeded in establishing a faction near the throne, which found in the support of its late enemies and recent friends, the surest prop to their own power. Mahmood, piqued by the distrust which the nation had betrayed of his reforms and innovations, and flattered by the compliment to his understanding which was implied in the desire to communicate with himself personally on matters of high importance, yielded to the impulse which led him away from his best counsellors, and taught him to place too much reliance on his own imperfect judgment, and the advice of those whose interest it was to confirm rather than correct his opinions.

At the same time, the commercial privileges and immunities granted to Russia for her Greek *protégés* had become exceedingly oppressive; the farmer of the revenue was defrauded, and the whole civil administration was deranged. Disputes and commotions followed, and the power of Russia enabled her in all cases summarily to decide in favour of her own parties. The Turks could get no redress; and were more and more disgusted with

a Sultan who was unable or unwilling to protect them. The influence of Russia was everywhere felt, and everywhere injuriously, by the nation, but the odium of her measures fell on Mahmood, who was regarded by the people as the instrument of her oppressions. The destruction of the Janissaries had removed the only national check on the sovereign, and his foreign connexion seemed to be formed with a view to place himself in a position of perfect independence of his subjects. To them, therefore, he ceased to be chief of their race; he had become a pageant in the hands of their enemies.

Meanwhile, a storm had been preparing in another quarter.

(After an exposure of the system of Mehemet Ali, the reviewer proceeds).

Independent of the general feeling of discontent generated by the anti-national position of the Sultan, which has already been explained, and fostered by the oppressive amount of the exactions to which so many years of foreign and domestic war had subjected the people—there were in Syria some especial grounds of disaffection, arising from the misconduct of the local government, which had driven the people to rebellion, and led to the massacre of the Pacha of Damascus, and the plunder of the provisions there collected for the use of the pilgrims to Mecca. The Porte endeavoured to re-establish its authority, and by measures of severity to repress the turbulence of the populace. At this

moment, the appearance of Ibrahim Pacha on the stage promised to afford them a refuge from the vengeance of the Porte. In this temper, smarting with the memory of their rccent wrongs, and encouraged by the petty chiefs and rulers, who had begun to suffer from the reforms of the Sultan—which, however, had not yet afforded any relief to the lower classes—they hailed Ibrahim as their deliverer. The army of the Sultan was beaten—and a wider field was opened to the ambition of the Egyptian leader. The example of Syria was followed by other provinces: wherever Ibrahim appeared, he was received, if not with enthusiasm, at least without opposition. The same causes of discontent, to a greater or less degree, existed every where; the subordinate governments were everywhere vicious and oppressive; the reforms of the Sultan, intended to ameliorate the condition of the peasant, were necessarily directed against the vices of their immediate superiors; and the more influential classes, from their greater intelligence, saw themselves compromised, while the mass of the population had not yet become aware of the benefits intended for them. But the root from which sprung the more widely diffused and deeper feelings of disaffection, now everywhere manifested, was the resentment excited by the thraldom of the Sultan, and his devotion to European manners, which brought even his religious opinions into question.

Mahommed Ali was not slow to take advantage of these sentiments. He proclaimed, as he advanced, that he had taken up arms to rescue his master from the trammels of Russian influence, and to place about him more worthy counsellors; but he disavowed, and perhaps truly, any intention to overturn the throne.

The Turkish nation, borne down by the weight of a pressure from without, which it felt itself unable to repel, acknowledged the necessity of endeavouring to counteract this by external means; and losing, in its hatred to Russia, that too acute perception of national and religious distinctions which had hitherto made the exclusion of foreign interference a part of its political creed, looked with anxiety and hope to England and France, who, it was believed, had an interest common with the Turks in opposing Russia, and re-establishing the independence of the Sultan.

The Pacha of Egypt here found another element of strength, and boldly asserted that these two powers were his abettors. The assertion, bold as it may seem, was never contradicted; and, judging merely from their proceedings, it would be difficult even now to show that it was not true.

However this may be, it is important to observe that Mahommed Ali, when holding to the Ottomans the language he thought most likely to attract to him adherents, never once suggested the idea of dethroning the Sultan, or changing the line of suc-

cession ;—he had marched, he said, *to the aid of his master*. This therefore must, in his opinion, have been the most acceptable character in which he could present himself to the nation, even at the moment of its strongest excitement against the reigning sovereign. From this we may gather the depth of the feelings that protect the loyalty of a Turk, and convince ourselves of the satisfaction with which the nation would receive back to their hearts the monarch of their race, could he only be restored to them free from the influence they abhor.

The successes of Ibrahim Pacha in Syria alarmed the Porte ; and it determined to apply for foreign assistance. The influence of Russia was necessarily great at the court of Mahmood—Wallachia and Moldavia were still occupied by her troops—a large amount of the indemnity for the expenses of the war was still due to her. Russia offered her assistance without reserve, and without stipulation. To reject it might give her umbrage; and to seek the aid of any other power might induce her to throw the weight of her moral influence into the opposite scale. Yet the Porte, true to its principles even in this extremity, declined her interference ; and, with a noble confidence, sought the support, the protection of England—but sought it in vain. May we ask—why ?

The dependence of the Sultan upon Russia had been a principal cause of disaffection in Turkey,

and therefore of his and her weakness. This weakness, and the jealousy with which the nation viewed his connexion with Russia, in their turn became the causes of his more hopeless dependence;—this again produced distrust in the only governments that could extricate the Sultan and his people from their difficulties. The Turks themselves were not more jealous of the influence of Russia with the Porte than England and France had become. The loyal men who approached the throne of Mahmood perceived the entanglement, and hoped to draw from the very difficulties which surrounded them the means of extricating their prince and their nation from the net in which they were inclosed. They knew that to release Mahmood from dependence on Russia was to restore him to the nation, and the nation to him. To secure the accomplishment of an object so important to Turkey, to Europe, and especially to England, required but that England should speak the word—that she should say, 'let it be done;' yet she remained silent.

Knowing as we knew, or ought to have known, that nothing but a deep conviction of its own inability to surmount, without assistance, the crisis that was fast approaching, could have induced the Porte to ask for assistance at all; it must have been obvious that when it lost all hope of assistance from England, and from France—(for they were then acting in intimate union)—there was every reason

to fear that it would have recourse to the dangerous aid of Russia, rather than allow itself to be overwhelmed. We had no right to expect from it even the firmness it displayed in resisting the friendly proposals of the Emperor. We knew that Russia had many privileges to protect, and a large sum of money to receive, and that this to her would be a sufficient pretext for interfering; but we knew, also, that Russia had never interfered in the affairs of Turkey without seeking and achieving her own aggrandizement. We knew that she had never ceased to desire the possession of Constantinople—the command of the Dardanelles; we knew that the weakness of Turkey was our loss, and the strength of Turkey our gain—precisely because it was our interest to exclude Russia from the possession of these Straits, and to have them in the hands of a power whose interests were distinct from those of Russia, and which was strong enough, with our assistance, to defend them. We had, therefore, lamented the prostration of Turkey, and the ascendency of Russia in her councils, and we knew that to refuse her aid was to aggravate the prostration and augment the ascendency. Or can it in truth be, that we were ignorant of all these things? Of which shall we accuse ourselves—the knowledge or the ignorance?

When we left Turkey to fall under the attacks of Mohammed Ali, or to stand under the protection of Russia, what did we propose to ourselves?

It may be presumed that we had some views—some objects: if we had none, of course there is an end of the matter; but if we had any, it is important to ascertain what they may have been. This, however, is difficult, for the positive indications of our motives or intentions are too slight to be traced, and it is from what was not done, rather than from what was done, that we must deduce our inferences.

From the facts that we did not assist the Sultan, that we did not restrain Mohammed Ali, (till Russia interfered,)—that we had not a ship of the line in the Mediterranean, and that we had not an ambassador at Constantinople—it may be inferred that the success of the Egyptians was not disagreeable to us: had it been otherwise, we should have snpported the Sultan—we should have told Mohammed Ali, that to weaken Turkey was to injure England; that the peace of Europe required that Turkey should be preserved, and that we could not permit him, or even a greater than him, to destroy it.* We should have reinforced our fleet in the Mediterranean, and put it in a position to give weight and effect to our remonstrance; and we

* The power of the Pacha of Egypt is at all times under the control of any nation superior to him at sea. To blockade the Nile is to extinguish the power of Mohammed Ali; and this is the more easily done, because he cannot bring his ships out of the river in a state fit for sea—they must be taken out first and fitted afterwards—they could not therefore attack a blockading squadron or force their way out.

should have hastened the arrival of the accomplished nobleman to whom the care of our interests in Turkey was to be intrusted; we should have done, before Russia interfered, what we were forced to do after that; we should have done, in short, as an act of friendship to Turkey, what we were at length obliged to do from fear of Russia, and the clamour which that fear produced. But as the English cabinet did nothing, the unavoidable inference is, that it looked with complacency on the progress of events—that it saw nothing in the success of Mohammed Ali, or in the subversion of the Turkish government, to excite its alarm, or induce any suspicion that the interests of *England* were about to be compromised—that the King's ministers hoped, in short, to find in the establishment of an Egyptian empire under Mohammed Ali, a sufficient compensation for the destruction of Turkey.

That this was the opinion on which the Government acted, or declined to act, is the more probable, because it certainly was that of the French ministry with which our measures were concerted.* But if this was the calculation on which England

* Mohammed Ali had long been a favourite of the French government, and more especially a favourite of the French admiral. He was surrounded by French officers, and his troops were commanded in great part by Frenchmen. Egypt seemed to be a land reserved for the enterprise of the French. To extend the government of the Pacha of Egypt was to extend the sphere of that enterprise

and France proceeded—(and it is difficult to reconcile the measures of the *two* governments with any other)—then it is obvious—as they made no attempt or preparation to prevent the interference of Russia—that they must either have expected her not to interfere at all, or prepared to abandon Turkey to her *protection* if she did, and to seek for compensation elsewhere.

How could they expect Russia not to interfere? Was it imaginable that the Sultan, abandoned by them, would suffer himself to be overpowered rather than accept the assistance of the Emperor? They were aware that he was reluctant to accept it—that he considered the measure dangerous. The existence of these fears was a sufficient reason why they should have left him under no necessity to incur the hazard; but it surely afforded no security that the hazard might not be incurred. On the other hand, how could they possibly imagine that Russia would sit quietly looking on, while the destinies of Turkey—the possession of the Dardanelles—the sovereignty of the north-eastern provinces—the whole of the rights and privileges she had acquired in Turkey—her claims to indemnity—her treaties, and the whole results of many wars and many sacrifices of every kind—were at stake? They surely could find nothing in the previous policy of the Court of St. Petersburgh (with which our readers are already acquainted) to induce them to believe that it would be so supine

—so wanting in energy and ambition—so little alive to its own interests. It would be doing injustice to any man, or any body of men, to suspect that they had ever harboured such hopes. But what is the alternative? That England and France calmly contemplated the prospect of resigning Turkey to the *protection* of Russia, and seeking their compensation in the increased power of Mohammed Ali. If this was their object, they have accomplished it. The only question then to be decided is, whether in so doing they have done wisely?

The interest which Great Britain and France both had in the preservation of Turkey was chiefly involved in the possession of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. It is the command of these passages that for the last century, at least, has given Turkey her influence in Europe;—it is the command of these passages that has made the subjugation of Turkey an object of ambition to Russia. Russia, once in possession of these, will have gained all the advantage that the conquest of Turkey could afford her; and England and France will have lost all of which the subjugation of Turkey by Russia could deprive them.

We have already shown that Russia, notwithstanding the opposition of more than one state—each of which was equal or superior to herself in resources—has steadily and successfully pressed upon Turkey with a view to her subjugation, and the ultimate possession of Constantinople—that is,

of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. But these two powers still stood opposed to each other; and so long as they stood so opposed, every step towards the subjugation of the weaker was necessarily an act of violence. Continual aggressions can only be made at a great sacrifice of character; and as they attract attention, they afford to other nations an occasion to interfere. There is a point, however, in the progress of subjugation, at which resistance ceases, and *protection* begins—a point beyond which force and violence are no longer necessary, and the absence of collision presents no occasion to interfere. To a power which has to dread opposition in its career of conquest, the step which enables it to pass this point is the most important in the whole series; and this was the step which *we* invited Russia to take when we abandoned Turkey to her protection. There were two ways in which Russia might acquire permanent possession of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus: the one, by force of arms—which we should always have had it in our power to oppose, because Turkey would then have been with us; the other, a more insidious, but not less effectual mode of subjugation, which, by placing the Porte under the protection of Russia, would leave all its resources at her command, and exclude all possibility of interference, because there could be no collision. This was the result we had to expect from the position in which we placed Turkey—a result which the

treaty of the 8th July announced to the world.* But this implies the immediate acquisition of a virtual command, and ultimately of an actual command, of the Dardanelles by Russia.† What then did we prepare to sacrifice, when we consented to this arrangement?

The possession of the Dardanelles would give to Russia the means of creating and organizing an almost unlimited marine. It would enable her to prepare in the Black Sea an armament of any extent, without its being possible for any power in Europe to interrupt her proceedings, or even to watch or discover her designs. Our naval officers of the highest authority have declared that an effective blockade of the Dardanelles cannot be maintained throughout the year. Even supposing, therefore, that we could maintain permanently in those seas a fleet capable of encountering that of Russia, which in a few months will be about sixty sail in the Black Sea alone,‡ it is obvious that in

* Those who may desire to know the details of the proceeding which led to this result, will find them in the Pamphlet, the title of which is prefixed to these observations; and they will find, moreover, that a perusal of the whole work will amply repay them for the time they may bestow upon it.

† We do not take into account the possibility of rescuing Turkey by a war with Russia. This is no doubt still practicable, but it will not be long practicable; and as such a measure is beyond all calculation improbable, we do not speculate upon it.

‡ Is this great fleet to remain for ever in the Black Sea? if it is not, Russia must consider her command of the Dardanelles as already secure.

the event of a war it would be in the power of Russia to throw the whole weight of her disposable forces on any point in the Mediterranean, without any probability of our being able to prevent it; and that the power of thus issuing forth with an overwhelming force at any moment, would enable her to command the Mediterranean Sea for a limited time, whenever it might please her so to do. Where then would be our supremacy at sea?—where the commerce of the Mediterranean? But it must be observed, that she would not only acquire the power of doing all this, but her own frontier would be much more perfectly protected, then, without the presence of the fleet, than it now is with it: her whole southern empire would be defended by a single impregnable fortress.

She would thus acquire an influence in the south of Europe as great and permanent as that which she exerts in the north. The influence which the power of destroying her commerce has hitherto enabled England to exercise over Russia, and the security which this power and this influence have given to Europe by curbing the ambition of the Czars, would be counterbalanced by the means which Russia would then possess of limiting our commerce, and extending and protecting her own. Her southern frontier (hitherto by far the most vulnerable) having been placed beyond the possibility of insult, the large military force now employed along the shores of the Black

Sea would be at her free disposal. The possession of Constantinople would at once establish her supremacy in Central Asia, by the moral influence it would exercise over the whole Mohammedan world. All disaffection in the Crimea, the Caucasus, Circassia, and Georgia, would be subdued for ever, because all hope of successful resistance, all possibility of obtaining succour from without, would at once be extinguished. Persia, for the same reason, would cease to be an independent kingdom. Greece, with its islands, would be but a province of Russia. The road to India would then be open to her, with all Asia at her back. The finest materials in the world for an army destined to serve in the East would be at her disposal—our power to overawe her in Europe would be gone—and by even a demonstration against India she could augment our national expenditure by many millions annually, and render the government of that country difficult beyond all calculation.

"Suffice it for the present to say, that the countries interesting us in importation and exportation to the annual amount of thirty millions would be placed under the immediate control of the coalition, and of course under the regulations of the Russian Tariff; not as it is to-day, but such as it would be when the mask is wholly dropped. What would the effect on the internal state of England be, if a considerable diminution of exportation occurred? But it is not

only the direct effect of the tariffs of the coalition that is to be apprehended—would it not command the tariffs of Northern and Southern America? Are the opening prospects of commerce, not to speak of that actually existing in Turkey alone, of no importance? Is it nothing to see projects maturing for direct communication with India through the Turkish territory, while the Danube is rendered navigable, while canals are about to connect that stream with the other rivers of Austria, and with those of Russia, Prussia, and Bavaria, so as to establish a direct communication between the manufacturing districts of Germany with the marts of Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Arabia, and even India itself? Is it for England to allow freedom of commerce to be extinguished in the only portion of Europe where it exists? Is it for England to allow an empire, a principle of whose existence is freedom of commerce, to be swallowed up by the most restrictive power on the face of the earth? Is it for England to allow the first commercial position in the world to be occupied by such a power? These motives could not have been appreciated by Lord Chatham; they did not then exist, because the fiscality of Russia had not been developed, when he said with all the concentration of deep conviction, "with the man who cannot appreciate the interests of England in the preservation of the Ottoman empire, *I will not argue.*"

"While the three powers (Russia, Prussia, and Aus-

tria) coalesce, first for the partition of Turkey, that they may march, as the St. Petersburgh Gazette has already ventured to threaten, 'by Constantinople to Paris,' they look with not less confidence to the partition of the commercial prosperity of Great Britain. On the occupation of the Dardanelles, disappears the importance of our possessions in the Levant. They were only valuable because the Turks held these Straits. When Russia is there, they are valueless, and will soon be untenable; although the expenses of harassing observation may greatly increase our internal embarrassments."—pp. 89-91.

But if such are the consequences which England has to apprehend, what were the interests of France in the preservation of Turkey?

"What must the consequence be of the accession of all the resources of the Turkish empire to the northern alliance? From that hour Russia is invulnerable,—a few thousand men suffice to guard her southern and eastern frontiers—her attention is all concentrated on the west. A very few years will double or triple her revenue. The commerce of Europe will be in her hands—in her control will be placed all the materials at present used in the arsenals of France. A formidable fleet will be launched in the Mediterranean; in three or four years, she may easily possess a navy superior to France. The influence and commerce of France are immediately arrested in the sea hitherto her

own; and at any hour Russia may transport her Cossacks to the shores of Italy or of Spain, to support the factions, and the principles which, even at present, cause her so much inquietude. These circumstances will re-act on Belgium, on Germany, on internal faction. The very hour that Russia is entrenched at the Dardanelles, these consequences will be evident.

"England, to-day the ally of France, will she be so then? Can she send fleets or armies to her support? Clearly impossible. Whatever may be her sympathy, England cannot again engage in a continental war—and this struggle will be confined to the dry land.

"If such consequences flow from the occupation of Turkey, is not that question one of existence for France? Supposing it possible for these consequences to be delayed, is it less so? A nation's life does not run out with the few sand-glasses that mark the period of individual existence. The life of a nation, is its system;—that life in France is already seriously compromised—and a few steps further gained by Russia, its fate becomes irrevocable."—pp. 86-88.

Such, then, were the sacrifices which England and France consented to make, and for which they hoped to find an adequate compensation in the aggrandisement of Mohammed Ali. But one of the most certain and immediate consequences of the possession of the Dardanelles by Russia, would

be the total destruction of that very power in which we have sought our compensation. No man knows better, or acknowledges more freely, than Mohammed Ali, the impossibility of maintaining his power in Syria, or even, perhaps, in Egypt, if Russia were in actual possession of the Dardanelles. We, therefore, made the sacrifice, without obtaining any compensation, or the shadow of a compensation.

But, perhaps, it may be imagined that the aggrandisement of Mohammed Ali was calculated to prevent the final consummation of the catastrophe, the evils of which we have briefly and imperfectly indicated. Quite the reverse; it must necessarily hasten it, and render it more inevitable. If the weakness of the Sultan forced him into dependence on Russia—if the attacks of Mohammed Ali, and the unhappy determination of England and France to abandon him, left him no alternative but to seek the protection of Russia—it is obvious that to perpetuate the causes of his dependence, and the necessity of that protection, is to perpetuate the dependence and the protection that these causes produced.

No man who knows Turkey, or who has even a general knowledge of the feelings of Asiatics, will ever dream of reconciling Mohammed Ali and the Sultan. They are placed in a position of unappeasable hostility: the sovereign, goaded by the remembrance of his own degradation, and firm in

the unchangeable conviction that his right is still entire, though his power to enforce it may be wanting, will never—can never—abandon the hope, or relinquish the desire of retrieving, in a more fortunate hour, the losses he has sustained. Mohammed Ali, feeling that such must be the unchangeable sentiments of the prince whom he has shorn of half his kingdom, and all his glory, and panting for acknowledged as well as actual independence, cannot be made to believe that he is safe from aggression, open or concealed. Disappointed in the hopes he had entertained of improving his finances by extending his territory—harassed by the revolts which are the necessary consequence of the iniquity of his system—and embarrassed by the want of means, which disables him from ameliorating his administration, even should he desire to do so, and leaves him no choice but to persevere in his course of coercion, which implies an augmentation of his army—he has no alternative but to attempt a further extension of his territory, in the expectation that he may thereby improve his condition; and he will be driven by this necessity to commence another series of conquests at the expense of the Sultan. At this moment both parties are preparing for the war, which both feel to be inevitable, and each is seeking a pretext to accuse the other of the first aggression.

Mohammed Ali already accuses the Porte of exciting the revolt in Syria. Pretending to believe

that the Sultan was instigated in this course by Russia, he calls on England, France, and Austria to aid him in rescuing the Ottoman monarch from the thraldom in which he is held by that power; and finds in the intrigues of which he accuses the Porte a sufficient reason why he should declare himself independent. The Porte demands in vain the restitution of the Pashalic of Orfa. This the Pasha of Egypt holds, without even a pretext, because it opens the way to Bagdad, which he has already announced, to at least one foreign power, his intention to occupy. With like ill success the Sultan requires the liquidation of an arrear of tribute, and finds in the rejection or evasion of these demands sufficient grounds for going to war.*

The kingdom is divided against itself, and cannot stand unless by foreign aid. So long, therefore, as the power of Mohammed Ali exists, so long must the Sultan be content to receive protection. The treaty of the 8th July has constituted Russia sole protectress of Turkey, not in fact only, but in right. "She is now legitimate protector of the Sultan, and the contingency again arising, an ap-

* The European powers interested in the question have declared that an attack on Mohammed Ali might compromise the peace of Europe. By what a slender tenure, then, does Europe hold that blessing, which may at any time be compromised by the caprice or folly of a Turkish subaltern; and how unfortunate has been the policy which has generated elements of discord so little capable of being controlled, and yet sufficient to convulse the whole civilized world!

peal to any other power becomes an infraction of the stipulations." It has given her the virtual command of the Dardanelles, on the precise ground of her having charged herself with that protection: it has enabled her to pass the point beyond which opposition ceases and collision can no longer take place. It is not by aggression, therefore, but by means of this very protection which was the offspring of our own errors, that we must now expect to see the subjugation of Turkey consummated. The aggrandisement of Mohammed Ali, then, directly and powerfully, contributes to that subjugation—and at the same time prepares its own destruction;—for by Mohammed Ali's express acknowledgment, the possession of the Dardanelles by Russia would annihilate his power in Asia. But were it otherwise—were it not certain that that power is ephemeral—were he not even under the necessity of drawing from exhausted Egypt the means of maintaining the conquests which were undertaken at a vast expense, in the hope of ultimately relieving it from its unendurable burdens—had not experience proved that the iniquitous fiscal system of Egypt cannot be endured by the people of Syria—had we not seen that his iron rule has produced revolt in every district capable of resistance to which it has been extended—were we ignorant that the tide of popular feeling in Turkey is now setting strongly against him;—were we, on the contrary, satisfied (which no man,

not ignorant of the facts, and of the feelings of the people, and of the history of Turkey, can be) that the power of Mohammed Ali is built on a solid and enduring foundation;—still—as the whole interest of the Turkish question to France, as well as to England, is involved in the possession of the Dardanelles by Russia—and as the possession of power by Mohammed Ali tends directly to hasten the arrival of the time when the virtual command, already secured by Russia, shall be converted, by the slow but sure process of continued protection, into an actual command of the Dardanelles—the existence of his power is to Europe an evil, and to Russia an advantage, of incalculable magnitude.

Such is the value of the compensation which England and France have preferred to the independence of Turkey! Such is the Gordian knot we are now called upon to unravel.

But *everything* is not yet lost. The spirit of independence is still alive in Turkey; and the Syrian people, now awakened to a perception of their true interests, and of the error they have committed in preferring the servant to the master, long to retrieve it. The nation feels that it is divided against itself, and longs to be re-united. The Porte, true to itself, desires the freedom of its chief, and longs for the re-establishment of its external relations on their ancient footing, so far as that may still be practicable. It is to England that Turkey looks for help—to England who has

so often compromised her. But she knows that our errors were of ignorance, not of design: her own eyes have been opened. She has been learning a bitter lesson, and she hopes that England too has drawn knowledge from the past—that the delusion is at an end—that we shall no more permit ourselves to believe that we can strengthen Turkey by dividing it into two hostile kingdoms—that we shall no longer permit ourselves to be misled with the belief that the ephemeral power of the Pasha of Egypt, or even the independence of Syria and Egypt, if that could by any possibility be preserved, would compensate to us for the loss of the Dardanelles—that we shall not hereafter, as heretofore, become instruments in the hands of her enemies to hasten the subjugation of Turkey—that we shall not, and this is the whole matter, slumber on in ignorance of what Turkey was, or is, or is to be.

Of all the questions of foreign policy with which England has at this moment to deal, this is the most important and the most difficult; it is complicated by the embarrassments which our past errors have accumulated. The path that lies before us is shrouded in the mist of imperfect knowledge, and narrowed by the dangers of war on the one hand, and worse evils on the other.

THE QUARTERLY REVIEW. No. CVIII.

EXTRACTS FROM A REVIEW OF QUIN'S STEAM-VOYAGE DOWN THE DANUBE.

We have already expressed our regret at the insufficiency of the information collected by Mr. Quin during seventeen days' navigation of so important a stream. We have selected from his book all those passages which can convey a general impression of the features of the country and its inhabitants; and we now proceed to supply some of his deficiencies on this and other topics from another source.

And first of all, a word or two as to what Mr. Quin says of Semendria;—surely two brigs of war could scarcely be supposed to have been constructed there, unless there were some means of conveying them to their own element; and, if there were such means, the whole matter of the navigation of the Danube was cleared up.

We have seen, in the unpublished Journal of a recent traveller, some very interesting details regarding the circumstance to which Mr. Quin alludes. Two years ago, a fine brig was built by Prince Milosch, as an experiment, at Semendria; it was of 230 tons

burthen, and drew eight feet water; the hull cost between four and five hundred pounds. It was conveyed past the rapids in safety to Galatz, and there, with great difficulty, was disposed of; the Russian authorities having done all in their power to disgust those who were interested in the enterprise, and to prevent the vessel from getting any flag. The vessel descended in the month of July, when the river is beginning to sink; difficulty or danger was nowhere anticipated, except at a place called the Cherdaps, three miles above Fetislam—where the bed of the river is interspersed with rocks for nearly the space of two miles; leaving three channels open, however—one in the centre, which is of considerable width; one on the Wallachian side, which is never used; and one on the Servian side, which when the river is low would not allow a craft drawing scarcely three feet to pass. The current is here exceedingly rapid, certainly not less than eight miles an hour. The barges upon the Danube are generally five hundred tons and upwards; these barges sometimes descend through the middle channel, but they can never re-ascend again, because the narrow channel at the side will not admit them. The commerce, therefore, between the higher and lower part of the river is maintained by smaller and shallower craft, the largest of which do not exceed 250 tons.

Except the rapidity, *not the shallowness* of the current, the *Cherdaps* are the obstruction to the

navigation of the Danube between Gollouvatz—where the river enters the mountains from the plains of Hungary—to Fetislam, just above Trajan's bridge, where it again emerges from the mountains into the plains of Wallachia and Bulgaria. In this district, however, it is absolutely necessary to tow the vessels ascending the stream by a tracking-path; the windings of the river, and the absence of roads along the sides, necessitate a repeated change of bank, so that the vessels are obliged, after having made one point on one bank, to cross to the other side: thus, they naturally lose way and drop down the stream in their passage—besides having to shift their trackers from bank to bank; nor is this last matter a trifle;—men, of course, have to be used for tracking instead of cattle, and the ascending craft has at times to be *laden* with this live cargo. From twenty to forty people are requisite for tracking a vessel through the mountains; and eight or ten pairs of oxen are wanted to get it through *the Cherdaps*, where it has often to be unladen and reladen.

Now here two distinct questions present themselves, the first, the deepening of the channel close to the tracking-path at Fetislam, to allow of large vessels returning upwards; and, secondly, the construction of a tracking-path through the mountains, to avoid the difficulties and inconveniences above enumerated, and permit the use of cattle for towing the vessels. Independently of both these, there

is the steam navigation of the Danube, and these three enterprises remain perfectly distinct, both as to the plans, as to the means of execution, and as to the authority by which they are undertaken.

1. The *first* and most important, the deepening of the Cherdaps above Fetislam, has not, we believe, yet been commenced, nor the plan even fixed upon: two projects have been entertained, the first for blasting the rocks in the channel under water, and thus freeing the passage; the second for cutting a canal on the Servian side—but it is to be observed, that here neither bank belongs to Austria, although in the vicinity she has overreached the Porte by obtaining a right to the fishery; she has, therefore, to obtain the consent of the Porte, and more particularly of the Prince of Servia, to this enterprise on the Servian soil. When accordingly the Austrian government applied, during the course of last year, for this permission, to the Porte—the Porte referred the matter to Hussein, Pasha of Vidin, and to Prince Milosch; and the account Mr. Quin gives us of the visit of Count Szecheny to the Pasha suffices to let us see, though Mr. Quin was not aware of what was on the cards, that Hussein's opinion was not the most favourable. Prince Milosch had in the first instance promised not only his consent but his co-operation; but it having been suggested to him that Austria might make use of the influence she would thus acquire to the prejudice of the commerce of

Turkey, either by the erection of tolls or in some other shape, the Prince desired from Austria a pledge that she would take advantage in no way whatever of this enterprise, or its consequences, for the introduction of any regulation unfavourable to the commerce or navigation of the Ottoman provinces—that, in fine, the advantages to accrue from this enterprise were to be entirely free and common to all nations. Austria was dilatory in returning to these demands a categorical reply; but until she does so, the prince's zeal in her service will not be very warm; and without his active co-operation the matter cannot be arranged. Then, the moment such a demand was made officially to the Porte, it became subject to all the conditions under which such transactions are conducted: doubt, suspicion, and delay on the part of the Porte—and the interference of Russia in the various modes in which she has it in her power to interfere. That interference has hitherto been exerted to frustrate the enterprise; and it probably will be so in future, unless the general tone of the policy of England, much interested, if it were but commercially, in this matter, should take such a shape as to make Russia pause.

2. The *second* enterprise is that of the tracking-path from the commencement of the mountains and the narrows opposite Gollouvatz to the frontiers of Wallachia. Corridors are blasted through the bluff rocks, and terraces run across the shallower parts,

at great labour and expense, to obviate the immense difficulties presented to tracking by the windings and contortions of the stream. This is a *government* enterprise; Count Szecheny has the direction of it; the works commenced three years ago, and they may be about a quarter concluded.

The Servian side presents much greater facilities for such an enterprise; indeed the Romans had established a complete line of path for this same purpose along that bank. At the lower portion of the passage the ancient corridor is cut in the rock, but at the higher extremity huge mortice-holes were let in for the insertion of beams, on which the tracking corridor was erected. A large inscription on the face of the rock remains to this day visible, and it gives the honour of this—one of the greatest, because one of the most useful of the works of Rome—to the Emperor Trajan. The traveller we have above referred to, and whose MS. notes we are now using, says—

"Never did I more strongly feel the greatness of that wonderful people, than when, on sailing down the Danube, I first observed the traces and comprehended the object to which this work was destined. Such were the modest and useful intentions and acts of sixteen centuries ago. Here was the evidence of the accomplishment by the Romans, although scarcely an indication of it remains in Roman authors, of an enterprise which is now universally admitted to be one of the most important

for the public welfare of Europe. In that chiselling of the rocks of Servia, what proofs are there not of commercial circulation and prosperity, and, consequently, of the national well-being and individual happiness of a former period, which it is the fashion to regard as sterile in useful fruits, because the habits of our times lead us to imagine that prosperity cannot exist without clamour, or commerce, or industry, without libraries of legislation.

"On looking at the two sides of the river, I immediately saw that the Servian was that on which the road *should* have been constructed, even had the Roman relics not been there, nor the facilities which the Roman work itself still continues to afford. The plan of the Romans—that is, corridors of wood, too, seemed the one best adapted to the nature of the country, covered with forests of oak. In fact, it appeared to me that the Roman road might be re-established with great ease: the rock having been cut away wherever it was called for, scarcely more than the restoration of the wood work would have been necessary. Servia would easily have supplied the timber; the river would have transported it; every Servian wears a hatchet in his belt, and they live under a system similar to that which has left so many and such stupendous ruins of works destined to public utility in Spain and in Hindostan."*

* We cannot pass this notice of such a relic of the ancient Roman sway in these regions without expressing our regret that no

This idea was subsequently suggested to Prince Milosch. It was objected, that as the Servians tracked their vessels, several villages lived entirely by that service, and the country gained half a million of piastres yearly; but he was soon made to perceive that, when the Austrian road was completed, horses belonging to the Austrian government would track the vessels. Some accounts have recently appeared in continental papers of this enterprise having been undertaken by the Servians; but we have stated all that we *know* on the subject.

3. The *third* business, perfectly distinct from these two, is the application of *steam* to the navigation of the Danube. A Company was formed for this purpose in 1830, and amongst its subscribers appeared the names of the late Emperor and his successor, Prince Metternich, the Prince Palatine, the Arch-Duke Ferdinand, &c. &c. But from the moment of the establishment of the steam-boats, the interference of the government has been by no means satisfactory to the directors. The concern is under the management of one of the principal banking-houses of Vienna, not (according to Mr. Quin's statement) of Count Szecheny—although

enthusiastic *scholar*, properly so called, has as yet conveyed to Europe at large some accurate information as to the actual Latin dialect still retained among the peasantry of what once was *Dacia*. In what are hastily called its barbarisms and corruptions may not most interesting fragments of the real old *lingua rustica et castrensis* be to this moment preserved?

there can be no question that to the zeal, activity, and influence of that distinguished person his country owes the commencement of this enterprise at the period when it did commence. Whilst steam is extending to all the great rivers of the earth—when boats are building in London for the Euphrates, the Indus, and the Ganges—when steamers constructed on the Thames visit the Euxine, and have become familiar in the windings of the Bosphorus—it cannot be surprising that the same power should seek to establish its dominion on the central, the largest, the longest, the most important river of Europe, and, as it has been termed, its main artery. It is most important, then, to ascertain how far the nature of the river itself affords facilities for steam navigation; and on that subject we have already laid before our readers much more accurate means of judgment than can be supplied by the results of Mr. Quin's rapid expedition. We know that it is navigated from Rahab, near Presburg, to Gollouvatz, backwards and forwards, by immense barges drawing six feet water—that these same barges descend to Galatz, although they do not return; we further know that barges of different sizes and dimensions, drawing from two feet draft, and of eighty tons and upwards, navigate it during its whole course from Ulm to the sea—bring the produce of the salt-mines of Transylvania and Upper Hungary to a large portion of the Austrian dominions—ascend the Drave for the produce

of the Styrian mines—and by the Save reach Laibach, within three days' land carriage of the Adriatic. Upon these facts are formed our ideas of the capabilities of the river. Its navigation is difficult and dangerous; its rapids and its shallows, its overflowings and its droughts, are all serious obstacles. But there is an obstacle much greater than all these; and that is, the absence, along its whole banks, of any population in the slightest degree acquainted with naval architecture, or even with the simplest operations of sailing and rowing. As an instance of this we may state, that the Turks, generally speaking, have an aversion to a sea-faring life, and know nothing of ships or boats; yet, on the Danube, so remarkable is the inferiority of the Germans and Hungarians to the Turks, that a vessel with a mast and a sail is known at once to be Turkish!

But for the *steam* navigation of the Danube there was another very weighty point to be considered—that of *fuel*. Wood there was in abundance, but the greater incumbrance and difficulties in making use of wood have so far been a drawback on the enterprise. The nearest point where coals were to be found was Edenburg, but these were of inferior quality. This difficulty was suddenly removed by the discovery of extensive coal-measures, of the very finest quality, on the banks of the river itself, just within the Austrian dominions, and about the centre of that portion of the Danube which is na-

vigable from its mouth upwards. Thus favoured, the first steam-boat, '*Francis the First*' its name, was launched in the spring of 1832; and although laid up during the fair of Pesth, one of the principal branches of profit at first anticipated, although frequently out of order, and though the whole arrangements might be considered as provisional and experimental,—yet, during the summer, a profit of 40 per cent. was realized. This vessel first plied between Rahab and Semlin. The boats on the river now amount to four—one between the Cherdaps and Fetislam, a second between Orsova and Pesth, and a third between Pesth and Vienna, with a spare boat to replace the others in case of accident. The communications between Vienna and the mouths of the Danube were thus to be maintained from the autumn of last year by these three vessels. A fourth steamer was sent out from Trieste, to ply between the mouths of the Danube and Constantinople; but that in which Mr. Quin embarked having been grounded, through Mr. Cozier's blundering, without the chance of extrication until the rise of the river, the last-mentioned steamer was retained at Constantinople, and she now plies between Constantinople and Smyrna, shortening a journey of five or six days to *thirty-two* hours.

As to the importance of the navigation, and more particularly the *steam* navigation of the Danube, not one word need be said; it will be generally ad-

mitted, however little the details may be appreciated. The importance of the river at this moment is reduced to almost nothing by its bi-section at Fetislam; and in the system of an internal European navigation dependant on the Danube, the slightest improvement on one point must re-act upon the whole of the rest, and progress once commenced here will soon receive the most surprising developement. A cut of forty miles may put in communication the Vistula and the Danube; one of fifteen miles the Elbe and the Danube; and the old project of Charlemagne, for connecting the Danube and the Rhine through the valley of the Neckar, is, it is said, about to be revived by means of a rail-road.

Already English bottoms are finding their way up the mouths of the Danube. The underwriters of Lloyd's have had to add a new country to their boards; the alarms of some of our navigators at the shoals and banks of the Danube have disappeared: and for a mighty region, into which no English flag had hitherto forced its way, 5000 ton of shipping have within the last few months been taken up. Again, so satisfactory has appeared to Prince Milosch his first attempt at naval architecture in Servia—so satisfied was *he* of the facility of transporting large vessels from his own country to the sea—that he has undertaken to build two corvettes, of 5 or 600 tons, which to propitiate the influences around him, he intends to present, the one to the

Emperor Nicholas, and the other to Sultan Mahmoud.

This progress, and the public spirit and unity called forth—not only by the results of such enterprises, but by their very existence—are elements of political power of the utmost moment at the present crisis. Hungary, Transylvania, and the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, lie now unsheltered before Russia. Treaties will only be binding on her so far as those countries afford practical means of resistance. Whatever, therefore, improves the state and resources of these countries, augments their spirit of nationality, or connects their interests with the interests or the sympathy of the remainder of Europe, renders the progress of Russia more difficult and hazardous. Happily, Mr. Quin's information on this subject coincides with the light which has lately broken upon us from many other quarters; and all this, we trust most fervently, will, at length, arouse us from that state of negligence of our foreign interests, which has always been the harbinger of national decay.

Austria has long, and, unfortunately alone, felt the necessity of arresting Russia. She may now have abandoned herself to a feeling of hopeless resignation to an inevitable destiny; but if anything can arouse her, it is the fact stated from Constantinople, that Russia is fortifying the Delta of the Danube, and throwing a bridge of boats across the Sulina mouth of that river; the object

being, no doubt, to search all passengers, or to raise a toll on the trade of Austria and the Turkish provinces. When we consider this, and look at Silistria, who can doubt of her having the complete command of the navigation of the river from that point?

England, in 1809, consented not to lead her men-of-war up the Dardanelles; but this was only that she might furnish no pretext for those of Russia coming down. England never admitted the principle of exclusion. While the whole of the *coasts* of the Black Sea were Turkish, then, indeed, the Porte might do what she chose with her own; but from the moment that another power gained a footing in that sea, and moreover erected arsenals and constructed navies there, it became imperative on England to acquire the right of passage, if she had it not before. In the midst of European struggles for a temporary object, she allowed the right, but the recognised right, to lie dormant. But the time for talking of rights has passed away. The Turkish nation, by all the means that men possess for rendering their thoughts intelligible, invoke the protecting and invigorating presence of the squadron of Great Britain; but Russia holds up before us the parchment of a deed done in darkness: a parchment powerful as a talisman—but, like that, only powerful through the ignorance and credulity of men.

This, however, does the Moscovite step by step

go on steadily, quietly, but surely; and if Prussia and Austria be weak enough to look on in the expectation of a share in the spoil, while our own once-glorious name continues to be degraded among the nations by the necessary consequences of internal feud and faction, *why* should Russia cease to go on in the same style—until the cross has supplanted the crescent on the dome of Saint Sophia—the favourite object never for a moment lost sight of since the days of Catharine II.?

We can well believe that the crafty ministers of the Czar contemplate, with the highest delight, all that fills us with such deep alarm in the late and present condition of this country—and of France too. But if the recent proceedings of the Autocrat will not awaken Europe at large from her slumbers, ere the incorporation of Turkey is completed, Europe may as well continue to slumber on; for we may be well assured that the possession of Turkey would speedily lead to the sacrifice of another and another victim at the shrine of inordinate ambition. England and France, however, at all events will not, we trust, be found to have lost all sense of honour and wisdom as respects a question to which a myriad of internal intrigues are but as dust in the balance. It behoves them, we think, to take immediate and effective measures to compel the Muscovite to nullify this surreptitious and offensive treaty.

Let us, for a moment, bring under view what this

gigantic power—gigantic as to the physical force of numbers, but still more fearful by its intellectual superiority—not the intellect of its people, as compared with those of Europe, but the intellect of its diplomatists, as compared with those of other countries—is preparing. Let us, in the first place, turn our attention to the Baltic. In military occupation of both shores of the Gulf of Finland, the eastern coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, and the eastern coast of the Baltic as far as Tilsit, Russia has nothing to disturb her along the whole of these shores. Prussia, on whom her territory joins, has no navy, except a little toy frigate at Potsdam, a present from our King William; and she is, morever, her ally. The harmless state of Denmark has a few ships of the line, one of which is occasionally put into commission. Those of Sweden—impoverished Sweden—have long been rotting in harbour. But this is nothing: it is well understood that some great change is at hand in Sweden: a very powerful party in that once lofty nation are desirous of uniting their country to the great neighbouring empire; and it is boldly affirmed, that old Bernadotte (*mirabile dictu!*) is not averse from the plan. Perhaps, he may be well aware that the amiable and accomplished Prince Gustavus Vasa, the legitimate heir of the ancient monarchs of Sweden, has many secret friends who only wait for a fit opportunity to hoist his standard on the soil ennobled by the valour and virtues of his ancestors—

and the shrewd old Frenchman may think it politic, since the succession of his own throne is so doubtful, to secure, at all events, to young Oscar, the quiet enjoyment of the vice-royalty of Sweden, when it shall become a province of Russia. Should this happen, Russia would have a line of sea-coast from the Gulf of Finland to Behring's Strait—from the German Ocean to the Pacific. For what purpose, then, does Russia keep in commission so large a fleet in the Baltic as eighteen sail of the line and as many frigates, which she paraded last summer fully manned and well equipped? She has no enemy at home—she has no foreign possessions to protect—she has no interests in the Mediterranean that require a single ship—she has neither port, nor island, not a foot of territory, nor any trade in that quarter, that calls for her interference or protection.

Turning our attention to the Black Sea—although every possible caution is used for concealment of what is there going on, it is nevertheless well known that, for some time past, the most active operations have been in progress preparatory for some hostile movement: she has no enemy there that can touch her—she is in possession of all the shores of that close sea, except where her humbled ally still keeps a few leagues on the southern coasts—she has taken care that no foreign ship of war can even approach that sea; yet warlike preparations are making with the utmost activity. We have seen a sketch of the

works which are constructing round the naval arsenal of Sevastopol, and which when finished will completely protect it against any force ever likely to be brought against it.

To enable Russia to carry on her operations unseen, and without being under the necessity of making application for supplies to any foreign state, that might create suspicion, her provinces adjacent to the Black Sea furnish abundance of the required materials—timber, iron, copper, and cordage may be procured at small cost and almost to any extent; and when ships are brought down to the Sea of Marmora or the Dardanelles, she will find no difficulty in getting them manned from the islands of the Archipelago, by some of those amiable Greeks, whose trade as pirates and pilots has at length nearly been destroyed. The Greeks indeed *have* a bond of union with the Russians in their common religion; and good pay will not be wanting in so vital a service, whenever the crisis may arrive—not of contesting for the supremacy of the Black Sea, which they already have—the wanton affair of Navarin * gave them *that*; but the far

* The fleet of an ally peaceably at anchor in the bay of Navarin, consisting of three sail of the line and nineteen frigates, was attacked by ten sail of the line and ten frigates, led on by three admirals; and the cruel havoc which they were able to make, magnified in quackish and gasconading phrase into utter *destruction*, was rewarded as a victory! The high character and renown of the British navy were not gained by such *victories* as these.

nobler object of ambition—*the supremacy in the Mediterranean!* Ten years ago all this would have appeared a chimera; but friends and foes have unfortunately alike contributed to realize the audacious projects of Catharine; and unless Turkey should regain her independence through the aid of England and France, which we think they are bound to give, so as to be enabled to oppose an effective barrier to the passage of a Russian fleet through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, we may ere long see the full completion of those long-contemplated designs. It is not altogether concealed that the anxious wish of the Russians is to be released from their *imprisonment in the Black Sea*—and who doubts that *this*, once accomplished, would open a new era to Russia, to the development of her internal resources, and the vast extension of her foreign influence?

This release can only follow the occupation of the Dardanelles—that is, the acquisition of an advanced position that renders her invulnerable, and which gives her in addition an immense empire, men, treasures, materials, and a fleet. One hundred sail will be ready a month after the occupation to issue from the straits. What then would happen it is not difficult to foresee. Greece thrown into utter confusion—the puny monarchy of the Bavarian boy destroyed—the imbecile government dissolved—the Ionian Islands insulted and plundered—the Levant trade cut up, and for a time annihilated.

France, equally unprepared with ourselves, would be pretty much in the same predicament.

We see all this and much more coming; time is all that is required for the consummation; time wears on—yet what are we doing—what *is* to be done; Lord Durham is gone to St. Petersburg—what *can* he do there that will change the progress of events? It has been whispered that the Emperor was to be requested to *disarm*—modest and amiable assurance! Imagine the yell of laughter that would arise from the Sclavonic millions if they were told to '*disarm!*' Imagine Lord Durham—another Æschines addressing another Philip—requesting Nicolas to DISARM! No, we must play our game, and strive to win it—not ask our antagonist to remove his pieces from the board. Russia plays for conquest; her existence, perhaps voluntary at first, but irrevocably now, is involved in her success. The northern hordes sigh for Asia Minor, the Russian nobles for the Bosphorus. Her navies await the signal to unmoor, her million of soldiers the word to march; if they wait patiently it is to make more sure. Ask the Emperor for any proof of his moderation, his generosity, or his '*condescension*'—any pledge, any guarantee, on any point, and you will receive a gracious reply. You may receive, as 'proofs of his imperial condescension,' a few firmans for the passage of the Dardanelles, or even a commercial treaty with Persia, or a shorter quarantine on the Danube; but all these advantages will be sacrificed if the word *disarm* is only whispered.

EXTRACTS FROM
THE FOREIGN QUARTERLY REVIEW.—No. XXX.

OPINIONS AND CHARACTER OF TURKISH TRAVELLERS.*

We cannot afford to remain any longer in such absolute ignorance of the state of the East. The public, judging from the extensive demand for works professing to give an insight into the state of Turkish society, shows the deep and lively interest it takes in the inquiry. This is no idle curiosity that seeks only to be gratified—it is not the curiosity of the enlightened few that would understand our nature better by studying mankind living under institutions different from those to which they have been accustomed—it is imperative necessity that urges on the European community to investigate the nature of that social system, which has so long single-handed arrested the tide of Russian encroachment; whilst Russia has been aided by the ignorance, the errors, of her antagonists, has been supported by the whole weight of the moral influence of the kingdoms of Christendom, and has had the dexterity to turn against her rival the arms of those most deeply interested in

* Revised and corrected by the author.

her preservation, and that too at a moment when she was the least capable of resistance.

Turkey still survives. This extraordinary vitality has to be accounted for. What are those ties that bind together populations differing so essentially in every respect, that, judging according to notions drawn from the centralized administrations of Europe, there seems to exist no common bond of union. What is the cause of that deep repose, of political principles of the Ottoman dominions, which so strongly contrasts itself with the actual state of Europe; of that absence of all revolutionary feelings, of restless desire of innovation, or of change. Has the Government had recourse to those strong and vexatious measures, and that formidable organization, by which the cabinets of the Continent seek to arrest the progress in their dominions of the moral contagion? Who that has looked at more than mere external forms, has failed to contrast the state of mind in the East and the West? Since European society has been fashioned on its present basis, has not every century had to record its tale of popular convulsion and civil bloodshed—of monarchs hurled from their thrones, not by a foreign foe, but by an angry and excited multitude—of dynasty succeeding dynasty—of principle supplanting principle—system changed for system? and yet after all this experience, modern European history is one uninterrupted series—one panoramic picture of revolution.

If, after some terrible crash, there has been a pause and temporary reaction in the popular mind, it is because the people stand aghast at their own handiwork. In amazement they find that, in their work of destruction, they have failed to arrive at the source of their disquietude, to eradicate the root of bitterness.

To this confusion, what a forcible contrast does Turkey, and Turkey alone, present! To this day, the race of Othman sits on the throne it has occupied for six centuries, governing its subjects according to the same fixed fundamental principles. This, be it remarked, is not predicable of any other eastern government. It is not predicable of Persia, India, or China. Any one, reflecting for a moment on this remarkable fact, must admit that the institutions which form the links of this society cannot but contain principles at once natural and good. This question is not one of philosophic speculation, it is to be turned to immediate account, that we may understand and counteract, or at all events, cease to support the views of Russia.

Now, how have the travellers who profess to exhibit a picture of the social system of Turkey discharged their duty to the public? How have they answered these questions, which meet them at the very threshold? How have they accounted for facts of such a startling nature? There is not one observation, in the numerous volumes that yearly issue from the press, under the title of Travels in

the Levant, that intimates that the mind of the writer was in a state to feel the importance of these facts—the necessity of their being accounted for. We are not therefore surprised at finding that the traveller has not only recorded those facts which he could hardly have failed to notice, without shutting his eyes—that he has mistaken the exception for the general rule; the general rule for the exception, so that the falsehood of an opinion often rests on the correctness of a fact. Just as we should have expected, after a hurried journey, a superficial view of the country and its inhabitants, and a necessarily slender stock of information; the traveller decides off-hand on all the subjects that connect themselves with such a vast and extended question—subjects of so diversified a nature that the very giving an opinion on them would presuppose at once an intimate acquaintance with military tactics; political science, whether administrative or financial; the principles and details of commerce; and not only a minute comprehension of the habits, local usages, and trains of thought, of all the different races and populations that inhabit this extended empire, but also a profound insight into the feelings and motives that actuate the human heart.

When conclusions are formed so hurriedly, it is no wonder that facts, as they come to light, show the invalidity of these conclusions—that the anticipations based on them are disproved by time.

Whilst industrious to record and prone to condemn every instance of abuse, we find them distorting and misrepresenting that which is most praiseworthy and estimable; and, as a consequence of this partizanship, passing over in silence what they could not fail to commend. But approaching their subject with presumption, they have disdained to observe—no wonder that they have not learnt, and that in judging they have outraged humanity and common sense. When they admit any moral virtue, any individual excellence, in an Eastern, it is generally coupled with a remark on the incompatibility of such virtue with a *civilized state;* honesty and integrity, it would seem, may be domestic virtues, but must be looked on as political defects; and institutions which foster their growth, and with which their development is inseparably connected, are radically and incurably bad;—that hospitality and politeness are signs of barbarism, when divested of the conventional signs of similar feelings amongst ourselves;—that simplicity and docility of character are barriers to improvement, and that a high state of civilization and refinement is necessarily one of falsehood, pauperism, political fermentation, and crime. We dwell on these moral and intellectual fallacies, because they are the sources of our political errors—nay, are they not every day put forward as justifying the notorious neglect of our political interests in the East? That neglect and all its consequences, whether of omission or commission, we cannot but at-

tribute to the absence of correct information respecting Eastern society.

But the question naturally suggests itself, why is it that only writers of the stamp we have described have taken up the subject? Are there not others who might give the public more correct information? If so, why have they not done so? But these are naturally men of a logical turn of mind; cautious by temperament and habit; and not inclined to appear before the public rashly. The mass of evidence they have collected bearing upon the question appears to them insignificant when they compare it with what they deem necessary for discussing with satisfaction to themselves a subject of such gigantic dimensions. They in fact have felt the real difficulties of the question. The difficulties that a man has to encounter, who would penetrate beyond the veil that conceals the East from the West, are not few or easily overcome. Indeed we should be inclined to place more confidence in the published accounts of travellers, had they shown symptoms of their feeling these difficulties. These difficulties the Moniteur Ottoman indicates to us in language equally forcible and comprehensive.

"In order to understand Turkey, one must disencumber one's-self of an immense load of prejudices, and when the investigator has put off the old man, the man of Europe, he has to surmount numberless obstacles, which arise from the difference of manners, ideas, and language. The very terms he is

accustomed to use characterise but imperfectly every step of the social question, and express erroneously every part in detail of the social system. Then what a void in the absence of all those facilities which the publicity of facts and statistics afford in Europe! There is no spirit of analysis to be found among the Orientals. He that would observe them as a nation must collect all this information for himself. To the European, Turkey is a political accident — an assemblage of facts essentially differing from the facts of Europe. Not one of these facts has been classified by political economy, and yet the knowledge of these facts would enrich that science and extend its bounds."

Here then we find difficulties which the observer of the Turkish social system has to overcome, sacrifices which he is called on to make, and a vast field of inquiry opened to his view, which we should never have dreamed of had we seen only with the eyes of the tourists in Turkey. In order to be able to appreciate the merits and demerits of any of the societies which form branches of the grand European family, the traveller must divest himself of all his national prejudices. Our neighbours on the continent have failed in their attempts at forming a just estimate of society in our own island. Why? The traveller had perhaps freed himself from the pre-conceptions peculiar to his nation, but he had forgotten to divest himself of his continental

prejudices. He nevertheless has a language in common—enters into our society—has access to our newspapers, reviews, pamphlets, and parliamentary reports, our ballads, proverbs, and histories. But he that investigates eastern society has first to divest himself of the more abstracted prejudices of the European. He has no common language; for the words in which he is accustomed to clothe his thoughts, and which seem to stand for things that bear the closest analogy to what he observes in Turkey, are most calculated to lead him astray. He has habits and usages to familiarize himself with before he can understand them —he must penetrate into a society which is closed to him as to those who never described it—moreover, be it remembered, that the system of government in Turkey, is not uniform as in the governments of Europe, but diversified and adapting itself to the local exigencies of the different regions and districts. Before, therefore, a generalized view can be taken of the whole, there must be an intimate acquaintance with all the parts. The inquirer has to study not one faith but many—not one race but many—not one region but many.—An acquaintance with any one of these branches requires many years' labour and calm investigation; yet, before even this investigation can be effectual, the master-key must be found, and that is, a correct understanding of the general principles of the economy and administration of the govern-

ment, which is the result of a just appreciation of the whole.

With the exception of the lamented Burckhardt and Colonel Leake, no eastern travellers have familiarized themselves with their subjects. And neither of these two touched even remotely on the principles that bind together eastern society. They did not treat of the action of government on the different parts, nor of the ties that connect these parts with the government. They had not the advantage of witnessing events of recent occurrence, which have rendered the task of anatomizing Turkey, and of discovering its principle of vitality one of less difficulty than formerly. But as to the others, no one condition attached to useful or successful inquiry have they fulfilled; and, consequently, they are exposed to all the dangers incidental to those who cannot distinguish false information from true.

We know what it is to travel in Turkey. We have had to struggle against all the difficulties which beset the path of the inquirer, and we have found that it is only by coming in constant contact with the natives—by witnessing the manner in which they conduct the concerns of their families and their villages, and the economy of the local administrations—by diving into the minutest circumstance—by abstaining from forming any opinion until one has frequently shifted his ground and examined the subject in different lights, that

anything like self-satisfaction can attend the inquiry. We have observed many of the travellers who have since published the results of their inquiry, when engaged in collecting what they look on as information, and are therefore relieved from all compunction and doubt in treating them as they deserve.

The traveller, on landing at any seaport in the Levant, enters into a new world, where every thing astonishes and confounds. Like the blind man restored to sight on a sudden, he sees objects quite new and strange to him, but they present themselves in a confused manner. It appears to him like a chaos. Institutions, manners, habits, customs, trains of thought, nay, every thing, from the most trifling conventional usage to the very foundations on which the society is based, appears to him, and indeed is, the very antithesis to what he has witnessed in Europe. He wishes to talk to the people, to put questions to them, but he is ignorant of any language in which to hold communication with them—he says he will learn—his enthusiasm is cooled by the information that the two languages most current in these countries would each of them require years of hard study, and then these are only two of a dozen. Resigning all hope of deriving information immediately from the natives themselves, he turns to the European population. Travellers have over and over again exposed the character of the society of the

Frank population in the seaport towns of Turkey; in fact they have devoted so many pages to the description of this society, that we suspect they gave more of their time to studying it than they did to that which they came professedly to examine. They have ridiculed the ignorance, presumption, and corruptness of these people, little imagining they were breaking the ground from under their own feet; that they were invalidating their own testimony; for, such being the character of their informants, their information was good for nothing. Much as we may think the pictures they have given of this society overcharged*—much as we must disapprove that heartless levity which could wound the private feeling of individuals, and violate the sanctity of hospitality, frankly offered and eagerly accepted,—we think their description in the main correct; and it is natural to expect that a European should be better qualified to judge of European society than of Asiatic, especially as he saw the one and did not the other.

The Frank population, either at Constantinople or Smyrna, (and these two cities give the tone of opinion to the Franks all over the Levant,) is as

* One writer sets down a young lady at Smyrna as an ignoramus, because she said she did not know what a nightingale was. The poor girl said to us with tears in her eyes, "French is not my language; I did not know what a *rossignol* meant: had he addressed me in Greek, and spoken to me about the *αηδονι*, I should have said "I hear multitudes of them at Budjà, where I spend the summer."

ignorant of the nature of Turkish society as the mass in England with the difference of their pretensions. The Franks have no sort of intercourse of a friendly nature with the natives; instead of mixing with them and instilling into their minds more civilized notions, if so superior in civilization as they pretend to be, they are exclusives!* The merchant transacts his business with the people of the country. How is it that this does not lead to more familiar intercourse? The Turkish purchaser and the European merchant were ignorant of a common language, separated by feeling and custom; thence arose a class of persons—brokers—or μεσηται, who transacted all business between them, and whose interest it was to render all direct communication impossible. What Frank merchant has been able to emancipate himself from this interference, and to do business directly, if ever so well acquainted with the language? It has been tried and failed, we know, in Smyrna. Thus naturally arose prejudice between the two parties, which has led to ill-will, opposition, and mutual injury.

Formerly the Frank merchant, particularly the English, was, though prejudiced against the native, blindly attached to the government. Recent cir-

* A Pasha of Smyrna for the purpose of breaking down this wall of separation, offered to join the Frank casino—he was rejected—the rule of the society is, to admit no individual who has not for one of his parents a European!

cumstances have changed his opinions. The Frank merchant, now no longer a member of a privileged body, has to compete with the superior knowledge, activity, and economy of the native trader. His position daily rendered more slippery—his profits diminished — his feeling soured — he exclaims, "Trade decays and the government is detestable." The answer of the Moniteur Ottoman is conclusive:—

"It may be granted that commerce, especially in Turkey, has diminished for each establishment in particular; but it has increased considerably for the mass. The proof of this is, that in all the ports of the empire, there are twenty times the number of establishments that existed in the time so regretted, reckoning only European establishments; and all these are placed in a state of affluence and luxury which they could not enjoy elsewhere, without considerable capital and more sedulous attention. Forty years ago, the French almost alone monopolized the commercial resources of Turkey," (during the existence of our Levant company.) "Compare the exports and imports then, with what they are now, and you will find them increased more than tenfold. But it is said that the productions of Turkey have decreased; with what then does she pay for the enormous importations from England, America, and France, which existed not before? It is notorious that she can only pay in kind. If the French have fallen behind their rivals, they must thank the monopoly created

by the sanitary system at Marseilles. Turkey has never known the *scientific madness of a balance of trade*. In consequence, every part of her territory is supplied according to its wants, and at a moderate price. Paying with her productions, the internal production has increased with increased consumption—which is sufficiently proved by the increasing demand for the rich cargoes from England and America, of which none remain without buyers, and consequently without payment."

Besides, the atmosphere of Pera and Smyrna is designedly impregnated with maxims favourable to Russian designs; and it is not to be supposed that Russia, who makes her influence and her gold be felt in every country in Europe, should neglect this most important of all points. But do not the *employés* of the different governments move about and examine for themselves? Yes: the Russian and Austrian* do; and we know how anxious they are to make out the best case possible for Turkey. Well—but the dragoman? Here we come to the ultimate cause of the line of demarcation drawn between the Frank and native society. The system of using interpreters at first was only contemplated as a temporary measure. It never could have been imagined that a friendly intercourse could exist between two nations, when that intercourse was carried on through the medium of men

* Whatever the policy of Austria may be, or the conduct of her agents in the East are *now*, certainly heretofore the subordinate agents of Austria in the East have been the subservient ministers of Russia.

who lived by the non-intelligence, and fattened on the misintelligence of their employers. How can we expect to have any beneficial intercourse with the Porte, so long as the channel of our communications is not only not one of our own nation, but one who knows no country, is connected to us by no tie, and is thus ready to sell our secrets to the highest bidder? The power that pays is Russia; therefore she is the only power served. * The Prussian, Austrian, Danish, Dutch, and Swedish missions, all openly and notoriously work for her, —others do so no less effectually, because in secret. Our present head dragoman is brother of the first dragoman of Russia! But besides all this the dragomans are Franks—members of that community which is neither eastern nor western by virtue or intelligence, but both in vices, prejudice, and ignorance.

Such is one source whence the traveller derives his information. Let us examine another. There are some Greeks acquainted with the European languages, who possibly have travelled in Europe. Perceiving that we in Europe are free from that peculiar class of abuses, which they have expe-

* A delicate matter was in treaty between one of our former ambassadors and the Porte. Our then dragoman revealed the secret to his wife, she to her paramour, he to the Prussian minister, who was the go-between of the Russians, and thus did it reach London through St. Petersburgh. This at least was the *excuse* set up by the dragoman when the revelation became known.

rienced in their own country, and dreaming of no others, they imagine that our system must be perfect, and conclude that the government in Turkey, in that it differs *toto cælo* from European governments, must be radically bad. They turn an eye of hope to the new kingdom of Greece Their hearts' desire is, or rather was, until very lately, its aggrandizement, which is incompatible with the existence of Turkey. Many such individuals went to Greece enthusiastic in the idea of a government established on the European model. They have found with amazement that the system does not work—that the people sigh for their old institutions —that the peasantry in bodies and whole communities emigrate to Turkey. If some travellers, who have built their opinions on such testimony, were to visit Turkey again, they would find the sentiments of their informants essentially changed.

The traveller, in his peregrinations through the capital, in his visits of ceremony to the officers of the Porte, or in his journey into the interior, is accompanied by an interpreter; and he cannot well escape seeing every thing with the eyes of this *fidus Achates*. In fact, the gains of the interpreter would be considerably decreased if his master were to come to any thing like an understanding with the people of the country. It is his interest therefore to spread before the eyes of his employer a beguiling medium. Nor is it intentionally alone that these people mislead you. Their position, igno-

rance, and disposition, unfit for rendering any useful assistance to the traveller's inquiries. They generally are men who have been driven by their vices from their native land—who perhaps have only a smattering of the language they pretend to interpret; despised, they hate in return; but they are clothed with the immunities of a Frank—the privilege of censuring what they do not comprehend, and designating their superiors among the natives barbarians. The traveller, soliloquizing with himself on looking around him, exclaims, "This is a most extraordinary country!" His companion mutters, "*Quest' è Turchia, signore.*" "Who is that man with such a dignified carriage?" "*Ba! è Turco.*" "That shopkeeper is a rogue." "*Che volete, signore? E Turco.*" It is on *such* testimony that the traveller builds his opinions, although unconsciously. Nay, we have traced to no better authority than this, tales which travellers have recounted as facts; while they have sought to conceal by metaphor, point, and antithesis, the spuriousness of the source.

What confidence is to be given to those who have enjoyed the greatest advantages may be seen from the following circumstance, which places the difficulties of this inquiry in a different point of view from any we have as yet touched upon:—A French consul stationed in Albania during the war, was on the point of publishing an elaborate work on that country. A high Russian functionary, then

at Paris, and now in our own capital, accidentally saw the MS. when the work was in the press. The publication was arrested, the picture was changed, and the resources of the country diminished one-third. The Count's arguments must have been most cogent!

But we think that the traveller is not only unfortunate in his having every source of information poisoned, but the public whom he addresses must come in for its due share of blame. Whether seeking emolument or reputation, the writer depends for both on the public. Now, how would the public receive, at least until very lately, a description of the state of Turkey that only observed the modesty of nature and the simplicity of truth? From our infancy we have been accustomed to look on the East as a land of romance and fable; in our nurseries we have assigned it as the "local habitation" of genii and monsters; armed with supernatural powers and endowed with inhuman propensities. The untractable taste of the writer and the public alike *must* find in the East impressive scenery, costume, and drama; it will not endure investigation, reasoning, statistics, all important but sober every-day occurrences, and scouts the homely narrative of facts recorded and accounted for. A distinguished member of the French chamber, several years ago, published the result of his observations in the East. He had remarked the high state of morals in Turkey, so strongly contrasting itself

with what he lamented in Europe. He found this view so contrary to the public conviction, that he bought up the first edition of his work, and put forward a second, more in harmony with the notions of the day.

We think it necessary to make some apology to our readers for having dwelt so long on this branch of our subject; but when we look on this question as involving interests dear to us as Englishmen, and affecting our future destiny as men, we feel that no consideration ought to prevent us from removing whatever stands in the way of its being fully and clearly understood. Our brother critics have done little to expose these mis-statements; nor was it to be expected that they should possess the necessary information to do so. It requires no small acquaintance with a subject to be able to detect error when put forward in an abstract form. This is a subject on which every part of the community however well-informed on other matters, has been notoriously in the dark—a subject on which only now light is beginning to break—and in the absence of correct data to go upon, even critical acumen becomes dangerous, because it systematizes error. Whatever may be the wholesome influence that the periodical press has exercised on the mind of the public in this country on the generality of the subjects which it is called on to handle, we find it on this subject not only sanctioning error, but largely contributing to confusion. Every new

author is cordially welcomed, his tale is listened to with marked attention, his assertions admitted unquestioned. His judge descends from the bench, conscious that he is not possessed of authority to decide. He feels it useless for him to attempt to hold the critical balance, not possessing the weights for trying the testimony. Thus we find in the same review statements approved of and argued on in one number, and subsequently contradicted. Nay, we have observed two works containing statements so contradictory that, if one was true, the other was altogether false—reviewed together—both authors equally commended; the testimony of both admitted; and a general synopsis given of the opinions of both.

This confusion and uncertainty of opinion shows that ideas on the subject are in a state of transition, incidental to the birth of a new science; for the study of the Turkish social system involves in it a new science, important in its results, wide in its bearings, extensive in its application. Whilst then we have seen that there exists in this country no standard of opinion on the subject, we congratulate our readers on one having arisen (where indeed it was most natural to look for it) at Constantinople. Availing ourselves of this new and most important light, we shall proceed to examine the different false positions that some of the most popular or

* We allude to a northern Review of "Records of Travels in Turkey," and "Turkey and its Resources."

most recent among European writers on this subject have taken up.

One of the most popular English writers on Turkey is Mr. Slade. If compared with those only that went before him, we may say that he deserved his popularity. He enjoyed great advantages, from the position into which he was thrown by accident, from the time he made his tour, and his having taken the trouble to obtain some small acquaintance with the Turkish language, which saved him from being haunted by a vagabond interpreter on ordinary occasions. These advantages, however small, compared with what was requisite to understand Turkey, might have led him to greater results, as we shall show. But first, we shall do him the justice of pointing out what he has done well. The insight he gave us into the state of the Russian invading army of 1829 is important. This was comparatively easy; for as we observed before, there is no reason why a European should not form a correct estimate of what is European. He sets before us the degraded and demoralized state of the Russian soldiery; their ignorance, as contrasted with the intelligence and independent spirit of the peasantry of the country invaded; the wretchedness and starvation of that army, occasioned by a peculating commissariat and a defective medical department; the excesses the soldiery were thus driven to commit, which, together with bad faith and other causes, had disgusted for a time the Russian pre-

dilections of the Christian natives. In fine, he gives much information which would lead us to form a correct idea of the designs of Russia, and the means employed to realize them; but gives nothing by which we can even suppose that there exists in Turkey elements by which we may foil them. It was with society, as it exists there, that he had principally to do. So have we. We therefore turn to what he says of Bulgaria.

He is the only traveller that has given a description of that country, with something of detail, and true as far as it goes. He shews the ease and affluence which the inhabitants enjoyed even in the midst of a war, and quotes passages from other authors, showing that the comfort he observed there is not confined to Bulgaria. He describes the domestic peace and contentment that are to be found there, the industrious habits of the people, the developement of their agricultural resources. Finally, he finds an absence of crime and a consequent absence of punishment. This is correct; indeed, we may say, that whatever he saw with his own eyes is generally so. But he is a careless observer, and as seldom penetrating beneath the surface as any of his predecessors. His very manner of mistaking misplaced levity for wit leads us to expect it. We shall give one remarkable instance of this, to illustrate our meaning: After a tiresome journey, "three hours wading through deep mud," he seeks refuge in a Bulgarian hamlet, in which

the only house unoccupied by the Turkish soldiery was one "where lay a child with a bad fever. This was offered to us; but, preferring filth to disease, we crept into an adjoining shed. Our host and hostess (parents of the sick child) were unremitting in their attention; they gave us a good soup, eggs, and a dish of fried meat (*perhaps from the next dead horse*)." Comment on this observation would be needless, excepting in as far as it shews how incompetent Mr. Slade was for the task he undertook of giving a true picture of Eastern populations. While noticing the strict attention to cleanliness of this population, both with regard to their persons and their dwellings, he seems to forget that it extends to what they eat, drink, or touch; that it is considered a religious duty, not only by Mussulmans, but by all the different races and populations. Thus the bare intimation of the possibility of a peasant's serving up fried carrion, shows such an ignorance of the habits and feelings of the people, that it is no wonder he falls into graver errors. It is a notion common in the East, that all Europeans are unclean, and will eat carrion or any filth; an idea taken up and exaggerated by seeing some Franks not over-nice. We have observed a Greek peasant relieved from a load of horror, when we succeeded in convincing him that the guest he harboured belonged to a nation that prided itself on its cleanliness. It may be said that the observation above was a mere slip of the pen: perhaps this

little slip may better account for the want of hospitality on the part of English merchants to English travellers, and particularly the navy, which our author complains of, than the supposition of our author, that the merchants, as a body, have taken it into their heads that the navy swarms with Don Juans.

But, little fitted for judging what we call things of sense, what can we expect when he comes to grapple with abstraction. He says, the prosperity the Bulgarians enjoy, is the result of the country being thinly inhabited. We have seen elsewhere the misery, mendicity, and discontent of the Greeks under the rule of Capodistrias, ascribed to the same cause—thinness of population. What is the criterion? Mr. Slade contradicts himself elsewhere—noticing "the superior condition observable in their flourishing towns and abundant fields. Witness," he adds, "Turnova, Gabrova, Rusgrad, Selimnia, Yamboli, Aidos, &c., all *thickly peopled*, wealthy, and *possessing manufactories of cloth.*" Besides, the quotation above contradicts the assertion, implied by the population theory that the inhabitants derive their revenues from the land. This is so far from the fact, that, calling to mind the manufactories of woollens, silk, and cottons, as well in Philippopoli and its environs, as all over Bulgaria, and the articles for which different places are famed;* remembering the

* To adduce an obvious instance—the otto of roses.

magnificent khans with extensive magazines, that we remarked on our road from Constantinople to Philippopoli, which, of themselves, show the activity of the trade between the capital and that town, chiefly in the hands of the Bulgarians; having seen the immense numbers of Bulgarians that at a particular season of the year regularly repair even to Syria to meet the Persian caravans, and exchange their own manufactures for the rich stuffs of Syria, Persia and India; not to mention their coasting along Asia Minor, when homeward bound, and making further exchanges—judging from these simple facts (if we had not the surer grounds of statistics to go upon) we should not hesitate to assert that the most apparent portion of their prosperity depends on their manufacturing energy and commercial enterprize.

Having shown what is *not* the reason of this prosperity, we shall show what *is*. In Mr. Slade's work, we find no mention of the Codjà Bashi, though we doubt not that he, as well as ourselves, was more than once indebted to the municipal officer for lodging and entertainment; but this authority has higher functions to discharge than merely to attend to the wants of the casual traveller. He is the intermediary between the government and the people of his district; but, elected freely by the suffrages of every tax-payer, or (which is the same) house-holder, he represents public opinion. It is as much the interest of the government as of the people

that the communications between them should be as easy as possible; and whenever the municipal authority does not represent public opinion, opposition to authority follows, which there is no organized system to overawe. Industry and commerce are left entirely free, because it is impossible to use difficult methods of raising the revenue, therefore the government does not vexatiously interfere with men's buying where they can cheapest, and selling where they do so to the best advantage. The interest of the community is not sacrificed to a few by fiscal artifices: there is no collision of interests, each interest striving to shift the load of taxation from its own back to that of another. National interest is felt as *one*, and therefore the central administration has not more work than it can do, in trying to reconcile interests, which it has first brought into collision. It is betrayed into the enactment of no laws creating fictitious crimes, the commission of which holds out great advantage, and insensibly leads on the mind to transgressions against the light of nature and Divine commandment. It is not tempted to enact laws thwarting Nature, by "unequally distributing wealth, to the great deterioration of social happiness" (Slade). It is not tempted to enact laws, which give a few dazzling results, at the expense of widely diffused misery.

Such is the social system which we observed in Bulgaria. We might have scrupled to lay this

statement before the public a few years—perhaps months—ago, fearing to be met with an incredulous smile. But now these accounts have received confirmation, and we know that the enlightened at least, of the public, will admit the correctness of our statements.

Speaking of the institutions of Turkey, we feel the danger of treating them in general terms. The system is not uniform, it being the distinguishing feature of the Ottoman government, not to intefere with the genius of the place, but to suffer its attachment to its natural predilections. Thus the constitution of the local authorities in mountainous tracts is somewhat different, but their intercourse with government, as regards taxation, nearly the same. In champaign countries (not the deserts) the system is much the same as in Bulgaria; in some places worked out with more purity, in others less so. In different places, more or fewer abuses prevent the free action of the system; but we have invariably found, in the low lands, comfort and prosperity in proportion to the purity with which the municipal system was worked out.

Mr. Slade having allowed this to escape him, blames the government for having acted up to the very principle which is its strength, thus:—

"The more we examine the conduct of the early Ottoman conquerors, the more we are convinced that *religious toleration* is the rock they split on in Europe. They should have either *extirpated* the

Greek religion, which has ever been a cancer to the Mussulman power, as they could have done, or they should have made its professors dependent on the government for salaries, whereby *they would have ceased to care so much for the affection of the people.* Amurath II. adopted the former plan in Albania. [?] He succeeded. [?] The Christians that are now there are later settlers. [?] After all, conversion by the sword, though it sound horrid, is as good as any other way—certainly more efficacious. There may be doubts as to the insincerity of forced proselytes, but their children are certain of being born in the faith; and this assurance in the converters of saving generations in future counterbalances the injustice of making one generation forswear itself." vol. ii.

What a host of reflections rush on the mind while reading the above paragraph! The monstrousness of the opinions (if such a term be applicable) is paralleled by the perversion or ignorance of historic events, and may suffice to render any of the author's conclusions, suspicious by the very fact of his having arrived at them. We were inclined to think that the Ottoman government was obnoxious because it had not allowed sufficient freedom to conscience. We had hailed with pleasure the recent enactment of the Porte, which went still farther towards equalizing the rights of all sects, especially as the Porte showed that it felt "that equality of rights involves an equality of duties."

The Porte may thank its stars that it has rejected all fellowship with all such counsellors, who parade, for its initiation into civilized existence, the worsts errors and vices for which civilization has to blush. Have "salaries, which made religious teachers dependent on governments," removed "the cancers to their power?" Has not the system broken up sympathies, because these teachers "ceased to care so much for the affections of the people?" Mr. Slade says elsewhere, that the Bulgarians, of the Greek Church, "lived tranquil, and never, until 1829, formed one of the jarring elements of the empire." Neither did they then, unless momentarily. He has shown how soon they learned to hate the Russians. Recent events have proved the strong and increasing attachment of all the Christian subjects to the Porte; but if it ought to extirpate the Greek Church in Europe (the religion, by-the-by, of the Cossack refugees, the most faithful adherents of the Turkish government), why not also in Asia Minor? Why not the Armenian Church? Why not the religions of the Maronites and Druses, in the mountains of Lebanon?—that of the Jews every where? "Amurath II. adopted such a plan in Albania, and succeeded." Where is this fact to be found? It is not a century since the mass of the Albanian tribes became Mussulmans. It is worth while to compare with the above quotation one on the same subject from another writer on Turkey:—

"What traveller has not observed the fanaticism, the antipathy of all these sects—their hostility to each other? Who has traced their actual repose to the *toleration* of Islamism? Islamism, calm, absorbed, without spirit of dogma or views of proselytism, imposes at present on the other creeds the reserve and silence which characterise itself. But let this moderator be removed, and the humble professions now confined to the sanctuary would be proclaimed in the court and the camp; political power and political enmity would combine with religious domination and religious animosity; the empire would be deluged in blood, until a nervous arm—the arm of Russia—appears to restore harmony by despotism. Did not the animosities of the eastern and western churches lay the Greek empire at the feet of the Turkish conqueror? Open abruptly the political arena to similar contentions, the same scene would be reproduced; and, even if the Christian sects alone remained, the theologian and sectarian acrimony of Mount Athos, of Etchmiadzin, and the Vatican, would re-appear, unaccompanied by the remnants of the science and philosophy of Athens and of Rome."*

We think a great number of Mr. Slade's miscalculations may be ascribed to his imagining that the government held its tenure by force and religious fanaticism. This explains his idea, that the annihilation of the corps of Janissaries is the ruin of

* England, France, Russia, and Turkey, *p.* 67.

Turkey; that the body of the Ulemas is its "sheet anchor," &c.

Where is that organization of force to which the long stability of the empire is to be ascribed? The population of European and Asiatic Turkey amounts to thirty millions; the standing army to 40,000* men, and that not an element of internal conservation. Contrasted with this, the population of Egypt is two millions. Mohammed Ali, before he was possessed of Syria, could hardly keep down a tame, dispirited people of Fellahs, chained to the soil, and whose daily bread is the condition of their slavery, with an army of 60,000. In Candia alone, an army of 10,000 was necessary for a population of 90,000. Such is the practice of *civilization* as applied to the East. Further, in Independent Greece, with a population of 850,000 to 10,000 troops, the people are always, whether under the Germans or Capodistrias, on the verge of a revolution. The police of Constantinople (a population of 600,000) consists of 150 men. Was it ever greater? Since the destruction of the janissaries, the executioner has found his office a sinecure. Are there prisoners immured for political offences, or rather opinions? In fact, where are the state prisons? Capodistrias filled Napoli with spies;—

* At the commencement of the Russian war it was only 30,000, for two years previously there was really no force whatever. The army has recently been carried to 100,000, *assembled on the confines of Syria and in Albania.*

is there one in Constantinople? Do not the Turks, &c. meet every evening at the coffee-houses, and freely discourse on every topic? Could they not hatch treason during the nights of the Ramazan, the Saturnalia of the Turks, inasmuch as all discipline is then relaxed? Finally, so strongly is the idea of individual liberty rooted in the habits of the people, that no sooner is any one, no matter who, put in confinement, than every influence is at work to procure his liberation.

But the Turkish government held its tenure by force, and the organization of this force was the janissaries. The most superficial glance at the history of the Turkish empire, and of this corps, shows, that ever since the days of Murad IV., if not before, the existence of this body was a source of internal weakness—a reason why the real strength of the government could scarcely develop itself. They were the first to mutiny, whether in peace or during war. It was this body that resisted every change, whether beneficial or the reverse. What hold had they in the Mussulman's affections? Selim III. contemplated their destruction; but previous to the attempt, he had rendered himself unpopular by the enactment of some erroneous financial measures derived from Europe. The janissaries, whose interests were in common with the body of consumers, found the people enlisted on their side, and he was deposed. His fall, while it taught Mahmud a lesson, made the military

oligarchy miscalculate its own power. Mahmud did not mix up with foreign matter the simple question, whether the janissaries were to govern Turkey or he; and they fell without enlisting one partisan—nay, out of their own body proceeded that man, who was the immediate instrument of their downfall. All the janissaries were not cut off, only the ringleaders and those found in arms. How came it, then, that Russia attempted to awaken the janissary feeling during the last war, and utterly failed? Should not this very circumstance have opened Mr. Slade's eyes, knowing, as he does, the designs of Russia, and how she works to effect them, namely, by fostering every element that can weaken the Porte, and alienate the affections of the people from the Sultan? Russia tried this experiment in the North of Roumelia and in Asia Minor. Since then, the Albanians in the West of Roumelia have been in insurrection; Ibrahim Pasha has marched through Asia as far as Kutahia; yet neither attempted to resuscitate the janissaries; for they knew that the people had, with a unanimity seldom witnessed, passed on that body the sentence of condemnation; the Sultan only carried that sentence into effect.

It is quite new to us, that a measure which gives universal satisfaction should have a tendency to weaken the hands of government. But are the disasters of the late Russian war attributable to the extinction of the janissaries? Would the janissaries have compensated to the Porte for the de-

struction of her fleet, which gave the Russians the command of the Black Sea? Would they have prevented *us* from throwing in the whole weight of our moral influence against Turkey, and on the side of Russia? Turkey was attacked at a moment when least capable of defending herself, being without an organised military force. But he must have read the Turkish history to little purpose, who has not seen that this military body, in her wars with Christian and other powers, acted invariably as a drawback on the inherent power of Turkey.*

Akin to this error is the supposition, that the abolition of the Derebeys has weakened the power of the Porte. So much did Mr. Slade understand the constitution of the Derebeys, that he confounds them with the Ayans. The former were usurpations against the principles of the government. The Ayans were the municipal officers of the Turkish population, originally elected like the Codjà Bashi. Some of these had also made successful usurpations, and rendered their office hereditary. The Porte, putting an end to these usurpations, showed the intention of returning to her original principles.

We come to the question of religious fanaticism. This is generally supposed to be the vital principle of Turkish power; so that we are not surprised at a superficial observer setting down the Ulema as "the sheet-anchor of Turkey." What is this body

* See Despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo, in Portfolio, No. 7; *now* it is superfluous to expose these errors.

of the Ulema? is it a body at all? What is its constitution? what its constituency? what its revenues? what its rights, influence, functions? These points should have been defined; they ought to be self-evident. A body which is the anchor of hope of an old and tottering empire must force itself on the attention of the most superficial observer of its agonizing throes. Can Mr. Slade answer the questions we have asked? can any traveller tell us satisfactorily what the Ulema are? If not, is not the supposition merely gratuitous? Does Mr. Slade suppose the Ulema is the body of the Church? If so, he is mistaken. He cannot suppose they are merely the body of the law, and call them the sheet-anchor of Turkey. But he supposes that they are possessed of immense revenues —revenues so large as to be visible means of accounting for the existence of the capital, namely, the revenue of the vakoofs and mosques, or a full third of the rental of the empire. It happens most unfortunately for Mr. Slade's theory, that the administration of this property has been lately taken into the hands of the government. The proposition was coolly, calmly discussed. It was decided. A firman of thirty lines appeared in the Gazette. A week sufficed for the new arrangements to be understood and acted on; nor was there opposition or convulsion among the Ulema; and though some of the individuals of the body may have suffered in their pocket, neither did the body consider itself

injured, nor was it lowered in public estimation. We have not undertaken to say what the Ulema are; we merely cite this fact to prove that our author understood no one branch of what he decided on so summarily.

It is too bad to see fact, morals, history, institutions, and futurity, dealt with in this heedless style, and the compound considered a work of authority on Turkey. We turn for relief to something satisfactory, something intelligible on the principles of conservation of the Ottoman Empire. A cotemporary has this remarkable passage, when speaking of the Crusades:—

"Christianity," or rather Catholicism, "then put on all that warlike character *to which the success of Islamism is ascribed.* The tide of Mohammedan conquest was rolled back, Christian kingdoms erected, and Gothic dynasties established in the centre of the former conquests of Turks and Saracens. Mussulman enthusiasm, ardour of conquest, and zeal for proselytism, might be deemed extinguished by defeat and the triumph of a hostile creed. From what series of causes then should Christian princes fail to consolidate their dominion in the East, and reap the fruits of their labours? Why could they not, by virtue of civil institutions, retain conquests won by religious zeal and superior military prowess? The difference in the mode of civil government pursued by Europeans and Asiatics, offers the solution. The causes of the

disastrous results of the religious wars are to be found in certain points of contrast between the administration, political maxims, and practice of Europe and the East; and these points are chiefly the introduction of feudalism, and all its concomitant evils by the Norman and Gallic princes, together with the commercial despotism of the trading republics, the carriers of the crusaders, and the ascetic severity of a political church government. Against these are to be placed a government despotic in name, but never exercising its despotism in the local administration of the country; occasionally oppressive in its burdens, but leaving commerce and industry free; absolute in its creed, but without a political church, or inquisitorial police. The establishment, remarkable prosperity, and permanency of Islamism in countries where that creed *does not* predominate, can only be attributed to its political character." *

Again, our author informs us, that the Turk is externally decorous, but that his harem is a scene of obscenity. Does the writer speak from personal observation? We had imagined that unlimited gratification of brutal lust had a tendency to smother all the kindly feelings of our nature; to break up the ties of kindred; and yet we find these sensual animals make, by his own assertion, the tenderest parents—the most dutiful, respectful, and obedient children that are to be found. By the laws of Mo-

* Tait's Magazine, end of 1833. Review of "Turkey and its Resources."

hammed the Turks are allowed to take four wives. The availing one's self of this licence, is the exception; *one wife* is the general rule.

In regard to the individual Greeks he has happened to come in contact with, he is pretty correct. They were, in a certain manner, "the most favoured subjects of the Ottoman Porte," but this was "*an abuse that crept in with time.*" Hear him further:

"Visit any part of Grecian Turkey, the peasant is well clothed and well fed; his property protected; his wife and daughters held sacred; (excluding periods of revolt) his great hardship is being obliged to lodge and feed troops on the march, and to receive government officers. The Turkish peasant is equally exposed. The Armenians, though not more oppressed, are less considered, because not so completely a nation; the Jews absolutely despised; the Fellahs of Syria, slaves in comparison." [It is not the fact.] "The Fellah in Egypt is in a state disgraceful to humanity."—vol. ii.

He concludes, then, that the Greeks had nothing to complain of. The simple fact of their revolution is a sufficient answer. Men in these countries do not fight about theories; when they complain, they do so about something tangible, although it may escape the observation of the European speculator, who expects to see in the clouds what lies at his feet. They did suffer under oppression, on which foreign intrigue was able to work. It is true, their wrongs have been exaggerated and mis-

understood. Their condition was infinitely superior to that of the peasantry in most countries of Europe, but there was not that complicated organization to keep them under. We think that the view which the official organ of the Turkish government has given on this subject is more intelligible. Speaking of the unwholesome influence of the janissaries:

"If Greece is objected to us, we answer, that events in Greece come precisely in support of an opinion which we have entertained so long. Detached, because the municipal principle was deprived of free action by military preponderance, Greece took up arms in the very sense of those reforms which were beginning to form themselves in the mind of Sultan Mahmood. This very revolution has contributed to his success, and if Greece be now separated, it is because, during the first five years of the insurrection, the government and the Ottoman people were still under the fatal and stationary dominion of the janissaries."—*Moniteur Ottoman.*

We dismiss this author, on whom we have spent more time than really the intrinsic merits of the book might claim. We have done so, because a happiness of style and facility of expression have served him as a passport to public favour, and given currency to his most erroneous opinions. In conclusion, whatever Mr. Slade describes from personal observation, is generally to be relied on,

Whatever he took on the testimony of others, is the reverse. Whenever he attempts to analyse, abstract, and reason, he goes beyond his tether. Take his facts—avoid his opinions.

From what we knew previously of Monsieur Cornille's character, we should have said that he was the last person from whom was to be expected not a description of Turkish institutions, but even a faithful picture of the most obvious parts of that society. There is a frivolity and flimsiness about all he says or does—a jumping to conclusions when he should be looking for premises—a tendency to erect theories on small foundations—to establish analogies where little or no similitude exists, that totally unfit him for a work which demands patient investigation and cautious deliberation. His political bias makes him necessarily see every thing through a distorted medium. The modern republican, if we are to take our author as a fair specimen, is one attached only to outward forms, substituting theories for realities, and taking words for things. If he wants to know whether a nation enjoys liberty, he looks for charters in black and white, not perceiving that the very writing down that "Tous les Français sont égaux devant les loix," is the severest satire on his nation. What faculty for observation of society can he have who looks on religion as a matter of taste, and treats it as a theme for jesting! He observes amongst the Turks great moral virtues, and the use to which he applies this

observation, is to cast a stigma on the Christian religion.

Religion has been, on all occasions, brought forward as the mode of explaining effects of political and moral causes beyond the observer's reach. In no country has that word stood more in the way of inquiry than in Turkey. Habits, institutions, there, are the reverse of our own. Islamism is called in to acount for them all. To-day we find Islamism the cause of political prostration, and to-morrow we meet with it as the cause of the successes of the Califat. In one author we find Islamism productive of turpitude, corruption, and crime; in another bearing the goodly fruits of chastity, sobriety, honesty, and truth. In fact, we see in the lucubrations of our wanderers over the East the counterpart of the impressions which some Turk, ignorant of the manners, history, languages, and differences of Europe, might carry home to his own country, after a visit to the West. All that was not eastern, correctly, or incorrectly observed, he might trace to the effects of Christianity. Let us imagine what our feelings would be on finding, in a Turkish tourist, our dogmas called in to account for the victories of Napoleon, the Reform Bill, Arkwright's spinning-jenny, savings-banks, and street prostitution.

We admit Mr. Cornillè's observation to be quite correct. What we have ourselves seen of the Turks, subsequently, of course, to the first two or three years of false observation and difficult apprentice-

ship, induces us to give our unequivocal testimony to the truth of the observation, that the Turks (excepting always government *employés*,) are a people "that speak only the truth and act honestly." If there be truth in this proposition, and we fear no contradiction from those whose contradiction would be of weight, it proves that the institutions there existing are not injurious to the moral state of the people—but the reverse. But while we deny that religious dogmas have produced the political prostration, which has been an effect of the policy of the Christian powers, we also deny that the faith of Islamism accounts for the moral virtues of the Turks.

There is a passage in the fifth edition of "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," that so illustrates this position, that we extract it. Speaking of Lazistan, the author says,

"The Dereh Bey system sprung up, and this, with the discredit attached to Christianity by the proximity to Russia, has led to the apostacy of the Lazes. Russia, in separating them administratively from the Porte, has unexpectedly brought about their union to the Sultan; she has also raised their character; for, it must be observed, the difference here is not between the Bible and the Koran, between Christianity and Islamism, but between the superstition and idolatry of the Greek church, and the simplicity of the Mussulman practice, but between two systems, the apparent differences of which are religious, but of which the material differences are *political* and *social*.

"The Georgians are proverbial for drunkenness and debauchery: they are not brave: they are superstitious. Those who have become Mussulmans, have also become sober, chaste, and hospitable—these are habits of their new faith. In confirmation of this change of spirit it may be mentioned, that the village schools date each from the period of its conversion."

M. Cornille treats of the Mohammedan religion. His first observation shows that he knew nothing about the most trivial circumstance connected with it. He confounds the Ulema with the Emirs, or descendants of the Prophet, whose distinguishing badge is, as every child knows, a green turban. Hear him—this is a man who was three years in the country—speaking of the Ulema. "Cousins and children of Mahomet, if one may believe their own story, they bind their heads with a triple green handkerchief, as a mark of their boasted descent. We know that green was the favourite colour of the Prophet. The Ulema alone have the right to wear their master's livery."—"The Ulemas," he goes on to state, "enjoy high consideration from wearing green turbans." He then tells us, that the Ulema are "a privileged body, immoveable in the enjoyment of their property." He does not tell us what property belongs to the body, but he lets us into the secret of their privileges, or at least of one of the most important of them—the being allowed (if condemned to death) to be pounded

in a mortar! This address he puts into the mouth of a poor Ulema going to suffer capitally, and revolting at the idea of being hanged like a dog—"You must pound me, Sultan—pound me, for it is written (we suppose in the Koran) 'Thou must be pounded.'" Our author's tour to the East was not necessary to acquire this information, no more than his arrival at what are called years of discretion; he might have got it at home and in his nursery. Every thing is in the same character. We feel that we have done him too much honour in noticing him at all. We have only done so, to show the public what trash will be foisted on them, if they do not show a disposition to resist imposition.

We make some observations on a trite parallel which he re-produces, between Peter the Great and Sultan Mahmood, not because brought forward under such auspices, but because we have heard it so frequently repeated, and think it perfectly unfounded. We introduce it in the garb in which we find it decked out by Mons. Cornille.

"Mahmood has commenced, they say, the work of Turkish regeneration. Like Peter the Great, he combats the prejudices of his people, and imposes on it civilization. But Peter had to do, as it were, with a new people. He had not to do with a people grown old in its opinions, unattackable in its faith. Branches are not revived when the root is dead. One hopes every thing from a new sprout. It has

every care taken of it. The oak, which shows above the young forest but two long branches, blackened and worm-eaten—the tree contemporary with by-gone ages—is left to die in peace."—p. 69.

We have seen it elsewhere asserted, that Mahmood *copied* Peter. He had as much thought of imitating Peter, as any of his predecessors, who, before Peter was born, contemplated the same thing, and for the same reasons. Monsieur Cornille remarks a striking difference between these two sovereigns, but, instead of following it out, immediately rushes off into a labyrinth of analogies and similies. The common-place parallel between the infancy, youth, maturity, and old age of individuals and nations, has been demolished by the profound Playfair. In his work on the Decline and Fall of Nations, he shows that nations have nothing analogous in their constitution that causes them to decay—that no law in nature condemns them to death—that nations, the institutions of which were originally good, are only in danger if corporate bodies grow up with interests distinct from those of the community, with chartered privileges, exclusive rights, and a strength of organization by which they divert to themselves the nourishment that should be equally distributed over the whole body. He says, if such corporations exist, and the nation has not sufficient energy to shake them off in time, they must lead to national

extinction. Now Turkey has shaken off the only corporation that had the consistency to prevent her institutions from working as they were intended to work, and the machine of government from performing the necessary functions. Peter, M. Cornille says, had to do with a new people. What does that mean? A people that had then no institutions capable of giving them national strength and consistency. He was thus necessarily a creator. Mahmood reigns over a people whose institutions had once made them formidable to Europe. He does not harbour the remotest idea of imposing on his people *French* civilization, and if he did, he could not; for his people are too sober-minded. We mean not to say, that he has not committed errors, but of these very errors M. Cornille has not the slightest idea.

The nonsense of M. Cornille about the people being "grown old in their opinions, and unattackable in their faith," shows that he knows nothing about the matter. As he can never get beyond externals, we suppose that he means the change of dress. What complaint did he hear in 1833 among the people? The Sultan feared that contemptuous depreciation of every innovation had too long existed with the turban and a particular style of dress, for the two ideas not to have become associated. Consequently, he had laid aside the turban and appeared in the simple *fez*, which he had always worn underneath; a head-dress that abo-

lished, too, all vexatious distinctions, because common to all, and the only part of Eastern costume that is so.

To say, as M. Cornille does, that the turban is as much the sign of Islamism as the cross is of Christianity shows that he knew as much of the one religion as of the other. He should have known that there are many individuals, many classes, among the Mussulmans who never wore the turban; the artillery, bombardiers, and dehlis, among the military, for instance, and the dervishes, or monks, among the religious community; and that there are many who never wore it from choice. We have entered into this absurd question further than its importance demands. It makes a great noise in Europe: it is rarely spoken of in the East, except by the new arrivals. We do it to descend to our author's level, and to show the style of observation of Eastern travellers. On this subject we add, that we know many Turks deeply interested in the regeneration of their country, who desire, not to return to their ancient costume, but to change their present attire for something more oriental, merely because they apprehend that, by too near an approach to European systems, their national character aud spirit may be impaired. In this wish we cordially concur. This notion is gradually gaining ground among the influential portion of the community, and we entertain no doubt that the Sultan, when relieved

from his political embarrassments, will turn his attention to the subject; and from their innate good taste may be expected a change to something more national, convenient, Eastern, and picturesque.

We respect the personal character and talents of M. de la Martine. We feel that we should wrong him by contrasting his full-toned mind and piety with the flimsy superficiality of his sceptical compatriot. But he seems not the person to be able to appreciate Eastern society. He has not those cosmopolite qualities so necessary for examining the comparative merits and demerits of a society so differently constituted to that of Europe, in order to give an impartial verdict. He is essentially a European. He had too long been accustomed to give the tone to opinion in his own country to consent to modify his opinions; too long a doctor to become a disciple. His character of poet alone disqualified him for political investigations. Poets, in simpler states of society, were the best instructors in legislation, because their study is nature; but, in the European system, nature and politics have been so long divorced, that familiarity with the one disqualifies for communion with the other.

But there was another impediment. It has long been the object of M. de la Martine's writings to arrest the progress of the *mouvement* in France. The means by which he proposes to accomplish it, is the revival of the attachment of his fellow-coun-

trymen to Catholicism. He comes into a country where he finds the Maronite Catholics superior in every respect to their neighbours, the Druses; but then he is surprised at finding that the Catholics do not enjoy that consideration in Syria which would please his predilections. The Mohammedans are every way superior to them by their numbers, courage, and intelligence, they gave the tone to opinions, and do not disguise their real sentiments; they treat the Roman Catholics both as idolators and inferiors. He then observes the tolerance, the dignified forbearance, of the Mussulmans. He feels the moral superiority of Islamism over what he had mistaken for Christianity: but he dares not avow the impression he receives. Thus he is overpowered, confounded. His convictions receive a rude shock, but his prejudices remain unchanged. He was labouring too under very considerable irritation of mind when he visited the East, where he wandered an involuntary exile. He left France in a moment of disgust at seeing the turn things were taking; still he longed to have an excuse to return. We witnessed his delight when his nomination as deputy for Dieppe furnished him with that excuse.

With such conflicting feelings, he was too preoccupied and prejudiced to look at any thing in its true light. In his conversation with a distinguished lady, who, in spite of all her eccentricities, might, had he better chosen his subject, have supplied him with much correcter local information than he did obtain, he neglected any topic that was connected

with the spot. He converses with two intelligent priests; not on the nature of a society on which he was to pronounce an opinion. He asks not how they account for its existence; he touches not a theme, which, in discussion, either he or they might have thrown out some new view whereby to account for that which has never been fully explained. His heart turns to Europe: he speaks of Paris, London, Florence. He travels to Syria to discuss St. Simonianism, and makes greater progress in their doctrines than in Syrian customs.

Yet what a field of inquiry does not Syria present? Let us take, for instance, the commercial emporium of Damascus. We meet there the nomade Arab, the mountaineer, and the inhabitants of towns, of villages—their character partly agreeing, partly disagreeing; we there see mingling specimens of the patriarchal system preserved in the desert—of mountain clanship—of the municipal system prevailing in the plains. Were these distinctive features not to be remarked by an inquiring mind? Were not these apparent contradictions sufficient to call forth the analytical powers of a man of superior and logical intelligence? Would not the first appearance of classification lead on to further inquiry? And, to take in a more immediate point, does not the practical reverence of the Porte for these different institutions, that is to say, its non-interference, explain the greatest phenomenon of present history, the permanence of its dominion?

The high state of cultivation in which he found the mountains of Lebanon strikes him, but only as regards the picturesque. He admires the precipitous and terraced sides clothed up to the summit with vines and mulberry trees. The high cultivation of the plain, wherever the presence of water enables the inhabitants to struggle against the aridity of the soil, does not strike him, as not being so obvious: and while he imagines that he is giving a history of the government of the mountains, he does not attempt to trace this prosperity to any causes. Our readers may well imagine to what this is to be ascribed when we say that, though the local administration is in the hands of an hereditary governor, this governor is easily removed, if he opposes the feelings of the people, another, of the same family, being set up in his stead. The revenue is collected by self-assessment, as in Bulgaria, and we thus find in these two countries similar results;—property equally distributed—absence of crime and punishment, except in times of high excitement—and great manufacturing industry, great commercial enterprise. Would Monsieur de la Martine trace these results to religion, because the Maronites are Catholics? This prosperity is common to the Druses, Metuales, &c. as well as to the Maronites.

He says that he entertains hopes of a brilliant *avenir* for the Maronites. But he neglects to state what it was that allowed him to entertain hopes which we think delusive. Did he know that, had

it not been for the supremacy of Mohammedanism, the Maronites would now be extinct? Fakreddin was the last Druse Prince of the Mountains. The Maronites were then a small sect, their numbers few; but they were more enlightened than the Druses. The prince naturally favoured his own race, and harassed the Maronites. For this reason, the Turkish authorities discontinued the Druse princes, and placed a Mussulman chief of the race of Chab, under the title of Emir Beshir, over the mountains. Thus justice being in the hands of one that could judge impartially between the contending creeds, the continual jar was removed, the resources of the country developed, as we have seen, and the natural power of superior intelligence felt, insomuch that the Maronites now are equal in number to the Druses, and are augmenting their converts. Take off the balancing weight, and you will have discord again. This is proved by events of no very ancient date.

The Druse population, perceiving the inroads that the Christians were making on their body by proselytism, raised a storm, which forced the Emir Beshir to fly. *He was reinstated by a small body of troops sent by the Pasha of Acre.*

The Maronites are promised brilliant prospects, because they are of the same creed as Monsieur de la Martine. The external form may be the same, but the practice is essentially different, as the priesthood forms no corporate body, separated from the

community by vows of celibacy, or by such a provision "as makes them careless about the affections of the people." The Jesuits, who have penetrated into almost every corner of Europe, and succeeded in distracting the settled march of government, whether courted and caressed by the chief authorities, or discountenanced and frowned on,—after having made repeated efforts to gain a footing in Turkey—after having spent such sums to erect vast edifices for monasteries, &c.—have failed to establish themselves even in the mountains of Lebanon, where there are so many Catholics. It must be premised that it is contrary to the spirit of hospitality acted on by the Porte to expel the stranger. This failure is explained by M. de la Martine justly, it is because in Turkey there is no state religion—religion is kept apart from politics, and confers neither power nor influence on its ministers.

M. de la Martine goes on his pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and there he observes the beneficial effect of the Turkish system. It *forced* itself on his notice. He approached the Holy Sepulchre with notions highly exaggerated, and with worked-up feelings. He expected that the priests (of his persuasion at least), from residing within an enclosure which was hallowed to him by every association, would be men pious and devout, who had long withdrawn their thoughts from earth to heaven. He found them mercenary, ignorant, degraded, demoralized; jesting and blaspheming near the

tomb itself; with their utmost might fanning the flame of superstition and fanaticism, in order to turn it to profit. In the moment of bitter disappointment, he looks at the conduct of the Mussulman guardians of the church. What a mortifying contrast!—Dignified and decorous; showing respect for the feeling that led the pilgrim to the spot; they watch over the Sepulchre, to prevent one religious communion from interrupting the devotions of others, which they are well disposed to do; such is the rancour of the several sects against each other. But for the Turks, he says, the tomb would be a scene of constant strife between the rival creeds; would pass into the hands of some one, to the exclusion of every other communion. "I see no grounds," he observes, "for accusing and abusing the Turks: their alleged brutal intolerance only shows the ignorance of those who prefer the charge—*they are the only tolerant people in existence.*"

Should not this one fact have led to investigate more accurately the nature and spirit of the government of the country? In every other part of her dominions, and with very few exceptions, the impartial toleration of the Ottoman government has calmed down the irritations of religious animosity. Here, the associations of the place keep alive angry recollections; but even here, all record of the fierce disputes between the Christian churches of the East and West would have died long ago, had it not

been for the intrigues of Italian monks, supported by foreign powers. But we do not attribute this toleration to dogma, because we find the same feeling taking upon itself a character purely institutional; because we find the Porte not only respecting difference of creeds, but difference of local laws, usages and customs; because we trace to this spirit, combined with hospitality, the privilege that the Porte confers on the stranger of every nation—the privilege of living under his own laws though in her dominions, enjoying his own customs, gratifying his own tastes, amenable only to officers appointed by his own government. These are the obligations which M. de la Martine and every eastern traveller have been under to the Porte; and the way in which these individuals have, for the most part, repaid her, is, by misrepresenting her people, her institutions, and her system; by publishing misstatements that favour the designs of her ambitious enemy.

We have not space to enter into all the erroneous opinions that have given a false colouring to all M. de la Martine's pictures of Eastern society. A *resumé* of his opinions is to be found in a speech which, on his return, he pronounced in a deliberate and solemn manner before the assembled representatives of his nation. How well he understood Turkey may be seen when we find him mistaking her vital principle for symptoms of dissolution. He had so well appreciated the reforms of the Sultan,

that what had curbed the arbitrary exercise of power, repressed military tyranny, secured property from rapacity, and increased the resources of his people, was characterized by him as elements of weakness; so well had he studied the spirit of the different races and creeds, that a confederation of states was to be formed—that they were to be bound by sympathies when the Ottoman supremacy ceased to connect them; so deeply had he penetrated into Russian policy, that such a confederacy was to prevent a power so artful in sowing dissensions from occupying a position, which was not with her a question of more or less importance, but one of life and death; he had read history, to such purpose, that he proposed that the ground (once Turkey) was to be proclaimed by a simple treaty *neutral;* and that thus, amidst jarring interests and conflicting passions, we were to see there Elis reproduced without its associations.

But we return to our original question; Is the problem not to be solved? How frequently and anxiously have we asked ourselves this question, while wandering over the East? We saw the danger that menaced Europe; we saw that, if the name of Turkey were blotted out of the map of Europe and Asia, Russia's would there be stamped in characters which must efface every other. We heard of several proposals. We had sufficient local knowledge to see that, the Ottoman supremacy once removed, no substitute but Russia could be found.

The Ottoman government we considered in a state of rapid decline; Russia constantly encroaching. Is there no expedient to be hit on? Can Turkey be made to stand by herself? Is she not rotten at the core? Must she not always be propped up? To this doubt we opposed the extreme difficulty that Russia had ever experienced in dislodging her antagonist, though Russia really had so many, and seemed to have every advantage. What necessity, we reasoned, for those immense exertions, those enormous sacrifices, those extended ramifications of intrigue, which she carries into every cabinet in Europe, to subvert an empire tottering to its fall? Why not wait patiently until it falls, and then step in quietly to reap the fruits of a conquest which would not cost either blood or treasure?

We could not explain the reason of the extraordinary contradiction. This very difficulty was a result of long observation. We did not even appreciate the facts as we should have done; we knew that the Ottoman dynasty was the oldest in Europe —we could not account for it. We saw populations so divergent held together for ages, and subject provinces lost with difficulty and retaken with ease by the Ottomans. We could not account for these historical facts; we had not possessed ourselves of the key. We put these questions to others—every one had his different theory—none was satisfactory to any but himself. We visited almost every province

in Turkey—we examined every circumstance carefully. We stored up in our minds facts, opinions, conversations. We looked into books, we found nothing satisfactory.

In this state of gloomy foreboding were we, when a small unpretending volume fell in our way. It was no account of fearful accidents—it was no romance of which the author was the hero, and in which he recounted the perils he had gone through while roaming over the world in quest of adventures. In fact it was not "Travels in the Levant." It was "Turkey and its Resources; its Municipal Organization and Free Trade." The title startled us—we glanced at the advertisement. The first sentence riveted our attention—"The lingering adhesion of the parts of Turkey to each other is far more surprising and less easily accounted for than the dismemberment of the empire." Here then was one who at length had addressed himself to the problem which so long perplexed us. We sat down to read this volume: at the first hasty glance we found that it bore the internal evidence of truth. It traced great effects to simple and natural causes. We then perused it with more serious attention; and we found the key to the system which appeared before no system; that institutions did exist, although those who lived under them and enjoyed their advantages were totally unconscious of their existence. We tested the positions by the facts

which we had been long collecting; we found that they solved them, that they completely reconciled all apparent discrepancies.

But we feared that we were under delusion, and became sceptical through dread of being sanguine. We examined its effect on others, and we found even the most deeply-rooted prejudice staggered. We heard men for the first time actually talk of the institutions of Turkey; *differences of opinion then for the first time arose.** We observed, even in the ambassadorial circles, from which such discussions had been banished by absurd mystery and pompous trifling, these questions mooted, attacked, and defended. But, what was much more important, we observed this influence over Turkish opinion. The government had formerly felt the necessity of reforms, of removing abuses. It had entered the career without a guide, without having reasoned on itself. Anxious to imitate Europe, that it might be

* The Frank population and the merchants naturally pronounced at once their anathema against these doctrines. Their animosity has since subsided, but the height to which it rose may be inferred from the following extract from a letter from one Levant merchant to another.—"If I could speak to you I could convince you that there is not a resident in Turkey, or an individual who has any transactions with the country, who is not under the greatest obligations to Mr. Urquhart. Should Turkey become alive to its own intrinsic value—should the dragoman system be abolished—should monopolies be done away with—should the iktisab be taken off—I say, should such things take place, whom will you have to thank but the man you are all so violent against?"

admitted into the European family and enjoy its protection, the imitations were undertaken without system, consequently they were often injudicious, and opposed to the very organization to which the government owed its stability. It attempted to imitate the errors of Europe: the genius of the people formed by these unknown institutions prevented it from succeeding. Their pride was insulted by the necessity of change; the injudiciousness of the change often ennobled that pride. The nation, detached from its habitual moorings of custom and opinion, was exposed to every danger and every apprehension. They concurred in the mass to despise their own practice, to imitate foreign customs and manners, of which scarcely one individual knew even the external forms; or, on the other hand, they clung with a hopeless but pertinacious conviction to all that was old. They knew not where to stop or where to begin; they knew not what was European or what was not—pride and expediency stood opposed—yet pride, honest pride, was often uselessly sacrificed, and expediency disregarded in the means taken to secure it. At this moment the opinions of a European became known, and as immediately obtained favour and carried conviction—for that European commenced by reconciling them with themselves—pointed out excellencies they had neglected, and which were worthy of the admiration of that very Europe whose contumelious reproach had far more deeply injured, wounded, and endangered them than its unto-

ward acts. While he urged them to hold fast by that which really was good, he pointed out to them that which really was bad, and thus again conciliated their self-esteem even in their self-condemnation. While they themselves despaired,—despaired of even arriving at the conditions required by civilized Europe,—he, a European, having examined them with the attention necessary to arrive at such results, did not despair; pointed out how the end was to be attained; and revived hope by directing opinion. One instance we quote, out of hundreds, as proving by a single expression the reality of the mental state which we have attempted to describe. One of the doctors of the law declared to us that he had no hope for his country until he understood the principles exposed in this work.

The Turks felt respect and awe for the power of Europe, and admiration for her institutions. From political circumstances they felt that their existence depended on its good opinion. Their feelings may well be conceived when they found themselves treated with respect. They received encouragement and confidence from feeling they had claims to that respect. Could they doubt that the European who had taken this view, who had rendered them this service, must be right? How many authors have reproached the Turks with intractability, because, though they received politely the suggestions of reforms offered by Europeans, they did not adopt them. How could they adopt suggestions offered in total ignorance of all that it was

requisite to know, and which, consequently, generally injudicious, were often impracticable? Could these fail to produce a most unfavourable impression with respect to individual European sagacity and judgment? The Turks were intractable while we were ignorant. This change of disposition, so contradictory to all pre-conceived opinions, proves *that we have now arrived at the truth.*

The influence that the author of these views gained amongst them was of the most rapid growth. To enter into the reasons of this, we must observe, that he was the first European who had gained their confidence on account of his opinions. His position then had all the charms of novelty. Besides, it is further accounted for by that very absence, among the Turks, of analysis, and of those laborious habits of thought necessary to arrive at conclusions, which led them more readily to adopt conclusions formed for them, when these bore the characters of truth recognizable in their eyes; and oriental society is not split into a number of factions, with opposite opinions and interests. The confidence of one man thus gained, implies the confidence of the million. There is a difference of creeds and races, but no difference of opinion. The unity of sentiments and principles is at once satisfactorily established by the fact, that the author of "Turkey and its Resources," while enjoying the confidence of the Turks, enjoyed equally that of the tributaries and rayahs.

The Turkish government had asked for en-

couragement from Europe by means of its official organ. "When the West confers on the East the benefit of enlightenment, may it also add that of opinion!" On the publication of this work, the *Moniteur Ottoman* sees its aspirations realized. Reviewing "Turkey and its Resources," and putting the seal of its sanction on those principles as the authentic elements of Turkish institutions, as the directing spirit of future reforms, it prognosticates that the work would also effect a change in the sentiments of the East and West towards each other; and time is beginning to show the truth of the prophecy.

"A fact occurs to-day, which has occurred once before in the history of Europe. The fact is, a violent animosity against Mohammedans, changing suddenly into contrary sentiments, and seeking, with all the good faith of real regret, to discover its errors.

"The early times of the crusades, that long *cauchemar* of the Christians, was a period of bitter hatred, of infuriated passions, rejecting all inquiry and exercising a despotical action over the masses of men that passed over to Asia. To hate and to fight, such was the only thought of the crusaders, during the eleventh century. But in the succeeding, opinion changes. The struggle between two systems, religious and social, loses its character of blind fury. It continues because begun; but the spirit of inquiry had taken the place of passion; fanatical prejudices are effaced. The crusaders study the character and habits of their enemies; sympathies arise; and, from this moment, com-

mences that movement of civilization, which was the final result of that vast irruption of the West on the East.

"The crusade of civilization of the nineteenth century commenced precisely as the religious crusade of the eleventh—in prejudice, blind hatred, and condemnation, without reason. It finishes, like that of the thirteenth, in inquiry, sympathy, and justice. Ten years have sufficed to operate this reaction, which, in another age, required two centuries. The diffusion of knowledge, facility of communication, and the immense power of the press, explain the difference. Thanks to those whose high intelligence raises them above the prejudices of their day, to whose investigations we owe this return to impartiality, fraternity; this return to the true spirit of civilization. Mr. Urquhart has caused his cotemporaries to make an immense stride in the path of honour, of social science, and of humanity. His laborious researches have thrown a new light on the question, so obscure before, of the institutions of the Ottoman empire, of the reason of its decay, and of the means of its regeneration."

After opening up the elements of the administration of Turkey, the author turns round to the political question, for it is impossible not to attribute the Pamphlet that appeared at the close of last year, under the title of "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," to the same master-mind that created order where all before seemed confusion; that re-

duced to principle what appeared only "jarring elements;" that, after having worked through the minute details of local administration, finance, and commercial intercourse, rose to all the imposing truths of political economy, social science, and moral philosophy. In both publications we find the same observation and appreciation of minute detail—the same searching analysis of facts—the same facility of combination, and what is still more striking, the same tracing of great and complicated effects to simple causes. So evident appears to us the connection between the discovery of the cause of resistance on the part of Turkey to Russia, and an understanding of the means that Russia takes to overcome that resistance—of the necessity of those immense exertions she makes, both in the East and West, and of the simple means by which Russian progress may now be arrested—that we hesitate not to say, that if the author had not written on the Institutions of Turkey, his *exposé* of Russian policy would never have appeared. We refer not to that pamphlet for the purpose of pointing out its merits or supporting its positions. We merely point out the intimate connection between the administration of Turkey, and the policy of Europe. The effect of this publication, on opinion, in England, is, perhaps, unparalleled; the question interests now, because it has been rendered intelligible.

But its action on the mind of the Turk is not so well known, and yet more remarkable. It has attracted the attention of the Turkish government,

and has been translated into Turkish, by order of the government. Turkey had been calumniated by Europe; from Europe she had learned that she did possess elements within herself of regeneration. By the errors of the European cabinets, particularly that of England, she had been prostrated; from England, again proceed a dissection of these errors; an exposition of the means by which Russia was working her destruction; of the means of rectifying these errors. It is shown that, whilst she depended on England, England knew and felt the necessity of her existence. Thus, while the consideration of her dependence on foreign interference humbled her and rendered her docile, she rose in her own estimation, from feeling that her existence was necessary to the tranquillity of Europe.

It is wonderful to see a great nation perishing through ignorance of its own means of existence, abandoned and wounded by other powers through the same ignorance; one able power profiting doubly by this ignorance, to cause this nation to destroy itself, and to cause others to destroy it; and, by such means, proceeding uncontrolled to the erection of one universal dominion on the ruins of all existing powers; and to discover that it is owing, probably, to some trifling accidents of every-day occurrence, which led to the observation, establishment, and combination of these simple truths in the mind of one individual, that the means are pointed out of blasting the gigantic schemes of such insatiable ambition.

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THE DIPLOMACY OF RUSSIA.

Russia has had her genius powerfully and irretrievably bent on acquisition, and on the means of acquiring and retaining by circumstances in her own state, hitherto unparalleled in the history of nations. Her own original population is bound by the threefold ties of a common faith, language, and race. This population is attached and devoted to their Emperor—to their Church, of which, again, the Emperor is the head—to their race, of which the Emperor is the Chief. Such a concentration of power, in the hands of a single individual, never has existed before: it is not the result of a sudden explosion of national feeling—it is not the impulse of conquest, the thirst of plunder, or the energy of hatred, that for a time confers unlimited sway on him whose talents can command the obedience which is a condition of success. The submission of the Sclavonic millions lies in themselves; and their Emperor is not less necessary to them, than they are to their Emperor. This concentration of power is therefore permanent, without re-action or complication. It has increased with the success of the

projects which its possession of necessity engenders. As the power of Russia has grown, the individuality of its subjects has disappeared; so that while the other states of the world, increasing in wealth, commerce and knowledge, have gradually seen disturbed, weakened, or dissolved, the bonds of general government, and consequently of external political power, Russia has shewn a progress the very reverse. While her wealth, revenue, territory, and population, have gone on making gigantic strides, the whole of these augmented means have been directed to external politics. Her energies and her thoughts, not exerted in the maintenance of authority at home, have been cast abroad, so as to put at her disposal political authority, far beyond even her vast material means, to be used for ends to which no individual system or government can ever prove indifferent;—the increase of power and influence, by interference in the affairs of others.

From these causes, and these facilities, have sprung that intelligence in the diplomacy of Russia, by means of which she has profited by every event and every change in Europe, for one hundred and fifty years; by which she has pursued a march steady, and invariable in advance, by which she has moderated the ardour of her soldiery in success, maintained her courage, and pursued her ends under momentary reverses, by which she has rendered her military and diplomatic action, in the remotest

countries, at the most distant periods, subservient to the same ends.

Russia, though emphatically a military power, owes few of her successes to conquest. It is a remarkable fact, that although, with the exception of Napoleon himself, Russia has effected more conquests than all the European states together in modern times, yet her aggressions never have produced a coalition against her; nay, further, that her acquisitions have been made by treaty, and her progress effected under the sanction of peace. When she has had to have recourse to military means as an absolute necessity, her victims have been left without sympathy or support, or she has been assisted by those most interested in defending them.

The cause of this superiority of the diplomacy of Russia, which we have already hinted at, is, that interference abroad, and conquest, are the only subjects that can occupy the attention of a Russian government. No dangers, no complications, no struggles, no pressure of internal business, occupy it at home; consequently it has the whole of its own undivided energy, the whole undivided energy of an immense population, to bring to bear on the feeble and anarchical governments of Asia—on the busied and dissected, and warring federation of Europe. There is no neighbouring State that can present a barrier to her. To the east and west, the state of things is such as to force her to interfere if

she were not so inclined; and her means are such as to render that interference effective whenever judiciously attempted. Besides this, two narrow channels, formerly at a great distance from her own territory, command the entrance of every river, port, coast, and arsenal which she possesses. She is thus placed in a state of dependence on foreign policy, that must excite her profoundest meditation of every hour—that must be ever and practically present to the minds of all men. Her commerce, her internal development, her naval armaments, the outlet of her superfluities, the inlet of her riches, or of the necessaries which the chances of the seasons, or the accidents of war, may render indispensable, are all at the disposal of the guns of the Dardanelles and the Sound, and consequently at the mercy of any political combination by which the Governments possessing these important straits may be put in opposition to her. It is necessary to enter into the position of Russia, to know what a Russian knows—to feel what a Russian feels, before we can comprehend the meaning of the expression, "foreign influence;" before, in fact, we can understand the geography of Europe. Any Russian corporal, if he were ambassador at Constantinople, though he might not fulfil with equal dexterity its instructions, would understand as well as Boutinieff the intentions of his court. The very insecurity of the position of Russia—her very dependence on the political combination of Europe, have forced on

her the necessity of exertion and combination to guard herself against the dangers that threatened and still threaten, at every hour, her existence; and in this attempt she, too, has discovered that knowledge is power, and has found in the intelligence resulting from this necessity, the means of solving every point of discussion between herself and Europe by a threat of war, which she safely hazards on the general ignorance of her position.

The first stage in Russia's designs has been to secure the free passage of these straits. Next, to weaken the possessing powers, and so to arrange the combinations of Europe, that they should be subservient to her. Lastly, these being obtained, she must look to absolute possession, which instantaneously alters her whole internal existence. We allude, of course, more particularly to the southern outlet, the possession of which multiplies the internal strength of Russia without reference to the acquisition of the richest empire, of the most important position on the face of the earth, and of rendering available the military and financial resources hitherto expended in observing large and extensive acquisitions which henceforward will be invulnerable and inaccessible, and unapproachable.

This diplomatic intelligence, once called into existence, and exerting itself for the furtherance of its national objects, has not only not found an opposing organization to represent and support

opposite interests, but has found auxiliaries in the warring principles of Europe. The tendency of European masses in all countries is to encroach on, and to restrict, the powers of the executive. Russia, the type and personification of the executive supremacy, obtains, therefore, from all governments, avowedly or unconsciously, favour, consideration, and respect, and acquires over them various degrees of authority and influence. It is but a narrow view of the question to reckon her influence as extending merely to the advocates of those principles and interests which have been denominated legitimate. The whole of the directing portion of European intelligence is thus rendered subservient to her in a twofold manner; politically, because they are engaged in a struggle from which she is free; morally, because they look to her as a model, and, if need be, as support. Hence the amazing prostration of mind and facility of delusion, to which Russia owes the astounding fact, that her acquisitions have been made in peace, and that her progress and her projects have never called into existence a combination against her. And then there is ignorance of her designs, and further ignorance of the general and extensive facts, the knowledge of which is necessary to the comprehension, discussion, or admission of these designs. There is with her a strong and powerful impulse of movement, which can only be met on equal terms by some feeling equally strong. Then her progress is gradual—one step is

assured before a second is made—each, in turn, becomes fact—men become familiarised to it—the progression is forgotten, the result not thought of, or if the individual act does create alarm, that alarm is subsequent to the perpetration. How can that be undone? Then the absence of plan, knowledge, appropriate agency and concert, renders it impossible to prevent, to repair, or oppose. Hence the slightest opposition to Russia is associated with the idea of war, and therefore, every idea of opposition is abandoned.

The point where all these views and this agency meet, is the council chamber of that power, which has been hitherto, we may say, the only enemy of Russia; possessing that which she wishes to acquire—for the prostration of which all her diplomatic command of Europe is useful, and all her material means of aggression have been created. That State has, by recent changes, been converted into a pure despotism; the authority of the chief has been left without any balance whatever, and while he has acquired this new power at home, the Sultan and his counsellors have practically found, when they have attempted opposition to Russia, the whole of Europe leagued against them. Tortuous and inextricable complications, through every winding of which the directing finger of Russia may be traced, have reduced the Sultan to that state, where all powerful in his internal administration—all dependent in his external position, he becomes the most efficacious in-

strument of disorganization imaginable, in the hands of a power who has occupied, no less by our fault than by her own dexterity, every avenue through which information or encouragement could reach her mystified protegee.

It is on such timorous and distracted combinations of European diplomacy and Turkish policy that Russia brings to bear the full intelligence, activity, and impulse of her conquering mind; and while each state reasons on its separate interests, consults momentary impulses, and revolves in its own circle—she is every where—her objects the same to-day as a hundred years ago. Her agency has no weakness, and her plans no interruption. So that while each anticipated advance has been believed impossible, because its success would raise a European opposition, not only has such combination not been formed, but she has obtained from those very States from which resistance was anticipated, "fleets and armies, and all the weight of their moral support, for the furtherance of her designs." *

But the object is not confined to the Cabinet; it extends to the army, and to the whole population; one object throwing all others into the shade—one enthusiastic feeling, absorbing all others, animates the whole, gives it unity of purpose and will, and entire submission to the leaders of this mighty and systematic movement, that is to endow the fortunes

* "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," *p.* 7.

of Russia with the richest provinces of the globe, and to raise up its power on the ruins of those States, and that civilization that has bestowed on them so long the harsh and irritating epithet of barbarian; not the less irritating because deserved, and rather a word of fear to Europe than of reproach to Russia.*

This national feeling is permanently acted on by climate; that climate which repels invasion propels to conquest. In every land to which the Russian is

* Russia makes equally good use of our expressions as of our acts. The following extract from the *Gazette de Moscow*, 27th December, 1832, will show that she has a national sensitiveness to work on, and no doubt she does so with effect.

"La nation Russe est indigée, de la part secrète que l'Angleterre, ou plutôt son perfide ministère, a prise aux troubles de la Pologne, mais nous aurons notre tour. Nous lui ôterons son masque, et nous apprendrons au monde, *comment, on constrait véritablement un peuple à l'esclavage*. Vous jugerez bientôt si Ponsonby a dit vrai en répétant, à qui voulait l'entendre; 'La Russie n'est plus rien, et la Pologne l'empêchera dorénavent d'intervenir dans les affaires de l'Europe, c'est un gouvernement Asiatique,' &c. Comment cet Albion endettée, et maintenant imbue des plus perfides principes, osc-t-elle reveiller l'ours, (ainsi qu'elle nous nomme) qui faillit dévorer Napoléon, avec la première armée qui fut jamais sur son territoire, et alla ensuite se venger de cette témerité, à Paris même? Non; il faut que son tour vienne, et dans quelque tems nous ne devons plus faire de traité, avec ce peuple que à Calcutta, sa fausse politique a joué son reste, qu'elle aille s'allier aux nègres d'Afrique, à qui elle veut tant de bien, et pour lesquels l'Europe est sa dupe. Nous barbares et esclaves comme ses feuilles nous nomment, nous lu donnerons une leçon, en attendant, qu'ils continuent C'EST CE QUE NOUS VOULONS."

led, he enjoys comforts, luxuries, authority, and indulgences, far different from any thing he can ever hope for at home.* The government is oppressive even to those who fulfil its most responsible functions; the tendency of all men is, therefore, to seek distinction at a distance from its repressive shade.† The whole system is military; as well might the habitual drunkard be expected not to long for strong drink, as a whole nation, educated and habituated to military service, be expected not to long for conquest. All necessities, all inducements, all motives, all feelings, commercial, political, military, and physical, combine to push the masses of the north on the south and west, even as the waters of her streams to their outlets the Sound and the Dardanelles. These outlets will be Russia's, unless some bolder arm and abler head interpose; but still that progress will not be a displacement of her strength; even this poor consolation is not reserved for us. Her power will flow down and overwhelm the South, but its sources will remain in the cold, inaccessible, uncontaminated North. Russia's serf

* The Government has seized, with its ordinary ability, this important motive; the navies and armies of Russia receive four times the regular pay the moment they have quitted the Russian frontier; but not to excite the alarm, she knows so well to soothe, her troops are only paid in silver instead of paper roubles.

† Even Paskevitch, in the midst of his splendid successes in Persia, carried about with him, as an invaluable and ennobling document, his *freedom* of the town of Perth in Scotland. During the war, his nails and hair remained uncut, in obedience to a vow!

has all the inducements to conquest of the ancient Scythian; her generals all the power of modern tactics to direct the impulse; her government, the science derived from the experience of the most opposite systems, the results of which she has combined so as—to menace and conciliate—to extend and to centralise.

The action of Russia on Turkey—the treaty of Adrianople, of Unkiar Skelessi—the convention of St. Petersburgh, have been so completely laid bare in "*England, France, Russia, and Turkey*," that we need offer no remark on the subject; no attempt has been made to controvert any of its positions; no doubt seems even to remain as to their truth. That essay is too succinct to admit of useful citation; it cannot be analyzed, because it is itself a condensed analysis of an overwhelming subject. We must content ourselves with urging it on our readers' attention, and presupposing in them acquaintance with its revelations and arguments, we shall proceed to point out what appear to us the principal, though hitherto unobserved, causes of the unity and disposability of Russian power—the reasons that lead us to consider that power permanent, and its progress, unless arrested, certain; and we shall then endeavour to point out the advantages it has gained, especially since the last settlement of Europe. But we do so with the deep conviction of the general insufficiency of the information we possess in common with those who have alreadv attempted to treat

this question. All we can hope to do is to excite, certainly not to satisfy inquiry.

The vast extent of European Russia (for her Asiatic possessions are scarcely worth considering,*) is composed of a dead level. There are, therefore, no ineffaceable and distinctive lines to separate race from race—to harden men, by continual and local struggles—to combine men, by the various motives and necessities arising out of relative weakness, strength, riches, and poverty. There is, consequently, no spirit of mountain independence; there are no clans—there are no chieftains—there are no castles. Levels are the cradles of independence, while the population thinly scattered over them, is pastoral and nomade; but when the population becomes fixed to the soil, it sinks into a state of serfage, and ceases to resist the authority that may be placed over it; yet if that authority is intelligent, can be made as efficient for the purposes of political power and foreign conquest as the warlike mountaineer, or the sturdy republican. Two millions and a half of Egyptians have been more easily subdued than a tribe of Bedouins; yet 20,000 of these Egyptians, imperfectly disciplined,

* Except in as far as they prove that extent of dominion is no cause of weakness, more than increase of capital is a cause of bankruptcy. This is a mere practical question. This large tract of the earth is governed with more strictness and watchfulness, than the little despotic handkerchief Modena. Along the vast frontier of China, the grass is every morning examined for the trace of footsteps.

have shaken the Turkish dominions. Why does the Bedouin wander? Precisely because his independence is lost when he settles: the difference between Fellah and Bedouin, is, not religion, race, climate, political condition, but that of being nomade, or fixed. Egypt, moreover, is placed in subjection, by its dependence for food on the Nile, so that, as in the northern levels of Russia, the government has complete command over every man's existence. But the degrees of this submissiveness, depend, in a great measure, on the extent of the plains, and on the density of the population. The plains of Russia, which nourish her troops, may be stated at 500,000 square miles,* and the population is increasing† more rapidly than in any State of Eu-

* A circle, the diameter of which is 1500 miles, may be drawn round Moscow as a centre, without touching or including a mountain.

† At p. 47 we have given an estimate of the present population of Russia, but the Caucasian tribes are, we conceive, greatly underrated. The privileged orders are—

		Totals.
Nobility (males only)	225,000	450,000
Clergy		243,000
Officers and Servants in Civil Departments		750,000
Emancipated Peasantry (males only)	550,000	1,100,000
Free-born Peasantry (males only)	97,000	194,000
		2,737,000

Thus, only about six per cent. of the population is not in a state of serfage; only one-fifth per cent. can read—that is, one in five hundred can expound to the rest, from the Psalters distributed in every parish, the spiritual and temporal authority of the Autocrat.

rope. Not less important is the severity of the climate. During six months of the year the soil is without vegetation, the peasant is confined to his hut, and depends for his own existence, and that of his cattle, on the accumulation of the previous season. Can men, under such circumstances, combine against the authority which, by the burning of a few barns and stacks of fodder, can leave a population for months in a state of utter destitution? The idea of resistance to any mandate becomes a chimera, and in time the possessor of such dreadful means of retribution, becomes elevated in the prejudices of the ignorant mind into a being superhuman, whose will is associated with the idea of the divinity, and whose decrees it becomes religion to obey.

A national character and national feelings, once generated, become themselves causes; they become elements of power, combining with, though distinct from, the motives that called them into existence; submissiveness and serfage have become the distinctive features of all the tribes descending from the Sclavonic stock; devotion to the Russian Autocrat, as chief of their faith and race, is more or less the creed of the largest family of nations in the world, and extends to climes, and regions, and circumstances, wholly uninfluenced by the causes that have impressed upon all their original type, and which continue to act on the great mass with daily increasing effect.

The principal strength of Russia is at present composed of thirty-four millions of Muscovites, who have no will, save that of their Emperor; who have no balancing power, no protecting statutes, no property; who are attached to the soil, or transportable, at his pleasure, to the remotest part of the empire; not excited by the hope of advancement, not even spurred by the obligation of providing for their own necessities; resigned to whatever fate awaits them; not inquiring into it. The indolent, the untractable, the turbulent spirits, if such are found, are draughted into the army, and the mass remains, as before, with its passive and active obedience, its strong muscle and pliant will.

Institutions, personal character, political accident, and religion, may separately and disjointedly produce devotedness, on the part of a people to its leader, its prophet, or its government. But here all possible causes coincide to produce that devotedness which consequently exists in a degree, and in an extent unparalleled. Then are the elements of the power of Russia fixed and increasing, because dependent on immutable causes, faith, ignorance, climate, geographical structure, and extent.

This is the mighty nucleus round which her conquests have been and are to be agglomerated; her future acquisitions are to furnish the resources which are to equip and pay the number of men drawn from this uncontaminated nursery, that are to render these conquests durable, and to depress

the populations she acquires down to her own level or below it.*

Above this mass of serfs there is no middle class. The Russian merchant when, as an exception, he does emerge from serfage, rises in the second generation to the class of noble, or sinks again into his original state. The progress of Russia in manufactures has produced no independent class of artisans; her principal factories are the property of the crown, and the workmen the most wretched of the serfs.

The soldier propagates no free race; he is himself made free, and therefore loses all interest in his brethren; but his children born before enrolment remain serfs, and subsequent marriages remain unfruitful, from the dissolute morals of a Russian barracks. The military colonies are specific nurseries of soldiers intended to reproduce and support the army, without being a drain on the general population (deteriorated by the continual abstrac-

* According to the date of the subjugation of each province may its degradation be estimated. This is most striking in Finland, where a streamlet divides the yet hale, holding property, sturdy peasant, in the recently acquired district, from the downcast unresisting serf of the district, acquired under Peter. In the southern provinces, in the Crimea, to the East, even in Kamskatka, the same effect is constant and uniform. A merchant intimately acquainted with every portion of Russia, made this remark, "The process of degradation is so regular, and so similar, at the most remote points, that it resembles the results produced by the action of a machine."

tion of the finest men), and at little or no charge to the state.

The regiments stationed on certain frontiers, where a strong and warlike population, and an exhausting climate, oppose her progress, *must* be married. Lands are allotted them, they then form a military settlement, like those of ancient Rome, opposed in interests and in feelings to the natives, and inured to the climate.

The nobles have in Russia, in direct contradiction of all European fact and history, been made the means of subduing the peasant to the crown. The noble's right of property in the peasant was not, as in our feudal states, extorted by the power of the Baron, but conferred by the favour of the Autocrat. The slavery of the Russian is of very recent date, and those sovereigns who are illustrated as the founders, or the consolidators of the power of Russia, are precisely those who have introduced those changes into the condition of the millions inhabiting those vast regions; evidently shewing that the progressive power of Russia has not depended on the progress of her intellect and institutions, but on the concentration, in the hands of the chief, not only of the powers of the state, but of the profits of all the individuals who compose it.

The Russian is superstitious, but the Church is no political body, as in the rest of Europe; the crosier no balance to the sceptre:—the superstition

of the Russian centres in his Emperor. Peter the Great took from the clergy the tenths conferred on it by Vladimir; Catharine appropriated to the state its remaining possessions, assigning scanty pensions in lieu; and Paul undertook to ennoble its dignitaries in the eyes of its votaries, by decorating them with the insignia of military rank.*

What can Russia want but money? Her conquests have as yet furnished none: she is therefore making efforts—laying out capital with the view of future returns. The Ukraine, Bessarabia, the Crimea, the plains of Mozdoc, Astrachan, Kizlar, the nominal possession of the Caucasus, the occupation of the coasts of Abazia and Circassia, the possession of the redundant Georgia, Mingrelia, Imirettia, of Erivan, and Carabaugh, are yearly drains on her treasury to an enormous amount, without in themselves the possibility of any return: but this expense is the expense of the bridge that is to carry her to the reality of her golden dreams,—the rich plains, the docile, yet warlike population, the timber-bearing coasts, the sailor-nourishing islands of Anatolia, Roumelia, Iran, and the Archipelago.

* "A bishop is little thought of *now*, unless decorated with the star and ribbon of some order of knighthood, which are worn by him when he officiates, above his pontifical robes, and add not a little to his importance in the eyes of the multitude. The lower degrees of the same order are bestowed upon the more distinguished of the secular clergy."—PINKERTON'S *Russia*, *p.* 247.

Why, it may be asked, has it not overwhelmed Europe again.* It is because its impulses are become designs ; because its power, increased as it is, is unequal to its objects. Asia and Europe swarms at once, not to overrun, but to incorporate. It has ceased to be a migrating horde ; it has become a system, with spreading branches, but with a deep root. It awaits the fitting moment for accomplishing its ends, with as much patience as it shows perseverance and ability in pursuing them.

But the process of incorporation is progressive and patient. Hitherto she has betrayed no hurry ; yet her progress has been rapid, beyond all parallel ; her's is not the sudden conquests of a gifted leader, but the regular advance of a system. The incorporation of a vast empire, which she is now compassing, is a work of infinite labour ; and, until completed, she dares not awaken Europe from its slumbers. She must not threaten and alarm ; she must soothe and undermine ; she does not excite combinations against her ; she sows dissensions before her ; the chains she carries do not clank ; her footsteps have no echoes ; her shadow blights where her hand cannot yet reach ; and when she comes, it is to abide.

It is singular to observe the effect a close observation of Russia has on different minds. Some,

* It must be however observed, that the Russian territory in Europe, half a century ago, amounted to a quarter of Europe ; it now amounts to the *half of Europe*.

disgusted with the barbarism of her people, treat her with contempt; some, astonished at the civilization of her government, hail her progress as the triumph of all that is most estimable and most to be desired in the destinies of man; some look exclusively on her military development, and consider her irresistible; some to her financial poverty, and deem her powerless. Not the least interesting is the religious alarm of the pious missionary, who looks on his silent labours as the only means of converting this tremendous power into an instrument of benevolence and charity, instead of the engine of wrath and desolation it portends to be.*

Russia's first acquisition of a settlement in the Black Sea, inspired the whole of Europe, and this country in particular, with deep and universal apprehension. The European public felt that that power could not go on increasing and extending

* "Russia has not yet reached the maturity of her strength: remain stationary she cannot: and who is able to predict her future greatness, or to tell how far her limits may yet extend? How desirable is it, therefore, that education and the pure principles of the Gospel should extend their influence among the nations of that mighty empire; so that this colossal power, raised up by the Almighty in these latter days, to fulfil His inscrutable decrees—raised up from the descendants of those very tribes that once overturned the Roman empire in the meridian of its civilization, and which has now assumed such a commanding position on the frontiers of the nations of Europe and Asia—may become the minister of peace and happiness, and not of desolation and thraldom to the human race!"—PINKERTON'S *Russia, p.* 17.

without disturbing the order of things as at that time constituted. There were grounds of alarm, which, moreover, presented themselves in perspective, resulting from the special position of Russia and her neighbours. It was apprehended that she would render her influence paramount in the Baltic; that she would reduce to subserviency Sweden and Denmark; that she would absorb Poland; that she would obtain a preponderating influence in Germany; that her military establishment would grow rapidly, and endanger the peace of Europe; that she would become a maritime power; that she would overwhelm the resistance, and undermine the stability of her principal enemy, the Porte; enrich herself by her provinces; strengthen herself by her degradation; ultimately command, at once, politically and commercially, the Black Sea; and, by that command, be placed under the necessity, while she acquired the means, of occupying the Dardanelles.

The apprehensions of that day are the facts of this;—and having to submit to these facts, we try to reconcile ourselves to them; we are pleased to say that Russia is a government so contemptible in resources as to give no just cause for alarm; that the extension of her dominion would be beneficial to the commerce of this country; that the common jealousy of the Continental Powers would effectually arrest that progress, if it were dangerous; that the exten-

sion of her limits would diminish her strength; that new acquisitions would lead to dismemberment; or that the *then* ultimate object of her supposed designs—the possession of Constantinople—would break up the empire.

These fallacies have strangely grown up with the very facts that demonstrate their hollowness, and confusion and indifference have succeeded to apprehensions and alarms, in proportion as these alarms have been verified, as the worst effects of the things apprehended have been inflicted on Europe, as the danger of the ultimate consummation has been brought more near.

But while some think the power of Russia too contemptible to require opposition, there are others whose ill-instructed apprehensions deem Russia too powerful to be resisted. These extreme opinions testify the ignorance that obscures alike the minds of men and the policy of cabinets. Both ideas have some degree of truth. Russia is yet so weak, that she may easily, very easily, be curbed; but will become, if not curbed, too powerful to be opposed.

But the weakness of Russia is relative, not positive; relative to her gigantic projects, which render her very existence precarious until they are realised: so that the evidences of weakness, so consolatory to us, are, in reality, proofs that the results formerly anticipated, and which now have been realised, are applied by her to bring about other results, as yet veiled from us.

The financial poverty of Russia is quoted, to prove the unfoundedness of all apprehension from her progress. Why does Russia suffer from her financial difficulties? Because she expends the greater portion of her revenue in the preparation of aggressive means; an enormous military establishment, for which no home necessity exists; the construction of navies unintelligible, if her projects are not admitted; the construction of lines of defence and fortresses, in the face of nations that never can give her cause of alarm; the expenditure of incredible sums, for the purpose of corruption, for obtaining an influence in foreign Courts, also unintelligible, if her real motives are denied; the expense entailed by her systematic action on Turkey, and that so lavishly expended for forty years, in the reduction of the Caucasus, which never can make any return in itself.*

* It is, of course, impossible to pierce the veil of mystery with which Russia covers all such transactions; yet, many things may be known, although not capable of proof. Diplomacy, espionage, subsidies for various party purposes, to exasperate the hate of faction, or to fan the flame of civil war in the various countries of Europe, must draw from her immense sums. The Chancellery at Constantinople is like a money change. It has been seen ancle deep with coin. Boutinieff, within three weeks of his arrival, drew bills on Vienna, &c. for 40,000*l.*; yet of the 200,000*l.* indemnity paid over by the Porte some months before, none had been remitted to St. Petersburgh.—The half of the revenue of Russia must suffice for all internal and peaceable ends—the other half may fairly be considered as devoted to the purposes of aggrandisement.

These are the causes of Russia's financial embarrassments. It is only the presumption of ignorance that can console itself with the existence of such embarrassments. Whoever has had the opportunity of studying this subject, equally vast and obscure, equally important and neglected, has learnt to appreciate better the judgment and information of Russia, and the comprehensive accuracy of her calculations; and even if he could not exactly see the objects she has in view, he would say, if Russia makes such sacrifices, and continues those sacrifices with so much perseverance and unity of purpose, it is neither rashly nor unadvisedly that she does so. Some immense compensation must be at hand. Either some new event is approaching, or those in progress offer to her eyes results which have not been appreciated by those who have not the same means of judging.

The progress of Russia has thus been succinctly traced by Sir R. Wilson, in 1817:—

"In the years between 1701 and 1711, Peter was contending, with various success, against the Swedes, Turks, and Poles, for an advance of his European territory.

"In 1713, having conquered Riga and Livonia, he built St. Petersburgh. In 1714, he developed his naval projects, which have been suspended, but never abandoned, by his successors.

"In 1721, he declared himself Emperor of all the Russias.

"From 1729 to 1762, although Russia, under *six* sovereigns, some of whose reigns were short and tragical, proceeded in the attainment of internal strength, solidity, and trade; although in the reign of Elizabeth she had connected herself with England, and acquired military character, still she had not taken her station as a great European power.

"When Catherine the Second mounted the throne, only twenty-two millions of subjects paid her homage. During the thirty-three years of her reign, the number was augmented to nearly thirty-six millions, by acquisition, and natural increase of population. The twelve millions acquired, Catherine subjected to the military conscription, and Europe has seen soldiers, from all of them, twice enter the capital of France!

"In this reign of naval and military exertion, territorial aggrandizement and political consequence made advances equally rapid on every side.

"Paul extended the military force, and the battles of Novi and the Trebia added to the laurels of Russia.

"Alexander commenced his reign in 1800, over thirty-six millions of people, but—

"The guns of Sweden could be heard at St. Petersburgh; the Poles of Warsaw were suspicious neighbours; the Poles of Russia doubtful friends. The Turks of Asia were still inclined to struggle

for the recovery of the Crimea, from which they were not a stone's throw. The Turks in Europe still occupied Bessarabia, and held the Russians in check on the Dniester; Persia presented a salient and *offensive* frontier; Denmark and Sweden had considerable navies; Aland covered the coast of Sweden from insult or invasion; and Sweabourg commanded the navigation of the mouth of the gulf of Finland.

"The finances were deranged, &c." After a summary of the ameliorations, conquests, and progress, he thus continues:—"At this day, (1817,) not less than forty-two millions, by increase and conquest, acknowledge his authority, chiefly Europeans; situated in territories, whose military and political value to Russia does not merely consist in an augmentation of her revenue and population, but in contracting her line of defence, and at the same time affording her powers of advance, to positions that must, if properly occupied, secure the *command* of Europe and Asia."*

In the great European struggle, Russia observed from a distance, and rejoiced in the irruption of the Gallic volcano; she artfully nourished the flame whenever it appeared to sink—counsel, negotiation, and bodies of troops, were employed in turn; but while every European state risked its

* Sketch of Russia, in 1817, pp. 116—128.

political existence in each combination, Russia stood aloof and indifferent; compromising no national interest; endangering no principle; *she risked just the number of men that crossed her frontier, and no more.* Any permanent settlement was thus rendered impossible; while one government, inaccessible, possessed such aggressive and convulsing power, and while *the policy of another was guided by a spirit alive to the necessity of opposing a barrier to such aggression.* Napoleon, therefore, saw no other alternative than a deadly blow at the very heart of the northern colossus. The European struggle resolved itself, in fine, into a contest between France and Russia; Russia being advanced to this high standing by the previous exhaustion of Europe, and by the maritime and financial support of England. The victory remained to Russia —that victory was solemnized and recorded in the Treaty of Vienna.

The three states bordering the Baltic, the empire encircling the Black Sea, and possessing the Dardanelles, linked together by intermediate Poland, hitherto formed a barrier extensive and powerful to the progress of Russia. The treaty of Vienna records the dismemberment of Denmark, the acquisition of Poland, and leaves, distinct from all European interests, the Turkish question to be disposed of by Russia at her own convenient time, and no longer to be an object of solicitude and protection to the other powers.

This is not all: Prussia is raised by her from the dust to the station of a first-rate power, by the dismemberment of Saxony; so that Russia possesses two voices in the council of five, and a strong military out-lyer, which she can make as subservient as if nominally her own; and while she obtains to this settlement the adhesion of the diplomatic synod, who never could have admitted the nominal extension of Russia to the same degree, she preserved the *compactness* of her own frontiers, the *integrity* of her own principles, and may sacrifice Prussia without risk or discredit.

The discernment of the representative of humbled France, the alarms of Prince Metternich, the debates in the House of Commons, and the prophetic remonstrances of the lesser German States, aroused for a moment a spirit of resistance in England, France, and Austria; but the final adjustment settled down to its natural basis. Russia, in fact, triumphed over France, and she insisted on the consequences. The Prussian troops in occupation of Saxony, and 200,000 Russians on the Vistula, were arguments too powerful for the sophistry of the Congress, especially when Alexander spoke of the 1,000,000 of bayonets entrusted to him by Providence, and Constantine appealed to the patriotism of 8,000,000 of Poles to support their *Russian Nationality. Since that period peace has existed in Europe, because no power has been alive to the necessity of opposing a barrier to her aggression.*

During this peace, Russia has been permitted to take her own time, and to concentrate all her forces, for the prosecution of three wars. She has beaten the troops of Persia, had it in her power to enter her capital, imposed a heavy debt upon her, and secured a new and aggressive frontier. She has effaced every trace of Polish nationality, and owes to the direct diplomatic agency of England the prevention of a simultaneous irruption from Persia, which must, of necessity, have spread to Turkey; France could not then have remained neuter; the consequences need not be traced.

Turkey, excluded from the "reparatory stipulations" of the Congress of Vienna, is dismembered and convulsed by her direct influence in Greece, in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, then attacked in the midst of an internal revolution—attacked under the sanction of a "European cause," and with the arms of a *Christian* combination. Beaten in the north, a lever is then applied to the south; the beaten victim is *driven back* into its foe's protecting arms; the fact of protection is no sooner established, than the conditions on which it was accepted are cancelled, and the convention of St. Petersburgh was regarded by the other powers as an internal regulation of the Russian empire. It is needless to talk of the annihilation of its maritime force, of its fortresses mortgaged, of its frontiers occupied, of debt contracted, of obligations of protection imposed—every chance of collision has now vanished, and unless

the systematic progress of Russia be disturbed from without, the consummation may be considered complete, though an interval of material time may be requisite to accomplish the progression.

Still, that no misapprehension may exist as to the essential consideration that it is not, that it cannot be, by physical means, that Russia can obtain possession of Turkey, it is necessary to observe, that 40,000 men, moved by her during the winter against the Caucasus, have been repulsed and beaten on every point; an additional reason for her altering her plans, to adapt them to the new expectations that wonderfully favouring circumstances have offered to her, and for aiming, with the least possible delay, at the Dardanelles, which will render such contests superfluous, and prevent the possibility of the introduction into the Euxine of the British flag, which at once connects the power of England with the destinies of Turkey, unites the interests of Austria to those of England, and by preventing Russia's acquisition of that vast basin, establishes an impassable region between her and the south, across which no body of troops capable of making any impression can be transported by any means she can command. That region, thus rendered impervious to her, and placed under the control of England, would extend over land and water, from the mountains of Transylvania to the deserts of Khyva.

Perhaps the most remarkable, though hitherto

the least understood portion of the political history of Napoleon, has reference to the relations of Turkey and Russia; and as he said himself, his character will not be appreciated nor his policy comprehended until this question is understood. His reminiscences in his lonely retreat contain much that bears on this subject deserving of the most solemn attention, not only for the views themselves, but in consequence of the experience of the man that had handled and knew the practical strength and weakness of all the masses in Europe; also, in consequence of the revelations there given of the designs of the Russian Cabinet, if, indeed, such revelations are still necessary to establish a fact, which, however few may reflect on, no one will deny.

"Alexander's thoughts," says Napoleon, "are directed to the conquest of Turkey. We have had many discussions about it. At first, I was pleased with his proposals, because I thought it would enlighten the world to drive those brutes, the Turks, out of Europe. But when I reflected upon the consequences, and saw what a tremendous weight of power it would give to Russia, in consequence of the number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions, who would naturally join the Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as Alexander wanted to get Constantinople, which I would not allow, as it would have destroyed the equilibrium of power in Europe. I reflected that France would gain Egypt,

Syria, and the Islands, which would have been nothing in comparison to what Russia would have obtained. I considered that the barbarians of the north were already too powerful, and, probably, in the course of time, would overwhelm all Europe, as I now think they will. Austria already trembles; Russia and Prussia united, Austria falls, and England cannot prevent it. France, under the present family, is nothing; Austria can offer little resistance to the Russians, who are brave and potent. Russia is the more formidable, because she can never disarm; in Russia, once a soldier, always a soldier. Barbarians who, one may say, have no country, and to whom every country is better than the one that gave them birth."*

We quote this passage, less on account of the confirmation of some of our positions, by the reflections of this great man, than to point out that in his mind many erroneous ideas existed, which militated against the very conclusions at which he arrived; that he reasoned, in fact, on a portion only of the case, and on that portion, too, which, in the actual posture of affairs, appears the least important. The possession of Constantinople, in his eyes, was important to Russia, as giving her a command over continental Europe—without reference to the value acquired in the Turkish empire—without reference to the dominion acquired over

* O'Meara's "Napoleon in Exile," Vol. 1. p. 382.

Mahometan Asia—without reference to the contraction of her vulnerable and insecure frontiers—without reference to the acquisition (by Russia, *not* France) of Syria, Egypt, and the Islands.

The ex-Emperor thought the Turks brutes, and desired their expulsion from Europe, he therefore had not the remotest idea of the utility which Russia will draw from them;* he thought that France would obtain a compensation in Egypt, &c. a mere delusion, on which we need scarcely waste words,† although this delusion has betrayed the present Government of France into its anti-national and perilous position. He conceived France, under the elder branch, as useless in the political balance of Europe; yet Louis XVIII., immediately on his restoration, displayed a resolution to oppose the encroachments of Russia, and a deep conviction of his prostrate country's dignity, which offers an afflicting contrast with the views actually entertained across the channel.

Napoleon's estimate of the power which Russia will acquire by the possession of Constantinople, is therefore far, far below the mark; he had quite overlooked the maritime ascendancy she will attain in the Mediterranean; he had no conception of

* See "England, France, Russia, and Turkey;" and "Sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali Pasha," passim.

† See Valentini, for Paskevitch's opinion on the service rendered in the last campaign, against Turkey, *by the Mussulman regiments.*

her carrying into effect his own commercial combination against England. On the other hand, his anticipation of the impossibility of a European balance to her prejudice has been fully realized; the sword, it is true, has not yet been drawn, nor will it, while no opposition exists; she will first obtain possession of the Dardanelles, establish herself as a maritime power in the Mediterranean—the idea of dislodging her will then as soon vanish as that of restoring Poland when "order was restored at Warsaw." Then will she throw the torch of discord on the inflammable principles, and breathe the breath of agitation on the struggling interests and influences of Europe; the long-suspended cloud will fall on Germany and France, and she will interfere when both are exhausted.

Immediately on the fall of Constantinople, England will find that troops must be shipped for India.

Few persons are aware of the maritime force that will *instantaneously* be placed at the disposal of Russia, by the occupation of Constantinople. Russia, at the close of 1834, had fifty-two men-of-war in the Black Sea; of which sixteen were line-of-battle ships; twenty-five new vessels are in construction. She will find at Constantinople forty men-of-war, of which nine are line-of-battle and four three-deckers. The day after occupation, she will have at her disposal, in the Channel, ninety-two men-of-war, with a flotilla of small armed

craft, at least as numerous. Such is the activity that reigns in all the arsenals of the Black Sea, that in less than two years, one-half of the vessels commenced in autumn last, will be ready for sea. Thus, in a few months she will be able to muster one hundred sail, twenty-five being line-of-battle, within the impregnable Dardanelles. These immediately secure her acquisition, and give her time to organise it, having the seas of Marmora and the Euxine to exercise in; having unlimited supplies of all materials within herself, ready to her hand, and at a trifling cost. She has at present 30,000 men employed on board her vessels, or in her arsenals; she will obtain a certain number of seamen from the Black Sea, and from Constantinople itself; but her great resource will be the Greek sailors; the seamen of Hydra, Spezia, Psara, reduced by the peace, and the stagnation of Greek commerce, will flock by thousands, spurred not only by their necessities, but by a spirit of enthusiasm, to hail the symbols of the Greek church reared above the Crescent. A single mass, chaunted in Saint Sophia, will collect every Greek seaman from far and near. This is no dream of the imagination; these materials are not to be created—they do exist, ready to be employed, and available at a moment's warning. The slightest degree of energy, the commonest feeling of self-preservation, will, in a month's time, combine these elements for securing her conquest; with one squadron anchored

in the Golden Horn, and another under the castle of the Dardanelles, who, that knows any thing of the topography of Constantinople, of the spirit of eastern populations, will be hardy enough to talk even of resistance from within, or of attack from without.

If it be asked, whence the pecuniary means are to come, we answer, the expenditure will be insignificant. Such an acquisition would be cheaply bought at the expense of twenty campaigns; and the expenditure will, perhaps, not exceed the sum she lays out in a single year on the Caucasus. Is Russia unprepared for such a contingency? Besides, is it to be supposed that the treasury of the Seraglio is empty?—Will Constantinople be a less rich prize than Algiers? Are there not many means by which a conquering power can obtain money? Is it not clear, that she will be able to borrow hundreds of millions of piastres from the merchants of all classes, and from the Armenian bankers, who, if they do not lend with the zeal of enthusiasm, as many will, will contribute from other motives, which Russia knows how to inspire?—Will not, moreover, every place of 'Change in Europe offer her resources on such a contingency? While we affect to believe the occupation of Constantinople impossible, because of the expense it would entail upon her, she, better informed, knows, as who that has given the subject a moment's serious consideration does not, that, independently of

all political gains, she at once lays her hand on an enormous treasure, which in itself, if she acquired nothing else, might justfy all the expenditure she now incurs in furtherance of the scheme that is to give her possession of it.

If Russia had never thought on the subject before, from the moment that England made a naval demonstration at the entrance of the Dardanelles, the possession of these straits must have become to her a question of life and death. That this was the case, appears from the following extract from "Sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali Pasha:"—

"Up to the autumn of last year, Russia seems not to have dreamt of the possibility of being attacked in the Black Sea; she seems to have remained confident of the indifference of Europe, and of the sufficiency of the means she actually possessed for the realization of her designs. At that period, a new light seems to have broken upon her: she suddenly contracted for the construction of twenty-five line-of-battle ships, and thirty-five of smaller sizes, and commenced extensive works at Sevastopol, which had but the character of strength. These facts require no comment. These vessels must be designed to issue from the Straits she has ordered to be closed against us. These works of defence can be of service but to resist retaliation for what she is preparing to inflict. Circumstanced as Russia financially is, such an expenditure, at this moment, proves that no time is to be lost.

"In conjunction with these facts, we have others no less important. The treaty of the 8th of July, is now clearly established to be an offensive treaty against England, and an abrogation of the treaty between England and Turkey of 1809.

"During the last year, the influence of England at Constantinople has been maintained by the hope and belief that England would be forced to take steps to annul the treaty of the 8th of July—restrain Russia, and re-organize Turkey. This conviction was universal, because all these things appeared easy, connected, necessary, and inseparable from the evident interests of England; and, however England might have sacrificed Turkey before, it was now hoped that a new era in our policy had arrived. The Turks judge of the nation by its representative, and, at a moment when, under the ordinary routine, our diplomatic relations with Turkey would have been interrupted, and our representative must have retired, not only have those relations been kept up, but an influence obtained over the counsels of the Government, and over the minds of the Turks, unparalleled at any previous perod. This result, though brought about by the efforts of the distinguished nobleman, whose statesman-like views, political sagacity, and courtly manners, most particularly fit to represent England as she ought to be represented, among such a people as the Turks, is still contingent on the decision of England, to do that which is pointed out as her

part, by the hopes of all the countries that feel or fear the Russian power."*

We have left untouched the principal points of this question; indeed, we profess to treat but one; but having extended our observations thus far, we are induced to offer some practical conclusions, the more, as the space seems to us daily and visibly contracting, during which, the event we dread shall remain to be anticipated. When the period of prevention will be passed, the truth will be equally clear and useless.

We consider the preservation of Turkey, and the re-organization of that Empire, as the means of opening up its own immense territory and resources, as those of central Asia, to light and commerce. We consider the existence of Turkey as necessary to the existence of Persia, and to the security of India. We consider the principles of Turkey as necessary to give to England, to liberal

* There is no individual who has had the means of appreciating, on the spot, the feelings of the Servians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Lazes, Armenians (of Armenia), Circassians, Georgians, Bessarabians, Crimeans, and, generally, in a greater or less degree, according to circumstances, of the Turks and Persians, who will not bear testimony to the truth of this assertion;—that all these populations have their hopes and feelings so rivetted on England, that an intimation of her will would be received by them as an order, that it is in her power to combine all these by moral means alone, and that a practical or intelligible demonstration of her decision to resist the encroachments of Russia, would put it out of Russia's power to advance.

governments, and a free-trade, the weight *they actually possess* on the Continent of Europe. We consider the political regeneration of Turkey, in itself, one of the most extraordinary events in the history of nations, and look to the results, if fostered and encouraged, as one of the most extensive prospects of good ever opened to man. We consider the principles of its existence, now distorted and obscured, as likely to benefit other lands, and advance science; and finally, we consider Turkey, in balancing the power, in arresting the progress, in exhausting the resources of the Scythian organization, as the only bulwark of Europe against Muscovy, of civilization against barbarism.

We consequently infer, that Turkey is to be supported by every means and every effort, at any cost and at any risk.

We feel too strong in our position to admit of any palliation of these conclusions in favour of timid reasoners; but when this alternative is looked boldly in the face, and only then would we say, that though Turkey ought to be supported at any risk, that she can be supported without the slightest risk;—that though the further extension of the power of Russia must be prevented, whatever the means, whatever the sacrifice;—that that extension can be prevented without any sacrifice whatever, and by means of the preservation of Turkey, which we should consider the first object of our foreign policy, even if it were not Russia that was to make the acquisition.

We talk of peace as of a thing which has only to be wished for to be secured, and not as a state of repose, which is to be enjoyed only by those who have the power and the will to cause their rest to be respected by others. No one accuses England of aggressive designs. Why does she, therefore, parade her pacific dispositions, if not to excite the ambition of others? The whole moral and material power of Europe and Asia are at the disposal of England if she signifies her intention of arresting the overflow of Russia; and with this force of imperturbable resistance at her disposal, she allows Russia to proceed to the acquisition of universal dominion, merely because she has the command of that magic word, "WAR;" while England is not only not aware that the result of a war in the East at this moment would break Russia to pieces, but that so disproportionate is the relative strength of the parties, that Russia must submit to any terms that England may dictate, whenever she places Russia between the two alternatives—her terms or war.

War is at present impossible between Russia and England,—because a regulation of England's Tariff suffices to deprive Russia of half her revenue and her nobles of all their allegiance:—because the Dardanelles are yet Turkish;—because the Caucasus is erect;—because the practical and visible union of England and Turkey causes Russia and Turkey to change places, rendering the first defensive, and the second offensive;—because

Sevastopol is *yet* defenceless; and finally because Russia can injure England only through attacking Turkey, clearly an impossibility, with England committed on the side of Turkey. We therefore conclude that a conviction on the part of the English ministry of the necessity of supporting Turkey, and a knowledge of the means of doing so, will even yet not only save Turkey from absorption, but Europe from a conflict which no one can anticipate without the darkest forebodings.

Russia, had she had it in her power when her troops were encamped on the Bosphorus, never would have retired; then it was impossible for her to have retained possession; she encamped at *the distance* of sixteen miles from the capital, with the Bosphorus *between*, the channel was commanded by thirteen Russian line-of-battle ships; the troops occupied the Giant's Mountain, in Asia, their tents so placed as to make the greatest possible display, sentries on every side forbade approach; their numbers represented as double their real amount; every precaution, in fact, was taken to guard against attack, collision, or contact. On the moment of embarkation, a breeze that had been blowing from the south suddenly failed; the most intense anxiety was the result, not only to the chiefs, but to the whole expedition. Fortunately, a light air sprung up, and carried them out of the channel. What service did not that breath of air render to the fortunes of Russia;— but for it, Nicolas would not

have had to boast of the glory of occupying Constantinople! or the greater glory of quitting it!! At that time the country was in a state of convulsion, and England and France were universally supposed, by means of her agency (a falsehood that cannot be twice available), opposed to the Sultan, and supporting Mehemet Ali.

Any number of troops Russia can suddenly and at once transport to the capital must be sacrificed if a single pistol is fired, or a drop of blood drawn; she, therefore, dare not—can not attempt to occupy until she is invited; that invitation she is now labouring to bring about by three causes, or rather sets of causes; 1*stly*, General rumours of war—of occupations spread and repeated throughout every province with a pertinacity and similarity most remarkable, producing a feeling of insecurity and alarm, arresting commerce and industry, and disturbing the action of government, and the idea of permanency. 2*ndly*, By the use she makes of her influence over the government, driving it into acts, and even crimes, that makes it despised and hated —detaching it from the other powers, and introducing administrative measures that place it in opposition with the people, their prejudices, rights, and opinions. 3*rdly*, Through the schism in the empire, and all the consequences of the hostile position of Mehemet Ali. These causes all acting together are now pushing Turkey forward with fearful rapidity to that point where all bonds of respect and government are dissolved, and revolu-

tion in the provinces, or revolt in the capital, or invasion from Egypt, or all these causes combined, will thoroughly disgust the Turks and their tributaries with the government, and the Sultan; and Russia will be called in to support the government —to protect the Sultan—to shield the people—to prevent convulsion—to arrest bloodshed—and then her intervention will be hailed by civilized Europe as an act of charitable humanity; and those who may dread the consequences will be little inclined to interfere in favour of a people that licks the hand of its betrayer and oppressor. For this,—peace, that is, the undisturbed progress of causes in action, the accumulation of the results of the treaty of protection are necessary. Russia cannot enter till she enters as a friend; and though this will soon be—the time is not yet come; and until it comes, collision is fatal to her projects.

We dread the word war—Russia makes use of the word, but dreads the *thing*. Let us grant both dread war equally; whichever country, therefore, makes an advance, or establishes a point, will secure the advantage of the other's dread of the word, or its consequences. But Russia alone understands how those steps are to be made, therefore this dread is turned solely to her account.

When Napoleon miscalculated the power Russia would acquire in the possession of Turkey, he also neglected the power Turkey did then exert, and could be made to exert, against Russia; deceived by that art that has so long deceived all Europe, he

looked on Russian power in Europe as an aggregate of native strength, and of means drawn from her Eastern possessions or position. He lay under a grave error; he believed Turkey already within the grasp of Russia—a graver error. Turkey has immensely, though silently weighed in the European balance; added to Russia, the amount exceeds all previous calculation; placed against Russia, all Napoleon's fears become shadows.

Again, while the European struggle is *allowed to appear* one of political principle, half of Europe is thrown into Russia's enumeration, and Turkey is wholly abstracted; but brought to its real issue, which a word of England does—that is, of opposition to Russian aggression, then is all that portion of Europe combined to us, Turkey added to this amount, and Russia left alone with her naked body and her exposed designs. In fine, it is reserved for some great mind, as minister of England, to ally the interests of civilization with the spirit of conservation; to disperse the gathering clouds which, in various forms, and under various denominations, menace bloodshed and convulsion; to close the gate of Janus, perhaps for centuries; to frustrate the consequences of the treaty of Vienna, to do, by a single declaration, that is, by the convictions that lead to it, and the consequences that flow from it—what Napoleon could not effect at the head of 500,000 of the finest troops on which the sun ever shone, under the first captain of this or any other age; and to put England in the position

France would have occupied had Napoleon triumphed, and been wise.

The question in its simplest expression is, shall Turkey, with its *space*, and seas, and positions, and wealth, materials and arms, be used for aggressive or conservative purposes? Is Turkey to be placed in the scale of Russia, or in the scale of England? for now it has been so violently disturbed in its proper equilibrium, that for the time being it must fall under the dominion of the one, or be stayed up by the power of the other. Strange that while Russia is straining every muscle, calling to her aid violence, corruption, deep combination, in fact, her whole known and unknown resources to place Turkey in her scale; that England not only takes no step whatever to oppose her, but even rejects the advances, and spurns the confidence of that very power on which hinge the destines of Europe and of the world, and thus continues to the last her efforts to secure to Russia all she aims at.

And under such circumstances, Russia talks of war! of being "armed to the teeth, and not inclined to be trifled with as *last year*."*

Need we a stronger proof of the universal ignorance that obscures this question, when Russia is allowed to make use of a falsehood insulting to common sense, as a menace which silences every tongue, carries every point, and—more than this, which arrests all inquiry.

* This was the tone of Pozzo di Borgo at the commencement of last year.—Alas, how changed is that tone!

EXTRACT FROM

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THE QUADRUPLE TREATY.

To whichever side we turn our eyes, a picture presents itself which is not that of peace. The Peninsula and Italy have only to be named, to call up ideas of convulsion, of struggling opinions, of opposing influences, of insecurity, and even war—the suspension of hostilities in Holland and Belgium, the existence of Greece, the independence of Sweden, are contingent only on the policy of the five great powers. These powers are all in a state of opposition—all having separate objects, distinct projects, alarms, and secrets. Prussia is making a peaceable conquest of all the small estates of Germany,—France dismembering in the south the Ottoman Empire, combining with Russia to overthrow it, combining with England to support certain principles in Spain—Austria, united in interests to England, is united by principles to Russia. Austria is opposed to Prussia's incorporations in Germany; she agrees with her in Holland, Belgium, and the Peninsula: she agrees with England in Germany and the East, but disagrees with her in Holland, Belgium, and the Peninsula. Austria

and Prussia seem to unite against England and France, yet Austria and Prussia are opposed in their most vital interests: and perhaps the action of the policy of England and France is not less at variance, whatever their principles or interests may be. Prussia, the most democratic of powers in her administration, the most despotic and legitimate in her policy, swallows up Germany by her apparent liberality, and throws into the scale of legitimacy nearly twenty millions (by acquisition in 1815 and 1835,) of the most enlightened population of Europe, and our natural and commercial allies.

Is this one of the results of our boasted modern civilization? The people who, while called barbarians, and uncivilised, for three hundred years, waged not unequal war with Rome in its pride; the people who, having combined monarchy with their municipal organisation (but still denominated barbarians), entered in triumph the capital of the world; this people, after twelve centuries of decidedly superior comfort, light, and even strength, (though divided) to the rest of Europe, is now, with its vast literature, its high intellectuality, its refined civilization—so emasculated by the centralised military, financial, and commercial system of the day, that, without a blow, without a feeling of resistance, without consciousness of the change, it has allowed the chains of the Prussian Zollferband to be wound around it, its local nationality to be lost, the spring of its energies to be repressed, and its muscle and

mind tamed by the administrative tact of Prussia to be harnessed to the political chariot of Russia. Is this condition of the German stock civilisation, and its former condition, barbarism? It is well to understand the meaning of the words; but it is afflicting to think that individual instruction and ability have of late, in so many instances, coincided with national characteristics precisely the reverse.

All substantial power has passed away from the southern and western extremities of Europe—power has migrated to the East and North, and, there concentrated, prepares for the practical subjugation of those countries that have hitherto figured in the history of the world. Spain and Portugal are null, in the political scale, their weight is great, but it tells negatively; so does Italy, so Turkey and Greece. Switzerland has lost even that importance which it had. Saxony is as if it did not exist. The minor states of Germany lie in their winding sheet—Poland in its tomb. The kingdom of the Netherlands is disrupted and neutralized; Denmark and Sweden have no strength in themselves. There remain, therefore, but the five powers— England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—who have occupied the positions of defence, incorporated in part, or in whole, or exert a domineering influence, either absolute or balanced by each other, over the other countries above enumerated.

England and France appear arrayed against

Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and the opposing principles of the two alliances appear to maintain the political equilibrium. Let us examine how the case stands.

During the twenty years of peace, France and England not only have made no acquisitions, but have been constantly and anxiously on the defensive. They have managed, latterly, to retard and to prevent some objects which the Northern Courts had in view; but on the other hand, they have both powerfully contributed, by armies, fleets, and treasure, to further the objects of the Northern Courts. France was compelled, by the threat of a war on the Rhine, to march an army into Spain to put down constitutional liberty; the fleets of England and France in the harbour of Navarin secured to Russia the treaty of Adrianople, and all its consequences: the enthusiasm and the money of England and France dismembered Turkey, to the benefit of Russia in the separation of Greece; and France was the willing and unconscious tool of Russia, in raising up Mehemet Ali against his sovereign. The political union of France and England has been sterile in commercial and practical benefits. Commercial hostility exists between them, and 60,000,000 of the most industrious people in the world, living within sight of each other, and mutually requiring what they can reciprocally supply, carry on less traffic with each other than England carries on with the remote and so termed

barbarous dominions of the Porte. Moreover, even that political union may be said to be dissolved. The power of the French nation, as a conservative weight, is withdrawn from the principle of peace and from the policy of England, and the means at the disposal of the Government of France, are added to the power of aggression, and to the policy of Russia.

Of the three states forming the northern alliance we have already shewn that Prussia and Austria are at variance between themselves; besides, their power by no means corresponds with their geographical extent, their military establishment, or the amount of their population. They are both, emphatically, governments, not nations; they are both entangled in those custom-house chains which weaken and distract a government, while they exasperate a people; they are both weighed down by an enormous military establishment, which increases the difficulties and dangers that have called it into existence, they are both so insecure, that they feel war in Europe would be fatal to them; they have therefore, in fact, already lost their independence.

Austria, during the twenty years of peace, has made no acquisitions; she has indeed—and if not as France, by dread of Russia—at least by desire of Russia, prevented the establishment of a free constitution in Naples; she does maintain a precarious influence in Italy, but she is involved in daily

increasing difficulties in her general government, in her foreign policy, and in her provincial administration. She has attempted to thwart the views of Russia, and to arrest her progress, and she has invariably failed; she attempted to reduce Greece without success; she was the means of forcing the Porte to declare war against Russia in 1828, in the hope of seeing Russia beaten—Russia was victorious. From her dread of the power and principles of France, she was, subsequently to July, 1830, led to support Russia in Turkey, and elsewhere, and to act in concert with her on the government of France. She is now startled with the fearful consequence of the prostration of France before Russia; the entire predominance of Russia in Turkey; the absolute sway of Russia over Prussia and western Germany. France before was the only *point d'appui*.—Austria assisted in subverting it—she now remains with the consciousness at once of her danger and her helplessness.

Prussia has made acquisitions during these twenty years, but it has been under the shadow of Russia, and for her ends. Prussia is the created creature of Russian policy, her subservient instrument, her delegated representative; through Prussia, Russia plays a separate game; through her she acts by principles apparently the reverse of her own; but Russia has ends, not principles, and it suits her to have a German dominion under a second name.

Russia has been the sole acquirer; she is at present the sole aggressor. During this long peace—by wars, by treaties, by intimidation, by enterprise, has this single power gone on, extending her frontiers, augmenting her population, territory, and resources, elevating her own influence, sowing dissensions among others, and what has been added to her strength and influence, has been abstracted from the means that formerly existed, and which have proved ineffectual for opposing her. She has been treated by other nations as a judge is by individuals—her acts have been considered decrees, to oppose which would be turbulence, and to support them meritorious. Peace has consisted in acquiescence in her designs. It is now an insult to the Emperor to talk of the independence of Poland; it will soon also be treated as an insult to talk of the independence of Turkey, Persia, and Austria.

But she is the only power relieved from the complications we have pointed out; her military or diplomatic superiority never could have secured her constant and successive acquisitions at the expense of all other powers, had it not been from the clear-sightedness resulting from this simplicity, while all other governments have been bewildered by complications, injurious indeed in themselves, but far more so by the intellectual superiority they have given to Russia.

We have first reduced to five the number of states that compose the republic of nations, and that

curb and control, or dispute, by their influence, Europe and the world. We have then divided those states into two opposing federations; on looking more narrowly into their position, we have found that two, France and Austria, are neutralized; that Prussia is a dependency of Russia; there therefore remain but Russia and England, which are really substantial powers.* If opposition exists, it must be between them, and if one of them does not wholly predominate, it is because the other opposes her.

Russia is a great military system, formed for conquest, made up of incorporations, under the necessity of conquering, her whole thoughts and energies bent on extension; dreaded by all men, but influencing, by a powerful agency, all governments, having daily increasing means at her disposal, to act on decreasing elements of resistance. England is a free and balanced government, without military means and without projects;—she is absorbed by the care of her vast commercial system. Her influence, by her commerce, her navies, her principle, is all-pervading—but it is influence on the people of the earth, not on the governments; she has no favour with any governments; she has no organization for external action. But the progress of principles that men dislike—the progress

* The Caimacam of Persia recently used this expression, "There "are but two flags in the world, that of England and Russia—we "cannot be under both."

of designs that nations dread—make the millions of Europe, and more particularly of the East, look to her with a low respect and fond hope, and place at her disposal the resources of the earth for conservative purposes, if she chooses to combine them; but these resources are passive, not active, and, uncombined by her intelligence, must gradually sink before the active principle of Russia.

What is Russia, so fortified, now aiming at?—Of course the Ottoman empire; and until this conquest is secured, she will veil from our eyes what the extent of her actual acquisitions are elsewhere. Until her buckler is placed at the entrance of the Dardanelles, she will be moderate in Europe—moderate in Asia—she will speak mildly, and walk softly; she will consent to argue and discuss, at Paris, London, Madrid, and Brussels,—even to admit and consent; she will foment no insurrections in Austria; she will allow Persia the semblance of independence. We, for the past, will not too curiously seek to penetrate her thoughts, to ascertain our own real position; and, disbelieving what we dread, hoping what we wish, will be lulled with the kindliness of her speech, and justify our confidence with the supposed certainty of her extension leading to weakness, and the occupation of Constantinople being the prelude to dismemberment.

But a treaty has been entered into between France and England for maintaining their influence

and principles in Spain. Strong as these governments are, especially when united, by the moral authority they possess everywhere, except among the Muscovite race itself, it was to be expected, had the alliance been productive of immediate and beneficial effects, that England and France would get a taste for acting in concert; that they would feel their own strength; and that having settled the Peninsula, they would then proceed to settle the East. It was therefore the policy of Russia to frustrate the objects of the Quadruple Alliance, to cause it to linger, and to produce difference of opinion between the governments themselves; and, as heretofore, to turn to her own account the measures indistinctly taken with the view of opposing her.

She has done this.

The union of France and England was death to the projects of Russia, if that union had been intelligent and effective; that is to say, if it prevented the conquest of the half hostile, half submissive empire that Russia is now effecting by a process cheaper, and more rapid than by armies. The union of France and England, if not directed to this end, is to her a matter of moonshine; and if it is to be, she is rejoiced that it should be directed to that Peninsula the struggles of which have in reality raised up Russia to the rank of a first rate power. She will no doubt speak loudly of her principles compromised, of social order, of

her determination to maintain the rights of legitimacy, and to resist the spirit of revolution and convulsion. Now, let us see what Russia gains by holding such langunge? (That her *feelings*, that *her* principles, are involved in the question, is a supposition that can only call forth a smile from him who has traced the agency by which Russian policy is conducted.) She establishes an important and European discussion on the question of Spain, that is, on the *West* of Germany, a discussion which touches nearly as one of principles—the factions, the people, and the governments of England, France, Austria, and Prussia, and puts them all at variance; men's minds become occupied—public interest absorbed in the affairs of Spain; she is, therefore, left to play her game unmolested in the East. England and France, seeing this opposition of the North, will think they have gained a triumph if they carry their views into operation; they will congratulate themselves with exerting some influence, with saving some prisoners in a civil broil, in a distracted country, while Russia is acquiring—let the word be weighed—ACQUIRING a kingdom equal to two Spains; or they will be frustrated in their objects, disappointed in their expectations, overawed in their policy; and not only beaten by the dexterity of Russia, but humbled before her power.

Austria, taking alarm at the progress of Russia in the East, is on the point, not only of escaping

from the influence of Russia, and of throwing her weight into the scale of England, but also of awakening England to the importance of the question, and to the danger of Europe; but by this discussion, she is again brought to the side of Russia, and placed in opposition to England. The King of the French, by mismanagement now at home, and by the line of foreign policy he has adopted, has his personal feelings engaged with Russia, and though forced to appear in the eyes of France to co-operate with England, will secretly be acting against us, seeking to frustrate the objects he seems to desire, and making Nicolas, now his connexion, his confidant.

All this while Russia, carbonaro and absolutist in Italy, at once—Carlist and republican in France —whiteboy and orange in Ireland—will she not be favourer of the niece and the uncle in Spain, as the cards may turn up? Yet while ostensibly supporting despotic principles, the party to which that ostensible Russian support is given, is strong merely in its respect for the traditionary predilections of northern Spain for the municipal institutions transmitted from the earliest ages, which are proscribed by the liberalism of modern legislative doctrines. The government, which England anxiously supports as the organ of freedom, is endangered, chiefly by its imitation of the centralised customs of France, which annihilates the freedom of commerce of the insurgent provinces; this they feel to

be injurious without knowing why, and seek support in any system opposed to that government which, by whatever names or epithets adorned, encroaches on their local customs, and interferes with their free markets. In fact, Russia becomes the advocate of national custom—England, the champion of commercial despotism.

Russia, obtaining all these ends, and calling forth this confusion, need little care how things turn, so that confusion is prolonged; she therefore gains every where: but, beyond this success, she has achieved another—she has overawed the quadruple alliance—the governments of England and France shrink from interfering—they confess their dread of Russia, and the danger and difficulty of the dilemma in which they are placed, by authorising armaments for the maintenance, by the sword, of private individuals, of the public interest, which the national government does not venture to protect. The opposition of party interest to national interest, which we have above indicated, has become organised; now, at length, it is armed—it displays its banner—it has an executive. Does not the sanction of Government, given to such a precedent, open the door to consequences of the most alarming nature—does it not confess an actual state of things, scarcely less alarming? Even the treaty of the 6th of July bore no such fruits as this.

We recollect, when the treaty of the 6th of July

was signed, between England, France, and Russia, the sounds of gratulation that resounded through liberal Europe— the satisfaction of all well-wishers of their race, to see an act drawn up between the great powers to put an end to war and convulsion in the East, and to restrain the projects of Russia, by forcing her, as we then imagined, to co-operate with us. The results are now matter of lamentable history—that act has proved in its consequences the most direful on record ; it has been the means of putting an end to all contest between Turkey and Russia, and leaves Turkey to fall a prey, without the chance even of a struggle. The quadruple alliance, now lauded and admired, may, five years hence, be looked back to as having afforded to Russia the means of sowing dissensions between the powers who had been sufficiently awakened to be on the point of concerting measures against her —of creating a confusion in the West that diverted men's thoughts from the East—that furnished, opportunely, a subject of the deepest interest in another quarter, so as to calm the alarms that were beginning to be felt for the state of Turkey.

Far be it from us to breathe a wish, to express a thought, that has not for its object the pacification and the re-organization of Spain. It is not the object we impugn, but, as in the treaty of the 6th of July, the means. Nor do we under-rate the value, or neglect the well-being of Spain, by rating infinitely higher the projects of the only aggressive

power in Europe, whose conquests and success would instantly destroy the best results it is possible to obtain in the Peninsula—whose preponderance is incompatible with the prosperity and tranquillity of Spain, as of the rest of Europe. While the fate of the whole of Europe hangs on the disposal of the Dardanelles, and while that position stands in imminent peril, is it not madness to talk of settlement or tranquillity any where? It is adorning a chamber while the house is on fire. Until that great point is settled, what matters peace; and peace you will never have till it is settled.

The acquisition of the Ottoman dominion by Russia, when it presents itself as an event about to assume the character of reality, cannot be contemplated without feelings of dismay. This practical demonstration of such immense power, by whatever means acquired, the consequence of such an accession as this to that power, terrifies the mind with its own conclusions; on such a subject, to reason is, as it were, to dream—and he who knows, is a visionary.

It is impossible to grasp this subject; its mighty results, if indeed the event we dread does take place, will be enrolled by time. In endeavouring to anticipate them, the mind takes refuge in detail, in objections, in comparisons, and turns away unsatisfied. What, in fine, can we compare it to? In contemporary history it stands alone, and swal-

lows up all other interest; in past times no event had ever occurred, no precedent, no parallel, can be found for the possession of Constantinople by the Government that rules supremely the hordes that encircle the Pole.

We will not venture to grapple with the question; but, anxious to dwell on it for a moment, we will select for refutation the fallacy, that the possession of Constantinople will have on Russia the effect the transfer of the metropolis from Rome to Byzantium had on the Roman Empire. If so false a position could be at all admitted, the comparison must be drawn between Rome when she was bounded by the Adriatic on the East and struggling with Carthage, and Russia now. What would then have been said of the same argument, held at Carthage, when *her* influence predominated in the East—her commerce connected her dearest interests with the Euxine and the Levant—and gave her the means of coping with Rome? Could any madman then have ventured to assert in a Carthaginian senate that the Roman power would be broken up by permitting Rome to possess Constantinople and the East. It was only when Carthage had perished, that Rome was able to push her conquests eastward; when she did remove her court to the Bosphorus, the East was her own; it was a transfer of internal administration, not the annexation of a hostile empire. She made that transfer to resist those very hordes, and that very

pressure from the North, that is now rolling downwards, as then, but not as then undisciplined and uncombined, yet which had succeeded in breaking the power of the eastern empire before the Turks stepped in. After the transfer itself, the superior advantages of that position, upheld her dominion for ten centuries, and until all that had co-existed with the change had disappeared from the face of the earth. Yet, then, that position, not defended by batteries and gunpowder, did not possess the impregnability which to-day is its chief importance.

Now, it is to the very danger that we look for salvation—some great necessity alone can arouse us from our inaction, ignorance, and security. The question now presents itself, as one from which there is no escape, and it is saved from the moment that England has decided. While Russia continues playing for so high a stake, and while a chance of success is open to her, no art, no expense, nor means, will be spared to convulse, to perplex Europe, to irritate principle against principle, interest against interest, government against people, nation against nation—has she not succeeded? How fearfully efficient for such ends is the power, the diplomacy, the position, and the gold of Russia —*what considerations has she it not in her power to offer to the few who may perceive, or have the means of thwarting her objects?* These are mighty evils in themselves, independently of the end to which they are the means. By arresting her projects,

you at once frustrate the end, and take from her the object for which those means are resorted to.

It is said, that the increase of the popular element prevents attention to foreign policy. It did not do so during the commonwealth; but the subject has been so encumbered, that the public does not understand it: it is, then, most essential to simplify it as much as possible. England, less than any nation, understands foreign policy by her position and pre-occupation; yet she is more interested than any other state in foreign combinations. We have hitherto generally neglected our foreign interests, under the belief that we had nothing to do with the Continent, until the misfortune to be guarded against has occurred, and made us practically feel the connexion. Our former history proves at every page this truth; and though we have been successful, we might generally have obtained success at a cheaper rate. During the present peace, we have allowed misfortune to accumulate on misfortune; and if the crowning disaster does take place, it will be out of our power, in all probability, to repair it. We have, however, within the last few months, gained a signal victory over the public apathy—and that is in the association of the word WAR with our foreign relations. This is an incontrovertible recognition of their importance; the very expression "we must "not go to war," confesses the importance of the question in the speaker's mind—proves interest,

alarm, and the disposition to inquiry—though it admits that that inquiry has not yet been undertaken, or has not been very happy. Peace is the mutual respect of two, who, conscious of each other's power and intelligence, venture not to provoke the resentment of each other; if either shows weakness or incapacity, the state of peace has ceased. The threat of war, or preparation for war, by a State not aggressive, is a guarantee of peace; but the threat of war on the lips of a Power actively aggressive, is the declaration it can only be supposed of perfect prostration of power or intelligence in those to whom the threat is addressed. If this position is the result of relative strength and weakness, or relative intelligence and ignorance, the consequences are the same, as the phantom to him who fears is as dreadful as the reality. The latter is the case with England. If the preponderance of the North were the result of real strength, then, indeed, would our case be hopeless. But, believing, as we do, that the danger will become real only in the event of this country's alarm at words, and indifference to realities, we look with confidence to the result, and with pride on the commencement of our own humble labours, in the hope of being in some degree conducive to that result, if indeed there is yet time—not the prevention of war, but something far greater—the preservation of peace, on those conditions which alone make peace desirable.

EXTRACTED FROM

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BURNES'S TRAVELS IN BOKHARA.

WHILE considerable sums have been expended in attempts to explore the most inhospitable regions of the earth for the purpose of solving abstract problems—the source or the course of a river, or the extent of an uninhabitable continent or island—the mission of Lieutenant Burnes is the first successful attempt that has been made by the British government to illustrate the geography of Central Asia. We must not be supposed to think lightly of the labours of Franklin, or Parry, or Lyons, or many of the less fortunate individuals, who, from the days of Mungo Park to the present time, have sacrificed, in Africa, lives devoted to the advancement of human knowledge. We honour the man who encounters privations, and hardships, and dangers, in such a cause; and we have no hesitation in saying, that so far from regarding the sums expended on such expeditions, when undertaken with due consideration, as an injudicious application of a moderate portion of the public funds, we, on the contrary, believe, that no equal amount has been expended in a manner tending more immediately, or certainly, to exalt the national character—one of the most important duties of a government, and

one of the most valuable results to be derived from any measures.

But while Africa and America have been explored at a considerable cost, not of money only, but of valuable lives, how comes it that Asia has been so long neglected, and that no national attempt has hitherto been made to improve and extend our knowledge of countries in which every educated man must be more deeply interested, one would imagine, than in the ice-bound coasts of Greenland and America, or the course of a river in Africa; and which, independent of these considerations, are of vast political importance to the nation that holds the empire of India.

We cannot help thinking it a reproach to us, that more has not been done to improve our knowledge of Central Asia, and that neither the interests of science, nor the demands of an obvious policy, have been sufficient to call forth any sustained efforts to put us in possession of authentic information regarding a portion of the globe which it concerns us to know well, and of which, till within a few months, we absolutely knew nothing certain. Whole regions still remain to be explored, of which we know little more than that they exist, but which we cannot prudently neglect any longer. Of Khiva, we know little—of Kokan and Budukshan, Hissar, and Durwaz, absolutely nothing; and even of the countries with which the labours of individuals have made us more familiar, how imperfect

is our knowledge. The natural history of Central Asia is a field untouched, except by Olivier, who did little more than was necessary to protect him from the imputation of having altogether neglected it. In comparative geography, we have nothing to show but the labours of Macdonald Kinnier, and Rennell, which, meritorious and creditable as they are, still leave much more to be done. The ingenious and able essays of Dr. Williams, so far from exhausting the subject, serve, by disturbing received opinions, to open up new fields for inquiry. The antiquarian researches of the French officers in the Punjab, and the active exertions of that intelligent and enterprising traveller, Mr Lewis, in Afghanistan, serve but to make us more impatient—to whet our appetites for knowledge. Let us hope that the success which has attended Mr. Burnes, and the satisfaction which his employers, in common with all his countrymen, must derive from the admirable manner in which he has acquitted himself of the task assigned him, will be a sufficient inducement to the Governors of India to pursue the course which the enlightened mind of Lord William Bentinck has chalked out; and that not content with a single effort, however successful, or the examination of a single line, or the pursuit of objects purely political, we may hereafter find the ruler of our eastern empire directing a series of scientific researches in all the accessible countries of Asia. At least let our knowledge of

the surface of these countries, of the people who inhabit them, of their resources and their capabilities, be perfected, and let us not again be told, as Mr. Burnes distinctly tells us, that the French (and we will add the Russians) have a more accurate knowledge of the countries bordering on India than we have.

That Asia, the cradle of the human race—the birth-place of all true religion—the scene of the earliest temporal greatness, and the first source of all temporal as well as spiritual instruction—a land adorned by the pomp of her great kings, in which we still tread in the path of Xenophon, and trace the march of the Macedonian conqueror by the ruins of the cities that fell beneath his arms, or sprung up in his footsteps—the field on which his successors struggled—the scene of the victories of Pompey, and the defeat of Crassus—the successes of Lucullus,—the retreat of Antony—and the destruction of Julian—of Heraclius's triumphs, and Bajazet's fall. The soil from which sprung up and spread abroad that mightiest of religious impostures, and most fruitful source of political power, which threatened to overshadow the whole earth, and still broods in darkness over her people—where the courts of the Caliphs shed lustre and learning around them, while the light of knowledge was hid from all the nations of Europe—the land that endured the atrocities of Chengiz, and the curse of Timour's sword. That Asia, every mountain and

valley of whose broad surface is planted thick with traces of all that is most striking, most instructive, in the early history of the human race, whether sacred or profane, and which teems with modern associations of deepest interest, should claim, comparatively, so small a share of the attention or the sympathies of civilised Europe as she receives, is a curious illustration of the caprice of the human mind.

Enough has not been done to give us a full feeling of the identity of ancient and modern Asia; and it is an effort of the reason, rather than an emotion of the heart, that connects in our minds the columns of Persepolis, or the towers of Rhages, with the march of the Macedonian—the ruins of Babylon with the glory of Semiramis, the victories of Cyrus, and the death of Alexander; or the mounds that are scattered on the plains of Shus, with the story of Esther, or the Prophecies of Daniel. Yet he who lingers in the shade of the Parthenon, or muses amidst the broken shadows of the Colliseum, is moved by no loftier associations than crowd on the mind of him who checks his steed in the desert, to survey the desolation of "the glory of the kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldees' excellency, which shall never be inhabited from generation to generation."

What are the wars of Hannibal in Italy, or of Cæsar in Gaul, to the conquests of Alexander? If Macedonia be classic ground, because it was the

place of his birth, how much more the Granicus, the Issus, and Arbela, the Persian and the Caspian straits, the Oxus, the Jaxartes, and the Indus, which were the birth-places of his glory ?

The growing conviction, that the most important questions of foreign policy, with which, not England only, but all the cabinets of Europe, are called upon to deal, have direct reference to the state of Asia, must give to every authentic account of any considerable portion of that continent, a value, independent of its literary merit, the scientific information it contains, or the amusement that may be derived from perusing a skilful narrative of adventures possessing in themselves no ordinary interest. The great majority of readers, however, will take up these delightful volumes, without any previous knowledge of the political importance that attaches to the countries they describe, and will lay them down without being conscious of any other feeling than the pleasure they have derived from an admirable story of stirring incidents, and an unaffected and graphic description of the habits, customs, and institutions, of nations and tribes, which are new to them, or with which, even the best informed were imperfectly acquainted. But while they are merely seeking enjoyment, they are insensibly preparing themselves to exert a salutary influence on the fate of nations, and extending to the remote people of Asia the protection which public opinion, growing from more perfect

knowledge, is capable of affording. He who has read Mr. Burnes's work, will retain some interest in the countries he describes; and should he hear or read of a scheme to overthrow their governments or subjugate their inhabitants, would perhaps not receive the intelligence with the utter indifference with which he would have regarded it twelve months ago.

It is thus that our enlightened traveller confers a benefit on his nation; and while he awakens our sympathy for a people far removed from us, prepares the way for that political and commercial intercourse, which is a reciprocal advantage to the more barbarous and the more civilised.

Even the works of fiction, which familiarise us with the domestic habits and feelings, and the historical names and incidents of the nations of Asia, have done much to attract to them the public attention, which, on more important, perhaps, but less popular grounds, they demand from us. The poetry of Byron and of Moore, the tales of Hope, Morier, Fraser, and Malcolm, have probably done more to make eastern names and eastern manners familiar to our minds, than any graver writings, and in an equal proportion have contributed to fit us for, or at least lead us to, the consideration of the weightier matters connected with the east, which are day by day becoming more and more important elements in the political calculations of European states.

Though the frontier of the British dominions in India no where touches the Indus, and does not extend to any considerable distance along the Sutlege, the only one of the tributary streams with which it is in contact, the line of the Indus must, nevertheless, be regarded as the true frontier, for all practical purposes, of the Indian empire, whoever may possess it; and the first appearance of danger from the north-west, the first threat of invasion by land, must, at any time, since our power there has been consolidated, have carried our troops to its banks and imposed upon us the necessity of occupying and commanding the resources of the whole country that interposes between our present frontier and that river, throughout its course, from the mountains to the sea. To obtain an accurate knowledge of that territory in its whole extent, and to ascertain the capabilities of the Indus, and its tributary streams, for the purposes of defence, was an indispensable duty of those to whom the government of India was entrusted. But independent of these prospective considerations, the facilities which the application of steam has afforded to the extension of commerce by river navigation, and the value of every such extension to Great Britain, made it a matter of great and immediate importance to ascertain how far the Indus might be made available as a channel for supplying with our manufactures not only the countries on its banks, but those other countries of Central Asia which had

been deterred from using our commodities to so great an extent as they would otherwise have consumed them, by the great additional cost of so long and tedious a land carriage as had hitherto been necessary to convey them to those markets.

With these two important objects in view, the public authorities, both in India and in England, were desirous to avail themselves of the first favourable opportunity that might be presented for examining the Indus; of the greater part of whose course, strange to say, we had no authentic information of a later date *than the days of Alexander*.*

The death of the Ameer of Hydrabad has already lighted up a civil war in Sinde. The chief of Bhawulpoor, too weak to protect himself, has been deprived of a large portion of his territory which he held of the Seik government, and when, in the course of nature, the talented chief of that government, now an infirm old man, shall have been removed from the stage on which he has enacted so distinguished a part, there will not remain, on the banks of the Indus, or between our possessions and that river, one chief capable of repelling, or efficiently aiding us to repel, the aggressions of any

* We ought, perhaps, to except the Voyage of Sebastian Manrique, a Portuguese Missionary, who sailed down the Indus from Moultan to Tatta, where he laid the foundation of a church, about 1712. He performed the voyage in nineteen days, in a boat which was laden with merchandise, belonging to a native of Moultan, and except an attack from banditti, encountered no difficulty.

powerful enemy; and there will no longer exist the means of giving security to commerce on any portion of the Indus or its tributary streams. Our own territories, or those of the neighbouring princes and chiefs, which we have engaged to protect, will be exposed along the whole line, as they have hitherto been from Sinde, to continual inroads from the predatory hordes, that internal discord, or a pusillanimous ruler, never fail in those countries to let loose on the peaceful part of the population. Where no established government exists, there can be no responsibility to foreign states—treaties necessarily become "a dead letter"—the lawless, the desperate, the enterprising, and the dissolute, attracted by the hope of plunder abroad, and restrained by no authority at home, reap, with their swords, a harvest where they have not sown; and preferring the excitement of such a life to the toils of husbandry, the fruits of which, by the depredations of robbers like themselves, are rendered daily more precarious, gradually convert the most fertile and populous provinces into deserts, and drive the more adventurous of the impoverished peasantry to the necessity of inflicting upon others the violence from which they have suffered, and of living by the rapine which has ruined them. Witness the condition of a large portion of the finest provinces of India during the supremacy of the Mahratta power, of Kandeish and Malwa, in the days of the Pindarees, and of almost every portion

of India at some period of its modern history, from the same causes, generated by a similar course of events.

The British government in India cannot permit such a state of things to endure, and ought not to allow it to arise. It is not enough that our troops should be ready to march against the depredators, and to extirpate the evil when it shall have become intolerable; or that we shall be prepared to interpose, and re-establish order and good government along the banks of the Indus, when they shall have been laid waste and depopulated. The political and commercial interests of England and of India, a regard to the security of our own territories, and the property of our fellow-subjects, as well as to the interests of humanity, demand, that, having knowledge and experience sufficient to enable us to foresee, and power enough to prevent, these evils, we should not permit our own position to be weakened—our frontier to be rendered indefensible for half a century to come—our commerce in Central Asia to be annihilated—the Indus to be rendered unavailable for any good purpose at the moment when its value has been discovered, and those whom we are bound to protect, to be plundered and massacred, or demoralised, and driven from their homes, because, forsooth, we must abstain from interfering in the affairs of other states, and permit every chief who can collect a hundred men, and possess himself of an enclosed village, to

contribute his share to the desolation of the country and the destruction of our means of defence against a foreign enemy, before we feel ourselves entitled to use the ample resources at our disposal for our own protection, and that of every industrious and well-disposed member of the commuuity.

We shall denounce every usurpation—we protest against every unprovoked aggression—we shall oppose, by all the means we can command, every abuse of power, every oppression of the weak by the strong; but we will not subscribe to the opinions of those who would sacrifice to a fancied theory of impracticable political morals the best interests of mankind; and call upon us to permit the growth of evils, and sanction, by our forbearance, the progress of crime and misery, which we, and we alone, can prevent, and which we know we shall at length be called upon to put down with the sword; because this kind of excuse for interfering, has *not yet* been afforded, which they are pleased to point out as necessary to justify the protection of our own means of defence, and the temperate assertion of the claims of humanity.

The first duty of the governors of British India is to ensure the safety, tranquillity, and prosperity of that country; they are as fully and equitably responsible for the evils they can and do not prevent, or remedy, as for any ills they may inflict; and they must answer to England and to India for the neglect, if, when danger

approaches, the line of the Indus should not be found to be in a defensible condition; or, if the nations on its banks, instead of contributing to our means of resistance, should not only have dissipated their own resources, but drawn largely upon our's, and become causes of disorganisation and of weakness to our allies and to ourselves. Let it be remembered, that preparations for defence are not best made when the danger against which we have to prepare is close upon us, and that all organisations in a new country are slowly matured; that the best guarantee for the preservation of peace is to be derived from maintaining an attitude and position which offers no prospect of advantage to an assailant; and that it is not enough—and this is emphatically true of our eastern empire—that a government should be strong and vigilant; it must also show that it is both, and give to its peaceful subjects not only safety, but the confidence of security.

We do not mean to assert, that an advantageous adjustment of our relations with all the states on the Indus, or even an occupation of the banks of that river, which sooner or later will be forced upon us, would comprise all that is necessary to be done for the security of India; but we do say, that in every plan for the defence and good government of that country, in every attempt to extend its commerce, and promote the prosperity and internal tranquillity of the empire, so far as these are de-

pendent on our relations with the countries to the west and the north,—a primary, a preliminary and indispensable condition, is the perfect security, so far as it can be secured, of our north-western frontier, that is the line of the Indus, and an open navigation of that river. These, therefore, are objects which must be attained.

Such is the shattered state of this once powerful empire (of the Afghans), which still contains a population of five millions, divided, it is true, by political factions, but connected by the bonds of a common language, nation, and religion, and capable of furnishing an almost unlimited number of the best and bravest undisciplined troops in Asia.

The condition of such a nation, bordering upon India, commanding the only routes by which an enemy could march to the invasion of that country, or its commerce find an outlet to the west, must always be a subject of the deepest interest to Great Britain; and if Persia should, at any time, fall into the hands of Russia, will become the only remaining barrier against the advance of that power to the Indus. Yet, up to this time, we have formed no connection with any of its chiefs, and have taken no steps to prepare the way for making it available to us as a second line of defence, into which it must, nevertheless, be converted, should we be pushed back from that which we have endeavoured, with more prudence than skill, to establish in Persia.

Even in the present distracted state of the country, while the Indus is forbidden to commerce, and the Punjab, Peshawer, and Kandahar, shut up by the exorbitant duties that are levied on the imports, and even on the transit of goods, the value of the merchandise, chiefly the produce and manufactures of Britain and of British India, that pay duty at the custom-house of Cabool, amounts to 800,000*l.* a-year, and there can be no doubt that the trade is capable of great extension. But a few years ago, the manufactures of Russia were more used in Central Asia, and even at Cabool, than our own; but now it is otherwise, and in Persia, Bokhara, and all Toorkistan, as well as at Cabool and Herat, our commodities, from their superiority and comparative cheapness, are gradually driving all others out of the market, and even superseding the native manufactures. Yet this commerce is carried on through the most disturbed and dangerous countries of the east, without the protection of treaties, or the active interposition of any public authorities.

That it is dangerous to tamper with commerce, or encumber it with help, we admit, and that the silent power of individual interests will continue to extend this trade, as it has led to its establishment, we do not question; but as little do we doubt, that the removal of acknowledged and obvious impediments—a more intimate connection with the rulers of the country, and with the people—the arrange-

ment of a more equitable scale of duties in some places—exemption from unnecessary molestation in others, and the confidence in the character and principles of a nation, which grow out of an intimate intercourse with even a few individuals belonging to it, could not fail to improve our commercial relations with the countries west of the Indus, as those relations in their turn would inevitably generate a livelier sense of mutual benefit, and a closer political connection, founded on community of interest.

It is to the influence of individual character, rather than to our political power, or the measures of our government, that we owe the reputation for fair dealing, and for honour, which often enables an Englishman to procure from the merchants of Central Asia, to whom he is an utter stranger, money in return for a bill, of which the man who purchases it cannot read a letter. When an untravelled Afghan speaks with respect of the English nation, it is most probable that the feeling is derived, either directly or indirectly, from the impression of the national character, which Mr. Elphinstone and the gentlemen of his mission have left in the country. When a Persian enlarges on the high character and qualities of the English, it is ten to one that he is painting, in his own way, the portrait of some individuals with whom he is or has been acquainted, or of whom he has heard. It is the same with the Arab. He knows little of

our nation, and nothing of its power; but his intercourse with Mr. Manesty at Bussorah, or Mr. Rich at Bagdad, has given him a feeling of respect for the people to whom they belonged. There are no men more ready than Asiatics to give their esteem to those who deserve it, however they may fail to profit by the example of him who has excited the feelings; and, like all uneducated men, they are ever prone to draw general conclusions from the few facts that come under their observation. We have reason to be proud of the reputation which our government enjoys wherever it is known in Asia; but this is not enough; and it surely would be wise to extend and improve our influence with the people of that continent, by placing in continual communication with them persons who are worthy representatives of our nation, and favourable examples of its character.

Besides affording the means of self-defence, what is the advantage of political power, and a high national character? Is it not the influence they give? But in semi-barbarous nations that influence does not grow up in an hour, neither is it matured in a day; for the knowledge of the power, and the character on which it is founded, is there imperfect, and slowly diffused. In Europe, where the resources of every kingdom are comparatively well known to all the other states, we may assume, with some confidence, that the power of a nation will give it corresponding weight and importance; but

in Asia, so few men have a sufficient knowledge of the facts, or are able, if the facts were before them, to arrive at any just conclusions on these subjects, that errors the most unaccountable to us, are daily committed by the best informed amongst them; nations, as well as individuals, are misled and deceived; and when we know that hundreds, nay, thousands, of the educated natives of India believed that our military means were inadequate to the reduction of the single fortress of Bhurtpore, unsupported by any army in the field, we have no right to presume that any accurate estimate of our strength will be spontaneously formed in Afghanistan, or Bokhara; or that our influence there, whenever we choose to exert it, will be immediately commensurate with our actual power.

While other states are studiously devising the means of extending and improving their connection with the natives of Central Asia, by employing emissaries and envoys, secret and avowed, conciliating individuals by personal favours, over-awing governments by exaggerated statements, and an ostentatious display of their power, and using every means to depreciate our character and disparage our resources and our strength, are we to wrap ourselves up in a fancied security, and trust to the all-powerful effect of truth, which we take no pains to promulgate, and which, for any thing we can tell, may never be known. The Russians (says Mr. Burnes) "have impressed the whole of the Ooz-

becks with high notions of their power, to the detriment of all other European nations; and, again, —"It is not to be concealed, that the Court of St. Petersburgh have long cherished designs in this quarter of Asia." And yet we have no intercourse of any description with these states.

The foreign, political, and commercial interests of India are daily becoming more important and more complicated, and her foreign relations must infallibly receive an extension and an organization to which they have not yet attained. The line which separated the politics of Asia from those of Europe, has been blotted out, and means must be found for assimilating and uniting their operations. The growth of our eastern empire has been so rapid, that men's minds have scarcely kept pace with it, and we have not yet fully appreciated the rank, the dignity, and importance in the scale of Asiatic nations, that attaches to the sovereignty, with far more than the power of Aurungzebe and of Akbar. The extent, the wealth, and resources of that empire, backed by our power in Europe, ought to make the influence of England paramount in Central Asia, and would make it so, if our strength and our policy were well understood; for it is our interest to preserve, not to destroy—to build up, not to pull down. But the government of India has no accredited representative at any really independent court—no organ of communication—no source of authentic information—no organised correspon-

dence with any kingdom or principality west of the Indus. While the pursuit of commerce carries the Hindoo across the whole continent of Asia, from the Indus to the heart of Russia, the British government has no means of obtaining authentic intelligence from any one of the countries he traverses.

There is no great government except, perhaps, the Chinese, that has established so few foreign connections, properly so called, as the British government in India; but the time will come, and is not now distant, when we shall be forced to acknowledge that it is not consistent either with our honour or our interest to imitate the policy of the Celestial Empire.

Central Asia, if it is not for us, must be against us. It cannot stand neutral between such powers as England and Russia. The question then is, whether, when the time of the struggle shall arrive —as arrive it will—we are to encounter Russia with all Asia at her back, or to oppose her with all Asia by our side. The power of choosing is still left to us; but how long shall we retain it?

EXTRACTED FROM

THE BRITISH AND FOREIGN REVIEW.—No. II.

EFFECT ON ENGLAND

OF THE

PRUSSIAN COMMERCIAL LEAGUE.

Memoir on the Political State and Prospects of Germany, confidentially communicated to several of the German Governments by Russia, 1834.*

We place this consideration (the union of Russia and Prussia), as a preliminary truth, of which the reader must be convinced; we beg him, if not convinced, to reconsider, before proceeding further, the reasons we have enumerated, but not developed. We insist on this point, because a perception of the connexion of the Prussian commercial system with Russian design, at once beats to the ground the vague, general notions entertained respecting that system in England, and indeed, in Europe, and which volumes would not suffice to answer in detail. Beaten, and outwitted, as we have been; baffled by her combinations, and almost shrinking before her menace; no one will be disposed *now* to despise the intelligence, or to make light of the views of Russia. No one can now

* In reproducing this article the whole of the commercial part is omitted.—Ed.

doubt the design of aggression and conquest in Russia; whoever, therefore, perceives that the Prussian system is designed by Russia, or is co-operated in by Russia, or is even suffered by Russia, requires neither breath nor ink to be convinced that it can lead neither to the *unity* of the German people, nor to the triumph of liberal doctrines, nor the increase of the power, the independent power, of Prussia; that it will not confer a feeling of union and sense of prosperity, nor, finally, a representative government, on the German people—that it will not lead to their well-being, nor enlightenment—that, in fine, it does portend no good to Germany, and can elevate no barrier to Russia; and if these propositions be admitted, the Prussian system must be considered merely an instrument in the hands of Russia.

So essential do we consider the complete and independent establishment of this point to the comprehension of the relative position of the powers of Europe; and so indispensable do we consider a just appreciation of that position to the continued prosperity, nay, the existence of this country—that we venture to produce some of the secret thoughts of that cabinet, which, for twenty years, has played off the great men and powers of Europe against each other, like black and white figures on a chess board. While we put forward our convictions, as the sole result of the considerations we have indicated, while we rest our case entirely on facts

and arguments; still, it is most gratifying to be able to adduce, in support of this conviction, the diplomatic arcana of that power, which have hitherto been enveloped in inscrutable mystery, and to be able to quote, in illustration of our argument, the expressions, cautious and formal though they be, of that man who is its chief director, and who, if the evil genius of Russia so willed it, may yet have his reputation as a diplomatist outshone by his celebrity as an author. We apprehend that the revelation of those successes, which must have overjoyed his court, that that happy appreciation of the weakness of European statesmen, and that epigrammatic sarcasm which must have delighted his emperor, would little contribute to the future success of his cabinet, or to the ends to which his transcendent talents are devoted. Before now, however, it has been the lot of genius to lend wings to the shafts of dull and nerveless adversaries!

"*La Prusse* * * * * *verroit, avec satisfaction, la* "*fin de la lutte entre La Russie et La Turquie, mais* "*elle se garde de la provoquer* par aucune démarche "propre à gêner *le Cabinet Impérial, et s'est pro-* "*noncée contre celles de ce genre proposées par la* "*cour de Vienne. Son maintien, son langage, ses dé-* "*monstrations ont été jusqu'à présent favorables à la* "*Russie, et* la crainte de le voir s'entendre avec elle "dans un cas extrême, en impose à l'Autriche et "sert à la France d'encouragement *pour la con-*

" *firmer dans les sentimens favorables qu'elle nous té-*
" *moigne. Le Cabinet Impérial a donc le plus grand*
" *intérêt de s'attacher comme il le fait, celui de Berlin,*
" *de le cultiver* et de lui faire entrevoir, que si
" l'Autriche et l'Angleterre voulaient mettre le
" statu quo territorial éxistant en péril, par une
" attaque contre la Russie, S. M. Prussienne, en
" fesant cause commune avec elle, trouverait des
" avantages, qu'elle ne saurait espérer ailleurs.

" *La notice confidentielle dont votre Excellence a ac-*
" *compagné sa dernière expédition contient les germes*
" *de ce système ; il s'agit donc de les entretenir et pour*
" *ainsi dire féconder de manière qu'ils soient prêt à*
" *se developper lorsque la nécessitè l'exigera.*

" *Dans toutes mes démarches envers le cabinet*
" *Français*, je m'attache à le tenir en bonne intel-
" ligence avec celui de Berlin. *Son représentant le*
" *Baron de Werther* s'en occupe également de la
" manière la plus zélée, *Il seroit peut-être sage et*
" *utile de* familiariser aussi la politique Prussienne
" avec l'idée *que si les événemens lui fournissent l'oc-*
" *casion de s'agrandir*, la France de son côté ne peut
" se compromettre et se battre en pure perte."

Again :—

" *L'Empereur notre Auguste Maître, este monté*
" *sur le Trône, lorsque la Russie jouissait d'une grande*
" *considération et cette considération s'est visiblement*
" *augmentée depuis son heureux avènement* * * * *
" *les Turcs amenés à signer la Convention d'Acker-*
" *mann, la Perse vaincue et rendue tributaire à la*

" *suite de ses provocations, l'Angleterre et la France*
" empressées de trouver un moyen de terminer à la
" satisfaction de sa Majesté *les troubles de la Grèce,*
" *Le prince Metternich n'ayant d'autre ressource*
" * * * * * *et* la Prusse fortifiant les liens du sang
" par ceux de la politique."

Again :—

" LA PRUSSE A SON RÔLE TOUT FAIT et les ob-
" jets de son ambition sous sa main, *et ce n'est* pas
" la Russie qui souffrira *de ses empiètemens.* ELLE
" RESTERA LIBRE D'ACCOMPLIR LES SIENS."

Here is the veil completely rent—nor can a shadow of doubt remain! We trust our case is made out, and we press the Count for no further testimony. We have to remark, that the despatch from which the latter extract is made, bears the date of Dec. 10, 1828, *six years previous* to the accomplishment of Prussia's "rôle," the present commercial league.

But while France has systematized the opposition of Napoleon to our commerce, *and connected the necessity of that opposition with the constitution of French power and administration,* Prussia and Russia have made a similar opposition a part of gigantic political designs. Russia, the power which most materially contributed to the frustration of the designs of Napoleon, now takes thelead in the establishment of a similar system of restriction, the basis of which is—that immense portion of the surface of the earth which is her own ; and the means of

which are—the army, the diplomacy, the commanding and domineering influence of that rapidly-extending empire, wherever her mandates can command submission, or her influence—respect.

Again, it must be borne in mind, that as it was by contraband traffic that England caused the cheapness of her produce at that period to tell on Napoleon's system, there were some geographical points, the possession of which, then, was of the utmost importance, but which have no importance under these changed circumstances, and in time of peace. These points are, Heligoland and Malta; the first was a station for smuggling, very useful when our vessels could enter no port of the northern continent; the second was of importance, as the centre from which our intercourse was maintained with the coasts of Turkey, which, though politically combined against us, yet, by her principles of free trade, gave passage through her vast dominions to the produce of the looms of England, which were thus presented with the greatest facility on the coasts of the Adriatic, the frontiers of Hungary, Transylvania, Poland, and Russia. In our calculations of future combinations, we cannot neglect the chance—and unless a decision is taken of a preventive nature by England—the certainty of the occupation of the Dardanelles by Russia.* In that

* Though we here treat the German branch of that universal question—Russian Policy, yet, in our mind, inseparably connected with her progress in the west is her progress in the east—these our

case, it is incontrovertible that we shall remain without the possibility of counteracting, even by those extremities to which we resorted against Napoleon, a continental system of exclusion, which has become a systematic object with all governments, whatever their political predilections, which has found favour in the eyes of the whole continental public, and in which Russia might be induced to take the lead, even if no previous design existed on her part; or if the major part of those very circumstances had not been brought about by the ability and success that have characterised her long, unremitting, and systematic efforts.

Having stated these general considerations, in the hope of awakening reflection on the relations of England to the continent, on the elements of her prosperity during peace, and on her means of coercion in war, we shall now address ourselves to the Prussian system itself; we shall point out, first, the considerations that predisposed the public mind of Germany to submit to the system, and then endeavour to trace its consequences, if allowed to run on peaceably and uninterruptedly, as leading to the political aggrandisement of Russia, to the political prostration of Germany, to the separation of Germany from all connection with England and France, and to the serious injury of the commerce of Great Britain.

alarms for Germany will not be realised, if anything retards the accomplishment of her designs in Turkey—and *vice versâ*.

Still, all these means and inducements might not have been sufficient to bring the small states of Germany to join in the Prussian system. The Prussian system has not been discussed in this country; or rather, the discussion of which it has been the object, has tended to mislead. We have become familiarised with the fact, without appreciating its decisive character, the labour necessary to bring it about, or the facility with which, at that time, it might have been counteracted. When first mooted, it was considered in Germany as tantamount to an invasion by arms; it would have been resisted as such, had not words been used instead of bayonets. It now is tantamount to a conquest by arms, and more important, perhaps, to Prussia, than if arms had been the means she used. It is, therefore, well worth the sacrifice of three millions of thalers, which the first year has cost her.

Prussia had gained to herself a name for liberality among the nations of the earth; her administration was decidedly the most perfect among the centralised systems; she disencumbered her land and her labourers of feudal prerogatives; she had struck a beautiful coinage; established systematic weights and measures; made good roads, and collected the younger portion of her population in schools: she had formed, in fact, a system, which would look the prettiest and most attractive from without; and which, governing, as well as she possibly could do, take away even the chances of self-

government, and therefore of nationality, which are afforded even by the abuses of a central authority. Add to this, the military conscription, which, by compelling every youth of Prussia into three years' service, unsettles his mind for the duties of his station; takes from his mechanical life those first years of apprenticeship and instruction, and leaves him afterwards with all the feelings of a soldier—want of thought and confidence in himself, and subserviency to the mandates of authority.

The aristocracy of Prussia had been levelled before the sweeping reforms of her scientific administration; but that body was replaced by no intermediate estate, possessed of political influence or privileges. The nation, freed from vexations of almost all kinds, and left with little cause of complaint, scarcely felt the want of local protection, because the control of the government agents was perfect; but it is weighed down by grinding taxation—by an insupportable military establishment—and the capital accumulated by industry generally finds its way into government securities. The tendency of the whole system is to divert men's minds from politics, and to render them subservient, not from fear, but by inclination, to the despotic sway under which they are placed. The object of the system, is to combine as much intelligence and efficiency as are safe and practicable with the principle of passive obedience. The march of the administration of Prussia is not to guard the nation, but the

dynasty, against the consequences of the caprice of a future tyrant.

Such is the use to which the schools have been applied—they elevate the character of the mass of the people, and give them that turn of mind and submissiveness, which the government seeks to inculcate. By the word instruction *we* are impressed with the idea of citizenship, of independence of character and of mind; but that word is as various in the idea it conveys, as "Man," "Government," or "Thought." Instruction and education are very generally diffused in China. In Saxony, the country the most advanced in Europe, a Jew is a proscribed being; he cannot even reside in the city where the greatest number of books in the world are published—Leipsic. In Persia, which certainly would not be taken as a model of government, education is more advanced even than in Prussia. Is it not by "instruction" that every fanaticism in religion, every despotism in politics, is established? Were the inquisitors not instructed? Are the tools of despots, their troops, not instructed? Is it, therefore, "instruction" (reading and writing, among other things), that renders a nation free and independent, or base and enslaved, as that instrument is used? How idle is it, then, to suppose that Prussia must achieve independence, because she has innumerable schools to inculcate submission; yet to fortify that species of nationality which is contempt or hatred of others, the government em-

ploys the pride of knowledge; the Prussians are taught to despise and look down on all other countries. When to this is added the diversity of the populations of which Prussia is made up—French, Sclavonic, and Germans, we may perceive how precarious is the existence of this state; and we may shrewdly guess the causes which have led it to make these extraordinary experiments in government. Prussia stands proud and erect; but her height is not that of a solid construction; beneath there is a hollow arch, which stands by the keystone alone, and the keystone here is of very fragile materials.*

But now how natural seems the policy of Russia—she raises up Prussia,† a power, at that period,

* "Prussia may be taken as an example of nearly every defect that can attach to a state of her importance. Touching both France and Russia with her frontiers, she rests on no natural outline towards the south, and is only in part backed by the sea on the north; and that, perhaps (from other causes), is the least secure portion of her dominions. All that she possesses beyond the Rhine and the Oder, is held by that frailest of tenures—the pleasure of her neighbours. What national feeling, what common spirit, can be supposed to animate the inhabitants of Treves Memel? What would it signify to the Duchy of Pozen, if Westphalia were invaded to-morrow?

"Let her beware of stretching her eagle wings over a French, or *a Sclavonic population*, lest they be clipped some day, and her lofty flight be turned into a downfall. Most states could preserve themselves by a defensive system, but Prussia requires an offensive war for her own security."—*Thoughts on Foreign Policy*, *p.* 7.

† It need not be repeated here, that, at the Congress of Vienna, Prussia numbered but 5,000,000 souls, and Russia insisted, and car-

reduced almost exclusively to her Sclavonic population, to such a height as to be the rival, and, therefore, the antagonist of Austria; she thus gives her at once a voice, and a casting voice, in the congress at Vienna; she makes use of her as *an independent agent* in all the diplomatic negotiations of the last twenty years, and all this while her liberalism, her power, and activity, are directed for the furtherance of a scheme, now realised, to put the small German states in the position of the remainder of the Prussian population, that is to say, under the legitimate control of a government and a dynasty subject to Russia, and, therefore, in the impossibility of entering a French or Austrian coalition; increasing the power and influence of Prussia, to be used for the furtherance of the views of Russia; augmenting her armies, which may be used for the same ends; and, finally, leaving a people, among whom opposition to France and England has been systematized, among whom their local feeling of nationality has been abolished, to be gradually sunk by administrative means, backed by the bayonets of Russia, to that level which seems to have been fixed upon as most conducive to the real happiness of mankind.

Is it to be expected that Hanover, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, could form a counter-league? It would be mere waste of words, to en-

ried her point by the menace of war, that Saxony and Denmark should be dismembered, to raise up Prussia to the rank of a first-rate power.

deavour to show that the thing is impracticable; and, if practicable, that it would be useless. Within the sphere of possibility, there were but two ways, by which the extension of the Prussian system to the whole of Germany—to the whole of the states not French or Austrian, could be prevented, and that was—by the annexation of the Austrian customs of the states bordering on her frontier, to the French of those on the Rhine.

However little such objects might accord with the ancient policy of Great Britain, still do we conceive, considering that one and a new source of danger alone menaces Europe, that such a thing, if possible, would have been tantamount to the prevention of the accession of so much influence and power to that sole ambition which causes the embarrassments of Europe.

But the thing is impossible, the influence and credit of Austria have been receding in Germany gradually, but steadily. Her system of customs is intolerable; but, above all, Austria is not possessed of that internal power which Russia alone, and under her auspices, Prussia possesses in the present age—*that of forming a design.* If such a thing had been possible, not only would Saxony never have been forced to join the league by a menace, but the league would never have existed at all. In the same way, with respect to France: an anti-French feeling has been growing east of the Rhine—an anti-revolutionary feeling amongst a great portion of the people and amongst the princes; and a spirit

of animosity and hostility has been instilled into the whole mass of the Germans by the commercial intolerance and restrictions of France; so that no German state could have sought, or found, or ever could have dared to seek protection, or support commercially from France, against the Prussian system. Consequently, we see Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of its Chambers, quietly acceding to the league, without even consulting France on the subject.

But among the states which have not been drawn in, but which necessarily must fall into the league, unless the peace of Europe is violently disturbed, there is Belgium, Catholic in its creed, and more or less French in its speech, its manners, habits, and feelings; may not this state be included in the French custom-house system, or even be annexed to France. And what would England gain by the annexation of Belgium, or the subjugation of the Scheldt to the customs of France? Who amongst us would not dare the worst, to avert such a consummation as this? Yet how far more desirable is it than the other alternative—still, that other alternative is inevitable. It is true, the French nation is restless for its extension to the Rhine; but the causes that brought the French army back from Antwerp, will maintain, with the strictest watchfulness, the most inviolable frontier, between the Belgian territory and the French. The King of the French and his family, and the majority of

the Chamber of Deputies, are interested in forests, coal measures, iron mines, iron works, cotton mills, &c., the value of the whole of which would be sensibly diminished, if the barrier between the frontiers of Belgium and France were swept away; and, therefore, it is clear, under the existing order of things, that there is no chance for Belgium's escaping from the vortex of the Prussian system.*

* The ink of this paragraph was positively not dry, when we took up the *Times* of the 12th of September, and read as follows:—

"Brussels, September 9.—The question on the proposed law for imposing prohibitory duties on foreign cotton manufactures, is still undecided."

In the report of the debate we have—"Let us oppose prohibition to prohibition—it is evident we have nothing to expect from France, if we do not adopt prohibitory measures. *If France will not consent to a system of reciprocity, let us join the Prussian league.*

"The Minister of the Interior *allowed that it was necessary* to modify the Tariff, in order to prevent the importation of foreign cottons.

"The Minister of Finance did not entirely approve the measure proposed, and, in fact, *remained neuter.*" Are such things credible?—"The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, that he had received a note from the Prussian Government of the same tenor as the notes from France and Switzerland." That is, an interchange of threats.

"Of these goods, England may be supposed to supply at least 25 millions, or about one million sterling; it consequently is against her, that the proposed Tariff is principally directed.

"The Reporter supported his general arguments *by recurring to the prohibitive system so long in vigour in England.*"

Running along the line, to the next column but one in the same paper, the eye comes upon—

"It appears that the Ministry have some idea of prohibiting the

Holland will be affected more or less by the same causes that affect the states similarly placed; as to her foreign traffic, she will be placed in the same position as the Hanseatic towns. Her predilections are already with the framers of the league, she is the second subject of the great northern potentate, and the advantages or necessities of such a connection are rendered ten-fold greater by her separation from Belgium.

The breasts of the mountaineers of Switzerland can oppose no resistance to custom-house invasion —the Alps can afford no protection against custom-house blockades. The industry which had fled from the despotic commercial atmosphere of Austria and Prussia, and especially of France—the arts and the workmen of Lyons, which had found refuge from fiscal persecution among her free-born

importation into the Castiles of the manufactures of this province (Aragon). Should they adopt this measure, the people here will at once proclaim their independence."—Where will this madness cease?

Again, we have Copenhagen, 5th September—

"The Commissioners appointed to draw up a new system of customs for Denmark, have completed their labours. The chief object of the law is to abolish all the existing privileges and exemptions of certain districts and persons, but for which an indemnity will be given."—*English Paper, Sept.* 12.

This means, that restrictions being but partially introduced before, they must now be equalised; and Holstein, like the Basque provinces, must, in the name of liberality, and, as the result of legal liberty, be deprived of their commercial immunities!

mountains, have transplanted thither an industrial prosperity, which has grown with surprising rapidity, which, instead of awakening in her neighbours a sense of honourable competition, has inspired them but with ignoble cupidity, and the vindictive desire of crushing a well-being, which they affect to consider filched from themselves.

By this prosperity has Switzerland been rendered dependent on foreign markets, and, consequently, on the regulations of foreign custom-houses; hitherto her sole legitimate, and therefore, important exportation, was to Germany.—"Will Switzerland also be brought into the league?" If, four years ago, it had been asked, "will Germany be brought into the league?"—what would have been the answer?

If the present progression is allowed to go on—if the projects, whatever they may be, of the two northern powers, are not thwarted—if peace continues—we do anticipate the junction of all these states, in a few years, to the Prussian commercial league; but then it is to be borne in mind, that whatever comes to retard the consummation, frustrates the calculation, and may lead to its total failure. Yet these political considerations are only of a secondary importance; the first and important point is the investigation of the question. If it appears, that if it can be satisfactorily proved, as we think it can, that this system will lead to an immediate, and great, and dangerous development

of the power of Prussia; that it is designed by Russia for the purpose, in many direct and indirect ways, of subjugating the whole of Germany to herself; if it can be proved that the system itself will be most ruinous in its not very remote consequences, that the moment it has succeeded in uniting Germany into one, it will cause it to be broken violently asunder; if these projects can be established, and the proof of them brought home to those whose co-operation in this scheme, or submission, or indifference, have hitherto assisted its progress, we think that much will have been effected towards frustrating the designs of the two courts. But many and various are the denominations of those to whom these convictions must be brought home, before such results can be expected from them: first, as most interested, the German public; then Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland; the public and government of France; the public and government of England.

At midnight, on the 1st of January, 1834, the internal barriers between sixteen states were knocked down; we were present at one of those festal assemblages, for such they were, within a few miles of Leipsic, and in witnessing the enthusiasm and vehement expression of their hopes, we reflected with a deep feeling of melancholy on the convulsions that might take place, or the civil blood that might flow, before Germany could be brought back to that simple state of mind and institution, from

which it now, in the fulness of conviction and of hope, had taken its departure. Nor was this all, a darker picture presented itself from without, than any internal troubles could offer—the various, the comprehensive means of progress resorted to by Russia, and the consequences to Europe and the world.

Sixteen states are thus added to the Prussian system, and agglomerated around her disjointed and unconnected territory. Hanover,* Mecklenburg, and Brunswick, still deeply indenting the new system; since then, Baden and Nassau have joined; Frankfort-on-the-Maine, if it has not joined, is on the point of doing so; and the necessity of junction, is becoming to the other states daily more apparent.

The league actually consists of

	Population.
Prussia . . .	13,250,000
Bavaria . . .	4,300,000
Wurtemberg . .	1,700,000
Saxony, (Kingdom) .	1,600,000
Do (Ducal Government)	700,000
Baden . . .	1,300,000
Nassau . . .	375,000
Hesse Cassel . .	700,000
Hesse Darmstadt . .	770,000
Frankfort on Maine .	55,000
Other small states .	600,000
Total	25,350,000

Extending to 8,200 German square miles.

* Hanover has recently concluded a commercial treaty with Brunswick, which makes provision for the event of one or both joining the Prussian League in 1841, or previously.

It will make Germany indeed one, but that unity, we fear, will be no less disastrous to the parts of which it is composed, than to the general interests of the European community of which it is a member.

It is needless to enter into elaborate argument, to show that the various states composing the union will pass, or have virtually passed, under the dominion of Prussia; from the moment that Prussia collects and distributes the revenue, she places herself, not in the position of a feudal sovereign, whose revenue was received from his vassals, but in the position of a proprietor who distributes the means of existence to his agents and dependants; she has withdrawn from the various states of Germany the only constitutional elements which they possessed, the control of the Diets over the expenditure, and their intervention in the collection of revenue.

Prussia's custom-house collectors,* her roads, weights, measures and coins, extended throughout the twenty-five millions, now composing the union, will soon be followed by her laws, by state paper,

* It may be said that the collectors are not Prussians, but a Prussian Inspector examines, and controls, of course, each separate custom-house system. The Prussian Inspector has not weight merely as the representative of the supreme government, but is regarded with a public confidence which singularly contrasts with the contempt in which the notoriously venal agents of the custom-houses are held. Each state, before transmitting its portion, reserves a portion for its expenses of frontier and collection.

state loans, and finally by conscription; and even at this moment, were the peace of Europe to be disturbed, the federation would fly to arms at the bidding of Prussia, assemble under her banners, be paid by her from the common treasury, and obey her generals.

Such are the political results of this system; Germany methodically and permanently opposed to France, and Prussian Germany hostile already to Austria, raised to an equality of power, which soon must produce collision, and this at a moment when the last necessity exists for union against Russia, when Russia is pressing on with rapidity to the realisation of her gigantic designs, in all of which, and at every point, Prussia has showed herself a willing assistant and a useful instrument.

This it is (the dread of war) which has inspired capitalists in the country, which must be the arena of every European struggle, with a dread of fixed investments. Not only has war given to England the command of the seas, and of the commerce of the world, but the dread of war during twenty years of peace has been the chief prop of her manufacturing superiority. And while England sacrifices every political advantage, and encourages every hostile design, by the terror she avows for that word "war," she knows not that under her own actual system of finance, confidence in the prolongation of peace would be the sacrifice of her external prosperity.

That confidence in the prolongation of peace would not only lead to the investment of foreign capital in manufacturing enterprises, but would scatter the enormous superabundance of the capital of England to raise in every part of the continent not only rival manufactures but rival shipping—that is to say, would hasten the transfer of English capital to the continent, for those ends; a transfer which has already commenced, and which is now proceeding to an alarming extent. We refer to the evidence taken before the Committee of Shipping and Manufactures. We could supply other instances, from our own experience, but reserve this branch of the subject for discussion in a subsequent number.

Fortunate, perhaps, has it been for England, that the wild speculations of 1825, and the seventeen millions sacrificed in South America, have relieved her of some of that superfluity of wealth which, if not thus uselessly lost, might have been noxiously employed in increasing the powers of production of rival manufactures, or in supplying means to the northern powers, which would have hastened the consummation of their hostile designs.

Such are the circumstances under which the continental system is again to spring to life.

"The revolutionary spirit against the commercial despotism of England has acquired such strength by means of this German confederacy,

that a successful resistance is now as impossible as it would be inexpedient.

"Year after year, some of the markets of Europe, and of America, will be successively closed against the produce of her industry.

"New worlds cannot again be called into existence; and of the trade of vast and distant countries, which is exclusively enjoyed by England, a large portion will be found to be dependent on our friendly relations with our nearest neighbour on the continent of Europe.

"The fatal depression produced by the operation of the continental system is still in the lively recollection of England. Colonial and American produce, the return for our manufactures, became absolutely without value; nor is it forgotten that in these unpropitious years, the only advantageous outlet to the redundant produce of our colonies and manufacturing industry, was to be found in the precarious contraband trade with the continent. The rough and brutal system of Napoleon has given England a practical lesson on the one side, of her dependence on the market of Europe, for the prosperity of her trade; on the other side, of the impossibility of forming any system, either continental or insular, which is at variance with the interests and feelings of mankind.

"The same feelings which roused the continent to evade, and at length put an end to the system of Napoleon, will now, under altered circumstances,

unite her in opposition to the principles of England by which she conceives herself to be aggrieved."*

The author of the able pamphlet, from which this extract is taken, was seated at Hamburgh, and saw merely the German side of the question; what would he have said had he combined the German with the Russian—the commercial with the political—the eastern with the western question? If he had anticipated the opening of a direct trade with India, through the Turkish dominions; if he had known that in Turkey free trade did exist; that that free trade which *had* frustrated the continental system of Napoleon, and that opposes the commercial schemes of Prussia and Russia *now*, was placed in jeopardy by the dangers of Turkey, and must be extinguished by the predominance of Russia over the Porte?

If the Prussian federation alone (supposing it undertaken in opposition to Russia, as he in common with the rest of the world has hitherto supposed it,) furnished him such grounds for alarm, what would he have said of the occupation of the Dardanelles by Russia? But, possessor of Constantinople, Russia's means of influence, of menace, of action, are brought home, with indubitable success, to Italy, Piedmont, and all the Levant, even if our influence in Spain

* "Remarks on the averages of Hamburgh, and on the commercial policy of Great Britain towards Russia and other northern states," p. 50.

prevails. Now, how will this political influence affect our commerce? France, our political friend, is our commercial foe; and the Dardanelles once closed against us, we do not see what spot of Europe but the precarious Peninsula, exporting Belgium, and Sweden, and Denmark, our decreasing customers to the amount of 500,000*l.*, may not be combined very soon against us. A combination which interests us, in exportation and importation, to the amount of 30,000,000*l.* per annum.

On reviewing this question, there is one point which affords us satisfaction, and supplies us with hopes. If Russia, in annexing new conquests to her dominions, threw open their harbours to traffic, encouraged emigrants, conciliated merchants, and favoured agriculture, not a voice would have been raised against her aggrandisement; and if the governments of England and France, jealous of her political power, had had energy enough to endeavour to keep her within bounds, they would have been assailed with the indignant reproaches of popular philanthropists. She might thus have gone on, from progress to progress, hailed by the enemy, whose positions she was turning, disguising the use to which she destined them, until they were wholly in her possession. Is it not then some consolation, to think that she shows her true colours, and unmasks her real designs? Look at the facts!

The transit trade of Georgia has been cut off. The opening prospects of traffic with the eastern

coast of the Black Sea have been cut off. Poland has been annexed to her empire and commercial regulations—its commerce is cut off. The Prussian system extends to twenty-five millions of our best customers. We *may* find new worlds and new markets; and supposing we *do*, is that a reason for neglecting the old? But these commercial schemes have hitherto been counteracted, and still are so, by the free trade system of Turkey, our dumb and neglected ally. A road through Turkey was opened for English manufactures into Austria and Russia—it is so still; a road through Turkey gives passage to the transit trade arrested in Georgia; the communications of the Black Sea paralyse the restrictions of Russia and Russian Europe. What will those restrictions become, when those straits, that territory, are her's, and when she no longer requires to wear the mask of moderation?

If it be asked, in the real spirit of conviction, and of useful apprehension, "What *now* is to be done?" we answer, "Take up a position, without an instant's loss, against your political foe, and diminish, with the least possible delay, the burdens that press at home on the sources of production." Russia's progress—Prussia's system, must very soon withdraw England from that state of mental decay—indifference; the danger and recompense are both before her—both of sufficient magnitude to awaken all her energies; and the first so certain, as to lead assuredly to the second.

POSTSCRIPT.

THIS article had already passed through the press, when the "MEMOIR;" the title of which is placed at its head, was communicated to us. We have not hesitated to place the title of that document at the top of a Review on the Prussian system —first, because we have no work amongst the *ex-parte* statements that have appeared, which takes a correct, or professes to take, a comprehensive view of the subject: and, secondly, because this most remarkable document so entirely corroborates and illustrates the views we have taken of the Prussian system, that we cannot but seize with avidity the support and confirmation thus accidentally furnished to us—support the more remarkable, as proceeding from the mouth of Russia herself, and the more eagerly accepted by us, as coming in support of opinions formed on other grounds, and of views already in print.

This document will soon be laid before the public, who will then be able to judge of it. The points it seeks to establish, and to impress upon the German governments, are briefly these:—the weakness of the German federation internally and externally—the opposition between the governments and the people—the baneful influence of French opinions over the people—the state of sub-

jection of the governments to one or other of the two great German monarchies.

"In the memorable crisis of 1821, as in that much "more important one of 1830, the states of Ger- "many, in their assembly at Frankfort, showed "themselves powerless and incapable, especially "in their external relations. Austria appeared to "overrule them on the south by means of her ma- "terial force, while Prussia extended to the north "a moral domination."

The revolution of France and of Poland, the "*Memoir*" proceeds to say, had produced a fermentation and excitement of the public mind in Germany, which ran into excesses alarming to the liberal party itself, and thus gave a handle to the Diet, opportunely seized, for the application of vigorous and decisive measures, which, while they obtained the desired end, acquired for the Diet, internally, new considerations and importance. These events also gave to it an external character of new political authority, manifested by its support of Prussia, in her military demonstrations on the Moselle.

It then traces the consequences to be drawn from this new power acquired by the Diet, and the advantages which were to be reaped *from* this victory —of the governments over internal opposition— of German feeling over French predilections. It divides the question into two heads.

"The first: what direction shall be given to the

" general exchange of ideas, between the states of " Germany ?"

" The second; what are the facilities to be af- " forded to, or the barriers to be raised against, the " material communications between the German " states ?"

As to the first question, it shows that all the German states, with the exception of Austria and Prussia, are constitutional; it admits the difficulty of subjecting those constitutional feelings to the principles of either government; that the case is hopeless, as regards *bigoted* Austria; but that the *liberal* character of Prussia, at once the guardian of protestantism, the model of administration, and the patron of science, might succeed.

With regard to the second question, which refers exclusively to the Prussian commercial system, it admits that Prussia, in 1832, had been the object of hatred to all the liberals in Germany, in consequence of her then projected system of customs, which, " as they asserted, must annihilate " every commercial freedom in Germany, and ex- " tirpate industry in the smaller states." Although it admits that the constitutional governments, even after giving their adhesion to the Prussian system, " found themselves placed in the most embarrass- " ing situation, with respect to their deliberative " assemblies," yet it informs us, though with marked reserve on this head, " that Prussia had " found means to cut short these difficulties."

The drift of this first portion of the document is to impress on the different governments a sense of their insecurity with respect to their subjects, of insecurity with respect to France; to impress upon them the necessity of the support, *not support only but direction, of a supreme power*—to show them that power could not be Austria, and to lead them to the conclusion, that the Prussian system alone could protect them against the two dangers which had already menaced Germany—"the first "brought about by the enlightened of Germany, "and their abstract ideas; the second, by the lower "classes from their material wants." Prussia's system of education was the only corrective for the first—Prussia's commercial system the only remedy for the second. "If," says Russia, "Adam Smith, "in his Wealth of Nations, says that 'money is "power,' how much more truly may that be said "in the present age, of public opinion—still is "that public opinion very easily led, and it easily "yields to the direction given to it. *The means by "which it is led, are the instruction of youth, and the "press—an enlightened government will not forget "these.*"

Here, then, is the fullest confirmation of the fact which we have laid down—the connexion of Russia with the Prussian system. We will extract from this document a few passages in illustration of the foregoing article; but we must first conclude

the abstract we have commenced, of its objects and its contents.

After showing that the German states must rally round Prussia, it proceeds to show that all commercial restrictions are obnoxious and injurious—that the Prussian system, useful for the moment as rallying Germany under one banner, must soon produce material effects so contrary to the habits and interests of the combined states—so injurious to their feelings of nationality, that they must ultimately break away from the Prussian league; but *that, in the mean time, if war takes place* (which war can only be that of "enlightened," "scientific," and "moral" Germany and Russia against the "barbarous liberalism" of France, and the "commercial despotism" of England), that the military power of Germany must be concentrated and disposed of, not according to old and antiquated routine, but "*according to the decision that shall be "made known from Berlin.*"

If, however, *peace is prolonged*, the Prussian system must be broken up, which will lead to the establishment of a system of which the Diet of Frankfort will be the centre and director, a system having a German tariff and a German code of laws.

"We have already said that this Prussian in-"fluence will also disappear more and more when "a German education, a German code, a German

" tariff, will be adopted throughout Germany, under " the protection of the Germanic Diet. But this will " not happen soon enough to prevent Prussia from " developing new forces, so as to be able to over- " come that inequality of influence on Germany in " opposition to Austria. Prussia must consider, with " respect to the system of customs, the strength " that the Diet will acquire by its opposition to her, " for Prussia is to expect from the Diet a much " more powerful opposition than from the cabinet " of Vienna. This may lead the cabinet of Berlin " into efforts to break down and weaken the poli- " tical power of the Diet; but happily for Ger- " many, Austria, from the same reason, will en- " deavour to increase its force, and prolong its " duration."

What a wonderful web is here wove; the alarms, the hopes, the sympathies, the antipathies of each and all, called into her service, and used for her ends. And have we not seen the results? Insulation of state from state—doubt, bewilderment; well may Russia speak of the power of public opinion, and of the facility with which it may be directed!

But the "*Memoir*" has shown us that the Prussian system will have given Prussia strength, which will raise her materially to the level of Austria—it does not follow out the consequences of such a struggle; but it gives Austria to understand that opposition to the Russian protectorate of Germany

"*might hasten the moment when the Sclavonic and* "*Latin portions of the Austrian monarchy would so* "*far reassert their national existence, that its German* "*character would be entirely absorbed.*"

However, in the mean time, the opposition between Austria and Prussia, and their mutual jealousies, will elevate the Diet to this high standing; but still that the dangerous neighbourhood of two such powers, who would unite in opposition to the Germanic body, from the moment it assumed a substantive form, would necessitate the dependence of that body on some *great and powerful foreign government.*

That the future fate and destiny of Germany, therefore, depended on the election, from the present moment, of that foreign protector. The list from which their choice was to be made was small—FRANCE—RUSSIA.

The memory of the Germans is then refreshed on all the wars and treaties of the last eighty years, to show them how fatal had been the influence, how hostile the power of France; to remind them how benevolent had been the intentions, how beneficent the policy of Russia. There is one liberty taken with history by this authoritative document which we cannot pass over wholly in silence, and it is the proof of her moderation which she draws, and which is the climax of all her arguments, from her rejection, out of regard to the interests and independence of Germany, of the splendid offers made to

her by Napoleon, if she would but allow France to be supreme over Germany. That prize offered by Napoleon, and rejected by Russia, being no less than the DARDANELLES and the OTTOMAN EMPIRE!

"Europe"—such, says the "*Memoir*" was the language addressed for several years by Paris to St. Petersburgh — "Europe, is she not large "enough for two masters?—let but Russia abandon "to us the western family, and she may deal with "the eastern family according to her pleasure. "Then, when the fitting time shall have arrived, "will there be nought to do, save to trace the grand "frontier line, and the nations of Europe, relieved "by the extirpation of inconvenient intermediary "members, from all collision, rivalry, war, and "other causes of alarm, will enjoy, under the "shadow of two absolute sovereigns, eternal "peace."

"If Russia had yielded," it then triumphantly demands, "to the spirit of these suggestions: if she "had been devoured with the thirst of aggran- "disement which France is so mendaciously for- "ward in reproaching her with to-day (though "then she offered the enticing cup with so much "persuasive softness), what would now be the des- "tiny, we say, not of the whole of Europe, but of "Germany? Austria struck to the ground by the "peace of Presburgh, Prussia by that of Tilsit, lay "powerless; it neither was from Austria, nor from

" Prussia that Germany could expect salvation and " deliverance."

Now the very magnitude of this question—the very brilliancy of the light thrown thus unexpectedly upon it, have a tendency to obscure its truth.

The reader, on perusing the extract we have just quoted, may be expected to exclaim, if he is acquainted with the fulness of the falsehood of this assertion—" What barefaced effrontery! What " Machiavelian policy!" This is not the point of importance. The practical conclusion to be drawn from this circumstance is, the superiority of Russia over the other states, exemplified by *her* making use of, and *their* being influenced by, a statement ridiculously false.

The conversations of Napoleon at St. Helena have laid bare the policy of that period, and exposed the views of Russia. His wonderful forethought gives increased splendour to his fame, and affords a new illustration to his intentions. These revelations have received a remarkable confirmation in a speech of M. Bignon, pronounced in the beginning of 1834, in the Chamber of Deputies. That speech has produced an effect on the state of Europe of which the author himself may be very little aware. We quote the following passage:

" In 1808, immediately previous to the interview " of Erfurth, at that period of strict intimacy between " the cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburgh, a period

" in which the ambition of the two emperors " frankly dispensed with every show of hypocrisy, " Alexander insisted, with incredible vivacity, on " the total partition of the Ottoman empire, which " Napoleon resisted. To tempt the French cabinet, " the offers of Russia were immense. Beyond the " unreserved abandonment, by Russia to France, of " the Spanish and Italian Peninsulas, beyond the " admission, as a right acquired, of the ascendancy " of France over Germany, she allowed Napoleon " to choose from the greater portion of the Turkish " empire what would be most convenient—Albania, " Bosnia, the Morea, and the islands (to which " Napoleon himself adds Syria and Egypt). She " even offered to furnish troops for their conquest. " But on the other hand, in the lot of Russia, " Alexander required *Constantinople and the Dar-* " *danelles.* He declared that 'Constantinople will " 'be for me but a provincial town—geography " 'gives it to me.' As to the passage of the Dar- " danelles, he said, '*It is necessary that I should* " '*hold the key of my house.*' Although Napoleon " was then completely bent on Spain, and although " he attached the utmost importance to the Russian " alliance—important, not only against England, " but also against Austria, which was then arming— " the demand appeared so exorbitant, that he " never would agree to it."

M. Bignon then proceeds to show, that the objects of Russia have not been diminished, but that the

equivalents that could be offered to France have exceedingly decreased in value. He rejects the idea of any shadow of equivalent being found in a partition of the Ottoman states. "Is it not to be "feared," he says, "that a portion of the compen- "sations must be found elsewhere, at the expense— "for instance—of the *Germanic* and Italian na- "tions?"

This speech nearly coincided in date, we believe, with the confidential communication of this "*Memoir*" to the German Governments. We may leave the reader to infer the effect.*

* In the prosecution of so complicated a scheme, many such *contre-temps* were to be expected. This was a signal one. We have recently had another. The articles in the *Frankfort Journal*, about the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, while just at the same time the treaty itself and the secret article were published in England. For several months the English press has addressed itself to the Russian policy with an intensity, an energy, and a resolution, perfectly unparalleled. Why has Russia remained speechless? At length her thunders have been let loose, and the occasion is instructive. The *Journal des Débats*, important from its official character, had given a series of articles on the pamphlet, "*England, France, Russia, and Turkey*," adopting unreservedly the views there set forth. The *Débats* quoted, as a text, from that pamphlet, "*Pour défendre la Turquie il faut l'occuper.*" The position was untenable and absurd, and consequently the *Journal de Frankfort* shows it no quarter. It, however, turns out that the passage above quoted was mistranslated for "*The defence of Turkey must precede occupation*," meaning that Turkey must be internally strengthened, to prevent *Russian* occupation. If the mistake of a translator thus arouses the indignation of Russia, why does she not address herself

But from Europe, thus wonderfully mystified, let us turn for an instant to Turkey. There, indeed, Russia may boldly assert that her former opposition to Napoleon was solely with a view of preserving the Ottoman empire; that her opposition to England now, has the same object. She has every means, every opportunity, of establishing belief; she has made the acts of all Europe, or the interpretations she has been allowed to give them, confirm her assertions. The impassable barrier of language has placed under the control of Russia, Turkish and European opinion in their action on each other. The Turks take little interest in European discussion, and receive on credit the notions instilled by her agents, whether these agents be nominally her own, or those of other powers in her pay. One of the first lights that burst through this ominous darkness was the speech of M. Bignon. The moment of its arrival in Constantinople, coincided with an epoch of extreme excitement and alarm, produced by the first remonstrance against the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The universal conviction of the Turks was, that England would—could only answer that deed by broadsides at Sevastopol; and a southerly wind having succeeded

to the *original?* After all, this is but an opinion. In that pamphlet there are *some facts which she ought to commence with disposing of.* Let her silence on this score, and her violent attack of an accidentally false position, be put together.

to one of some duration from the north, expectation was wrought to the highest pitch. The more advanced and commanding eminences were thronged with many, who, without concert, thought they might be among the first to hail the sight of a squadron on the sea of Marmora, on which, as it neared the channel, they might distinguish and welcome the British flag. This public disposition, of course, excited the utmost fears of Russia, and no doubt was made use of by her to awaken all sorts of apprehensions in the mind of the Sultan, and to confirm his dispositions of confidence in the power and the intentions of Russia, the natural result of the political events that had gone before. Russia's influence, however, had been effective only on the seraglio, the tone of which was at that moment deeply Russian, while the capital, the public, and the army, proclaimed aloud their antipathy for the Muscovite, and their longings for the arrival of the squadron. At this moment (the 5th or 6th of February, a memorable day) the speech of M. Bignon arrived. To say that it passed from hand to hand, from mouth to mouth, of the inhabitants of Constantinople, may not surprise, however unprecedented the remarkable event. But two hours after the arrival of the courier, an abstract in Turkish and the whole of the passage above quoted found its way into the palace, and was laid before the Sultan. It was read and re-read. The only words that escaped his lips, when he recovered the

sense of being in the presence of witnesses, were, "*Is it* REALLY *so?*"

We shall now quote some passages from the "*Memoir*," as notes to the article itself; and if, on the one hand, we are rejoiced at receiving this subsequent confirmation of every word which we have said, on the other, we are gratified that this essay has preceded the publication of the Russian memoir, the drift of which, covert and insidious, as from its objects and application it necessarily must be, might not have been fully appreciated—the true sense and the real intentions of which might have been misinterpreted and misunderstood, even while the other errors, regarding historical facts and general opinions, might have been fully exposed.

"As the princes of the small constitutional states "of Germany are pressed upon by the encroach- "ments of their national assemblies, as Louis XVI. "by the National Convention, they recall to their "mind this grand and memorable example, *they* "*have admitted* the connexion between their future "existence and the licence of their chambers, and "both are for them a question of existence or non- "existence. These princes, therefore, yield their "aid themselves to Prussia, to bridle the liberty of "their representative assemblies; and, in yielding "voluntary obedience to the general decisions of "the Diet, they only submit themselves to the ab-

" solute exigences of the times. Thus it is to be " presumed, in future, if peace continues, that the " principles of Prussia, above all, in as far as the " exchange of political ideas is concerned, will be- " come common to the whole German federation, " excepting Austria; and, therefore, will the pro- " gress of the human mind, and of *burgher* civiliza- " tion, be maintained within tranquil and fixed " limits. So, also, will the Diet have acquired " a large intellectual basis, which combining the " whole intellectnal force of the confederation, " will raise it above each individual state. The " influence and the power of Prussia will neces- " sarily pass, in a great degree, to the Diet, and " that with a remarkable profit for the *ensemble*. " For each little German state will thus save its " moral independence, and will appear as a mem- " ber of a whole, and not as a minor under the " guardianship of a federative government."

" During the peace —Instead of increased eco- " nomy, we have had increased expenditure; and " during a pacific period the government debts, " instead of diminishing, have been augmented in " most of the German states, and this greatly in- " creased the general discontent so peculiarly " manifested in 1830 and 1832. This increase of " debt appeared incomprehensible, and most of the " governments themselves were troubled by it. " They made projects—drew up plans of reform—

" changed that which existed—established that " which did not—and the only result, after all, " was excess of expenditure over revenue.

" It was not, however, the departments of justice, " nor of education, nor of police, not even their " military establishments, which created these " difficulties for all the minor states. These diffi- " culties sprung from the finances themselves, their " system of administration, and their custom-house " regulations. But that which irritated most their " subjects, was that this enormous expenditure, " with the view of protecting commerce, only " served to incommode it. The secret of all these " unfortunate results, was principally the false re- " lations that had, in this present time, been intro- " duced between production and consumption."

" The small states of Germany, and therefore " the majority of the Diet, see then, clearly, " that their existence, as separate and inde- " pendent states, can be guaranteed neither by " Prussia nor Austria; and that even as regards " their internal organization, the protection of " Austria and of Prussia will always have a pre- " judicial effect; for whatever differences may exist " between the different German states, they are, " nevertheless, unanimous and agreed in that they " would remain free German states, and become " neither provinces of Austria nor Russia. The " Diet will, therefore, most willingly accept the " guarantee of its constitution, on the part of a

"great foreign power. Its choice, as we have "already remarked, can only be between France "and Russia." * * * *

"Here France can by no means be considered "as a guarantee, but an adversary, menacing the "Diet and the confederation; hence at this time "the interests of the federated states of Europe are "divided, according to a theory of national prin- "ciple, on one side of which are placed the con- "stitutional revolutionary governments, and on "the other, the monarchical legitimate govern- "ments; and since the German confederation, "from the elements on which it is based, belongs "to the latter, it can then not only not attach itself "to France, but it is forced, from its monarchical "and legitimate principles, to join itself in alliance "with the three great powers that represent these "principles. * * * If then, in the case of a pre- "ponderance on the part of Austria or Prussia, "which threatens oppression, it should be under "the necessity of calling upon France or Russia in "its defence, it will be compelled to accept of "Russia as such, seeing it cannot put itself in op- "position to its principles. * * * Thus it is that "the necessities of the Diet, as well its internal as "external relations, concur in proving that Russia "must be the protector of the Germanic confe- "deration.

"The Russian empire, at the moment of its en- "rolment among the principal powers of Europe,

" already possessed, as the basis of its power, all " that a state of the first rank may desire or seek, " and more than others had acquired, after ages of " successful efforts. Its immense extent, its insulated " position, the law of the state, its great military " resources, and the fear with which it inspired its " neighbours, all gave it a degree of power and " security of which no European state, with the " exception of France, could boast; for no state " was a continual influence over the relations " and interests of others less a real necessity " than for Russia, and yet it would be difficult to " find one which possesses, within itself, so many " different and precious means of securing, without " the least violence, the most important connexions " with all the nations of Europe, and of opening " the sources of a great, transcendent, and yet " pacific influence."

In the following extract, the projects of Russia will be seen as clearly developed as language can explain them. She tells us that the complications —that the opposition of doctrine, and of interests, have put parties within the states, and states between themselves, at variance. And that men and governments being thus distracted, neglect external politics, and open a career of the widest ambition to any one power capable of taking advantage of these chances. She admits her incapability of playing this game single-handed, and almost takes credit for having furnished Prussia with a

histrionic helmet and lance, to perform this second part.*

" The principles upon which every state reposes " the relations of friendship, and political alliance " —have experienced, in our day, a remarkable " change. France and England, naturally at en- " mity, are now in alliance with each other. Eng- " land quits her ancient and most faithful ally—Hol- " land. Austria abandons Switzerland, and Prus- " sia becomes the ally of Russia. Wonderful poli- " tical phenomena. Since, on this account, the " states no longer follow the policy which their " geographical position and natural interests point " out, but are influenced in their alliances by prin- " ciples of theory—the political balance upon which " the European system has for so long reposed, has " become sensibly weakened, and in its place there " has arisen a system of political counterpoise in " that which concerns the principles of states.— " *By these means the predominance of one great power* " *has been considerably facilitated.* It is not easy " to admit, that Prussia can soon, of herself, gain " a preponderance over Austria. Nevertheless, " what Prussia may be incapable of effecting alone, " she may be enabled to accomplish, *as far as re-* " *gards the rest of Germany*, with the assistance of " *a great foreign power.*"

With respect to the authenticity of this docu-

* We beg to refer to the view we have taken of this important question in our previous number, in the article " Quadruple Treaty."

ment, or others quoted in the body of the article, we have not a word to say—the reader, according to his lights and his intelligence, will judge them. Unless Russia challenges their authenticity, we think no one else will be disposed to do so; *we fear* Russia will *not* challenge them. Russia has, of late, reserved her powers of eloquence for the statement of her own case; she has not ventured to attack, save when she found an accidentally false position.

Not one of the least curious means of influence employed by Russia, developed in this paper, is the air of superiority and supremacy which she has succeeded in assuming—she seems invested with the infallibility of superior intelligence, with the might of irresistible power—intelligence, so lofty as to descend on mankind only in charity and benevolence—might, so superior to all human objects and struggles, as to manifest its existence, alone, in shielding the friendless, in protecting the oppressed. Is such, then, the state of public mind in Germany, and can Russia really venture to tell them to their faces, that "they have turned their "eyes toward Russia, to look for a saviour?"

The fact of such a paper being drawn up, is not one of the least important at this critical period. The views, the arguments, the falsehoods, the truths, all of the utmost consequence, and revealing, if words can reveal, the precariousness of the peace of Europe, the extent of the projects forming

under the garb of peace, and the conquests, not which Russia is making, but which the intelligence of two or three foreigners, forming the secret councils of Russia, are now achieving over the interests, the opinions, and the policy of the great mass of civilised Europe—that mass which is wealthy, and thinks not of acquisition—which is powerful, and takes no precaution—which is industrious, and dreams not of rapine—which, in its learning, ease, and contentment, thinking no evil, credits no evil designs in others.

The publication of this document, will awaken, we believe, an attention for which the public mind of Europe is somewhat prepared; and, independently of the effect of awakened attention, the mere fact of the revelation of a secret project suffices to frustrate it.*

* Besides the revelations already made use of, or hinted at, there is another of some importance. Despatches purloined from the desk of M. Nagler, Minister of Prussia at the Diet, and published some months ago at Strasburg, under the title of "Authentisce Aktenstücke aus den Archiven des deutschen Bundes." Prussia has succeeded in buying off the editor, and in buying up the edition—that is to say, *all but* succeeded. We trust this article is in time to reach Toplitz just after Russia has taken up and divulged her positions. The prospects here developed for Germany, are indeed encouraging. Austria will have additional reason to congratulate herself. To France we wish joy of the task of reconciling the language she will here find with the words that have beguiled her monarch. Prussia may see in the consequences of these exposures the means of preserving for *herself*, the powers which Russia has conferred upon her for *other ends*. It would be well for the cabinet of England "*to familiarize the cabinet of Berlin with this idea!*"

We wish ill to no country—nay, we wish well to Russia. As a manufacturing country, we ought to have no predilections, nor can we have antipathies without very sufficient cause. The only object of the foreign policy of England, besides the prevention of hostile designs, is to promote individual well-being and national prosperity throughout every portion of the globe, so as, on the one hand, to obtain large markets for our manufactures, and on the other, to obtain large and numerous supplies of raw materials. Russia, unfortunately, has got a monopoly of the supply of many raw materials, and, political designs apart, must look with dissatisfaction, nay, with alarm and dread, at every indication of progress in a producing country. The home interest, that connects the well-being of mankind with the thoughts of England, connects the misfortune or subjugation of mankind with the thoughts of Russia. Hence an aversion in England to war, even against her, her most active foe: hence, in Russia (amidst the universal aggression which forms the history of our times)— the "Memoir" of which we are more particularly treating. But endurance, like prosperity, has its limit. We are sorry that Russia has forced England to be against her, and, we think, she has made a serious miscalculation; she has mistaken the patient endurance of England for cowardice and weakness, not considering that equanimity and reserve betoken but firmer decision and increased energy, when the

hour of indecision has passed away, and that of determination has arrived.

We cannot conclude this article, which now has extended to so many various and important subjects, without taking notice of one very grave fallacy, which Russia has succeeded in disseminating throughout the Continent, and in various quarters where correcter opinions ought to prevail, that is, the supposed unprepared state of England for going to war. We do not say, that this supposition is too absurd to answer. Russia appreciated its importance, or else she would not have taken the trouble she has done to disseminate it. For the consideration of those whom it concerns, we make the following observations.

England never was so well prepared as at the present moment for going to war. Her army has been kept efficient throughout this long peace, which never was the case before. Her navy, increased in positive strength, is still further increased in relative strength, and leaves no possible balance on the seas to the power of England if war takes place at the present moment. The foreign possessions, the military and naval stations, the fortresses occupied by England, now double her military and naval strength, by the present efficiency it gives her at so many various and remote points.

Her finances are more capable of meeting the exigencies of war than ever they were before.

Her revenue increasing, with reduced taxation.

The public fortune rapidly increasing.

A low rate of interest, and enormous amount of floating capital, immediately available for the purposes of war, and this is the root of the whole question.

They talk of England's debt, and by talking of that debt as a means of preventing war, they confess that the means of war and success, lie in the financial resources of England. The very exultation with which the debt of England is referred to, unmasks their own conviction. England's debt IS enormous—her resources are MORE SO. EIGHT hundred millions ARE absorbed in Government Securities. CAPITAL CAN ONLY FETCH TWO AND A HALF PER CENT. Government wanted 20,000,000*l.* for a special object; it was raised without difficulty; almost without observation: it influenced the price of no stock—it was not even quoted as an instance of the vastness of the resources of England! What would have been the result of the former war, and what its duration, had England then financially been in the condition which this single fact establishes?

It is the very innate conviction of strength in England which permits the periodicals and the debates to run wild in predictions and assertions of the most extravagant nature, in support of sectional views; it is a conviction of her strength which has caused public discussion to assume a tone of party,

and to lose the character and feeling of nationality; and thus one of the most striking proofs of confidence and strength has been taken on the continent for a confession of alarm and weakness.

The commercial relations of England are extending in the east, in the west, in the south, every where but in the north.

A war can interrupt none of those relations—a war can endanger no territorial possession of England—exposes her to no aggression or invasion; and, supposing war with the whole of Europe, it gives her the command of the seas, and of the commerce of the continent itself, because a war is the death-blow to those commercial projects, those manufacturing means which have already occupied so large a portion of this article. To other powers, war, either as means of carrying a design into execution, or as the means of preventing any hostile design—is a mere instrument, painful in every case to use, and detrimental in itself, whether the object be gained or lost. To England, a war opens *up positive advantages*, independent of the object. But of these advantages a commercial nation, occupied in the progress of hourly transactions, would never dream unless they were forced upon her.

In short, England by a war, with whatever power, or with even all the powers of the continent together, loses no one element of her greatness; and a war now would give her the same impulse that the last war did, and still further would have done,

had there not been the spirit of a Napoleon to rule the storm. But war in Europe can only be (until the Dardanelles are Russian) *between* England and France. *If these nations are not opposed*, there can be no balance between the contending parties, and therefore no war, except of words and threats, can take place.

But in this hypothetical fiction of a war with Russia alone, need we talk even of such considerations? An empire that can be blockaded with a couple of squadrons—an empire that can be ruined by a slender discriminating duty in our tariff—a power, the basis of whose influence and progress is falsehood and deception, and which, therefore, can be beaten down by a mere statement of facts. A conqueror who holds the better part of his conquests only while we choose not to display our hostile pennants in the Black Sea. Is this the power, before venturing to speak, to which we have to reckon over our strength? Is this the power which ventures to proclaim to Europe that England is unprepared for war?

We have alluded to the means of coercion which we singly possess, without firing a single gun. But what are the means Russia has to attack us? Would it be a descent on our coast? Will it be the attack of Corfu, or Gibraltar? Will it be the blockade of the Humber, the Mersey, or the Thames? Will it be the bombardment of Chatham,

or Sheerness? *Where* can Russia touch England? *What can* Russia do, we should like to know, against England? And supposing she could beat and humble us, does she not want money for the purpose? Where can she get a loan? There are but three marts where a loan can be negotiated, London, Paris, and Amsterdam. France must be with England; Amsterdam must be with France and England, or with Russia. If with us, Russia will get no credit there: if Holland is with Russia, her ports are blockaded, her commerce is cut up; she is at once in a state of bankruptcy.

Russia may injure an ally of ours—Turkey—that she is now proceeding in with the utmost activity. A war is the salvation of that ally; and the continuance of peace alone affords Russia the means and chances of success. Russia may get possession of the Dardanelles; that possession will be the prize of peaceful intrigue; and if peace is necessary to Russia, because she is not prepared to go to war—if peace is necessary to her, because she is vulnerable in her commerce, her acquisitions, her communications, and her character, by a mere hostile demonstration on the part of England—peace is no less necessary to her, for the gradual repression of the spirit of nationality in Turkey—which now, in any collision with Russia, *must be supported by England*, and where, consequently, Russia can succeed *only by preventing any collision from taking place.*

Let the English public read and reflect on the following ominous words, addressed by Russia to the German states.

"From the instant that they," speaking of Austria and Prussia, "are not sufficiently strong "to prevent the smallest or weakest member of the "league from being injured by the insolence or "violence of a neighbour, from that moment their "throne is shaken to its foundation. Away, then, "with every thought of insulated prosperity!— "away all culpable indifferences with regard to "foreign dangers!—no neutrality, no backward- "ness, in a question of this importance—never and "in no case, and least above all, when the tempest "of the west of Europe assumes so menacing a form, "and whilst its shocks tell upon all the old states "of Europe! Nowhere let there be indifference, "and least of all in such an alliance of states as that "of Germany! The apprehension of Austria and "Prussia, of being led by this policy (the only true "and noble policy) into interminable disputes, and "a war without aid with France is pusillanimous, "and can flow but from a false philanthropy, or "from disgraceful weakness or indolence. The "greater the care and severity with which these "powers pursue, even to its inmost core, every in- "justice and every violence that France may "commit against Germany, by so much the less "will they have to deploy their forces against her

"on the field of battle. The more that France "sees them ready and instant, the less will she be "inclined to provoke them."

THE END.

NORMAN AND SKEEN, MAIDEN LANE, COVENT GARDEN.

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